Abstract

According to dominant views in affective computing, artificial systems e.g. robots and algorithms cannot experience emotion because they lack the phenomenological aspect associated with emotional experience. In this paper I suggest that if we wish to design artificial systems such that they are able to experience emotion states with phenomenal properties we should approach artificial phenomenology by borrowing insights from the concept of ‘attunement to the world’ introduced by early phenomenologists. This concept refers to an openness to the world, a connection with the world which rejects the distinction between an internal mind and the external world. Early phenomenologists such as Heidegger, consider this ‘attunement’ necessary for the experience of affective states. I argue that, if one accepts that the phenomenological aspect is part of the emotion state and that ‘attunement to the world’ is necessary for experiencing emotion, affective computing should focus on designing artificial systems which are ‘attuned to the world’ in the phenomenological sense to enable them to experience emotion. Current accounts of the phenomenal properties of affective states, analyse them in terms of specific types of representations. As artificial systems lack a capability for such representation mainly because of an inability to determine relevance in changing contexts (‘the frame problem’), artificial phenomenology is impossible. I argue that some affective states, such as ‘attunement’ are not necessarily representational and as such a lack of capacity for representation does not imply that artificial phenomenology is impossible. At the same time ‘attunement’ helps restrict some aspects of the ‘frame problem’ and as such, goes some way of enabling representational states such as emotion.