This paper explores how individuals experiencing hostile affective states such as envy, jealousy, hate, contempt, and Ressentiment tend to deceive themselves about their own mental states. More precisely, it examines how the feeling of being diminished in worth experienced by the subject of these hostile affective states motivates a series of self-deceptive maneuvers that generate a fictitious upliftment of the subject’s sense of self. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper explores the (...) main arguments that explain why several hostile affective states involve a feeling of diminution in the subject’s own value (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of how the negative feeling of self-worth motivates self-deception. While in extrinsically motivated self-deception, the subject feels diminished in worth after negatively evaluating her own hostile affective states, in intrinsically motivated self-deception, the negative feelings of self-worth are constituent elements of the hostile affective state in question (section 3). Cases of intrinsically motivated self-deception are particularly intriguing because in them the motivation for self-deception is inherent to the hostile affective state, independently of external reasons. I coin the expression “self-deceptive style” to capture the distinctive form in which each hostile affective state intrinsically motivates changes in the architecture of the mind (e.g., perception, imagining, memory, judgment, attention, etc.) in order to generate an upliftment of the self (section 4). To show the descriptive and explanatory function of this concept, a comparative analysis of the self-deceptive styles of envy and hate is provided (section 5). The conclusion summarizes the main findings and explores directions for further research (section 6). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the friction between xenophobic discourses on migration and the crisis caused by the politics of austerity in Greece. On the one hand, an ‘excessive’ influx of migration is managed through violent means by the state and the para-state; on the other, a ‘scarcity’ of domestic resources is blamed for a ‘rise’ in racist attitudes, and the political ascent of a fascist movement-cum-parliamentary party, Χρυσή Αυγή (Golden Dawn). ‘Crisis’ is said to give rise to ‘austerity’—and hostility. (...) Inverting the inverted causal relationship between crisis, austerity and hostility, I problematise representations of hostility toward migrants which construct racism as a consequence of economic conditions or even as the antidote to the ‘bitter pill’ Greeks have been forced to swallow. I examine how racialised and gendered violence secures the politics of austerity in Greece. Specifically, through an examination of three eruptions of violence (the feminicidal acid attack on Konstantina Kouneva, the murder of Shehzad Luqman, and the drowning of eleven refugees near the island of Farmakonisi), I make concrete connections between the politics of austerity and what, drawing on Sara Ahmed, might be termed an ‘affective economy of hostility’ that articulates racialised and gendered modes of belonging and estrangement. Some bodies are rendered vulnerable and precarious, while others assert an entitled relation to national space while being economically disentitled by austerity measures. (shrink)

What kind of affective phenomenon is religious zeal and how does it relate to other affective phenomena, such as moral anger, hatred, and love? In this paper, I argue that religious zeal can be both, and be presented and interpreted as both, a love-like passion and an anger-like emotion. As a passion, religious zeal consists of the loving devotion to a transcendent religious object or idea such as God. It is a relatively enduring attachment that is constitutive of (...) who the zealot is, and it expresses itself in a distinctive set of mental and behavioral dispositions. Most importantly, it motivates uncompromising actions and involves intense, hot, and deep emotions. As an anger-like emotion, religious zeal is an occurrent affective state of mind that is intentionally directed towards a specific object, characteristically a person or group of persons. It condemns the violation of a religious norm that is taken to be of absolute validity and general applicability. It motivates an action aiming at vengeance and retaliation, and it involves intense and hot feelings of hostility towards its object. I argue that rather than reducing the complex phenomenon of religious zeal to one of these two manifestations, we should reflect upon the question of how the two distinct conceptualizations relate to each other. (shrink)

Workplace incivility has been touted as a form of modern discrimination with serious negative consequences for the target. The increasingly unequal gender distribution in STEM workforce has also been attributed to workplace incivility. This study examines the _lived experience_ of this covert mistreatment for women employees in STEM workplaces. Data from STEM women employees revealed a typology of STEM incivility, mapping onto ostracism, hostility, undermining, and sexual incivility. Further, the gendered nature and STEM-specific phenomenology of incivility against women employees, based (...) on instigator characteristics, incivility frequency, and the general climate of STEM which aided or fostered interpersonal mistreatment was found. Drawing on affective events theory from organizational sciences and grounded in the STEM industry, this research examined the person-centric, emotional consequences of being a target of STEM incivility. Three broad themes that describe the first-person, felt-experience impact of mistreatment were as follows: discrete emotions, emotion regulation, duration of emotion experience. Upon encountering uncivil interpersonal experiences, participant reactions fell among one of four discrete emotional states: anger, fear, sadness, and surprise. Emotion regulation emerged as a key feature of the affective response. Specifically, STEM demands were tied to participant utilization of the regulation strategy of _suppression_ to hide the felt emotion initially and reappraisal and response modulation over time. Importantly, although understood as a mild event, the emotional consequences of incivility were long-lasting such that they continued beyond the episode, lasting anywhere from two hours to a week. The STEM context was central to the emotion trajectories. Results are discussed with respect to work performance, attitudinal, and health-related consequences for women employees in STEM jobs. Practical implications are discussed with a special grounding in STEM context with an eye toward best practices for managing incivility for women in STEM. (shrink)

The self evolved out of a sense of somatic motor orientation and body boundary awareness; and affective states as motivators furthered in conjunction with a sense of self evolutionary speciation. Affective states form to a greater extent than cognition the sense of experiential reality that is taken for granted. Neurophysiological and experiential culture-invariant evidence indicate the existence of eight (and possibly ten) basic affective states in mammals. These affective states have in humans (...) found expression in mythic terms as well as in the basic themes of world literature. According to classical Indian introspective analysis of aesthetics the basic emotions determine human activity and are the well- spring of literature and art, especially if the emotions become dis- sociated from a sense of egocentricity, i.e. if they become detached from a sense of self so that they no longer are in uenced by ex- istential fear. The comparatively close similarity between Indian aesthetics and the neurophysiology of the different affective states suggests the possibility that such aesthetic value judgments may be based on widespread evolutionary determinants. (shrink)

Samuel Lepine Dans cet article, je propose d’analyser le concept de bonheur en termes d’humeurs positives. Je montre que cette analyse constitue une voie moyenne entre l’analyse du bonheur comme émotion et l’analyse du bonheur en termes de propensions émotionnelles. Je soutiens plus particulièrement qu’être heureux consiste à ressentir une humeur positive, quelle que soit cette humeur. Cette analyse est donc réductionniste – être heureux n’est rien d’autre qu’être de bonne humeur – et pluraliste –nos bonnes humeurs, dans toute leur (...) diversité, constituent autant de manières différentes d’être heureux. Afin de soutenir cette approche, je défends la thèse selon laquelle les humeurs sont des attitudes prospectives, consistant à évaluer l’impact affectif possible de notre environnement sur nos états motivationnels tels que nos désirs ou nos préférences. Je m’efforce ensuite d’explorer les relations que le bonheur entretient avec le bien-être à partir de cette analyse du bonheur comme bonne humeur. (shrink)

Ethics studies the evaluation of actions, agents and their mental states and characters from a distinctive viewpoint or employing a distinctive vocabulary. And epistemology examines the evaluation of actions (inquiries and assertions), agents (believers and inquirers), and their states (belief and attitudes) from a different viewpoint. Given this common concern with evaluation, we should surely expect there to be considerable similarities between the issues examined and the ideas employed in the two areas. However, when we examine most textbooks (...) in ethics and epistemology, this expectation is not fulfilled. Of course, the vocabularies of evaluation are different: in ethics, we are concerned with issues of right and wrong, virtue and vice, moral obligation, and so on; and in epistemology, it is most commonly assumed that we are interested in whether states count as knowledge or as justified beliefs, with whether beliefs and strategies of belief formation are rational. (shrink)

Event-based prospective memory tasks require the realisation of a delayed intention at the occurrence of a specific target event. The present research investigates how performance in this kind of prospective memory task is influenced by the current affective state. By manipulating participants’ mood during intention realisation we tested two competing models of mood effects on memory (i.e., a capacity consuming account and a processing style account). Furthermore, we manipulated the valence of the target event to investigate mood-congruency effects in (...) prospective memory. No evidence was found for a mood-congruency effect, but the results showed that prospective memory performance increased with a sad mood. This effect is consistent with recent theories on mood-dependent processing-style regulation, postulating that a sad mood produces a more analytic and detailed processing style whereas a happy mood produces a more global and less detailed processing style. (shrink)

Social relationships are constructed by and through the relational communication that people exchange. Relational messages are implicit nonverbal and verbal messages that signal how people regard one another and define their interpersonal relationships—equal or unequal, affectionate or hostile, inclusive or exclusive, similar or dissimilar, and so forth. Such signals can be measured automatically by the latest machine learning software tools and combined into meaningful factors that represent the socioemotional expressions that constitute relational messages between people. Relational messages operate continuously (...) on a parallel track with verbal communication, implicitly telling interactants the current state of their relationship and how to interpret the verbal messages being exchanged. We report an investigation that explored how group members signal these implicit messages through multimodal behaviors measured by sensor data and linked to the socioemotional cognitions interpreted as relational messages. By use of a modified Brunswikian lens model, we predicted perceived relational messages of dominance, affection, involvement, composure, similarity and trust from automatically measured kinesic, vocalic and linguistic indicators. The relational messages in turn predicted the veracity of group members. The Brunswikian Lens Model offers a way to connect objective behaviors exhibited by social actors to the emotions and cognitions being perceived by other interactants and linking those perceptions to social outcomes. This method can be used to ascertain what behaviors and/or perceptions are associated with judgments of an actor’s veracity. Computerized measurements of behaviors and perceptions can replace manual measurements, significantly expediting analysis and drilling down to micro-level measurement in a previously unavailable manner. (shrink)

Pragmatists challenge a sharp separation of issues of theoretical and practical rationality. This can encourage a sort of anti-realism: our classifications and theories are shaped by our interests and practical concerns. However, it need not do this. A more fundamental theme is that cognition is itself an activity, the attempt to solve problems and discover truths effectively and responsibly. Evidence has to be collected, experiments have to be devised and carried out, dialogues must be engaged in with fellow inquirers, decisions (...) must be made about when we have scrutinized our opinions enough to trust our results. Even if our goals are “purely cognitive,” the attempt to achieve them through inquiry and deliberation is an activity. The normative standards that guide its conduct, like those governing any activity, will include standards of practical rationality. Indeed, we might suggest that a belief isjustifiedso long as it is the product of responsible, well-executed inquiry. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAffective states influence how individuals process information and behave. Some theories predict emotional congruency effects. Emotional congruency should theoretically obstruct the learning of reward associations and their ability to guide behaviour under negative mood. Two studies tested the effects of the induction of a negative affective state on appetitive Pavlovian learning, in which neutral stimuli were associated with chocolate or alcohol rewards. In both experiments, participants showed enhanced approach tendencies towards predictors of reward after a negative relative to (...) a positive performance feedback manipulation. This increase was related to a reduction in positive affect in Experiment 1 only. No effects of the manipulation on conditioned reward expectancies, craving, or consumption were observed. Overall, our findings support the idea of counter-regu... (shrink)

Even though researchers regularly use neutral affect induction procedures as a control condition in their work, there is little consensus on what is neutral affect. This article reviews five approaches that researchers have used to operationalize neutral AIPs: to produce a minimal affective state, in-the-middle state, deactivated state, typical state, or indifferent state. For each view, the article delineates the theoretical basis for the neutral AIP, how to assess it, and provides recommendations for when and how to use it. (...) The goal of the article is to encourage researchers to state their theoretical assumptions about neutral affect, to validate those assumptions, and to make appropriate conclusions based on them. (shrink)

It is widely held within contemporary metaethics that there is a lack of linguistic support for evaluative expressivism. On the contrary, it seems that the predictions that expressivists make about evaluative discourse are not borne out. An instance of this is the so-called problem of missing Moorean infelicity. Expressivists maintain that evaluative statements express non-cognitive states of mind in a similar manner to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being (...) in the corresponding belief state famously gives rise to Moorean infelicity:?? It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining. If expressivists are right, then conjoining evaluative statements with the denial of being in the relevant non-cognitive state of mind should give rise to similar infelicity. However, as several theorists have pointed out, this does not seem to be the case. Statements like the following are not infelicitous: Murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it. In this paper, I argue that evaluative statements express the kind of states that are attributed by ‘find’-constructions in English and that these states are non-cognitive in nature. This addresses the problem of missing Moorean infelicity and, more generally, goes to show that there are linguistic facts which support expressivism about evaluative discourse. (shrink)

In ordinary language, “calmness”, “melancholy”, “cheerfulness”, and “sadness” are employed to describe affective states experienced by sentient beings. More precisely, these terms are used to report instances of moods. Yet, the very same terms are used to describe what seem to be properties of certain objects (e.g., things, situations) which, unlike sentient beings, are unable to feel. We usually describe atmospheres employing these terms: We speak about the calmness of a forest, the melancholy of a painting, the cheerfulness (...) of a field of flowers and the sadness of a landscape. Are we in fact referring to the same phenomenon? If not, why then do we employ the same terms? (shrink)

A substantial portion of the knowledge base of psychology is based on subjective reports with a risk of information bias. The objective of the present study was to elucidate one contextual source of variance and potential bias in subjective reports: the influence of affective state at the time of responding to questionnaires. Employees were subjected to mood-induction procedures in the laboratory. Neutral, positive, and negative moods were induced by combinations of pictures from the international affective picture set and (...) music. The subjects responded to questions on visual analog scales in order to optimize sensitivity and attenuate short-term memory effects. Most subjects exhibited significant affective-state inductions with no change in arousal. The analyses took affective response to the manipulation into account. Only four of 20 questions were somewhat influenced by induced affective state: job overload, social support from co-workers, satisfaction with getting to develop personally, and an item measuring agreeableness. In general, responding to questions of work that were phrased for valence was little or insignificantly influenced by induced affective state. (shrink)

I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is nota possibility we should take seriously. The principlereason is that if someone's qualia were inverted inthe specified manner there is reason to believe thephenomenal difference would manifest itself inbehaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, Isuggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, arepartly constituted by an affective component whichwould be inverted along with the connected qualia. Theresulting affective inversions will, given theintimate connections that exist between emotions andbehaviour, likely manifest themselves (...) in behaviour, inwhich case the underlying phenomenal differences canbe functionally captured. Second, I argue that othersense modalities lack the structural featuresnecessary for undetectable inversion which, because oftheir analogy with colour qualia, weakens theplausibility of such an inversion in the original caseof vision. (shrink)

In this book, Tom Cochrane develops a new control theory of the emotions and related affective states. Grounded in the basic principle of negative feedback control, his original account outlines a new fundamental kind of mental content called 'valent representation'. Upon this foundation, Cochrane constructs new models for emotions, pains and pleasures, moods, expressive behaviours, evaluative reasoning, personality traits and long-term character commitments. These various states are presented as increasingly sophisticated layers of regulative control, which together underpin (...) the architecture of the mind as a whole. Clearly structured and containing numerous diagrams and examples to illustrate the discussion, this study draws on the latest research from fields including philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, and will appeal to readers interested in the philosophy and cognitive science of emotion. (shrink)

An adequate understanding of ‘the self’ and/or ‘primary-process consciousness’ should allow us to explain how affective experiences are created within the brain. Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms of consciousness. At present, abundant evidence indicates that affective states arise from the intrinsic neurodynamics of primitive self-centred emotional and motivational (...) systems situated in subcortical regions of the brain. Accordingly, a neural understanding of ‘the self’ may arise from a study of how various biological value-coding systems converge and interact with coherent brainstem representations of the body and nearby attentional/waking systems of the brain. Affective feelings may be caused by the neurodynamics of basic emotional circuits interacting with the neural schema of bodily action plans. One key brain area where such interactions occur is found within centromedial diencephalic midbrain areas such as the periventricular and periaqueductal gray and nearby tectal and tegmental zones. Here I will envision that a Simple Ego-type Life Form is instantiated in those circuits The ability of this ’primal SELF’ to resonate with primitive emotional values may help yield the raw subjectively experienced feelings of pleasure, lust, anger, hunger, desire, fear, loneliness and so forth. A study of such systems is a reasonable starting point for the neurological analysis of affective feelings, which may lie at the periconscious core of all other forms of animal consciousness. If such a neurodynamic process was an essential neural preadaptation for the emergence of higher levels of consciousness, it may help us close the explanatory gap between brain circuit states and the psychological nature of affective feelings. Thereby, it may also help us conceptualize the nature of psychological binding within higher forms of consciousness in new ways. (shrink)

In an attempt to discover the facial action units for affective states that occur during complex learning, this study adopted an emote-aloud procedure in which participants were recorded as they verbalised their affective states while interacting with an intelligent tutoring system (AutoTutor). Participants’ facial expressions were coded by two expert raters using Ekman's Facial Action Coding System and analysed using association rule mining techniques. The two expert raters received an overall kappa that ranged between.76 and.84. The (...) association rule mining analysis uncovered facial actions associated with confusion, frustration, and boredom. We discuss these rules and the prospects of enhancing AutoTutor with non-intrusive affect-sensitive capabilities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Researchers have increasingly acknowledged that affect plays a role in ethical decision making. However, the impact that specific affective states may have on the expression of decision biases in the context of ethical dilemmas has received limited empirical attention. To address this, the present effort examined the impact of happy and sad affective states on biases in ethical decision making. In an online experiment, undergraduate students read short stories that either induced happy, sad, or relaxed (...) affective states, followed by a covert measure of three types of biases held to inhibit ethical decision making. Results demonstrated that happy affective states increased the expression of regulation biases, and sad affective states increased the expression of simplification biases, compared to relaxed affective states. Implications are discussed for advancing research on ethical decision making and reducing unethical behavior in organizations. (shrink)

On approach to competitive situations, affective states (emotions and anxiety) occur through the complex interaction of cognitive antecedents. Researchers have intimated that irrational beliefs might play an important role in the relationship between cognitive appraisals and affective states, but has ignored challenge and threat. In the current research, we examine the interaction between cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat to predict golfers’ pre-competitive affective states. We adopted a cross-sectional atemporal design to examine (...) how golfers approached two different competitive situations: imagined imminent golf competition (phase 1), and actual future golf competition (phase 2). Path analysis revealed how cognitive appraisals, irrational beliefs, and challenge and threat interact to predict affective states among golfers. Serial atemporal multiple mediation analysis indicated that the relationships between cognitive appraisals and affective states were mediated by irrational beliefs and challenge and threat. Further, some differences were revealed between phase 1 and phase 2 in the serial multiple atemporal mediation results with regard to challenge. That is, at phase 1 no significant serial mediation was found for any affective outcomes, but at phase 2 significant serial mediation was found for all affective states, showing that irrational beliefs and challenge serial mediated the associations between cognitive appraisals and affective states. The finding that mediation and bivariate associations differed across phase 1 and phase 2 is echoed in the phase 1-phase 2 tests of differences. The current research makes a theoretical advancement by elucidating in more detail the complex interaction between cognitive antecedents and mediators of affective states. Specifically, the inclusion of challenge and threat alongside irrational beliefs and cognitive appraisals is an important theoretical advancement that builds on work inside of sport literature (e.g., Dixon et al., 2016) and outside of sport literature (e.g., David et al., 2002; 2005), as this constellation of theoretically related antecedents of affective states has not been examined together in the extant research. (shrink)

PurposeThe aim of the study was to establish the differences in affective states of swimmers depending on the subjective rank of the competition and the relationship between affective states and performance in sports competitions of low, medium and high subjectively perceived rank.MethodsThe respondents aged from 15 to 23 years were studied using the psychological questionnaires Perceived Stress Scale, Profile of Mood State, and Positive and Negative Affect Schedule during sports events. 362 measurements using POMS and 232 (...) measurements using PANAS before the starts were collected. The significance of intergroup differences was determined using the Kruskal-Wallis test. A stepwise regression analysis was used to determine the emotional predictors of sports results.ResultsSubjective rank of sports competition differentiated significantly anger, confusion, depression, fatigue, vigour, positive emotions, and negative emotions. Regression analysis showed the influence of mood states and positive emotions on the sports result.ConclusionThe swimmers’ affective state changed depending on the subjective rank of the competition. Depression and positive emotional state made it possible to predict the result in medium- and high-rank competition. (shrink)

Focusing on the first journal in 'The Unabridged Journals of Sylvia Plath', this book writes a convincing case for the value of corpus-based stylistics and narrative psychology in the analysis of representations of the experience of affective states.Situated at the intersection between language study, psychology and healthcare, this study of the personal writing of a poet and novelist showcases a cutting-edge combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches, including metaphor analysis, corpus methods, and second person narration. Techniques that systematically (...) account for representations of experiences of affective states, such as those in this book, are rare and crucial in improving understanding of these experiences. The findings and methods of this book therefore potentially have bearing on the study, diagnosis and treatment of depression and other mental illnesses. Zsófia Demjén follows the cognitive turn in both literary studies and linguistics here, emerging with a greater understanding of Plath, her diarized output and her experience of her inner world. (shrink)

A summary of The Emotional Mind: A Control Theory of Affective States is presented: I claim that a convincing account of the emotions requires a rethink of how the mind as a whole is structured. I provide this reconceptualization by introducing a fundamental type of mental concept called “valent representation" and then systematically elaborating this fundamental type in stages. In this way, accounts are provided of the various sorts of affective states ranging from pains and pleasures (...) to character traits. (shrink)

We applaud Gasper (2018) for reviewing five approaches to operationalizing neutral states. To supplement Gasper’s important contribution, we express the five neutral conditions at the appraisal level with the hope of clarifying their defining features and helping researchers to generate suitable neutral conditions.

According to dominant views in affective computing, artificial systems e.g. robots and algorithms cannot experience emotion because they lack the phenomenological aspect associated with emotional experience. In this paper I suggest that if we wish to design artificial systems such that they are able to experience emotion states with phenomenal properties we should approach artificial phenomenology by borrowing insights from the concept of ‘attunement to the world’ introduced by early phenomenologists. This concept refers to an openness to the (...) world, a connection with the world which rejects the distinction between an internal mind and the external world. Early phenomenologists such as Heidegger, consider this ‘attunement’ necessary for the experience of affective states. I argue that, if one accepts that the phenomenological aspect is part of the emotion state and that ‘attunement to the world’ is necessary for experiencing emotion, affective computing should focus on designing artificial systems which are ‘attuned to the world’ in the phenomenological sense to enable them to experience emotion. Current accounts of the phenomenal properties of affective states, analyse them in terms of specific types of representations. As artificial systems lack a capability for such representation mainly because of an inability to determine relevance in changing contexts (‘the frame problem’), artificial phenomenology is impossible. I argue that some affective states, such as ‘attunement’ are not necessarily representational and as such a lack of capacity for representation does not imply that artificial phenomenology is impossible. At the same time ‘attunement’ helps restrict some aspects of the ‘frame problem’ and as such, goes some way of enabling representational states such as emotion. (shrink)

The Emotional Mind: A Control Theory of Affective States. By Cochrane Tom.

Factory workers make up a large proportion of China’s internal migrants and may be highly susceptible to job and adaptation stress, negative affective states, and Internet gaming disorder. This cross-sectional study investigated the relationships between job stress, psychological adaptation, negative affective states and IGD among 1,805 factory workers recruited by stratified multi-stage sampling between October and December 2019. Structural equation modeling was conducted to test the proposed mediation model. Among the participants, 67.3% were male and 71.7% (...) were aged 35 years old or below. The prevalence of probable depression, probable anxiety, and IGD was 39.3, 28.7, and 7.5%. Being male, younger age, and shorter duration of living in Shenzhen were associated with higher IGD scores. Job stress was significantly associated with IGD but not with negative affective states. Psychological adaptation was significantly associated with negative affective states. Negative affective states were positively associated with IGD. The indirect effect of psychological adaptation but not job stress on IGD through negative affective states was statistically significant. The observed psychological correlates and mechanisms are modifiable, and can inform the design of evidence-based prevention programs for depression, anxiety, and IGD in this population. (shrink)

The paper explores situational and dispositional underpinnings of cooperative behavior. According to psychological research, cooperation is strongly related to affective states and personality dimensions. In an experimental study we examined the conditions under which people cooperate with each other. The dispositional traits of co-workers, the contribution to a collaborative effort, and a situational factor – ambient odor condition were taken into consideration. A one-way ANOVA revealed that compared to a malodorous condition, both the pleasant odor condition and the (...) natural odor condition showed higher rates of cooperation. Further analysis indicated that only malodors influenced affective states which in turn determined social decisions. Although we found effects for the participants’ agreeableness and the coworker’s contribution to a joint work, they appeared to play a less critical role than affective states induced by the experimental odor conditions tested here. (shrink)

Affective effects on breadth of attention have been related to aspects of different components of affective states such as the arousal and valence of affective experience and the motivational intensity of action tendency. As none of these explanations fully aligns with existing evidence, we hypothesised that affective effects on breadth of attention may arise from the appraisal component of affective states. Based on this reconceptualisation, we tested the effects of conduciveness and power appraisals (...) on two measures of breadth of attention. In two web-based experiments, we manipulated these appraisals in a 2 × 2 design using a game-like arithmetic task where participants could (1) gain or lose rewards (goal conducive vs. obstructive) based on (2) either their action or the actions of a “robot” (high vs. low power). Breadth of attention was assessed using the flanker task (Experiment 1; n = 236) and the Navon task (Experiment 2; n = 215). We found that appraisals did not directly influence breadth of attention even though high power appraisal significantly improved the overall performance in both experiments indicating successful appraisal manipulation. We discuss ways in which these findings inform future efforts to explain the origins of affective effects on attentional breadth. (shrink)

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is (...) possible only due to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

Recent literature reported that judgments of semantic coherence are influenced by a positive affective response due to increased fluency of processing. The presented paper investigates whether fluency of processing can be modified by affective responses to the coherent stimuli as well as an automaticity of processes involved in semantic coherence judgments. The studies employed the dyads of triads task in which participants are shown two word triads and asked to solve a semantically coherent one or indicate which of (...) the two is semantically coherent. Across two studies in a dualtask paradigm we show that a) attentional resources moderate insight into semantically coherent word triads, whereas b) judgments of semantic coherence judgments are independent of attentional resources. We discuss implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgments of semantic coherence. (shrink)

Research on human motion perception shows that people are highly adept at inferring emotional states from body movements. Yet, this process is mediated by a number of individual factors and experie...

We applaud Gasper for reviewing five approaches to operationalizing neutral states. To supplement Gasper’s important contribution, we express the five neutral conditions at the appraisal lev...

We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems (...) in the contemporary philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Abstract4E approaches to affective technology tend to focus on how ‘users’ manage their situated affectivity, analogously to how they help themselves cognitively through epistemic actions or using artefacts and scaffolding. Here I focus on cases where the function of affective technology is to exploit or manipulate the agent engaging with it. My opening example is the cigarette, where technological refinements have harmfully transformed the affective process of consuming nicotine. I proceed to develop case studies of two very (...) different but also harmful affective technologies. Casinos and electronic gambling machines deploy computationally intensive scaffolding to shape the onset and continuation of gambling episodes. High-heeled shoes affectively engineer wearers’ relationships to their own embodied capacities and are predominantly expected to be worn by women. I conclude with a discussion of the need for study of affective technology to focus other-directed applications, some of which will serve competing or antagonistic interests. (shrink)