A widely held view holds that it is permissible to conduct destructive research on embryos discarded following fertility treatment, but not on embryos especially created for research. One argument in support of this view appeals to the nothing-is-lost principle. It holds that because discarded embryos will die soon in any case, and something good is expected to come out of using them for research, it is presumptively permissible to do so. It is then claimed that (...) no equivalent justification can be adduced in support of destructive research on embryos especially created for research. I argue that, on a standard formulation of the nothing-is-lost principle, this argument fails. I consider whether other plausible variants of the principle render the argument sound and argue that they do not. (shrink)

Many who believe that human embryos have moral status are convinced that their use in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research can be morally justified as long as they are discarded embryos left over from fertility treatments. This is one reason why this view about discarded embryos has played such a prominent role in the debate over publicly funding hESC research in the United States and other countries. Many believe that this view offers the best (...) chance of a compromise between the different sides in this debate. This paper focuses on what seems to be the most plausible argument for this view about discarded embryos. It shows that this argument is unsound regardless of how one understands the claim that embryos have moral status. It also discusses the implications of this conclusion for attempts to use this argument as a basis for public policy. (shrink)

Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are far more (...) effective strategies for preserving the lives of frozen embryos than adoption. Moreover, we point out that those who regard the deaths of frozen embryos as a very bad thing will generally regard the deaths of all embryos as a very bad thing, whether they are discarded embryos, aborted embryos or embryos that spontaneously abort. This entails these other embryos must be taken into account when considering moral obligations, as well as other human lives at risk from preventable causes. (shrink)

The paper by Savulescu et al is timely and the concepts illuminated deserve further reflection.1 Reproductive tissue which includes sperm, oocytes and embryos are commonly treated differently to other human tissue, even when the reproductive potential of these has no possibility of being realised. This unnecessary exceptionalism hampers research in human reproduction, disadvantaging patients and delaying life-changing treatments from being incorporated into clinical practice. In jurisdictions where embryo creation is permitted for clinical purposes, such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF), (...) supernumerary embryos are routinely discarded once they are no longer required to attempt pregnancy. We contend that research on such embryos, which will never realise their reproductive potential, is not substantially different to any other human tissue research and should not require any additional ethical or regulatory oversight. The only individuals who can possibly be harmed by such research are the tissue providers and their interests, including confidentiality and informed consent provision, should be protected. This protection once again is no different in its scope to any other type of research involving human cells and tissues. Most Western societies have moved away from the concept that ‘every sperm is sacred’ and it is time that the regulators and scientific community aligned with the prevailing communal norms and stop treating gametes and embryos as somehow holding higher moral value, compared with other human cell/tissue lines, provided that there is no intention to attempt a pregnancy …. (shrink)

Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos ('discarded-created-distinction', from now (...) on d-c-d). I will point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main focus is that the 'revealed beliefs' of its defenders are inconsistent with their 'professed beliefs', more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate individual human suffering. (shrink)

When prospective parents use in vitro fertilization, many of them hope to generate more embryos than they intend to implant immediately. The technology often requires multiple attempts to reach a successful pregnancy, and couples can cryopreserve any excess embryos so that they have them on hand for later attempts. As part of obtaining informed consent for IVF or cryopreservation, clinics typically ask patients to specify their preferences for the embryos in the event of divorce or death, offering (...) options such as use of the embryos by a specified partner, donation to research, or discarding the remaining embryos. Still, many courts face a recurring problem: the partners dissolve their relationship, and one party wants to use the frozen embryos over the objections of the other. Courts and legislatures have struggled with how to handle these cases, which seem to pit one partner's right to procreate against the other's right not to procreate. In this essay, we use one of the most recent decisions in this line of cases—the Appellate Court of Illinois's decision in Szafranski v. Dunston—to explain the current state of the law and make recommendations for changes. The issue is ripe for revisiting because in the last year, embryo disputes have become a battlefront for larger conflagrations over the moral status of embryos. (shrink)

Many of the thousands of human embryos currently in cryogenic storage will sooner or later be discarded, often after being experimented upon. Others will remain in storage indefinitely, left there by parents who have no plans either to bring them to term or to offer them for adoption. These facts, coupled with a commitment to the basic moral equality of all human beings at all stages of development, generate a pressing question: What should be done for these (...) class='Hi'>embryos whose vital activities have been suspended and whose futures look so bleak? This paper offers a case that allows some of these cryogenically stored embryos to thaw and die, allows disposal of their remains in a manner that reflects their status, and is morally acceptable in that it is consistent with the principles that many accept as governing the removal of life-sustaining treatment in end-of-life cases. (shrink)

BackgroundHuman embryonic stem cells are currently used for developing treatment against Parkinson’s disease (PD). However, the use of ES cells is surrounded with moral concerns. Research regarding the public's attitudes can form an important basis for policymaking. The aim was to explore the perceptions of the public on using donated human embryos for developing treatment of Parkinson’s Disease.MethodsSemi-structured individual qualitative interviews were conducted with 11 members of the general population in Sweden. Interviews were analyzed with thematic content analyses.ResultsFour categories (...) and additional sub-categories; Different views on the embryo requires delicacy, Using embryos to treat Parkinson’s disease, Doing things in the right way, and Communication, media, and public opinion. In general, respondents were positive towards the usage of embryotic stem cells to treat PD, but the usage were conditioned and specific terms were demanded. Informed consent from both donors were required and delicacy and sensitivity when working with embryos were needed.ConclusionsIt was perceived better to use surplus embryos to treat PD increase is than to discard them, also among those who perceived the embryo as “a potential life.” The participants raised several conditions under usage for treatment should be allowed. Even if the embryos otherwise are going to be discarded, usage requires informed consent from the donating couples. (shrink)

As a growing number of embryos collect in fertility clinics, it is imperative to evaluate the permissibility of available options for genetic parents and fertility institutions. Much of the discussion on appropriate treatment of embryos has focused on the circumstances under which it is permissible to destroy embryos for instrumental purposes, and thus has little application to the fertility context. I aim to develop a new account of the value of embryos whereby embryos have final (...) value in virtue of their relationship to persons that could exist. I call this symbolic value. To establish this value, I first show that corpses have this same symbolic value in virtue of their relationship to prior persons, and then show that the cases of corpses and embryos are relevantly similar. Because of this value, we ought to treat embryos in particular respectful ways. It is currently common practice in the United States to simply discard extra embryos that exist as a result of in vitro fertilization. I argue it is generally impermissible to simply discard embryos because it is an act of disrespect and does not treat them in accordance with their value. (shrink)

The success of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) worldwide has led to an accumulation of frozen embryos that are surplus to the reproductive needs of those for whom they were created. In these situations, couples must decide whether to discard them or donate them for scientific research or for use by other infertile couples. While legislation and regulation may limit the decisions that couples make, their decisions are often shaped by their religious beliefs. Unfortunately, health professionals, scientists and policy-makers are (...) often unaware of the way in which faith traditions view ART and decisions concerning the ‘fate’ of surplus embryos. In this paper scholars representing six major religious traditions provide a commentary on a hypothetical case concerning the donation or destruction of excess ART embryos. These commentaries provide a rich account of religious perspectives on the status of the human embryo and an insight into the relevance of faith to health and policy decisions, particularly in reproductive medicine, ART and embryo research. (shrink)

Issues surrounding human embryos are poignant and profound. Should research be conducted on them? Should they be discarded? Should they be donated to infertile couples? The Warnock Report was a landmark in providing guidelines limiting experimentation on human embryos to the first 14 days after fertilization, at which time implantation of the embryo is complete and the primitive streak has appeared.2 However, these embryological features were not considered sufficiently distinctive to bestow upon this 14‐day period a separate (...) classification. This situation changed when, in 1986, Anne McLaren suggested the use of the terms ‘pre‐embryo’ or ‘conceptus' to designate “the entire product of the fertilized egg up to the end of the implantation stage” and the term ’embryo‘ for “that small part of the pre‐embryo or conceptus, first distinguishable at the primitive streak stage, that later develops into the foetus.”3 In this paper we look critically at the term ‘pre‐embryo’, and we shall present the case for an alternative set of terms, namely, embryo‐placenta and embryo‐fetus. We consider this latter to be biologically‐based terminology, that does not have any connotation of restricted moral value as the term pre‐embryo does for some. (shrink)

Issues surrounding human embryos are poignant and profound. Should research be conducted on them? Should they be discarded? Should they be donated to infertile couples? The Warnock Report was a landmark in providing guidelines limiting experimentation on human embryos to the first 14 days after fertilization, at which time implantation of the embryo is complete and the primitive streak has appeared.2 However, these embryological features were not considered sufficiently distinctive to bestow upon this 14‐day period a separate (...) classification. This situation changed when, in 1986, Anne McLaren suggested the use of the terms ‘pre‐embryo’ or ‘conceptus' to designate “the entire product of the fertilized egg up to the end of the implantation stage” and the term ’embryo‘ for “that small part of the pre‐embryo or conceptus, first distinguishable at the primitive streak stage, that later develops into the foetus.”3In this paper we look critically at the term ‘pre‐embryo’, and we shall present the case for an alternative set of terms, namely, embryo‐placenta and embryo‐fetus. We consider this latter to be biologically‐based terminology, that does not have any connotation of restricted moral value as the term pre‐embryo does for some. (shrink)

On August 1, 1996, due to the expiration of the five-year preservation limit provided by British law for unclaimed and legally unusable frozen embryos, 3,300 embryos were thawed and discarded. In Italy the news of this impending event triggered many reactions among scholars as well as the general population. In Massa, a little town in Tuscany, a most unusual response arose. Two hundred women banded together and asked to carry out a prenatal adoption. Their purpose in making (...) this request was to avoid what they believed to be mass infanticide. Many of the women were married and already had children. They belonged to a local Catholic association. Nonetheless, their reaction was their own response to numerous appeals to respect life by the Catholic Church worldwide and by Italian Catholic thinkers especially. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NABER on Embryo SplittingMichael B. BurkeMadam:In its interesting Report on Human Cloning through Embryo Splitting: An Amber Light (KIEJ, September 1994), NABER (the National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction) discusses ten potential clinical uses of embryo splitting. With one member dissenting, NABER finds two of the uses to be acceptable in principle: (1) “to improve the chances of initiating pregnancy in those individuals undergoing IVF who produce only (...) a limited number of embryos for transfer and implantation” (p. 267) and (2) “to minimize the number of egg retrieval procedures for those undergoing IVF by providing embryos for cryopreservation and future transfer” (p. 268).However, some members of NABER limit their support for these uses to cases in which none of the embryos into which the originals are split are intentionally destroyed (see pp. 266–68). I find their position puzzling. They consider it “ethically unacceptable to discard cryopreserved embryos” (p. 268). In general, they object to intentional destruction of embryos resulting from embryo splitting. Yet they accept intentional destruction of the original embryos.Does the splitting of an embryo truly destroy it? Yes, it does, at least if the embryo is split into two equal parts—or into more than two parts, none of which contains a majority of the cells contained by the original. Suppose, for instance, that a two-cell embryo has been split into two one-cell embryos. Then the original embryo, although it may not have “died” and although its cells have both survived, has nonetheless ceased to exist. Even though the resulting one-cell embryos are identical genetically to the original embryo, neither of them is that embryo. (There is nothing to confer this honor on one of them rather than the other.) The original embryo has undergone what I will call “destructive splitting.”Now it is possible, even likely, that some splittings are not destructive splittings. Suppose that a four-cell embryo is spilt into a three-cell embryo and a one-cell embryo. At least from my perspective as an identity theorist, there is nothing to stop us from identifying the three-cell embryo with the four-cell original: we could say that the original embryo, although diminished, still exists. In any case, there is no indication that any members of NABER intended to limit their acceptance of embryo splitting to cases in which the original embryo survives.How are we to understand the apparent indifference of conservative members of NABER to the embryo that is split, given their concern for the embryos that result from the split? Perhaps the explanation is found in the following passage:NABER members represent a broad spectrum of views on the moral status of the embryo, and yet virtually all of them find embryo splitting per se ethically permissible if the resulting embryos are not damaged or destroyed in the process. These members maintain that there is nothing inherently wrong with creating several embryos [End Page 210] from a single embryo, providing all the embryos involved [except the original!] remain intact at the conclusion of the procedure. Embryo splitting parallels the spontaneous production of identical twins or triplets at this stage of embryo development, an occurrence that is accepted in our society with equanimity. The fact that embryo splitting is deliberately used to produce multiple embryos does not make it inherently wrong to employ the procedure.(Report, pp. 266–67)This argument appears to rely on the following principle: if something is properly viewed with equanimity when it happens spontaneously, then it is not inherently wrong to bring it about deliberately. At least in its full generality, this is a principle generally and rightly viewed with suspicion (by moral conservatives above all). Although it is proper to view with equanimity, even with relief, the natural deaths of terminally ill patients in great pain, many hold that active euthanasia is inherently wrong.When NABER has occasion to revisit the issue of embryo splitting, those members who object to destruction of embryos resulting from embryo splitting should make clear whether they accept the destructive splitting of embryos. If they do, they should clarify their reasons for accepting it.Michael B. BurkeDepartment of Philosophy Indiana... (shrink)

Is it morally acceptable to use human embryos left over from fertility treatments in research that would harm or destroy them? Many answer "no" to this question on the grounds that all human beings, including human embryos, have a basic moral status that forbids such use. There are some, though, who accept this claim about the basic moral status of human embryos but who believe nevertheless that frozen human embryos which were generated for fertility treatments but (...) which are no longer wanted for that project are a morally acceptable source of human embryonic stem cells and are acceptable subjects of other forms of research that would destroy them in course. The reasoning offered in defense of this position typically employs the claim that since these embryos are going to be discarded anyway, their possibly fruitful use by researchers is a preferable alternative and one that is not inconsistent with their basic moral status. Howard Curzer has offered a well-developed argument of this sort, defending the use of these embryos in the ways mentioned while at the same time allowing for their equal basic moral status. This article challenges Curzer’s case and offers reasons to reject the moral acceptability of using even these to-be-discarded embryos as research material. (shrink)

A number of advances in assisted reproduction have been greeted by the accusation that they would produce children ‘without parents’. In this paper I will argue that while to date these accusations have been false, there is a limited but important sense in which they would be true of children born of a reproductive technology that is now on the horizon. If our genetic parents are those individuals from whom we have inherited 50% of our genes, then, unlike in any (...) other reproductive scenario, children who were conceived from gametes derived from stem cell lines derived from discarded IVF embryos would have no genetic parents! This paper defends this claim and investigates its ethical implications. I argue that there are reasons to think that the creation of such embryos might be morally superior to the existing alternatives in an important set of circumstances. (shrink)

As is the case around the globe, South African fertility clinics face an ever‐expanding problem: what to do with the growing number of surplus cryopreserved embryos. Fertility clinics remain hesitant to destroy these abandoned embryos, partly because of concerns about the legal ramifications. This article clarifies the legal position in South Africa and offers practical recommendations to assist fertility clinics in managing abandoned embryos. In sum, fertility clinics cannot deem embryos as abandoned and discard them if (...) fertility patients fail to respond to a notice that the embryo storage agreement is about to expire. However, if there is non‐payment for embryo storage by fertility patients and the fertility clinic has informed the fertility patients of other options available to them with respect to their embryos, and there is still no response, the fertility clinic is legally entitled – and legally obliged – to discard the embryos. (shrink)

Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos (‘discarded‐created‐distinction’, from now (...) on d‐c‐d). I will point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main reason is that the ‘revealed beliefs’ of its defenders are inconsistent with their ‘professed beliefs’, more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d‐c‐d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d‐c‐d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell‐research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d‐c‐d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate individual human suffering. (shrink)

Anxieties about the creation and destruction of human embryos for the purpose of scientific research on embryonic stem cells have given a new urgency to the question of whether embryos have moral rights. This article uses a thought experiment involving two possible worlds, somewhat removed from our own in the space of possibilities, to shed light on whether early embryos have such rights as a right not to be destroyed or discarded . It is argued that (...) early embryos do not have meaningful interests or any moral rights. Accordingly, claims about the moral rights of embryos do not justify restrictions on stem cell research. (shrink)

Part of the normalization of assisted reproductive technologies is the premise that the children born from in vitro fertilization are no different from their counterparts conceived spontaneously. However, interest in peri-conception health and new epigenetic understandings of biological plasticity has led to some questioning the presumed irrelevance of conception in vitro, and when doing so, describing IVF children as “apparently healthy.” Taking “apparently” and “healthy” seriously, this article explores how modes of attention—ways of naming and framing embryo potentiality—shape understandings of (...) health and normality. I contend that understanding the politics of potentiality, and how they may emerge in a postgenomic age, requires an unpacking of various modes of attention and framing. Ethnographic findings from South Africa’s fertility clinics and emerging literature on epigenetic variation in IVF conception demonstrate how, under a genetic mode of attention, IVF clinics views “abnormality” as fated, unviable, and discardable. Exploring the possibility of answering the postgenomic questions to IVF reveals structural challenges to knowing long-term health implications. Incipient attempts within the fertility clinic at managing these questions shows various strategic techniques, such as leveraging epigenetics to marketable ends and shifts to individual responsibility. (shrink)

BackgroundPrevious studies have found that the decision-making process for stored unused frozen embryos involves much emotional burden influenced by socio-cultural factors. This study aims to ascertain how Japanese patients make a decision on the fate of their frozen embryos: whether to continue storage discard or donate to research.MethodsTen Japanese women who continued storage, 5 who discarded and 16 who donated to research were recruited from our infertility clinic. Tape-recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed for emergent themes.ResultsA model (...) of patients’ decision-making processes for the fate of frozen embryos was developed, with a common emergent theme, “coming to terms with infertility” resulting in either acceptance or postponing acceptance of their infertility. The model consisted of 5 steps: 1) the embryo-transfer moratorium was sustained, 2) the “Mottainai”- embryo and having another child were considered; 3) cost reasonability was taken into account; 4) partner’s opinion was confirmed to finally decide whether to continue or discontinue storage. Those discontinuing, then contemplated 5): the effect of donation. Great emotional conflict was expressed in the theme, steps 2, 4, and 5.ConclusionsPatients’ 5 step decision-making process for the fate of frozen embryos was profoundly affected by various Japanese cultural values and moral standards. At the end of their decision, patients used culturally inherent values and standards to come to terms with their infertility. While there is much philosophical discussion on the moral status of the embryo worldwide, this study, with actual views of patients who own them, will make a significant contribution to empirical ethics from the practical viewpoint. (shrink)

In this article I rebut conservative objections to five phases of embryonic stem cell research. I argue that researchers using existing embryonic stem cell lines are not complicit in the past destruction of embryos because beneficiaries of immoral acts are not necessary morally tainted. Second, such researchers do not encourage the destruction of additional embryos because fertility clinics presently destroy more spare embryos than researchers need. Third, actually harvesting stem cells from slated-to-be-discarded embryos is not (...) wrong. The embryos are not sacrificed for the good of others because they would have been destroyed anyway. Fourth, harvesting stem cells from embryos that are not doomed is morally acceptable, because preserving frozen embryos is futile therapy. Finally, creating embryos solely for the sake of harvesting stem cells from them is morally acceptable because the assumption that embryos have the right to life has very counterintuitive implications. (shrink)

This article explores the impact of Dobbs on access to assisted reproductive technologies. Clinical aspects of IVF, including embryo discard and cryopreservation, preimplantation genetic testing, and selective reduction of multiple pregnancy are potentially jeopardized by a new legal landscape that protects embryos over the interest of infertility patients.

This paper discusses the issue of whether we have responsibilities to future generations with respect to genetic screening, including for purposes of selective abortion or discard. Future generations have been discussed at length among scholars. The concept of ‘Guardianfor Future Generations’ is tackled and its main criticisms discussed. Whilst germ-line cures, it is argued, can only affect family trees, genetic screening and testing can have wider implications. If asking how this may affect future generations is a legitimate question and since (...) we indeed make retrospective moral judgements, it would be wise to consider that future generations will make the same retrospective judgements on us. Moreover such technologies affect present embryos to which we indeed can be considered to have an obligation. (shrink)

Although principles, as a framework to resolving moral dilemmas are still debated and seem to be in a philosophical quagmire, there are strong arguments that by specification one can resolve case-specific dilemmas in certain areas of bioethics. When it comes to genetic screening and testing however, the problem at the base is a moral disagreement on higher-order principles—such as the status of the embryo and parental issues. No amount of specification can resolve these issues without a dose of relativism. We (...) explore a possibility of agreement on debatable areas specifically in regard to genetics—such as conferring status to the embryo solely for purposes of preventing genetic selection; but it is difficult to see how this can be incorporated into law without extrapolation to other areas. We conclude therefore that the four-principles approach, albeit valuable for expounding opposing views and discussing issues, cannot either alone or by specification, help resolve issues of genetic screening and testing without agreeing on higher order principle. This does not seem to be a possibility in the near future. (shrink)

This issue includes a number of papers on reproductive ethics, broadly construed. In a recent book, Anja Karnein proposed that embryos created in vitro should be offered up for adoption before being discarded or used in research;1 here Timothy Murphy offers a critical response . Elsewhere, Tak Chan and Stark & Delatycki debate the role of medical professionals in providing parentage determination. Chan argues that doctors are obliged to provide parentage tests when this is requested by parents, provided (...) there is a low risk that the child will be abandoned . Stark & Delatycki discuss some difficulties raised by the ‘risk of abandonment’ condition . Finally, papers by Kate Greasley and David Lang discuss the controversy surrounding the criminal prosecution of abortion doctor Kermit Gosnell. Greasley criticises the way in which some commentators capitalised on horror at Gosnell's extreme practices to advance more general anti-abortion objectives . Lang argues, against Greasley, that the dominant pro-life response to the case was neither self-contradictory nor intellectually dishonest .The issue is dominated, however, by discussions of ‘bioenhancement’ – the use of biomedical technologies to augment human capacities. A common criticism of bioenhancements is that they are anti-social: though they may benefit the user, they will have a negative effect on society-at-large. Such concerns are perhaps well placed in relation to the most obvious contemporary examples of bioenhancement: doping in sport, aesthetic medicine, and the use of stimulants to enhance examination performance. However, two varieties of bioenhancement discussed in this issue might be thought to have more positive social effects.David Shaw discusses the possible use of cognitive enhancing drugs to improve health outcomes in disadvantaged segments of society . Such enhancements might be thought to have desirable social …. (shrink)

The views on in vitro fertilization within Russian Orthodox Christian society are diverse. One reason for that variation is the ambiguity found in “The Basis of the Social Concept,” the document issued in 2000 by the Russian Orthodox Church and considered to be the primary guidelines for determining the Church’s stance on bioethics. This essay explores how the treatment of infertility reconciles with the Orthodox Christian faith and what methods of medical assistance for infertility may be appropriate for Orthodox Christians. (...) The focus here is on IVF because it is among the most widely used methods to overcome childlessness, and the permissibility of IVF is the object of disagreement among Orthodox. The article defines criteria that can help to discern what is absolutely wrong and must be avoided from what only falls short of the mark, but not very far, for Orthodox Christians. If treatment of the underlying causes of infertility has failed or promises no hope and a husband and a wife do not feel able to carry the Cross of infertility, then from pastoral dispensation they might be blessed to use ethically acceptable variants of IVF. IVF has many variants that are different in their spiritual influence on a person. Orthodox Christians pursuing IVF should seek spiritual guidance and a blessing to pursue IVF. They must not form more embryos than will be transferred in the same cycle. Freezing, discarding, or reduction of embryos is forbidden. Infertile couples ought to use only their reproductive cells. The use of donor gametes is unacceptable. Any embryo formed ought to be transferred into the wife’s womb, and the use of surrogates is impermissible. Only a husband and wife who are able to maintain their marital union and where the wife is still of childbearing age should be blessed to use IVF. (shrink)

The term “ectogenesis” has been around for about a century now, and it is generally understood as the development of embryos and fetuses outside a uterus. In this sense, all in vitro fertilization is ectogenesis, but in vitro development can only proceed to a certain point, at which time human embryos are then either implanted in the attempt to achieve a pregnancy, frozen for that use in the future, used in research, or discarded.

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis is a new method of prenatal diagnosis that is developing from a union of in vitro fertilization technology and molecular biology. Briefly stated, PGD involves the creation of several embryos in vitro from the eggs and sperm of an interested couple. The embryos are permitted to develop to a 6-to-10-cell stage, at which point one of the embryonic cells is removed from each embryo and the cellular DNA is analyzed for chromosomal abnormalities or genetic mutations. (...) An embryo or several embryos found to be free of genetic abnormalities are subsequently transferred to the woman's uterus for gestation. Embryos found to carry a genetic abnormality are discarded or frozen. Extra normal embryos may be frozen for future transfer or donation to another couple. (shrink)

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis is a new method of prenatal diagnosis that is developing from a union of in vitro fertilization technology and molecular biology. Briefly stated, PGD involves the creation of several embryos in vitro from the eggs and sperm of an interested couple. The embryos are permitted to develop to a 6-to-10-cell stage, at which point one of the embryonic cells is removed from each embryo and the cellular DNA is analyzed for chromosomal abnormalities or genetic mutations. (...) An embryo or several embryos found to be free of genetic abnormalities are subsequently transferred to the woman's uterus for gestation. Embryos found to carry a genetic abnormality are discarded or frozen. Extra normal embryos may be frozen for future transfer or donation to another couple. (shrink)

This Article considers the moral and legal status of practices that aim to modify traits in human offspring. As advancements in reproductive biotechnology give parents greater power to shape the genetic constitution of their children, an emerging school of legal scholars has ushered in a privatized paradigm of genetic control. Commentators defend a constitutionally protected right to prenatal engineering by appeal to the significance of procreative liberty and the promise of producing future generations who are more likely to have their (...) lives go well. This 'new eugenics,' however, confronts us with ethical challenges that neither liberal arguments about autonomy, fairness, and consent, nor utilitarian arguments about preferences, happiness, and equality, are able to capture. I begin by analyzing the Supreme Court's modern substantive due process jurisprudence, as it bears on recent advancements and controversies in genetic science. After developing a doctrinal framework that could support an asserted right to genetic engineering, I draw on empirical research in behavioral psychology to examine the influence of eugenic norms on egalitarian attitudes and institutions. I predict that if parents become accustomed to choosing the genes of their children, it would be radically more difficult to give an influential account for why the successful should adopt a charitable posture toward those who are less fortunate. I argue that by shifting control over offspring DNA from chance to choice, enhancement will inflate a sense of individual entitlement for social and economic outcomes. I conclude that increasing willingness to prevent the birth of abnormal children distracts attention from institutions that fail to accommodate the limitations of imperfect people. Some may reply that producing people who better fit the roles society chooses to reward need not deter us from providing for people whose abilities fail to meet the demands of modern society. However, this reply misses the way that changes in reproductive practices can bring about changes in the way that we understand our identities and relationships. Eugenic solutions to social problems such as poverty, crime, and unemployment reshape the challenge of genetic disadvantage so that it is no longer one we address through collective measures such as public education, social services, and income redistribution, and instead becomes one for individual parents to prevent through donor screening, embryo discard, or selective abortion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future Directions for Oversight of Stem Cell Research in the United StatesCynthia B. Cohen (bio) and Mary A. Majumder (bio)Human pluripotent stem cell research, meaning research into cells that can multiply indefinitely and differentiate into almost all the cells of the body, has become a minefield in which science, ethics, and politics have collided over the last decade in the United States. President Barack Obama entered this highly charged (...) territory when he indicated during his campaign that once in office he would issue an executive order expanding federally funded human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research and introduce rigorous oversight of it (Obama 2008a & b). Candidate Obama stated that he would require that the hESC lines involved were derived with donor consent from early embryos that otherwise would be discarded following in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment. However, in contrast with the policy of President George W. Bush, he would do so without regard to the date of their derivation. He added that he would call upon the director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to develop guidelines for federally funded hESC and other pluripotent stem cell research that would draw from the guidelines developed in 2005 by the National Academies of Science (NAS) for privately funded research (National Research Council 2005).A similar policy was written into the 2008 version of the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, which reiterates the policy enunciated in earlier versions of this bill, passed twice by the Congress but vetoed by President Bush each time (House of Representatives, 110th Congress 2008).1 Depending on how one reads the 2008 version of the act, it could also apply in certain respects to hESC research that is not federally funded. We proceed on the assumption that the act applies at least to federally funded stem cell research. Therefore, it appears that the president or the Congress, or both, will approve of an expanded policy of federal funding of hESC research, as well as other forms of human pluripotent stem cell research. [End Page 79]This policy would make the guidelines developed by a committee appointed by NAS, a prestigious private body of American scientists and related experts, the primary basis for the development of new federal guidelines for oversight of hESC research in the United States. This would have certain advantages in that those familiar with the relevant scientific issues are likely to address them accurately and stem cell investigators are apt to accept restrictions on their research written by fellow scientists and ethics and policy experts whom they perceive as strong supporters of stem cell research. However, it also would have certain disadvantages. Chief among these is that the NAS committee appointed to write guidelines for this research, in its concern to see stem cell science move forward after a period in which many scientists and others maintained that it had been unduly restricted, might have overlooked or deferred consideration of some pressing ethical and policy issues. We maintain that this is the case—although we also maintain that the NAS guidelines provide a responsible foundation for developing NIH guidelines for stem cell research. Consequently, we propose that an NIH task force charged by the director of NIH with writing new guidelines for hESC and other stem cell research should revise and expand the NAS guidelines in ways that we propose below, as well as others that it considers necessary, and make it obligatory for those seeking federal funding of such research to follow these new guidelines.We highlight certain areas in which an ethical case can be made for strengthening the existing NAS guidelines and certain areas in which more fundamental ethical reflection—and building on that, additional guideline/policy development—seems warranted. Among the sections of the NAS guidelines that need clarification and reworking, we include those regarding consent to embryo donation, which provide one of their central focuses, and the development of human-nonhuman chimeras, which they address relatively briefly. In addition, we maintain that new guidelines need to be written to address the nascent ethical and policy issues raised by the possibility that human gametes will be induced from pluripotent stem cells in the next few years and that... (shrink)

This paper focuses on the issue of what to do if a couple who generates embryos chooses to lawfully, and in their (and my) view, ethnically discard those embryos. Specifically, is it appropriate to use the cells that come from “excess” embryos in medical research instead of discarding them when a couple has ceased trying to have any additional children?

Efforts to improve the means to diagnose and treat human genetic diseases have a long history in biomedical research and medicine. Now, preimplantation genetic diagnosis provides a new way to prevent the transmission of certain types of human genetic diseases to the next generation. It is an alternative to elective termination of pregnancies.PGD is used to test for genetic diseases that are due to defective single genes or abnormal chromosomes within days of fertilization and prior to the establishment of pregnancy. (...) The procedure essentially begins with the biopsy of one or more cells of a cleavage stage or blastocyst stage preimplantation human embryo that has been produced by in vitro fertilization. In certain cases, PGD can be done on polar bodies—discarded by-products of egg formation containing excess chromosomes—of unfertilized eggs. Then, the cell, or a polar body, is placed into a tube for single gene analysis ), or for chromosome analysis by spreading the nucleus of the cell on a microscope slide ). (shrink)

Efforts to improve the means to diagnose and treat human genetic diseases have a long history in biomedical research and medicine. Now, preimplantation genetic diagnosis provides a new way to prevent the transmission of certain types of human genetic diseases to the next generation. It is an alternative to elective termination of pregnancies.PGD is used to test for genetic diseases that are due to defective single genes or abnormal chromosomes within days of fertilization and prior to the establishment of pregnancy. (...) The procedure essentially begins with the biopsy of one or more cells of a cleavage stage or blastocyst stage preimplantation human embryo that has been produced by in vitro fertilization. In certain cases, PGD can be done on polar bodies—discarded by-products of egg formation containing excess chromosomes—of unfertilized eggs. Then, the cell, or a polar body, is placed into a tube for single gene analysis ), or for chromosome analysis by spreading the nucleus of the cell on a microscope slide ). (shrink)

It has been argued by some authors that our reaction to deaf parents who choose deafness for their children ought to be compassion, not condemnation. Although I agree with the reasoning proposed I suggest that this practice could be regarded as unethical. In this article, I shall use the term “dysgenic” as a culturally imposed genetic selection not to achieve any improvement of the human person but to select genetic traits that are commonly accepted as a disabling condition by the (...) majority of the social matrix; in short as a handicap. As in eugenics, dysgenics can be achieved in a positive and a negative way. Positive dysgenics intends to increase the overall number of people with a particular genetic trait. Marriage between deaf people or conceiving deaf children through reproductive technology are examples of positive dysgenics. Negative dysgenics can be obtained through careful prenatal or pre-implantation selection and abortion (or discarding) of normal embryos and foetuses. Only deaf children would be allowed to live. If dysgenics is seen as a programmed genetic intervention that undesirably shapes the human condition – like deliberately creating deaf or dwarf people – the professionals involved in reproductive technologies should answer the question if this should be an accepted ethical practice because the basic human right to an open future is violated. (shrink)

The February 1997 announcement of the birth of Dolly, the sheep cloned from a mammary cell of an adult ewe, has drawn attention to the growing ability to select, alter, or otherwise manipulate the genome of offspring. Prior to Dolly, ethical discussion of genes in reproduction had focused on negative selection: carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis, and abortion or embryo discard. After Dolly, ethical debate will have to consider the direct or positive use of genetic selection or alteration technology.The principal use (...) of genetic selection techniques in human reproduction likely will be to treat or prevent disease in offspring. In the future, however, such techniques might also be used to enhance or even diminish expected characteristics of progeny. Techniques to accomplish these goals are likely to include: selection of the nuclear genome, as occurs in somatic cell cloning; chromosomal transplants; or direct insertion or deletion of specific genes. (shrink)

The February 1997 announcement of the birth of Dolly, the sheep cloned from a mammary cell of an adult ewe, has drawn attention to the growing ability to select, alter, or otherwise manipulate the genome of offspring. Prior to Dolly, ethical discussion of genes in reproduction had focused on negative selection: carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis, and abortion or embryo discard. After Dolly, ethical debate will have to consider the direct or positive use of genetic selection or alteration technology.The principal use (...) of genetic selection techniques in human reproduction likely will be to treat or prevent disease in offspring. In the future, however, such techniques might also be used to enhance or even diminish expected characteristics of progeny. Techniques to accomplish these goals are likely to include: selection of the nuclear genome, as occurs in somatic cell cloning; chromosomal transplants; or direct insertion or deletion of specific genes. (shrink)

IVF/PGS procedures require that all embryos produced for potential implantation be screened for genetic abnormalities: only embryos free of genetic defects may be implanted or cryogenically preserved for future implantation. In this paper, I argue that the standard practice of the reproductive technology clinic, according to which all abnormal embryos must be discarded, unjustly imposes certain biases and discriminatory social values upon persons for whom it may not be a significant concern that their offspring would be (...) disabled. The “standard” practice both reflects a bias against disability and imposes this bias upon those who seek reproductive assistance from RTCs. I argue, therefore, that insofar as consenting to the destruction of any abnormal embryos as a condition of IVF treatment, RTCs threaten the autonomy of women seeking medical assistance to overcome infertility. Finally, I examine recent empirical findings which suggest that genetic screening and destruction of abnormal embryos does not actually aid the overall objective of IVF, which is live birth, and may actually hinder it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future Directions for Oversight of Stem Cell Research in the United StatesCynthia B. Cohen (bio) and Mary A. Majumder (bio)Human pluripotent stem cell research, meaning research into cells that can multiply indefinitely and differentiate into almost all the cells of the body, has become a minefield in which science, ethics, and politics have collided over the last decade in the United States. President Barack Obama entered this highly charged (...) territory when he indicated during his campaign that once in office he would issue an executive order expanding federally funded human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research and introduce rigorous oversight of it (Obama 2008a & b). Candidate Obama stated that he would require that the hESC lines involved were derived with donor consent from early embryos that otherwise would be discarded following in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment. However, in contrast with the policy of President George W. Bush, he would do so without regard to the date of their derivation. He added that he would call upon the director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to develop guidelines for federally funded hESC and other pluripotent stem cell research that would draw from the guidelines developed in 2005 by the National Academies of Science (NAS) for privately funded research (National Research Council 2005).A similar policy was written into the 2008 version of the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, which reiterates the policy enunciated in earlier versions of this bill, passed twice by the Congress but vetoed by President Bush each time (House of Representatives, 110th Congress 2008).1 Depending on how one reads the 2008 version of the act, it could also apply in certain respects to hESC research that is not federally funded. We proceed on the assumption that the act applies at least to federally funded stem cell research. Therefore, it appears that the president or the Congress, or both, will approve of an expanded policy of federal funding of hESC research, as well as other forms of human pluripotent stem cell research. [End Page 79]This policy would make the guidelines developed by a committee appointed by NAS, a prestigious private body of American scientists and related experts, the primary basis for the development of new federal guidelines for oversight of hESC research in the United States. This would have certain advantages in that those familiar with the relevant scientific issues are likely to address them accurately and stem cell investigators are apt to accept restrictions on their research written by fellow scientists and ethics and policy experts whom they perceive as strong supporters of stem cell research. However, it also would have certain disadvantages. Chief among these is that the NAS committee appointed to write guidelines for this research, in its concern to see stem cell science move forward after a period in which many scientists and others maintained that it had been unduly restricted, might have overlooked or deferred consideration of some pressing ethical and policy issues. We maintain that this is the case—although we also maintain that the NAS guidelines provide a responsible foundation for developing NIH guidelines for stem cell research. Consequently, we propose that an NIH task force charged by the director of NIH with writing new guidelines for hESC and other stem cell research should revise and expand the NAS guidelines in ways that we propose below, as well as others that it considers necessary, and make it obligatory for those seeking federal funding of such research to follow these new guidelines.We highlight certain areas in which an ethical case can be made for strengthening the existing NAS guidelines and certain areas in which more fundamental ethical reflection—and building on that, additional guideline/policy development—seems warranted. Among the sections of the NAS guidelines that need clarification and reworking, we include those regarding consent to embryo donation, which provide one of their central focuses, and the development of human-nonhuman chimeras, which they address relatively briefly. In addition, we maintain that new guidelines need to be written to address the nascent ethical and policy issues raised by the possibility that human gametes will be induced from pluripotent stem cells in the next few years and that... (shrink)

Iran is the only Muslim country that has legislation on embryo donation, adopted in 2003. With an estimated 10–15% of couples in the country that are infertile, there are not any legal or religious barriers that prohibit an infertile couple from taking advantage of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). Although all forms of ARTs available in Iran have been legitimized by religious authorities, there is a lack of legislation in all ARTs except embryo donation. By highlighting ethical issues in embryo donation, (...) the paper presents a critical review of the Act of Embryo Donation in Iran. The paper argues that the Act does not provide enough safeguards for the future child and assurance for the safety of the donated embryos. It also does not restrict embryo donation to surplus embryos from infertile couples and is silent about the number of embryos that could be donated by each couple as well as the number of recipients for donated embryos by a couple. The Act is also silent about the issues of genetic linkage (nasab) and heritage which are challenging issues, especially in a conservative Islamic society. As a result, the future child may not inherit from their birth parents, as it is not required by the Act, or from the genetically related parents under the anonymity policy. Finally there is no standard national protocol or guidelines to evaluate the safety of the donated embryos. The paper concludes that despite its benefits, the Act lacks clarity, and it is subject to misunderstanding and confusion. (shrink)

The recent publications reported in 2022 reveal the possibility of obtaining mouse embryos without the need for egg or sperm. These ‘artificial embryos’ can recapitulate some stages of development ex utero – from neurulation to organogenesis – without implantation. Synthetic mouse embryos might serve as a valuable model to gain further insights into early developmental stages. Indeed, it is expected for these models to be replicated by employing human cells. This promising research raises ethical issues and expands (...) the horizon of ethics in regard to the development of the human embryo. From this point of view, we state some of the new open venues for bioethical research. (shrink)

Recent scientific advances have indicated that it may be technically feasible to sustain human embryos in vitro beyond 14 days. Research beyond this stage is currently restricted by a guideline known as the 14-day rule. Since the advances in embryo culturing there have been calls to extend the current limit. Much of the current debate concerning an extension has regarded the 14-day rule as a political compromise and has, therefore, focused on policy concerns rather than assessing the philosophical foundations (...) of the limit. While there are relevant political considerations, I maintain that the success of extension arguments will ultimately depend on the strength of the justifications supporting the current 14-day limit. I argue that the strongest and most prevalent justifications for the 14-day rule—an appeal to individuation and neural development—do not provide adequate support for the limit of 14 days. I instead suggest that an alternative justification based on sentience would constitute a more defensible basis for embryo protection and that a consideration of such grounds appears to support an amendment to the current limit, rather than the retention of it. While these conclusions do not establish conclusively that the current limit should be extended; they do suggest that an extension may be warranted and permissible. As such, this paper offers grounds on which a reassessment of the 14-day rule may be justified. (shrink)

I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: theories are always only partial representations of the world, and almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts (...) suggest that most scientific theories are apt to be discarded sometime, superseded by new theories that better serve scientists’ new research interests. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that many of the theories we currently accept, despite their many impressive successes, will be discarded sometime in the future. But I also argue that discarded theories are not always aptly characterized as a sign of failure or as a sign of some sort of shortcoming with science. Theories are discarded because scientists are making advances in their pursuit of knowledge. Thus, discarded theories are often a sign of the good health of science. Scientists are responding to their changing research interests. (shrink)

I defend the argument that if embryo loss in stem cell research is morally problematic, then embryo loss in in vivo conception is similarly morally problematic. According to a recent challenge to this argument, we can distinguish between in vivo embryo loss and the in vitro embryo loss of stem cell research by appealing to the doctrine of double effect. I argue that this challenge fails to show that in vivo embryo loss is a mere unintended side effect while in (...) vitro embryo loss is an intended means and that, even if we refine the challenge by appealing to Michael Bratman's three roles of intention, the distinction is still unwarranted. (shrink)

The main objection to human embryonic stem cell research is that it involves killing human embryos, which are essentially beings of the same sort that you and I are. This objection presupposes that we once existed as early embryos and that we had the same moral status then that we have now. This essay challenges both those presuppositions, but focuses primarily on the first. I argue first that these presuppositions are incompatible with widely accepted beliefs about both assisted (...) conception and monozygotic twinning. I then argue that we never existed as embryos. If this last claim is right, killing an embryo does not kill someone like you or me but merely prevents one of us from existing. (shrink)

This paper is based on linked qualitative studies of the donation of human embryos to stem cell research carried out in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and China. All three studies used semi-structured interview protocols to allow an in-depth examination of donors’ and non-donors’ rationales for their donation decisions, with the aim of gaining information on contextual and other factors that play a role in donor decisions and identifying how these relate to factors that are more usually included in evaluations (...) made by theoretical ethics. Our findings have implications for one factor that has previously been suggested as being of ethical concern: the role of gratitude. Our empirical work shows no evidence that interpersonal gratitude is an important factor, but it does support the existence of a solidarity-based desire to “give something back” to medical research. Thus, we use empirical data to expand and refine the conceptual basis of bioethically theorizing the IVF–stem cell interface. (shrink)

In the debate regarding the moral status of human embryos, the Embryo Rescue Case has been used to suggest that embryos are not rightholders. This case is premised on the idea that in a situation where one has a choice between saving some number of embryos or a child, it seems wrong to save the embryos and not the child. If so, it seems that embryos cannot be rightholders. In this paper, I argue that the (...) Embryo Rescue Case does not independently show that embryos are not rightholders. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical discussion on human embryonic stem cell research has focused primarily on the metaphysical and meta-ethical issues suchresearch raises. Though these discussions are interesting, largely ignored are arguments rooted in the secular research ethics tradition already informing humansubject research. This tradition countenances the notion of vulnerability and that vulnerable human subjects (of which human embryos are likely members)ought to be protected from research-related harms. This is the basic idea behind the argument from vulnerability, and it enjoys prima facie (...) plausibility. This articlepresents the vulnerability argument and then focuses critically on several lines of attack including: (1) twinning and totipotency arguments, (2) embryo-rescuearguments, and (3) natural loss arguments. The article concludes that there is no good defeater for the vulnerability argument, and, therefore, we have undefeated reasons for protecting human embryos from research related harms. (shrink)

Are embryos deserving of moral consideration in our actions? A standard view suggests that embryos are considerable only if they have interests. One argument for embryonic interests contends that embryos are harmed by death because they are deprived of valuable future lives as adult persons. Some have challenged this argument on the grounds that embryos aren’t identical to adults: either due to the potential for embryos to twin or because we do not exist until the (...) fetus develops consciousness. These arguments fail to show that embryos do not have future adult lives. There is a better reason to think that embryos cannot have interests; namely, because they are not capable of having desires. Others have held this view but have not sufficiently justified it. The justification lies in the fact that the capacity for desires is necessary to make sense of the normativity of interests. (shrink)