Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism.

Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A centralreason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view toachieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual (...) class='Hi'>atomism; and the second, to dispel some misconceptions associated with it. My aim is to show that the prospect of conceptualatomism is a promising one. (shrink)

Conceptual atomism is a doctrine deeply rooted in the tradition of western thought. It originated with Aristotle, was present in the entire Aristotelian tradition and came to its most pure expression in the work of Leibniz. However, ab initio this doctrine suffered from certain difficulty labelled traditionally “aporia generis”, namely the problem of how it is possible to reconcile the absolute simplicity of the primitive concepts (or ultimate differentiae) with the existence of transcendental concepts, that is, concepts necessarily (...) included in every concept. In this paper the entire problem is subject to an analysis and a solution is suggested, based on a distinction between two different kinds of conceptual containment: the primitive concepts do not contain the transcendentals formally, that is, as constituents thatcan be revealed by means of definitional analysis, but they nevertheless do contain them virtually, that is, they strictly imply them. It is noted that the germ of this solution is already present in Aristotle. (shrink)

Focusing on Machery's claim that concepts play entirely different roles in philosophy and psychology, I explain how one well-known philosophical theory of concepts, Conceptual Atomism (CA), when properly understood, takes into account both kinds of roles.

The most prominent recent model of how concepts can have gradient applicability—that is, apply more fully to some items than to others—is that supplied by the prototype theory. Such a model, however, assumes concepts to be internally individuated and structured, and it might thus be challenged by both concept externalism and conceptual atomism. This paper argues that neither of these challenges presents an obstacle to viewing some concepts as having gradient application, and develops a different model of the (...) conditions for such application. I call the notion of gradient applicability I discuss a feature-based one, and distinguish it from both the prototype theory’s typicality-based notion and a vagueness-based notion. On the model I develop, what determines whether a concept has gradient applicability is just the nature of the property it expresses, not facts about its stereotype. Focusing in particular on Fodor’s Informational Atomism, I argue on this basis that externalism is compatible with gradient applicability for all concepts, and that conceptual atomism is compatible with gradient applicability in the case of natural kind concepts, but not in the case of response-dependent concepts. This does not, however, present an obstacle to viewing some response-dependent concepts as having gradient applicability, for I also argue that in fact atomism cannot be true of response-dependent concepts. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...) further shown that, given the falsity of content-externalism, the falsity of the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) follows. It is also shown that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as "computation," "syntax," "algorithm," and "formal truth." Novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms are put forth. These analyses yield clear, intuition-friendly, and extensionally correct answers to the questions "what are propositions?, "what is it for a proposition to be true?", and "what are the logical and psychological differences between conceptual (propositional) and non-conceptual (non-propositional) content?" Naively taking literal meaning to be in lockstep with cognitive content, Burge, Salmon, Falvey, and other semantic externalists have wrongly taken Kripke's correct semantic views to justify drastic and otherwise contraindicated revisions of commonsense. (Salmon: What is non-existent exists; at a given time, one can rationally accept a proposition and its negation. Burge: Somebody who is having a thought may be psychologically indistinguishable from somebody who is thinking nothing. Falvey: somebody who rightly believes himself to be thinking about water is psychologically indistinguishable from somebody who wrongly thinks himself to be doing so and who, indeed, isn't thinking about anything.) Given a few truisms concerning the differences between thought-borne and sentence-borne information, the data is easily modeled without conceding any legitimacy to any one of these rationality-dismantling atrocities. (It thus turns out, ironically, that no one has done more to undermine Kripke's correct semantic points than Kripke's own followers!). (shrink)

In this talk I consider two problems for conceptual atomism. Conceptual atomism can be defended against the criticism that it seems to contend that all concepts are simply innate (even technical concepts to pre-technological humanoids) by specifying the innateness thesis as one of mechanisms of hooking up mental representations (concepts as language of thought types) to properties in the world (§1). This theory faces a problem with non-referring expressions/concepts, it seems. Conceptual atomism can, however, (...) deal with non-referring expressions/concepts (§2). Hooking up concepts with properties raises, further on, broader metaphysical problems of making concepts correspond to (natural) properties. These questions are much harder to answer (§3). (shrink)

Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I (...) show several ways in which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content. (shrink)

Humphreys and Forde fail to account for the ontology of the “features” that they claim are constitutive of concepts. This failure is common to decompositional theories of conceptual representation. Category-specific deficits can be better explained by a theory that takes inferential relations among atomic concepts to be the key characteristic of conceptual representation and processing.

In order to understand the aim of this brief account, we must first acknowledge this statement: That every experience can be analysed and understood as a theoretical entity. The theorization of experience is only the outcome of what appears to be the History of the Philosophy of Experience, a History in which we meet John Locke, John Dewey, William James, E.B Holt, Bertrand Russell, and A.N. Whitehead.

Biological atomism postulates that all life is composed of elementary and indivisible vital units. The activity of a living organism is thus conceived as the result of the activities and interactions of its elementary constituents, each of which individually already exhibits all the attributes proper to life. This paper surveys some of the key episodes in the history of biological atomism, and situates cell theory within this tradition. The atomistic foundations of cell theory are subsequently dissected and discussed, (...) together with the theory’s conceptual development and eventual consolidation. This paper then examines the major criticisms that have been waged against cell theory, and argues that these too can be interpreted through the prism of biological atomism as attempts to relocate the true biological atom away from the cell to a level of organization above or below it. Overall, biological atomism provides a useful perspective through which to examine the history and philosophy of cell theory, and it also opens up a new way of thinking about the epistemic decomposition of living organisms that significantly departs from the physicochemical reductionism of mechanistic biology. (shrink)

Atomism is the programme explaining all changes in terms of invariant units. The development of physics during the 20th century may be treated as a spectacular triumph of atomism. However, paradoxically, changes and conceptual difficulties brought about by quantum mechanics lead to the conclusion that the ontological model provided by classical atomism has become inadequate. Atoms (and elementary particles) are not atomos—indivisible, perfectly solid, unchangeable, ungenerated and indestructible (eternal), and the void is not simply an empty (...) space. According to quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, there is no unchanging substance at all. If we want to understand contemporary notions of matter and develop an ontological model of the world, consistent with contemporary natural sciences, we should probably go beyond the conceptual framework of atomic philosophy. (shrink)

Since the appearance of T. S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scholars from various fields have sought to evaluate their disciplines in the light of Kuhnian criteria for scientific change. In this paper I argue that a new paradigm seems needed in high energy physics, and that there is no more reason to say that matter is made of elementary particles, than to say that it is not. My argument, that high energy physics is approaching a state of crisis, (...) and that a new paradigm is needed, is based on an examination of two events which, according to Kuhn, presage a conceptual revolution: (1) the "old" paradigm of normal science becomes unclear; and (2) this paradigm fails to support normal problem solving research, and scientists begin to use it as if it were merely definitional. After examining the elementary particles paradigm in the light of these two criteria, I conclude that high energy physics is moving from "normal science" to "extraordinary science." I argue neither that a new paradigm has been found, nor that a return to normal science is imminent; instead I attempt to briefly outline some of the conceptual problems in high energy physics to which Heisenberg, Feynman, and others have alluded, but which so far have not been spelled out in any great philosophical detail. No attempt is made to argue about what the specific consequences of these difficulties might be, but merely to begin to clarify the problems facing scientists dealing with elementary particles. (shrink)

The original conception of atomism suggests “atoms”, which cannot be divided more into composing parts. However, the name “atom” in physics is reserved for entities, which can be divided into electrons, protons, neutrons and other “elementary particles”, some of which are in turn compounded by other, “more elementary” ones. Instead of this, quantum mechanics is grounded on the actually indivisible quanta of action limited by the fundamental Planck constant. It resolves the problem of how both discrete and continuous (even (...) smooth) to be described uniformly and invariantly in thus. Quantum mechanics can be interpreted in terms of quantum information. Qubit is the indivisible unit (“atom”) of quantum information. The imagery of atomism in modern physics moves from atoms of matter (or energy) via “atoms” (quanta) of action to “atoms” (qubits) of quantum information. This is a conceptual shift in the cognition of reality to terms of information, choice, and time. (shrink)

Fodor and LePore's reconstruction of the semantic holism debate in terms of "atomism" and "anatomism" is inadequate: it fails to highlight the important issue of how intentional contents are individuated, and excludes or obscures several possible positions on the metaphysics of content. One such position, "weak sociabilism" is important because it addresses concerns of Fodor and LePore's molecularist critics about conditions for possession of concepts, without abandoning atomism about content individuation. Properties like DEMOCRACY may be "theoretical" in the (...) following sense: only devices capable of inference can come to be selectively sensitive to such properties. Thus, such concepts cannot be punctate, although their contents are individuated, as atomism requires, independently of their conceptual connections. (shrink)

Ulrich Meyer's objections to Dummett's arguments on the time continuum fail because he takes Dummett to endorse Hume's atomistic doctrine that events are ‘loose and separate’, In fact, Dummett rejects this doctrine. He used it in his original article only to indicate that certain implications which are conceptually possible fom the point of view of the classical model of time are not actually conceptually possible.

The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account (...) of concepts is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and change. (shrink)

Fodor and LePore's reconstruction of the semantic holism debate in terms of "atomism" and "anatomism" is inadequate: it fails to highlight the important issue of how intentional contents are individuated, and excludes or obscures several possible positions on the metaphysics of content. One such position, "weak sociabilism" is important because it addresses concerns of Fodor and LePore's molecularist critics about conditions for possession of concepts, without abandoning atomism about content individuation. Properties like DEMOCRACY may be "theoretical" in the (...) following sense: only devices capable of inference can come to be selectively sensitive to such properties. Thus, such concepts cannot be punctate, although their contents are individuated, as atomism requires, independently of their conceptual connections. (shrink)

I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of (...) representation must take. I hope, however, to have created some advance sympathy for the gesture by distinguishing the problem of representation from the problem of targets on the one hand, and from the problem truth-conditions for the attitudes on the other. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a qualitative approach to the theory of conceptual spaces, in contrast to the usual metric framework. This requires qualitative notions of similarity, simple concepts, prototypes and conceptual categorisation. For this purpose, I will introduce three mathematical models for conceptual spaces. The first one is topological and has been proposed by Mormann. The other two are new and are based on atomistic orders and similarity relations. I will discuss how each (...) of them deals with the Design Principles proposed by Douven and Gärdenfors and with further Adequacy Conditions. Despite being apparently different, I will show that these three models are mathematically equivalent. Finally, I will address three objections to the present approach. The first one says that the qualitative notion of a prototype is a bad analogue of the metric one. The second one suggests that, in contrast to the Voronoi construction, the function qualitatively representing the conceptual categorisation process is arbitrary. The last one appeals to Goodman’s companionship and imperfect community problems to show that there is a flaw in defining simple concepts from similarity relations. (shrink)

Philosophers have historically been concerned with concepts and their analysis, and in recent decades psychologists have also begun to speculate on what kinds of structures concepts might be. I take concepts to satisfy three core desiderata: they are mental representations, they are the constituents of thoughts, and they are centrally employed in categorization. There are four major theories of concepts currently in play: definitionism, prototype and exemplar theory, the 'theory theory', and conceptual atomism. I survey these theories and (...) argue that none of them adequately satisfies all three of the core properties. The reasons for these failures are principled, and generalize to many other positions that share their assumptions. Concepts do not form a unitary psychological natural kind. I propose taking a pluralist view of concepts. Conceptual representations are adaptively constructed and used by a set of processes that vary with elements of the task, subject, domain, and wider context. (shrink)

As Buddhist externalists, both Saṅghabhadra and Śubhagupta claim the existence of an external object on the basis of atomism. In this paper, I will show the interrelationship between Saṅghabhadra’s and Śubhagupta’s atomic theories. Regarding the ontological status of the aggregation of atoms, both of them agree on a Vaibhāṣika principle that the aggregation of atoms, as a real substance, can serve as an object-support of cognition. Based on this principle, their similarities can be further explicated from three aspects. Regarding (...) epistemology, Śubhagupta differs from Saṅghabhadra on the cognitive process of the awareness of something blue. For Saṅghabhadra, a gross object is grasped by non-conceptual sensory consciousness because it is a real entity aggregated by atoms. Through the function of vitarka of sensory consciousness, an object with its essential nature, i.e., the colour blue, is distinguished from other entities. Then, it is known as the notion ‘blue’, which is a mere provisional existence, through the conceptual thought of mental consciousness. However, for Śubhagupta, a coarse object such as something blue is only a mental error of conceptual construction. (shrink)

In _The Philosophy of Logical Atomism_, Russell defends a version of semantic empiricism according to which direct acquaintance with logical atoms is the source of our semantic capacities. Previous commentators have construed Russellian acquaintance in one of two ways: either as an act of _de re_ designation involving neither conceptualization nor propositional content, or as a species of belief _de re_, which does involve conceptualization or classification. I argue that two further, interim possibilities have been overlooked: that direct acquaintance involves (...) purely phenomenal content or that direct acquaintance involves protoconceptual content. I conclude, however, that on none of the four interpretations considered, can direct acquaintance with logical atoms be the source of our semantic capacities. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine the origins and nature of Mach's philosophy, or rather theory, of science. I show how it relates to, and is informed by, his own works in physiology, psychophysics, physics, and the history and psychology of science. I argue that Mach's theory of science grew out of his concern to provide a single, unified--albeit coherent--perspective on both the life and physical sciences. Corresponding to this conceptual unification of perspectives in the different branches of knowledge, lies (...) Mach's belief in the unity of the so-called 'organic' and 'inorganic' worlds. I demonstrate how Mach grappled with these issues, tracing the evolutionary development of his thought, which vacillates between the two poles of the physical and the psychological, culminating in his neutral monism. My main findings, which differ from previous accounts of Mach, consist in the following: Mach can be considered as a precursor of Logical Positivism only in the sense that they both reject metaphysics, and believe that the world can be constructed out of simple entities. However, significant differences can be discerned between Mach and the Logical Positivists, viz.: Mach's emphasis on history and psychology--rather than logic--in understanding the nature of scientific knowledge, Mach is not a scientific realist, and he asserts the primacy of sensations over physical objects. Mach's notion of "philosophy", and hence of "philosophy of science", differs in character from contemporary mainstream philosophy of science which is based on analytic philosophy. For Mach, philosophy is not first philosophy and its function is not to provide justification or foundation for science. In this sense Mach anticipates the naturalization of epistemology and the philosophy of science. ;Finally, I show how his reaction towards atomism can be understood within this broader context of his attempt to provide a unified view of knowledge. I defend Mach's stand on atomism on the grounds that his objection is not so much against the development of the atomic theory, but against a realist construal of the atom and the mechanistic-reductionistic world-view implied by it. (shrink)

Nonlocality is a puzzling issue in modern physics. I propose that, aside from the experimental determination of nonlocality, the concept of atomistic lightmdash;discrete, self-bounded photonsmdash;breaks down toward something like nonlocality when subjected to philosophical scrutiny. Louis de Broglie made a similar argument regarding the material atom: the concept of the classical atom, when interrogated, collapses upon itself to offer a glimpse of wave-particle duality. Light atoms or photons, I argue, similarly collapse toward the contradictory possibility of nonlocality.

The homogeneity of time (i.e. the fact that there are no privileged moments) underlies a fundamental symmetry relating to the energy conservation law. On the other hand the obvious asymmetry between past and future, expressed by the metaphor of the arrow of time or flow of time accounts for the irreversibility of what happens. One takes this for granted but the conceptual tension it creates against the background of time''s presumed homogeneity calls for an explanation of temporal becoming. Here, (...) it is approached with the help of a claim to the effect that the instant (moment) itself has a structure isomorphic to that of time as a whole. Then the asymmetry of past and future in regard to temporal becoming is associated with the internal structure of the very moment, and not with external relations between different moments of time. In this paper ideas of ancient atomism and contemporary dialectics are brought together. It is for the sake of a contrast to what is known as logical atomism that I choose to call this view dialectical atomism. The latter admits dialectical contradictions and, so far as the logical status of contradictions is concerned, bears reference to paraconsistent logics. In the paper there is an outline of a method of converting any consistent axiomatic formal system into a paraconsistent theory. (shrink)

Although not universally accepted at the time, the atomic hypothesis during the 19th century provided a definite ordering scheme for certain relatively sophisticated chemical phenomena. As such, it was conceptually responsible for the formulation and precise articulation of important seminal ideas in chemical studies. In this paper we will explore this claim with regard to the views of the British chemist Alexander W. Williamson.

The structure of words is often thought to provide important evidence regarding the structure of concepts. At the same time, most contemporary linguists posit a great deal of structure in words. Such a trend makes some atomists about concepts uncomfortable. The details of linguistic methodology undermine several strategies for avoiding positing structure in words. I conclude by arguing that there is insufficient evidence to hold that word-structure bears any interesting relation to the structure of concepts.

The quantum symmetrization procedure that is used to handle systems of identical quantum particles brings into question whether the elementary constituents of matter, such as electrons, have the fundamental characteristics of persistence and reidentifiability that are attributed to classical particles. However, we presently lack a coherent conception of matter composed of entities that do not possess one or both of these fundamental characteristics. We also lack a clear a priori understanding of why systems of identical particles (as opposed to non-identical (...) particles) require special mathematical treatment, and this only in the quantum mechanical (as opposed to classical mechanical) setting. -/- Here, on the basis of a conceptual analysis of a recent mathematical reconstruction of the quantum symmetrization procedure, we argue that the need for the symmetrization procedure originates in the confluence of identicality and the active nature of the quantum measurement process. We propose a conception in which detection-events are ontologically primary, while the notion of individually persistent object is relegated to merely one way of bringing order to these events. On this basis, we outline a new interpretation of the symmetrization procedure which gives a new physical interpretation to the indices in symmetrized states and to non-symmetric measurement operators. (shrink)

The late 19th century debate among German-speaking physicists about theoretical entities is often regarded as foreshadowing the scientific realism debate. This paper brings out differences between them by concentrating on the part of the earlier debate that was concerned with the conceptual consistency of the competing conceptions of matter—mainly, but not exclusively, of atomism. Philosophical antinomies of atomism were taken up by Emil Du Bois-Reymond in an influential lecture in 1872. Such challenges to the consistency of (...) class='Hi'>atomism had repercussions within the physics community, as can be shown for the examples of Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. The latter developed a series of counter-arguments, culminating in an ingenious attempt to turn the tables on the critics of atomism and prove the inconsistency of non-atomistic conceptions of nature. Underlying this controversy is a disagreement over specific goals of physical research which was considered crucially relevant to the further course of physical inquiry. It thereby exemplifies an attitude towards the realism issue that can be contrasted with a different, more neutral attitude of construing the realism issue as merely philosophical and indifferent with respect to concrete research programs in physics, which one also occasionally finds expressed in the 19th century controversy and which may be seen as the prevailing attitude of the 20th century debate. (shrink)

In the current debate on the future of bioethics in Africa, several authors have argued for a distinct communitarian African bioethics that can counter the dominancy of Western atomistic principlism in contemporary bioethics. In this article I examine this rather contentious argument and evaluate its validity and viability. Firstly, I trace the contextual origins of contemporary bioethics and highlight the rise and dominance of principlism. I particularly note that principlism was premised on a content-thin notion of the common morality that (...) is in need of enrichment. I also contend that bioethics is essentially two-dimensional, being both conceptual and empirical, and indicate the lag in Africa with regard to conceptual bioethics. I then appeal for authentic engagement by 1) African health care professionals, 2) African health care training institutions, 3) Africa's bioethics development partners, and 4) African bioethicists and philosophers, towards addressing this critical lag. I underline the need to maintain the essential universality of bioethics as a discipline. I particularly argue against the pursuit of a distinct African bioethics, as it appears to be rooted in sterile African ethno-philosophy. Rather, African bioethicists and philosophers would do well to elucidate the universalisability of insights from traditional African thought, for the benefit of bioethics as a whole. Thus we must engage beyond the sterility of a distinct African bioethics - authentically reflecting on the essentially universal contemporary bioethical concerns - to effectively articulate a viable trajectory for bioethics in Africa. (shrink)

In the present article, the role of Gestalt concepts in clarifying the issues of perception is evaluated. Grounded in anti-atomism, Gestalt assumed organizing forces intrinsic to perception. Insofar these were identified with singularity preference, Gestalt is criticized for having failed to distinguish between perception and thought.

There is a paradox about how our social understanding develops if we take seriously both theory theory and the cognitivist dictum that all skilful interaction has robust conceptual underpinnings. On the one hand, it is clear that young infants demonstrate a capacity to reliably detect and respond to other’s intentions. For example, recent experimental evidence confirms that they have the capacity to appropriately parse what would otherwise be an undifferentiated behaviour stream at its mentalistic joints. If we follow the (...) cognitivist trend in thinking that having the appropriate concepts is an antecedent requirement for such recognitional capacities then it follows that we should ascribe to these infants the concept of intention (or, at least, a concept of intention). But if we also hold that mentalistic concepts are constituted by their links with other mentalistic concepts, such as belief and desire, as assumed by proponents of theory theory, then we ought to conclude that infants lack certain concepts, such as intention, because at their tender age they lack other concepts, such as belief, which are required to constitute their contents. I will consider two possible atomistic ways of squaring this circle, in the process ultimately rejecting cognitivism in favor of the idea that various nonconceptual capacities best account for our initial abilities for recognizing and responding to intentional agency. I hold that it is what these responses are directed at that remains common throughout the developments of our mentalistic concepts, enabling us to make sense of talk of conceptual change. Not only does this resolve the paradox with which theory theorists must content, it shows how we can start our folk psychological careers without a theory or even any concepts. (shrink)

The late 19th century debate among German-speaking physicists about theoretical entities is often regarded as foreshadowing the scientific realism debate. This paper brings out differences between them by concentrating on the part of the earlier debate that was concerned with the conceptual consistency of the competing conceptions of matter---{}mainly, but not exclusively, of atomism. Philosophical antinomies of atomism were taken up by Emil Du Bois-Reymond in an influential lecture in 1872. Such challenges to the consistency of (...) class='Hi'>atomism had repercussions within the physics community, as can be shown for the examples of Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. The latter developed a series of counter-arguments, culminating in an ingenious attempt to turn the tables on the critics of atomism and prove the inconsistency of non-atomistic conceptions of nature. Underlying this controversy is a disagreement over specific goals of physical research which was considered crucially relevant to the further course of physical inquiry. It thereby exemplifies an attitude towards the realism issue that can be contrasted with a different, more neutral attitude of construing the realism issue as merely philosophical and indifferent with respect to concrete research programs in physics, which one also occasionally finds expressed in the 19th century controversy and which may be seen as the prevailing attitude of the 20th century debate. (shrink)

Concepts: Core Readings traces the develoment of one of the most active areas of investigation in cognitive science. This comprehensive volume brings together the essential background readings on concepts from philosophy, psychology, and linguistics, while providing a broad sampling of contemporary research. The first part of the book centers around the fall of the Classical Theory of Concepts in the face of attacks by W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eleanor Rosch, and others, emphasizing the emergence and development of the Prototype Theory (...) and the controversies it spurred. The second part surveys a broad range of contemporary theories—Neoclassical Theories, the Prototype Theory, the Theory-Theory, and Conceptual Atomism. (shrink)

Llull and Leibniz both subscribed to conceptual atomism: the belief that the majority of concepts are compounds constructed from a relatively small number of primitive concepts. Llull worked out techniques for finding the logically possible combinations of his primitives, but Leibniz criticized Llull’s execution of these techniques. This article argues that Leibniz was right about things being more complicated than Llull thought but that he was wrong about the details. The paper attempts to correct these details.