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  1. Subjunctive Conditionals are Material.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The material account proposes that indicative conditionals are material, but it is widely believed that this account cannot be applied to subjunctive conditionals. There are three reasons for this consensus: (1) the concern that most subjunctive conditionals would be vacuously true if they were material, which seems implausible; (2) the inconsistency with Adams pair, which suggests that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions; and (3) the belief that the possible world theories are a superior alternative to the material (...)
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  2. The conditionals of deliberation + whither middle knowledge?Keith DeRose - manuscript
    Work in progress. Will probably split into two papers, and then, perhaps, later, will be brought back together, along with other material, into something larger. (All this only if it works out OK!).
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  3. On Stalnaker's "Indicative Conditionals".Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Louise McNally & Zoltan Szabo (eds.), Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol 100. Springer.
    This paper is a guide to the main ideas and innovations in Robert Stalnaker's "Indicative Conditionals". The paper is for a volume of essays on twenty-one classics of formal semantics edited by Louise McNally and Zoltàn Gendler Szabò.
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  4. The case of the missing ‘If’: Accessibility relations in Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals.Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Semantics and Pragmatics.
    A part of Stalnaker (1968)’s influential theory of conditionals has been neglected, namely the role for an accessibility relation between worlds. I argue that the accessibility relation does not play the role intended for it in the theory as stated, and propose a minimal revision which solves the problem, and brings the theory in line with the formulation in Stalnaker & Thomason 1970.
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  5. Conditionals, Supposition and Euthyphro.Daniel Nolan - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Williamson proposes that a "suppositional procedure" is a central heuristic we use to evaluate the truth of conditionals, though he also argues that this method often leads us astray. An alternative approach to the link between supposition and conditionals is to claim that we are guided by our antecedent conditional judgements in our supposing, and in particular in our determining which things follow from an initial supposition. This alternative explanation of the close link between conditionals and supposition is developed and (...)
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  6. Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism.David Boylan - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):259-286.
    Counterfactual skepticism says that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. While few endorse counterfactual skepticism, the precise costs of the view are disputed and not generally well-understood. I have two aims in this paper. My first and primary aim is to establish, on grounds acceptable to all parties, that counterfactual skepticism is not benign. I argue it leads to significant skepticism about the future: if counterfactual skepticism is true, then we can have only very limited knowledge about the future. I give (...)
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  7. Conditional Collapse.Sam Carter - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):971-1004.
    Indicative and subjunctive conditionals are in non-complimentary distribution: there are conversational contexts at which both are licensed (Stalnaker 1975; Karttunen and Peters 1979; von Fintel 1998). This means we can ask an important, but under-explored, question: in contexts which license both, what relations hold between the two? In this paper, I’ll argue for an initially surprising conclusion: when attention is restricted to the relevant contexts, indicatives and subjunctives are co-entailing. §1 introduces the indicative/subjunctive distinction, along with a discussion of the (...)
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  8. Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.
    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. The introduction of either type of supposition initiates judgments that may be either qualitative, binary judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or quantitative, numerical ones about how acceptable it is. As such, accounts of qualitative/quantitative judgment under indicative/subjunctive supposition have been developed in the literature. We explore these four different types of theories by systematically explicating the relationships canonical representatives of each. Our representative qualitative accounts of indicative (...)
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  9. (Counter)factual want ascriptions and conditional belief.Thomas Grano & Milo Phillips-Brown - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (12):641-672.
    What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes not-p—for example, ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is (...)
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  10. Indicative and counterfactual conditionals: a causal-modeling semantics.Duen-Min Deng & Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3993-4014.
    We construct a causal-modeling semantics for both indicative and counterfactual conditionals. As regards counterfactuals, we adopt the orthodox view that a counterfactual conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its consequent is true in the submodel M∗, generated by intervening in M, in which its antecedent is true. We supplement the orthodox semantics by introducing a new manipulation called extrapolation. We argue that an indicative conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its (...)
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  11. Strictness and connexivity.Andrea Iacona - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1024-1037.
    .This paper discusses Aristotle’s thesis and Boethius’ thesis, the most distinctive theorems of connexive logic. Its aim is to show that, although there is something plausible in Aristotle’s thesis and Boethius’ thesis, the intuitions that may be invoked to motivate them are consistent with any account of indicative conditionals that validates a suitably restricted version of them. In particular, these intuitions are consistent with the view that indicative conditionals are adequately formalized as strict conditionals.
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  12. Variations on Anderson Conditionals.Julia Zakkou - 2021 - Theoretical Linguistics 47 (3-4):297-311.
  13. Presupposing Counterfactuality.Julia Zakkou - 2019 - Semantics and Pragmatics 12.
    There is long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers of both non-past subjunctive (or ‘would’) conditionals and past subjunctive (or ‘would have’) conditionals need not convey counterfactuality. The relationship between the conditionals in question and the counterfactuality of their antecedents is thus not one of presupposing. It is one of conversationally implicating. This paper provides a thorough examination of the arguments against the presupposition view as applied to (...)
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  14. A logic for the natural language conditional.Monique Whitaker - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):261-283.
    Ordinary speakers intuitively assign truth-values to conditional utterances in everyday conversation, but, despite the general ease with which this occurs, it is notoriously difficult to give an account of the implicit logic that is followed in making these truth-value assignments. I propose a twofold logic of the conditional – a relatively simple “factual” logic for conditionals interpreted with regard to what is actually the case, largely following the logic of the material conditional; combined with a variably strict possible-worlds counterfactual logic (...)
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  15. Conditionals.Anthony S. Gillies - 2017 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 401–436.
  16. Abductive, causal, and counterfactual conditionals under incomplete probabilistic knowledge.Niki Pfeifer & Lena Tulkki - 2017 - In G. Gunzelmann, A. Howes, T. Tenbrink & E. Davelaar (eds.), Proceedings of the 39th Cognitive Science Society Meeting. pp. 2888-2893.
    We study abductive, causal, and non-causal conditionals in indicative and counterfactual formulations using probabilistic truth table tasks under incomplete probabilistic knowledge (N = 80). We frame the task as a probability-logical inference problem. The most frequently observed response type across all conditions was a class of conditional event interpretations of conditionals; it was followed by conjunction interpretations. An interesting minority of participants neglected some of the relevant imprecision involved in the premises when inferring lower or upper probability bounds on the (...)
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  17. In Defense of Brogaard-Salerno Stricture.Matheus Silva - 2017 - The Reasoner 11 (7):42.
    Brogaard and Salerno (2008) argued that counter-examples to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent, and hypothetical syllogism involving subjunctive conditionals only seem to work because they involve a contextual fallacy where the context assumed in the premise(s) is illicitly shifted in the conclusion. To avoid such counter-examples they have proposed that the context must remain fixed when evaluating an argument for validity. That is the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. Tristan Haze (2016), however, has recently objected that intuitively valid argumentative forms such as conjunction introduction (...)
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  18. Conjunction, Connection and Counterfactuals.Chaoan He - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):705-719.
    The standard Lewis–Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals, given the Strong Centering Thesis, implies that all true–true counterfactuals are trivially true. McGlynn developed a theory, based on Penczek, to rehabilitate the non-triviality of true–true counterfactuals. I show here that counterfactuals with true but irrelevant components are counterexamples to McGlynn’s account. I argue that an extended version of the connection hypothesis is sustainable, and grounds a full theory of counterfactuals explicable in a broadly standard way, if an indispensable asymmetry between semifacuals and other (...)
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  19. On Indicative And Subjunctive Conditionals.Justin Khoo - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    At the center of the literature on conditionals lies the division between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, and Ernest Adams’ famous minimal pair: If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did. If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have. While a lot of attention is paid to figuring out what these different kinds of conditionals mean, significantly less attention has been paid to the question of why their grammatical differences give rise to their semantic differences. In this paper, I articulate (...)
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  20. Intervention and the Probabilities of Indicative Conditionals.Michael Zhao - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):477-503.
    A few purported counterexamples to the Adams thesis have cropped up in the literature in the last few decades. I propose a theory that accounts for them, in a way that makes the connections between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals clearer.
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  21. A Uniform Theory of Conditionals.William B. Starr - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.
    A uniform theory of conditionals is one which compositionally captures the behavior of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals without positing ambiguities. This paper raises new problems for the closest thing to a uniform analysis in the literature (Stalnaker, Philosophia, 5, 269–286 (1975)) and develops a new theory which solves them. I also show that this new analysis provides an improved treatment of three phenomena (the import-export equivalence, reverse Sobel-sequences and disjunctive antecedents). While these results concern central issues in the study (...)
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  22. Subjunctive biscuit and stand-off conditionals.Eric Swanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
    Conventional wisdom has it that many intriguing features of indicative conditionals aren’t shared by subjunctive conditionals. Subjunctive morphology is common in discussions of wishes and wants, however, and conditionals are commonly used in such discussions as well. As a result such discussions are a good place to look for subjunctive conditionals that exhibit features usually associated with indicatives alone. Here I offer subjunctive versions of J. L. Austin’s ‘biscuit’ conditionals—e.g., “There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them”—and subjunctive (...)
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  23. Future Conditionals and DeRose's Thesis.David Barnett - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):407-442.
    In deciding whether to read this paper, it might seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (i) that, if you read this paper, you will become a better person. It might also seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (ii) that, if you were to read this paper, you would become a better person. Is there a difference between (i) and (ii)? If so, are you rationally required to base your decision on (...)
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  24. Conditionals, Literal Content, and 'DeRose's Thesis': A Reply to Barnett.K. DeRose - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):443-455.
    Against Barnett (2012), I argue that the theory I advance in DeRose 2010 is best construed as one on which ‘"were"ed-up’ future-directed conditionals like ‘If the house were not to be painted, it would soon look quite shabby’ are, in ways important to how they function in deliberation, different in literal content from their ‘straightforward’ counterparts like ‘If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby’. I also defend my way of classifying future-directed conditionals against an attack (...)
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  25. The Conditionals of Deliberation.K. DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will (likely) happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between 'straightforward' future-directed conditionals like ' If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby' and * "w e r e ' ' e d F (...)
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  26. ``The Conditionals of Deliberation".Keith DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between ‘straightforward’ future-directed conditionals like ‘If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby’ and ‘ “were”ed-up’ FDCs like ‘If the house were not to be painted, (...)
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  27. Conditionals and Actuality.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):135 - 150.
    It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve (...)
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  28. Is human reasoning about nonmonotonic conditionals probabilistically coherent?Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter - 2006 - In Proceedings of the 7 T H Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. pp. 138--150.
    Nonmonotonic conditionals (A |∼ B) are formalizations of common sense expressions of the form “if A, normally B”. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted by a “high” coherent conditional probability, P(B|A) > .5. Two important properties are closely related to the nonmonotonic conditional: First, A |∼ B allows for exceptions. Second, the rules of the nonmonotonic system p guiding A |∼ B allow for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new premises. This study reports a series of three experiments on reasoning (...)
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  29. Indicative versus subjunctive conditionals, congruential versus non-hyperintensional contexts.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.
    §0. A familiar if obscure idea: an indicative conditional presents its consequent as holding in the actual world on the supposition that its antecedent so holds, whereas a subjunctive conditional merely presents its consequent as holding in a world, typically counterfactual, in which its antecedent holds. Consider this pair.
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  30. Indicative versus subjunctive in future conditionals.A. Morton - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):289-293.
    I give cases where the contrast between "if Shakespeare had not written Hamlet someone else would have" and "if Shakespeare did not write Hamlet and someone else did"is found in future tense sentences. This is often denied.
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  31. Doesn't-will and didn't-did.Charles B. Cross - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):101 – 106.
    In "Against the Indicative," AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1994): 17-26, and more recently in "Classifying `Conditionals': the Traditional Way is Wrong", ANALYSIS 60 (2000): 147, V.H. Dudman argues that (a) `If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy then someone else did' and (b) `If Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy then someone else will' should not be classified together as "indicative conditionals." Dudman relies on the assumption that (a) is entailed by (c) `Someone shot Kennedy', whereas (b) is not entailed by (d) `Someone (...)
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  32. Three Twentieth-century Commonplaces about 'If'.V. H. Dudman - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (3):119-127.
    The commonplaces, all grammatically confused, are that ?conditionals? are ternary in structure, have ?antecedents? and conform to the traditional taxonomy. It is maintained en route that ?The bough will not break? is consistent with ?If the bough breaks ??, that there is no logical difference between ?future indicatives? and ?subjunctives?, and that there is a difference between the logic of propositions (e.g. ?The bough broke?) and that of judgments (?The bough will/might/could/should/must/needn't break?).
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  33. Indicative and subjunctive conditionals.Brian Weatherson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
    This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, (...)
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  34. Classifying ‘conditionals’: The traditional way is wrong.V. H. Dudman - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):147–147.
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  35. Classifying 'conditionals': the traditional way is wrong.V. H. Dudman - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):147-147.
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  36. On the grammar of conditionals: Reply to Barker.V. H. Dudman - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):277–285.
    Received doctrine has an 'antecedent' message encoded within a conditional clause, such as the string comprising the first five words of the sentence 'If the bough had broken the cradle would have fallen'. Criticisms of mine of this tenet were recently challenged by Stephen Barker. In the course of responding to his examination, I venture a snappy demonstration that the 'conditionals' such sentences encode can have neither 'antecedents' nor 'consequents'. Also, less happily, I urge a binary outermost structure for these (...)
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  37. David Lewis on indicative and counterfactual conditionals.Robert J. Fogelin - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):286–289.
    David Lewis has argued that there must be a difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals beyond an indication of truth-value commitments. He cites the following contrast to show this: If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. In response, it is shown that this difference is better explained by shifts in context. Keep context fixed, the contrast disappears. EG: If Oswald was not the one who shot Kennedy, (...)
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  38. Opting out: Bennett on classifying conditionals.Ross Cogan - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):142–145.
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  39. Classifying conditionals: The traditional way is right.Jonathan Bennett - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):331-354.
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  40. On conditionals.V. H. Dudman - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):113-128.
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  41. Against the indicative.V. H. Dudman - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):17 – 26.
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  42. A popular presumption refuted.V. H. Dudman - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (8):431-432.
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  43. Classifying Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):134-147.
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  44. Nute Donald. Conditional logic. Handbook of philosophical logic, Volume II, Extensions of classical logic, edited by Gabbay D. and Guenthner F., Synthese library, vol. 165, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster, 1984, pp. 387–439. [REVIEW]Charles B. Cross - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1477-1479.
  45. Vive la revolution!V. H. Dudman - 1989 - Mind 98 (392):591-603.
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  46. On the Tense Structure of Conditionals.Diane Barense - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:539-566.
    When philosophers and linguists theorize about the nature of conditionals, they tend to make a number of assumptions about the linguistic structure of these sentences. For example, they almost invariably assume that conditionals have “antecedents” and “consequents” and that these have the structure of independent clauses. With a few exceptions, they assume that conditionals are categorized according to whether they are in the “indicative” or the “subjunctive” “mood”. However, rarely do they formulate criteria for identifying these moods, or for distinguishing (...)
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  47. Farewell to the phlogiston theory of conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):509-527.
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  48. Indicative and subjunctive.V. H. Dudman - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):113-122.
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  49. Lowe on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals.Wayne A. Davis - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):184 - 186.
    Lowe claims that "if oswald did not kill kennedy, someone else did" is a material conditional. he also claims that the difference in truth-value between this indicative conditional and the subjunctive "if oswald had not killed kennedy, someone else would have" does not support the conclusion of lewis and others that corresponding indicative and subjunctive conditionals are not always equivalent. i dispute both claims.
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  50. Indicative and subjunctive conditionals.Wayne A. Davis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):544-564.
    The idea that english has more than one declarative "mood" has been dismissed as superstitious by empirically-minded grammarians of english for centuries--with such spectacular unsuccess, however, that the indicative/subjunctive dichotomy stands today as a cornerstone for philosophical and logical speculation about "conditionals." let me be next into the breach. i shall urge that there is no grammatical basis for any such distinction. and as for the particular adjudications of mood logicians and philosophers actually propose, there is neither rhyme nor reason (...)
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