Synthese 124 (2):239-255 (2000)

Authors
Neil Campbell
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is not a possibility we should take seriously. The principle reason is that if someone's qualia were inverted in the specified manner there is reason to believe the phenomenal difference would manifest itself in behaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, I suggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, are partly constituted by an affective component which would be inverted along with the connected qualia. The resulting affective inversions will, given the intimate connections that exist between emotions and behaviour, likely manifest themselves in behaviour, in which case the underlying phenomenal differences can be functionally captured. Second, I argue that other sense modalities lack the structural features necessary for undetectable inversion which, because of their analogy with colour qualia, weakens the plausibility of such an inversion in the original case of vision.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005237026544
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,410
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Generalizing Qualia Inversion.Neil Campbell - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.
Inverting Intentional Content.R. Takenaga - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Generalizing Qualia Inversion.Neil Campbell - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.
Qualia Compression.Lieven Decock & Igor Douven - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):129-150.
Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
Constrained Inversions of Sensations.Erik Myin - 2001 - Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.
Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap.Clyde L. Hardin - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.
Functionalism and Inverted Spectra.David J. Cole - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):207-22.
Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Spectrum Inversion and the Color Solid.Austen Clark - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):431-43.
Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement):109-131.
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
Functionalism and Qualia.Kalevi Lehto - 2003 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
Introspection and Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
139 ( #85,274 of 2,519,852 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #270,671 of 2,519,852 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes