This article examines initial-condition dependence and initial-condition uncertainty for climate projections and predictions. The first contribution is to provide a clear conceptual characterization of predictions and projections. Concerning initial-condition dependence, projections are often described as experiments that do not depend on initial conditions. Although prominent, this claim has not been scrutinized much and can be interpreted differently. If interpreted as the claim that projections are not based on estimates of the actual initial conditions (...) of the world or that what makes projections true are conditions in the world, this claim is true. However, it can also be interpreted as the claim that simulations used to obtain projections are independent of initial-condition ensembles. This article argues that evidence does not support this claim. Concerning initial-condition uncertainty, three kinds of initial-condition uncertainty are identified. The first is the uncertainty associated with the spread of the ensemble simulations. The second arises because the theoretical initial ensemble cannot be used in calculations and has to be approximated by finitely many initial states. The third uncertainty arises because it is unclear how long the model should be run to obtain potential initial conditions at pre-industrial times. Overall, the discussion shows that initial-condition dependence and uncertainty in climate science are more complex and important issues than usually acknowledged. 1Introduction2Projections and Predictions 2.1Predictions2.2Projections3Initial-Condition Dependence 3.1Projections 3.1.1Dynamical conditions justifying independence of initial conditions?3.1.2What projections can and cannot provide3.2Predictions4Initial-Condition Uncertainty 4.1Projections4.2Predictions5ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

This article attacks “open systems” arguments that because constant conjunctions are not generally observed in the real world of open systems we should be highly skeptical that universal laws exist. This work differs from other critiques of open system arguments against laws of nature by not focusing on laws themselves, but rather on the inference from open systems. We argue that open system arguments fail for two related reasons; 1) because they cannot account for the “systems” central to their argument (...) (nor the implied systems labeled “exogenous factors” in relation to the system of interest) and 2) they are nomocentric, fixated on laws while ignoring initial and antecedent conditions that are able to account for systems and exogenous factors within a fundamentalist framework. (shrink)

It is often said that the world is explained by laws of nature together with initial conditions. But does that mean initial conditions don’t require further explanation? And does the explanatory role played by initial conditions entail or require that time has a preferred direction? This chapter looks at the use of the ‘initialness defence’ in physics, the idea that initial conditions are intrinsically special in that they don’t require further explanation, unlike (...) the state of the world at other times. Such defences commonly assume a primitive directionality of time to distinguish between initial and final conditions. Using the case study of the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics and the so-called ‘past hypothesis’ — the hypothesis that the early universe was in a state of very low entropy —, I outline and support a deflationary account of the initialness defence that does not pre- suppose a basic directionality of time, and argue that there is a relevant explanatory asymmetry between initial conditions and the state of systems at other times only if certain causal conditions are satisfied. Hence, the initialness defence is available to those who reject a fundamental direction of time. (shrink)

I discuss two case studies from classical electrodynamics challenging the distinction between laws that delineate physically possible words and initial conditions. First, for many reasonable initial conditions there exist no global solutions to the Maxwell‐Lorentz equations for continuous charge distributions. Second, in deriving an equation of motion for a charged point particle one needs to invoke an asymptotic condition that seems to express a physically contingent fact even though it is mathematically necessary for the derivation.

Those who think of some aspects of the world as "physically necessary" usually think of this kind of necessity as being confined to the general law of nature, initial conditions being "contingent." Tachyon theory and general relativity provide independent but related reasons for thinking that some initial states are, however, "impossible." And statistical mechanics seems to lead us to conclude that some initial conditions are, if not impossible, "highly improbable." We are then, led from these (...) aspects of physics to wonder if initial conditions are always "freely specifiable" and in the domain of physical contingency. (shrink)

The Newtonian universe is usually understood to contain two classes of causal factors: universal regularitiesand initial conditions. I demonstrate that,in fact, the Newtonian universe contains no causal factors other thanuniversal regularities: the initial conditions ofany physical system are merely theconsequence of universal regularities acting on previoussystems. It follows that aNewtonian universe lacks the degree of contingency that is usually attributed to it. This is a necessary precondition for maintaining that the Newtonian universe is a block universe (...) that exhibits no temporal development. It follows also that Newtonian physics is inconsistent, since a Newtonian universe as a whole exhibits some properties – such as the total mass of the universe – that are not determined by the laws of Newtonian physics, and that must therefore be considered contingent. (shrink)

For the generalizations of thermodynamics to obtain, it appears that a very ‘special’ initial condition of the universe is required. Is this initial condition itself in need of explanation? I argue that it is not. In so doing, I offer a framework in which to think about ‘special’ initial conditions in all areas of science, though I concentrate on the case of thermodynamics. I urge the view that it is not always a serious mark against a (...) theory that it must posit an ‘improbable’ initial condition. (shrink)

I review the present status of the problem of initial conditions for inflation and describe several ways to solve this problem for many popular inflationary models, including the recent generation of the models with plateau potentials favored by cosmological observations.

The cosmological theory of the author, discussed in (Greben in Found Sci 15(2):153–176, 2010 ), has a number of implications for the interpretation of initial conditions and the fine-tuning problem as discussed by Vidal (Found Sci 15(4):375–393, 2010a ).

We critically analyse the point of view for which laws of nature are just a mean to compress data. Discussing some basic notions of dynamical systems and information theory, we show that the idea that the analysis of large amount of data by means of an algorithm of compression is equivalent to the knowledge one can have from scientific laws, is rather naive. In particular we discuss the subtle conceptual topic of the initial conditions of phenomena which are (...) generally incompressible. Starting from this point, we argue that laws of nature represent more than a pure compression of data, and that the availability of large amount of data, in general, is not particularly useful to understand the behaviour of complex phenomena. (shrink)

This paper concerns the meaning of the idea of typicality in classical statistical mechanics and how typicality is related to the notion of probability.

Dynamic approaches to understanding probability in the non-fundamental sciences turn on certain properties of physical processes that are apt to produce “probabilistically patterned” outcomes. The dynamic properties on their own, however, seem not quite sufficient to explain the patterns; in addition, some sort of assumption about initial conditions must be made, an assumption that itself typically takes a probabilistic form. How should such a posit be understood? That is the problem of initial conditions. Reichenbach, in his (...) doctoral dissertation, floated a Kantian solution to the problem. In this paper I provide a Reichenbachian alternative. (shrink)

Some of what is true about the world is thought, by some, to be true of necessity. Other truths about the world are merely contingently true, it is said. Next we get a familiar distinguishing of necessity into its various kinds. Anything whose contrary would contradict the laws of logic is logically necessary. Anything compatible with these laws is logically contingent. There are, of course, grave problems in finding a principled way of discriminating the logical truths from all the others. (...) Some propositions are not logically necessary but are metaphysically necessary. For Kant, I suppose, the alleged facts that every event had a cause, and that in any change a substance remained unchanged would be such facts. So, I suppose, would be the necessary but synthetic truths of geometry and arithmetic. For more contemporary philosophers genuine identity statements, either singular or general, might have such a status. (shrink)

In a recent article, L. Angel ([2001]) argues that if we do not implement Newtonian physics adding to it a certain usual type of boundary condition, then this leads to the rejection of what he calls the P principle: ‘the composition of contact interactions does not create a noncontact interaction.’ Here I shall demonstrate that this conclusion does not follow. However, as will be made clear, this in no way diminishes the interest or importance of the model introduced by Angel (...) in his paper. 1 Introduction 2 The ‘impact without contact’ argument 3 Taking self-excitations seriously 4 Some interesting implications. (shrink)

In a recent article, L. Angel ([2001]) argues that if we do not implement Newtonian physics adding to it a certain usual type of boundary condition, then this leads to the rejection of what he calls the P principle: ‘the composition of contact interactions does not create a noncontact interaction.’ Here I shall demonstrate that this conclusion does not follow. However, as will be made clear, this in no way diminishes the interest or importance of the model introduced by Angel (...) in his paper.1Introduction2The ‘impact without contact’ argument3Taking self‐excitations seriously4Some interesting implications. (shrink)

If the block universe view is correct, the future and the past have similar status and one would expect physical theories to involve final as well as initial boundary conditions. A plausible consistency condition between the initial and final boundary conditions in non-relativistic quantum mechanics leads to the idea that the properties of macroscopic quantum systems, relevantly measuring instruments, are uniquely determined by the boundary conditions. An important element in reaching that conclusion is that preparations (...) and measurements belong in a special class because they involve many subsystems, at least some of which do not form superpositions of their physical properties before the boundary conditions are imposed. It is suggested that the primary role of the formalism of standard quantum mechanics is to provide the consistency condition on the boundary conditions rather than the properties of quantum systems. Expressions are proposed for assigning a set of (unmeasured) physical properties to a quantum system at all times. The physical properties avoid the logical inconsistencies implied by the no-go theorems because they are assigned differently from standard quantum mechanics. Since measurement outcomes are determined by the boundary conditions, they help determine, rather than are determined by, the physical properties of quantum systems. (shrink)

(i) Inferences from the (assumed) truth of the asserted sentence. Hearers may have conditional beliefs (if p, q) and upon hearing p asserted they can infer q by Modus Ponens (with suitable caveats about the reliability of their initial conditional belief and the new information that p).

Takes up the questions of the initial bargaining position and the initial factor endowment, raised in Chs. 6 and 4 respectively. We reject James Buchanan's identification of the initial bargaining position with the outcome of non‐cooperative interaction, and John Harsanyi's identification of it with the threat point. Instead, we argue that, as the basis of market and cooperative interaction, it must rule out all taking of advantage—bettering oneself through worsening the situation of others. We term this condition (...) the ‘proviso’, deriving it from Robert Nozick's interpretation of Locke's insistence that in acquisition, one leave ‘enough, and as good’ for others. We show how the proviso constrains directly maximizing behaviour, and we then demonstrate its role in introducing a structure of individual rights to person and property, rights that define each person's initial bargaining position and factor endowment. We show that the proviso satisfies our standard of impartiality, and why rational persons would accept the proviso, as part of a narrow interpretation of compliance with the requirements for cooperation. We show that cooperation in the absence of the proviso tends to be unstable, and to depend on ideologies, entrenched historical factors, and differential technologies, all of which undermine the equal rationality of persons on which an impartial morality depends. (shrink)

In recent years, the fight against money laundering has emerged as a key issue of financial regulation. The Wolfsberg Group is an important multistakeholder agreement establishing corporate responsibility principles against money laundering in a domain where international coordination remains otherwise difficult. The fact that 10 out of the 25 top private banking institutions joined this initiative opens up an interesting puzzle concerning the conditions for the participation of key industry players in the Wolfsberg Group. The article presents a fuzzy-set (...) analysis of seven hypotheses based on firm-level organizational factors, the macro-institutional context, and the regulatory framework. Results from the analysis of these 25 financial institutions show that public ownership of the bank and the existence of a code of conduct are necessary conditions for participation in the Wolfsberg Group, whereas factors related to the type of financial institution, combined with the existence of a black list, are sufficient for explaining participation. (shrink)

Equal freedom is the common starting point for most contractual theories of justice from Hobbes and Rousseau to Rawls. But while equal freedom defines a common starting point for these theories, this does not result in a general consensus on the conception of justice. On the contrary, different ways of conceptualizing the contractual starting point leads to different conceptions of the demands of justice. To fully understand the relationship between equal freedom and justice we therefore first need to explicate how (...) and why the initial condition of equality is transformed into demands of justice. In this paper we discuss how this transformation takes place in the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls, with particular emphasis on the vexed relationship between motivation and justification. (shrink)

Noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has become widely available in recent years. While initially used to screen for trisomies 21, 18, and 13, the test has expanded to include a range of other conditions and will likely expand further. This paper addresses the ethical issues that arise from one particularly controversial potential use of NIPT: screening for adult‐onset conditions (AOCs). We report data from our quantitative survey of Australian NIPT users' views on the ethical issues raised by NIPT for (...) AOCs. The survey ascertained support for NIPT for several traits and conditions including AOCs. Participants were then asked about their level of concern around implications of screening for AOCs for the future child and parent(s). Descriptive and comparative data analyses were conducted. In total, 109 respondents were included in data analysis. The majority of respondents expressed support for NIPT screening for preventable (70.9%) and nonpreventable AOCs (80.8%). Most respondents indicated concern around potential harmful impacts associated with NIPT for AOCs, including the psychological impact on the future child and on the parent(s). Despite this, the majority of participants thought that continuation of a pregnancy known to be predisposed to an AOC is ethically acceptable. The implications of these data are critically discussed and used to inform the normative claim that prospective parents should be given access to NIPT for AOCs. The study contributes to a body of research debating the ethical acceptability and regulation of various applications of NIPT as screening panels expand. (shrink)

In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, we postulate a low-entropy boundary condition to account for the temporal asymmetry. In this paper, I show that the Past Hypothesis also contains enough information to simplify the quantum ontology and define a unique initial condition in such a world. First, I introduce Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the quantum universe is described by a fundamental density matrix that represents something objective. This stands in sharp contrast to Wave (...) Function Realism, the thesis that the quantum universe is described by a wave function that represents something objective. Second, I suggest that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient to determine a unique and simple density matrix. This is achieved by what I call the Initial Projection Hypothesis: the initial density matrix of the universe is the normalized projection onto the special low-dimensional Hilbert space. Third, because the initial quantum state is unique and simple, we have a strong case for the \emph{Nomological Thesis}: the initial quantum state of the universe is on a par with laws of nature. This new package of ideas has several interesting implications, including on the harmony between statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, the dynamic unity of the universe and the subsystems, and the alleged conflict between Humean supervenience and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads (...) to a specification of the properties these intentions need to have in order to be genuine commitments. I then show how a structure of conditional intentions with these properties settles a collection of agents on engaging in social interactions that display all the features typically associated with shared agency. (shrink)

The necessary but not sufficient conditions for biological informational concepts like signs, symbols, memories, instructions, and messages are (1) an object or referent that the information is about, (2) a physical embodiment or vehicle that stands for what the information is about (the object), and (3) an interpreter or agent that separates the referent information from the vehicle’s material structure, and that establishes the stands-for relation. This separation is named the epistemic cut, and explaining clearly how the stands-for relation (...) is realized is named the symbol-matter problem. (4) A necessary physical condition is that all informational vehicles are material boundary conditions or constraints acting on the lawful dynamics of local systems. It is useful to define a dependency hierarchy of information types: (1) syntactic information (i.e., communication theory), (2) heritable information acquired by variation and natural selection, (3) non-heritable learned or creative information, and (4) measured physical information in the context of natural laws. High information storage capacity is most reliably implemented by discrete linear sequences of non-dynamic vehicles, while the execution of information for control and construction is a non-holonomic dynamic process. The first epistemic cut occurs in self-replication. The first interpretation of base sequence information is by protein folding; the last interpretation of base sequence information is by natural selection. Evolution has evolved senses and nervous systems that acquire non-heritable information, and only very recently after billions of years, the competence for human language. Genetic and human languages are the only known complete general purpose languages. They have fundamental properties in common, but are entirely different in their acquisition, storage and interpretation. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. (...) Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)

Williamson proposes that a "suppositional procedure" is a central heuristic we use to evaluate the truth of conditionals, though he also argues that this method often leads us astray. An alternative approach to the link between supposition and conditionals is to claim that we are guided by our antecedent conditional judgements in our supposing, and in particular in our determining which things follow from an initial supposition. This alternative explanation of the close link between conditionals and supposition is developed (...) and compared to Williamson's proposal. (shrink)

Volume 46, Issue 6, November 2020, Page 727-743.

Citizen participation is booming, especially the number of urban bottom-up initiatives where information and communication technologies (ICT) are deployed is increasing rapidly. This growth is good news for society as recent historical research shows that the more citizens actively and persistently interfere with public issues, the more likely a society will be resilient. And yet, at the same time, a growing number of scholars argue that due to the unprecedented impact of ICT, the public sphere is at stake. How to (...) understand both trends? How do the anti-'public sphere' developments relate to the growing number of citizens' initiatives using ICT? And if these citizen initiatives can indeed be understood as manifestations of public spheres, how can ICT foster or hinder the development of these public spheres? These questions will be explored by analyzing a Dutch citizen initiative called 'Buuv' (an online 'market' place for and by local residents) from a 'public sphere' perspective. The author will turn to 'The human condition' (1958) of Hannah Arendt in order to elaborate a 'public sphere' perspective. An Arendtian perspective (as any perspective) highlights, however, some aspects and underexposes other aspects. Furthermore, chances are that Arendt's thoughts are somewhat outdated, in the sense that we now live in a world where the online and the offline life intertwine - an experience that is referred to with the term 'onlife'. Bearing these remarks in mind, the author will elaborate on the value of Arendt's ideas to 1) the endeavor of understanding current trends in society-more urban bottom-up initiatives and anti-'public sphere' developments due to the broad uptake of ICT-and 2) the endeavor of revitalizing the public sphere in an onlife world. (shrink)

Given a model \ of set theory, and a nontrivial automorphism j of \, let \\) be the submodel of \ whose universe consists of elements m of \ such that \=x\) for every x in the transitive closure of m ). Here we study the class \ of structures of the form \\), where the ambient model \ satisfies a frugal yet robust fragment of \ known as \, and \=m\) whenever m is a finite ordinal in the sense (...) of \ Our main achievement is the calculation of the theory of \ as precisely \-\. The following theorems encapsulate our principal results:Theorem A. Every structure in \ satisfies \-\.Theorem B. Each of the following three conditions is sufficient for a countable structure \ to be in \: \ is a transitive model of \-\. \ is a recursively saturated model of \-\. \ is a model of \.Theorem C. Suppose \ is a countable recursively saturated model of \ and I is a proper initial segment of \ that is closed under exponentiation and contains \. There is a group embedding \ from \\) into \\) such that I is the longest initial segment of \ that is pointwise fixed by \ for every nontrivial \.\)In Theorem C, \\) is the group of automorphisms of the structure X, and \ is the ordered set of rationals. (shrink)

Knowledge is a social institution, a social activity, as well as the product of that social activity. All known societies incorporate several modes of hierarchical knowledge. Three styles of knowledge co-exist in the transitional societies of the third world in general and of contemporary Africa in particular (even though in each of the latter, only one style tends to predominate). The first are initiation societies - where power is conferred on the initiated; the second are learned societies (or academies) - (...) which handle science and technologies; and the third are industrial societies - whose enterprises apply the technologies in order to improve humankind’s material and cultural condition. The initiation, learned and industrial societies were developed in a pre-modern, pre-industrial context which was monarchic, sacred, anti-democratic or endowed with a tribal democracy. A gradual opening can be seen in the passage of initiation societies (where power is the perquisite of the initiated) towards learned societies and then, later, to industrial ones. Here, the problem is knowing whether and how to bring into play a fourth style of society - cognitive society - which requires relatively advanced conditions of democracy. (shrink)

The philosophical tradition of liberal political thought has come to see tolerance as a crucial element of a liberal political order. However, while much has been made of the value of toleration, little work has been done on individual-level motivations for tolerant behavior. In this article, we seek to develop an account of the rational motivations for toleration and of where the limits of toleration lie. We first present a very simple model of rational motivations for toleration. Key to this (...) model is an application of David Ricardo’s model of trade to thinking about toleration. This model supports the claim that we always have reasons to be as tolerant as possible. We then explore why we do not always see tolerant attitudes in the actual world, and point to some potential preconditions for toleration that the initial model does not capture. Subsequently, we examine a more detailed model that allows us to investigate more carefully the conditions under which tolerant behavior can be rewarded. We conclude by arguing that a consideration of self-interested motivations for toleration is essential to the success of a robust theory of toleration for a diverse society, but that even this approach has its limitations. (shrink)

In this paper I take up John Searle's account of ?Background capacities? to render intelligible the presupposed and hidden aspects of the background conditions that enable the performance of skilled movement. The paper begins with a review of Searle's initial account of Background capacities and how this picture can be applied to account for skilled movement in sport. Then an objection to this picture is addressed, claiming that Searle's initial picture might ?overrepresentationalise? background conditions. Moreover, this (...) objection prompts how Searle has modified his initial picture of background conditions in accordance with his more recent ?connection principle?. Searle's recent account of background conditions is then elaborated and discussed in the second half of the paper. The discussion emphasises three distinct levels of analysis in Searle's framework necessary to a full understanding of his background conditions: (i) the neurophysiological level; (ii) the descriptive higher-order practical skill level; and (iii) the logical level of integration. It is argued that Searle's logical framework is found plausible, but that more work is needed to better understand the background conditions of skilled movement in terms of neurophysiological capacities and practical skills from both scientific and philosophical perspectives. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with constraints on the interpretation of pronominal anaphora, in particular Condition B effects. It aims to contribute to a particular approach, initiated by Reinhart (Anaphora and semantic interpretation, 1983) and further developed elsewhere. It proposes a modification of Reinhart’s Interface Rule, and argues that the resulting theory compares favorably with others, while being compatible with independently motivated general hypotheses about the interaction between different interpretive mechanisms.

The proliferation of multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) over the past years has sparked an intense debate on the political role of corporations in the governance of global business conduct. To gain a better understanding of corporate political behavior in multistakeholder governance, this article investigates how firms construct a political identity when participating in MSIs. Based on an in-depth case study of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh—an MSI established after the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory complex (...) in 2013 to improve working conditions in the Bangladeshi garment industry—we introduce the construct of a political CSR (corporate social responsibility) identity (PCSRI) and explore how firms construct their PCSRIs in MSIs. Employing a qualitative, inductive theory-building method, we analyze interviews and archival data to develop a framework that elucidates how companies construct their PCSRIs within a continuum ranging from conservative to progressive. We show that constructing a PCSRI involves enacting specific, yet interrelated, political strategies that are themselves shaped by several forces over time. This article contributes to the literature by providing a political perspective on organizational identity construction that extends the emerging integrative perspective in political corporate social responsibility (PCSR) research. We suggest that MSIs should be conceptualized as inherently political governance mechanisms that are driven by multidirectional and dynamic political processes of identity construction. Our study shows that corporate political engagement in MSIs is a more nuanced and complex phenomenon than presently theorized. (shrink)

Indicative and subjunctive conditionals are in non-complimentary distribution: there are conversational contexts at which both are licensed (Stalnaker 1975; Karttunen and Peters 1979; von Fintel 1998). This means we can ask an important, but under-explored, question: in contexts which license both, what relations hold between the two? In this paper, I’ll argue for an initially surprising conclusion: when attention is restricted to the relevant contexts, indicatives and subjunctives are co-entailing. §1 introduces the indicative/subjunctive distinction, along with a discussion of the (...) relevant notion of entailment; §2 presents the main argument of the paper, and §3 considers some of the philosophical implications of the argument in §2. Finally, §4 argues that we can reconcile the equivalence of indicatives and subjunctives with apparently conflicting judgements. (shrink)

Truthmakers, truth conditions, and analyses are closely related, but distinct in rather important ways. A failure to properly appreciate their differences has led to some confusion regarding the role that possible worlds ought to play with respect to modality. Those philosophers who initially proposed the existence of possible worlds were understood as providing an analysis of modality. More recently, many have interpreted them as providing modal truthmakers. But, possible worlds are only suited to serve as truth conditions for (...) modal truths. My goals are as follows: First, to dispel this confusion by detailing the differences between these three concepts. Second, to apply the lesson learned to the famous Humphrey objection against possible worlds. While this objection, if successful, does undermine Lewisian modal realism, it only partially undermines ersatzism, and leaves available a route by which ersatzers may avoid the objection altogether. (shrink)

The variably strict analysis of conditionals does not only largely dominate the philosophical literature, since its invention by Stalnaker and Lewis, it also found its way into linguistics and psychology. Yet, the shortcomings of Lewis–Stalnaker’s account initiated a plethora of modifications, such as non-vacuist conditionals, presuppositional indicatives, perfect conditionals, or other conditional constructions, for example: reason relations, difference-making conditionals, counterfactual dependency, or probabilistic relevance. Many of these new connectives can be treated as strengthened or weakened conditionals. They are definable conditionals. (...) This article develops a technique to infer the logic for such definable conditionals from the known logic of the underlying defining conditional. The technique is applied to central examples. The results show that a large part of the zoo of conditionals arises from a basic conditional—a constant nucleus of the different contextual and conceptual variations of variably strict conditionals. (shrink)

Humans excel in categorization. Yet from a computational standpoint, learning a novel probabilistic classification task involves severe computational challenges. The present paper investigates one way to address these challenges: assuming class-conditional independence of features. This feature independence assumption simplifies the inference problem, allows for informed inferences about novel feature combinations, and performs robustly across different statistical environments. We designed a new Bayesian classification learning model that incorporates varying degrees of prior belief in class-conditional independence, learns whether or not independence holds, (...) and adapts its behavior accordingly. Theoretical results from two simulation studies demonstrate that classification behavior can appear to start simple, yet adapt effectively to unexpected task structures. Two experiments—designed using optimal experimental design principles—were conducted with human learners. Classification decisions of the majority of participants were best accounted for by a version of the model with very high initial prior belief in class-conditional independence, before adapting to the true environmental structure. Class-conditional independence may be a strong and useful default assumption in category learning tasks. (shrink)

We give a rough statement of the main result. Let D be a compact subset of ℝ3× ℝ. The propagation u of a wave can be noncomputable in any neighborhood of any point of D even though the initial conditions which determine the wave propagation uniquely are computable. A precise statement of the result appears below.

Do democratic systems that include binding referendum and initiative processes violate a core principle of democracy, namely that legislators should be accountable? Some have argued that they do: these popular vote processes would grant the right to legislate to ordinary voters even though they cannot be held accountable—i.e., face possible consequences imposed by others for their actions and decisions. As a result, we should favor conventional representative systems over systems with popular vote processes. In this article, I analyze this ‘accountability (...) objection’ to referendums and initiatives and the conception of voters as ‘legislators’ on which it relies and argue that it does not withstand scrutiny. I first demonstrate that there is no sound basis to characterize only voters in popular votes, and not voters in elections, as ‘legislators’. Therefore, the scope of the objection is broader than anticipated by its proponents: it cannot be consistently used to dismiss popular votes without also being fatal to elections. I then argue that voters’ lack of accountability is not fatal to either mass voting process. The institutional role of ordinary voters provides them with co-lawmaking powers; but these are not the kind of special powers that justify holding certain actors accountable in democratic systems. This does not exclude that voters have responsibilities. I close by highlighting that, compared to conventional representative systems, democratic systems including well-designed popular vote processes could offer voters more supportive conditions to meet such possible responsibilities. (shrink)

By a classical theorem of Harvey Friedman, every countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of a sufficiently strong fragment of ZF has a proper rank-initial self-embedding j, i.e., j is a self-embedding of $\mathcal {M}$ such that $j[\mathcal {M}]\subsetneq \mathcal {M}$, and the ordinal rank of each member of $j[\mathcal {M}]$ is less than the ordinal rank of each element of $\mathcal {M}\setminus j[\mathcal {M}]$. Here, we investigate the larger family of proper initial-embeddings j of models $\mathcal {M}$ of (...) fragments of set theory, where the image of j is a transitive submodel of $\mathcal {M}$. Our results include the following three theorems. In what follows, $\mathrm {ZF}^-$ is $\mathrm {ZF}$ without the power set axiom; $\mathrm {WO}$ is the axiom stating that every set can be well-ordered; $\mathrm {WF}$ is the well-founded part of $\mathcal {M}$ ; and $\Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $ is the full scheme of dependent choice of length $\alpha $.Theorem A.There is an $\omega $ -standard countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^-+\mathrm {WO}$ that carries no initial self-embedding $j:\mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ other than the identity embedding.Theorem B.Every countable $\omega $ -nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\ \mathrm {ZF}$ is isomorphic to a transitive submodel of the hereditarily countable sets of its own constructible universe $L^{\mathcal {M}}$.Theorem C.The following three conditions are equivalent for a countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^{-}+\mathrm {WO}+\forall \alpha \ \Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $. There is a cardinal in $\mathcal {M}$ that is a strict upper bound for the cardinality of each member of $\mathrm {WF}$. $\mathrm {WF}$ satisfies the powerset axiom.For all $n \in \omega $ and for all $b \in M$, there exists a proper initial self-embedding $j: \mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ such that $b \in \mathrm {rng}$ and $j[\mathcal {M}] \prec _n \mathcal {M}$. (shrink)

Distributed agile teams are increasingly employed in organizations, partly due to the increased focus on digital transformation. However, research findings about the performance of such teams appear to be inconsistent, calling for more research to investigate the conditions under which distributed agile teams may thrive. Given that task coordination is particularly challenging when team members are not co-located, the present study investigates the roles of the two types of task interdependence, i.e., initiated versus received task interdependence. Survey results from (...) 191 participants working in distributed agile teams within three companies in Norway confirm our hypotheses. Specifically, we show that high initiated task interdependence is associated with higher role clarity of others, while received task interdependence is associated with higher role clarity of self, and that both subsequently result in higher team performance in distributed agile teams. Thus, we argue that each type of task interdependence contributes in a unique way to team performance in distributed agile teams. (shrink)

In the fall of 1991, voters in Washington state were asked to consider a public initiative that sought to legalize physician-assisted death: Initiative 119. Drafted by Washington Citizens for Death with Dignity, the initiative was intended to amend the existing state natural death act in several ways:1) expand the definition of “terminal condition” to include patients in irrevers ible coma or persistent vegetative state;2) specifically name “artificial nutrition and hydration” as life-sustaining medical procedures that could be refused or withdrawn;3) legally (...) allow mentally competent patients with certifiably terminal conditions to request and receive “aid-in-dying” from their physician as a medical service.The first two proposed amendments were widely acknowledged as timely and appropriate; a coalition of medical, religious, and community organizations had been actively working on such additions for several years. It was the proposal to legalize “aid-in-dying,” however, that represented a radical shift in the conduct of physicians towards their patients and a dramatic shift in social policy. (shrink)

Conditionals give rise to stand-offs that have become well known from Gibbard’s initial Sly Pete example. The stand-offs can be seen as evidence for the context-sensitivity of conditionals and arguably do not involve disagreement. I claim that the latter feature lends credibility to an indexical treatment of indicatives.