Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 24 (sup1):203-225 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Pragmatists challenge a sharp separation of issues of theoretical and practical rationality. This can encourage a sort of anti-realism: our classifications and theories are shaped by our interests and practical concerns. However, it need not do this. A more fundamental theme is that cognition is itself an activity, the attempt to solve problems and discover truths effectively and responsibly. Evidence has to be collected, experiments have to be devised and carried out, dialogues must be engaged in with fellow inquirers, decisions must be made about when we have scrutinized our opinions enough to trust our results. Even if our goals are “purely cognitive,” the attempt to achieve them through inquiry and deliberation is an activity. The normative standards that guide its conduct, like those governing any activity, will include standards of practical rationality. Indeed, we might suggest that a belief isjustifiedso long as it is the product of responsible, well-executed inquiry.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Regulating Inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:149-157.
Self-doubt: One Moral of the Story.Susan Verducci - 2014 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 33 (6):609-620.
Affective states and indian asthetics.Niels Hammer - 2008 - Mind and Matter 6 (2):147-177.
Affect regulation and affective forecasting.George Loewenstein - 2007 - In James J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation. Guilford Press. pp. 180--203.
Reid and Moral Emotions.Sabine Roeser - 2009 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):177-192.
Value and the regulation of the sentiments.Justin D’Arms - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-03-29

Downloads
123 (#143,508)

6 months
9 (#290,637)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Hookway
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.
Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.
A new role for emotions in epistemology.Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle - 2008 - In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. pp. 1--31.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
Unnatural Doubts.Michael Williams - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):533-547.
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.E. N. - 1936 - Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):107-109.

View all 7 references / Add more references