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A cautious welcome: An introduction and guide to the book

In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--15 (1988)

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  1. Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
    In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
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  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
    Some cases of prosopagnosia involve a highly circumscribed loss of A-consciousness. When seen in this way they offer further support for the arguments made in Block's target article.
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  • The Comparative Simplicity of Tool-Use and its Implications for Human Evolution.Thomas Wynn - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):576-577.
  • Does Cognitive Neuropsychology Have a Future?J. T. L. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):456-457.
  • Consciousness: Limited but Consequential.Timothy D. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):701-701.
  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
    Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.
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  • No Conscious or Co-Conscious?Graham F. Wagstaff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):700-700.
  • The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.
    This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
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  • Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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  • Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
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  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
    Blocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
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  • Attention is Necessary for Word Integration.Geoffrey Underwood - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):698-698.
  • More on Modularity.Carlo Umiltà - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):455-456.
  • Consciousness Does Not Seem to Be Linked to a Single Neural Mechanism.Carlo Umiltà & Marco Zorzi - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):701-702.
    On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.
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  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
    It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
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  • Objects Are Analogous to Words, Not Phonemes or Grammatical Categories.Michael Tomasello - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):575-576.
  • On Giving a More Active and Selective Role to Consciousness.Frederick Toates - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):700-701.
    An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.
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  • Are Rhythms of Human Cerebral Development “Traveling Waves”?Robert W. Thatcher - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):575-575.
  • Don't Leave the “Un” Off “Consciousness”.Neal R. Swerdlow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):699-700.
    Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.
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  • Ultimate Differences.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):698-699.
    Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
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  • Damn! There Goes That Ghost Again!Keith E. Stanovich - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):696-698.
  • Dissociating Consciousness From Cognition.David Spiegel - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):695-696.
  • The Homunculus at Home.J. David Smith - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-698.
    In Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator and matches have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.
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  • Making Up the Brain's Mind.Michael E. Smith - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):454-455.
  • Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
    If phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?
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  • A Lawful First-Person Psychology Involving a Causal Consciousness: A Psychoanalytic Solution.Howard Shevrin - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):693-694.
  • Précis of From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure.Tim Shallice - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):429-438.
    Neuropsychological results are increasingly cited in cognitive theories although their methodology has been severely criticised. The book argues for an eclectic approach but particularly stresses the use of single-case studies. A range of potential artifacts exists when inferences are made from such studies to the organisation of normal function – for example, resource differences among tasks, premorbid individual differences, and reorganisation of function. The use of “strong” and “classical” dissociations minimises potential artifacts. The theoretical convergence between findings from fields where (...)
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  • How Neuropsychology Helps Us Understand Normal Cognitive Function.Tim Shallice - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):457-469.
  • Consciousness Beyond the Comparator.Victor A. Shames & Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-697.
    Gray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.
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  • Isn't the First-Person Perspective a Bad Third-Person Perspective?W. Schaeken & G. D'Ydewalle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-693.
  • Communication and Consciousness: A Neural Network Conjecture.N. A. Schmajuk & E. Axelrad - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):695-696.
    The communicative aspects of the contents of consciousness are analyzed in the framework of a neural network model of animal communication. We discuss some issues raised by Gray, such as the control of the contents of consciousness, the adaptive value of consciousness, conscious and unconscious behaviors, and the nature of a model's consciousness.
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  • Hierarchical Organization in Grammar.Leonard Rolfe - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):574-574.
  • A Limitation of the Reflex-Arc Approach to Consciousness.J. Steven Reznick & Philip David Zelazo - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-692.
  • Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.
  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
    Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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  • Prospects for a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):694-695.
    In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.
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  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
    I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.
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  • Unitary Consciousness Requires Distributed Comparators and Global Mappings.George N. Reeke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):693-694.
    Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.
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  • The Elusive Quale.Howard Rachlin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):692-693.
    If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements within the brain or as internal products of the brain.
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  • Goal Directed Behavior in the Sensorimotor and Language Hierarchies.David M. W. Powers - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):572-574.
  • Evolving Remembrance of Times Past and Future.William Noble & Iain Davidson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):572-572.
  • Reticular-Thalamic Activation of the Cortex Generates Conscious Contents.James Newman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):691-692.
    Gray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.
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  • The Control of Consciousness Via a Neuropsychological Feedback Loop.Todd D. Nelson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):690-691.
    Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.
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  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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  • Phenomenal and Attentional Consciousness May Be Inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
    In common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the way an experience feels, the line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
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  • Comparators, Functions, and Experiences.Harold Merskey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):689-690.
    The comparator model is insufficient for three reasons. First, consciousness is involved in the process of comparison as well as in the output. Second, we still do not have enough neurophysiological information to match the events of consciousness, although such knowledge is growing. Third, the anatomical localisation proposed can be damaged bilaterally but consciousness will persist.
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  • On Crude Data and Impoverished Theory.Michael McCloskey & Alfonso Caramazza - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):453-454.