The Cautious Jealous Virtue is an illuminating meditation that will interest not only Hume scholars but also those interested in the issues of justice and in ...

This article draws upon discursive psychology to explore the organization of public accountability in accounting for an alleged conflict of interest in journalism. The analysis focuses on the published record of an interview given by the editorial director of one of the major Romanian daily newspapers on the issue of an assumed conflict of interest involving a senior editor of the same newspaper. The analysis shows how a moral order is constituted by the use of various discursive resources: role and (...) professional incumbency discourse, disposition avowals and doing being fair/ democratic. This is a moral order where adherence to personal ethical principles, professional incumbencies and responsibilities are practically managed in dialogue and publicly displayed. Acting in-role, reporting a general disposition to engage in moral courses of action and making reference to the values of citizenship and democracy are all publicly available discursive resources used in this context to express a cautious moral judgement bounded and constrained by both personal and professional accountability perspectives. (shrink)

Sustainable development is a common goal in the public sector but may be difficult to implement due to epistemic uncertainties and the long time frames required. This paper proposes that some of these problems can be solved by formulating cautious utopias, entailing a relationship between means and goals differing from both utopian and realistic goal-setting. Cautiously utopian goals are believed, but not certain, to be achievable and to remain desirable, but are open to future adjustments due to changing desires and/or (...) factual circumstances. Quality criteria for such goals are suggested. (shrink)

In this thesis, the framework within which long-term goals are set and subsequently achieved or approached is analyzed. Sustainable development and climate change are areas in which goals have tobe set despite uncertainties. The analysis is divided into the normative motivations for setting such goals, what forms of goals could be set given the empirical and normative uncertainties, and how tomanage doubts regarding achievability or values after a goal has been set. Paper I discusses a set of questions that moral (...) theories intended to guide goal-setting should respond to. It is often claimed that existent normative theories provide only modest guidance regarding climate change, and consequently have to be revised or supplemented. Two such suggested revisions or supplements are analyzed in order to determine whether they provide such guidance. Paper II applies the deep ecological framework to survey the extent to which it can be utilized to discuss issues concerning the management of climate change. It is suggested that the deep ecological framework can provide guidance by establishing a normative framework and an analysis of how the overarching values and principles can be specified to be relevant for actions. Paper III is focused on normative political theory, and explicates the two dimensions of empirical and normative uncertainty. By applying recent discussions in normative political theory on ideal/non-ideal theory, political realism, and the relation between normative demands and empirical constraints,strategies for managing the proposed goals are suggested. Paper IV suggests a form of goal that incorporates uncertainties. Cautious utopias allow greater uncertainty than realistic goals,but not to the same extent as utopian goals. Such goals have a performance-enhancing function. A definition and quality criteria for such goals are proposed. Paper V considers whether a goal that is becoming all the more unlikely to be achievable should be reconsidered. The paper focuses on the two degrees Celsius target, and asks whether it could still be a sensible goal to aspire to. By applying the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, the role of such obligations is investigated. Paper VI surveys how to treat circumstances in which an already set goal should be reconsidered and possibly revised, and what would evoke doubt in the belief upon which those goals have been set.Two situations are analyzed: a problematic or surprising event occurs, upsetting confidence in one’s relevant beliefs, or respectable but dissenting views are voiced concerning one’s means and/or values. It is suggested that the validity of doubt has to be considered, in addition to the level in a goal-means hierarchy towards which doubt is raised. (shrink)

Part of a book symposium on Anjan Chakravartty's Scientific ontology: integrating naturalized metaphysics and voluntarist epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2017).

This paper introduces and studies a notion of cautious distributed belief. Different from the standard distributed belief, the cautious distributed belief of a group is inconsistent only when all group members are individually inconsistent. The paper presents basic results about cautious distributed belief, investigates whether it preserves properties of individual belief, and compares it with standard distributed belief. Although both notions are equivalent in the class of reflexive models, this is not the case in general. While we argue that an (...) understanding of the concept of cautious distributed belief from first principles is important, cautious distributed belief can be expressed using standard distrbuted belief and we show that the propositional language extended only with cautious distributed belief is in fact strictly less expressive than the propositional language extended only with standard distributed belief. We, finally, identify a small extension of the language making the former as expressive as the latter. (shrink)

Psychobiography has been a topical area and an applied research specialty in psychology since Freud’s influential psychoanalytic psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci. Throughout the last century, psychobiographers have emphasized the importance of anchoring interpretations of life histories in established psychological theories and rigorous historiographic research methods. One topical area receiving less attention in psychobiography is the critical relationship between the psychobiographer and her or his subject as it relates to the process of psychobiographical writing. The present article explores the phenomenology (...) and challenges of this relationship in order to ultimately propose practical strategies for navigating countertransference issues throughout the subject selection, research and publication phases of psychobiography. Freud’s psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci is used as a model of the stages of psychobiography, the evolution of the psychobiographer-subject relationship, and the challenges of countertransference. (shrink)

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (1994; J. Econ. Theory 63: 299–325) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one (...) to belong to the largest cautious consistent set. (shrink)

The global relation between logical empiricism and American pragmatism is one of the more difficult problems in history of philosophy. In this paper I’d like to take a local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern the vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter of logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, Ernest Nagel. In this paper, I want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the then „new“ logical-empiricist philosophy. In the beginning (...) Nagel welcomed logical empiricism whole-heartedly. This early enthusiasm did not last. At the end of his philosophical career Nagel’s early positive attitude towards logical empiricism shown in the 1930s had been replaced by a much more reserved one. Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with the Carnapian version of logical empiricist philosophy was clearly expressed in Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic and more generally in his last book Teleology Revisited and Other Essays on History and Philosophy of Science. There he critized harshly Carnap’s philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and non-pragmatist. One of the distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science is the emphasis that he put on the role of history of science for philosophy of science. A compelling evidence for this attitude are his works on the history and philosophy of geometry and algebra One may say that Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities of how the profession of a philosopher of science could be understood: Carnap as a „conceptual engineer“ was engaged in the task of inventing the conceptual tools for a better theoretical understanding of science, while Nagel was to be considered more as a „public intellectual“ engaged in the project of realizing a more rational and enlightened society. (shrink)

May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

This paper introduces a generalization of Reiter’s notion of “extension” for default logic. The main difference from the original version mainly lies in the way conflicts among defaults are handled: in particular, this notion of “general extension” allows defaults not explicitly triggered to pre-empt other defaults. A consequence of the adoption of such a notion of extension is that the collection of all the general extensions of a default theory turns out to have a nontrivial algebraic structure. This fact has (...) two major technical fall-outs: first, it turns out that every default theory has a general extension; second, general extensions allow one to define a well-behaved, skeptical relation of defeasible consequence for default theories, satisfying the principles of Reflexivity, Cut, and Cautious Monotonicity formulated by D. Gabbay. (shrink)

Annette Baier was the dean of contemporary Hume studies and one of the most insightful and influential philosophers writing on Hume. Since the late 1970s, her writings and the example of her distinctive mode of scholarship have inspired generations of scholars to look with fresh eyes at Hume's work. The special turn of her philosophical mind and personal style of writing are especially well-suited to uncover, appreciate, and effectively communicate the rich, nuanced, and humane dimensions of Hume's moral philosophy. Her (...) masterpiece, A Progress of Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), for example, taught us that Hume's moral psychology underwrites his moral and social philosophy. The Cautious .. (shrink)

This article start from two opposing intuitions in the environmental duties debate. On the one hand, if our lifestyle causes environmental harm, then we have a duty to reduce that impact through lifestyle changes. On the other hand, many people share the intuition that environmental duties cannot demand to alter our lifestyle radically for environmental reasons. These two intuitions underlie the current dualism in the environmental duties debate: those arguing for lifestyle changes and those arguing that our duties are limited (...) to promoting just environmental institutions. The paper has two goals: first, to grasp the underlying reasons for the two intuitions, and, second, to provide a proposal that integrates both intuitions. The paper consists of two main parts. The first part examines the ‘our-duties-should-be-limited’ intuition. Two interpretations are discussed, one under the title ‘what I do make no difference’, dealing with causality and collective action, and one under the title ‘my duty cannot be to change my lifestyle completely’, which discusses demandingness, fairness and value conflict. The second part shows how the ‘lifestyle-matters’ intuition can still play an important role. This part consists of two sections, one on ‘how to make a difference’, which deals with the idea of a cooperative ethos, and the other with ‘why lifestyle matters’, discussing expressive rationality and integrity. These ideas allow giving an important place to lifestyle duties, while avoiding the possible counterproductive effect of a private duties account. (shrink)

This note is on cautious cut elimination for one of Veitman's might logics. Syntactically, the logic is presented as an extension of a sequent system for classical proposition logic . I show that this extension preserves the completeness and decidability of CPL. The proof has cautious cut elimination as a corollary. I also give a rather general syntactic proof of cautious cut elimination. It states that any ‘base’ logic which has a reflexive, monotone consequence relation that allows cautious cut to (...) be eliminated preserves cautious cut elimination when extended to a might logic. (shrink)

Shamans, healers, and doctors have always known that patients may improve even if no real therapy is administered. In the Charmides, Plato noted that to soothe a headache, one needed "a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time he used the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm would be of no avail". Similarly, more than two millennia later, Thomas Jefferson (...) observed, "One of the most successful physicians I have even known has assured me that he used more bread pills, drops of colored water, and powder of hickory ashes, than of all other medication put together"; Jefferson famously labeled this... (shrink)

In this paper, I develop what I call, following Steven Shaviro, Merleau-Ponty’s “cautious anthropomorphism.” Rather than defending Merleau-Ponty against the accusation of anthropomorphism, I show the role this anthropomorphism plays in Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the Cartesian-Sartrian ontology of the object. If the thing is always “clothed with human characteristics,” as Merleau-Ponty says in the Causeries, it is not so that it can be reduced to a powerless object that can easily be assimilated but rather to ensure its own resistance or (...) adversity – and even, paradoxically, its inhumanity. After developing Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s views of things, focusing on their respective reading of Ponge in “Man and Things” and the Causeries, I put Merleau-Ponty in conversation with Jeffrey Cohen’s book Stone to push for a non-humanistic reading of Merleau-Ponty’s anthropomorphism. (shrink)

Mitochondria, the powerhouses of our cells, are essential to life. Normal mitochondrial function is achieved through the cooperative interaction of the nuclear and mitochondrial genomes. New IVF approaches intended to circumvent devastating mitochondrial disease look set to change the ancient pattern of mtDNA inheritance and interaction with unknown consequences.

Should fear guide our actions and governments’ political decisions? A leitmotiv of common sense is that emotions are tricky, they blur our rational capacity of estimating utilities in order to plan action and thus they should be banned from any account of our rational expectations. In this paper I argue that an “heuristic of fear” is the appropriate attitude to adopt in order to cope with extreme risks. I thus defend the Precautionary Principle against the criticism put forward by Cass (...) Sunstein and other authors on the basis of a new analysis of extreme risks or “ruin-problems”. (shrink)

This paper critiques the version of the argument that the regulation of hateful speech by the state undermines its democratic legitimacy made by Ronald Dworkin and James Weinstein. It argues that in some cases the harmful effects of hateful speech on the democratic process outweigh those of restriction. It does not challenge the central premise of the Legitimacy Argument, that a wide-ranging right to freedom of expression is an essential political right in a liberal democracy. Instead, it uses ideal and (...) nonideal theory as a framework for judgements about the regulation of hate speech. The mistake underpinning the Legitimacy Argument is that it assumes that other conditions pervade that make an ideal democratic procedure possible when they do not. In reality the state can be put in a position where, whatever course of action it takes with regard to the regulation or non-regulation of hate speech, some citizens will not be able to participate fully in political deliberation. Under such conditions there remain strong pro tanto reasons not to regulate hate speech on democratic grounds, but they are not all-things-considered reasons, and there are also pro tanto reasons to regulate hate speech that might outweigh them in some cases. This leads to the cautious conclusion that while there might be a normative justification for the regulation of hate speech in individual instances, the debate is best understood as one between competing pro tanto reasons, and must be approached on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

This paper argues that even though massive technological unemployment will likely be one of the results of automation, we will not need to institute mass-scale redistribution of wealth to deal with its consequences. Instead, reasons are given for cautious optimism about the standards of living the newly unemployed workers may expect in the fully-automated future. It is not claimed that these predictions will certainly bear out. Rather, they are no less likely to come to fruition than the predictions of those (...) authors who predict that massive technological unemployment will lead to the suffering of the masses on such a scale that significant redistributive policies will have to be instituted to alleviate it. Additionally, the paper challenges the idea that the existence of a moral obligation to help the victims of massive unemployment justifies the coercive taking of anyone else’s property. (shrink)

I show that Albert Einstein’s distinction between principle and constructive theories was predated by Hendrik A. Lorentz’s equivalent distinction between mechanism- and principle-theories. I further argue that Lorentz’s views toward realism similarly prefigure what Arthur Fine identified as Einstein’s ‘‘motivational realism.’’ r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Burke thanks Professor Elshtain for her response "and the editors for inviting me to make some clarifications and engage in what is emerging as a profound normative dispute about the underlying hopes and worldview of 'just war' thinkers and various post-Kantian tendencies.".

Planning with incomplete knowledge becomes a very active research area since late 1990s. Many logical formalisms introduce sensing actions and conditional plans to address the problem. The action language $\mathcal{A}_{K}$ invented by Son and Baral is a well-known framework for this purpose. In this paper, we propose so-called cautious and weakly cautious semantics for $\mathcal{A}_{K}$ , in order to allow an agent to generate and execute reliable plans in safety-critical environments. Intuitively speaking, cautious and weakly cautious semantics enable the agent (...) to know exactly what happens after the execution of an action. Computational complexity analysis shows that cautious semantics reduces the reasoning complexity of $\mathcal{A}_{K}$ , it is also worth to point out that many useful domains could still be expressed with this setting. Another important contribution of our work is the development of Hoare style proof systems. These proof systems are served as inference mechanisms for the verification of conditional plans, and proved to be sound and complete. In addition, they could also be used for plan generation, in the sense that constructing a derivation is indeed a procedure to finding a plan. We point out that the proof systems posses a nice property for off-line planning, that is, the agent could generate and store short proofs in her spare time, and perform quick plan query by easily constructing a long proof from the stored shorter ones (under the assumption that sufficient proofs are stored). (shrink)

In some severely uncertain situations, exemplified by climate change and novel pandemics, policymakers lack a reasoned basis for assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of the policies they must choose between. I outline and defend an uncertainty averse, egalitarian approach to policy evaluation in these contexts. The upshot is a theory of distributive justice which offers especially strong reasons to guard against individual and collective misfortune.

Peer review of journal submissions has become one of the most important pillars of quality management in academic publishing. Because of growing concerns with the quality and effectiveness of the system, a host of enthusiastic innovators has proposed and experimented with new procedures and technologies. However, little is known about whether these innovations manage to convince other journal editors. This paper will address open questions regarding the implementation of new review procedures, the occurrence rate of various peer review procedures and (...) their distribution over scientific disciplines or academic publishers, as well as the motivations for editors or publishers to engage in novel review procedures. It shows that in spite of enthusiastic innovation, the adoption of new peer review procedures is in fact very slow, with the exception of text similarity scanners. For now, peer review innovations appear to be restricted to specific niches in academic publishing. Analysing these niches, the article concludes with a reflection on the circumstances in which innovations might be more widely implemented. (shrink)

This article takes up the “Furet/nolte debate” over the meaning of fascism and communism for our time. It does so in order to sketch out the dilemmas that confound the construction of meaningful narratives of the twentieth century, where persistent obstacles attend the enclosure of twentieth‐century events within an integrated and coherent whole. For at least two reasons, I suggest, the correspondence of Ernst Nolte and the late François Furet is instructive in identifying the nature of these obstacles more precisely. (...) First, Furet himself is the author of what is currently construed as being one of the most ambitious attempts to narrate the twentieth century, by taking the “illusions” engendered by faith in the Marxist–Leninist project as its organising principle. Second, the positions adopted by Nolte have been contested in the public sphere as being acutely emblematic of problems latent in the attempt to enclose communism and fascism together in a narrative of mutual complicity. The correspondence between Furet and Nolte therefore provides a fruitful context in which to treat a set of related problems bearing upon the relation between historical truth and reconciliation, between history and memory, and between the contemporary world and the advent of totalitarianism. As I conclude, a key point which has to date been overlooked in discussions of this kind is the coincidence of attempts to establish a historiographic framework for the twentieth century with efforts to undertake a settling of accounts with socialism. (shrink)