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Conceptual deficits without features: A view from atomism
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):482-483 (2001)
Abstract
Humphreys and Forde fail to account for the ontology of the “features” that they claim are constitutive of concepts. This failure is common to decompositional theories of conceptual representation. Category-specific deficits can be better explained by a theory that takes inferential relations among atomic concepts to be the key characteristic of conceptual representation and processing.Author's Profile
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