Pulvermüller's attempt to link language with brain activity appears to depend on the assumption that words have context-independent meanings. An examination of everyday talk contradicts this assumption. The meaning that speakers convey depends not only on word content, but also, and importantly, on the location of a “word” in an ongoing sequence of turns in talk.

A neurologist presents evidence for locating the unconscious--Freud's concept--within the actual physiology of the brain, in a study that explains current knowledge about perception, memory, sleep, dreams, and Freud's theory of the unconscious.

In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central (...) themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness. In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

Subthalamic nucleus deep brain stimulation is an established therapy for Parkinson’s disease motor symptoms. The ideal site for implantation within STN, however, remains controversial. While many argue that placement of a DBS lead within the sensorimotor territory of the STN yields better motor outcomes, others report similar effects with leads placed in the associative or motor territory of the STN, while still others assert that placing a DBS lead “anywhere within a 6-mm-diameter cylinder centered at the presumed middle of (...) the STN produces similar clinical efficacy.” These discrepancies likely result from methodological differences including targeting preferences, imaging acquisition and the use of brain atlases that do not account for patient-specific anatomic variability. We present a first-in-kind within-patient demonstration of severe mood side effects and minimal motor improvement in a Parkinson’s disease patient following placement of a DBS lead in the limbic/associative territory of the STN who experienced marked improvement in motor benefit and resolution of mood side effects following repositioning the lead within the STN sensorimotor territory. 7 Tesla magnetic resonance imaging data were used to generate a patient-specific anatomical model of the STN with parcellation into distinct functional territories and computational modeling to assess the relative degree of activation of motor, associative and limbic territories. (shrink)

In this paper, it is examined how neuroscience can help to understand the nature of volition by addressing the question whether volitions can be localized in the brain. Volitions, as acts of the will, are special mental events or activities by which an agent consciously and actively exercises her agency to voluntarily direct her thoughts and actions. If we can pinpoint when and where volitional events or activities occur in the brain and find out their neural underpinnings, this (...) can substantively aid to demystify the concept of volition. After first discussing some methodological issues regarding whether it is possible to locate volition in the brain, various approaches by which neuroscientists and psychologists explore the neural correlates and substrates of volition are examined. Although different psychological conceptualizations of volition shape different perspectives toward understanding the functions of volition, the explorations of the neural basis of volition converge on certain common brain areas and structures. A unifying conception of volition that helps to make better sense of recent empirical findings is then suggested. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences are non-physical states that exist alongside physical states. Dualism leads to the postulation of psychophysical laws that generate experiences by operating on certain sorts of physical states. What sorts of physical states? To the limited extent that dualists have addressed this question, they have tended to favor a brain-based approach that locates the physical basis of experience in the head. In contrast, this paper develops an argument for a form of dualism on which experience has (...) a physical basis that reaches out into the world. Specifically, the argument uses a puzzle about spatial experience to support a theory I call _tracking dualism_. On tracking dualism, a psychophysical law generates experiences by operating on complex physical states that involve both brain states and tracking relations that they bear to features of the environment. To develop the argument, I discuss tracking dualism alongside its more familiar physicalist counterpart, the tracking intentionalist theory associated with Dretske, Lycan, and Tye. I conclude by outlining a tracking dualist research agenda. (shrink)

Hypotheses regarding the selective pressures driving the threefold increase in the size of the hominid brain since Homo habilis include climatic conditions, ecological demands, and social competition. We provide a multivariate analysis that enables the simultaneous assessment of variables representing each of these potential selective forces. Data were collated for latitude, prevalence of harmful parasites, mean annual temperature, and variation in annual temperature for the location of 175 hominid crania dating from 1.9 million to 10 thousand years ago. (...) We also included a proxy for population density and two indexes of paleoclimatic variability for the time at which each cranium was discovered. Results revealed independent contributions of population density, variation in paleoclimate, and temperature variation to the prediction of change in hominid cranial capacity (CC). Although the effects of paleoclimatic variability and temperature variation provide support for climatic hypotheses, the proxy for population density predicted more unique variance in CC than all other variables. The pattern suggests multiple pressures drove hominid brain evolution and that the core selective force was social competition. (shrink)

Despite the remarkable progress made in consciousness research during recent decades, there is still no sign of a general agreement about the location of its object. According to internalists, consciousness resides inside the brain. According to externalists, consciousness is partly constituted by elements or aspects of the environment. Internalism comports better with the existence of dreams, hallucinations and sensory imaging. Externalism seems to provide a more promising basis for understanding how we can experience the world and refer to (...) the content of our consciousness. I argue that the framework of structural realism supports internalism and helps to reveal the reasons behind the apparent explanatory success of the externalist approach. More specifically, structural realism supports the view that the structure of our consciousness is always present in our neural processes and only sometimes in an extended system that includes elements of the environment. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of contemporary thought that the mind is located in the brain. Although there have been some challenges to this view, it has remained mainstream outside of a few specialized discussions, and plays a prominent role in a wide variety of philosophical arguments. It is further assumed that the source of this view is empirical. I argue it is not. Empirical discoveries show conclusively that the brain is the central organ of mental life, but do (...) not show that it is the mind's location . The data are just as compatible with a view where mentality is a human capacity on the model of circulation or respiration, with the brain playing the same kind of role as the heart or lungs. The standard conception of the brain as the locus of mind stems, I claim, from the imposition of a Cartesian conception of the self on a materialist ontology. Recognizing that the empirical data do not justify such a move casts doubt on the foundations of a number of philosophical discussions and raises new questions about the nature of the psychological subject. (shrink)

Many neuroscientists have claimed that our minds are just a function of and thus reducible to our brains. I challenge neuroreductionism by arguing that the mind emerges from and is shaped by interaction among the brain, body, and environment. The mind is not located in the brain but is distributed among these three entities. I then explore the implications of the distributed mind for neuroethics.

Treatment of diseases of the brain by drugs or surgery necessitates an understanding of its structure and functions. The philosophical neurosurgeon soon encounters difficulties when localising the abstract concepts of mind and soul within the tangible 1300-gram organ containing 100 billion neurones. Hippocrates had focused attention on the brain as the seat of the mind. The tabula rasa postulated by Aristotle cannot be localised to a particular part of the brain with the confidence that we can localise (...) spoken speech to Broca's area or the movement of limbs to the contralateral motor cortex. Galen's localisation of imagination, reasoning, judgement and memory in the cerebral ventricles collapsed once it was evident that the functional units-neurones-lay in the parenchyma of the brain. Experiences gained from accidental injuries (Phineas Gage) or temporal lobe resection (William Beecher Scoville); studies on how we see and hear and more recent data from functional magnetic resonance studies have made us aware of the extensive network of neurones in the cerebral hemispheres that subserve the functions of the mind. The soul or atman, credited with the ability to enliven the body, was located by ancient anatomists and philosophers in the lungs or heart, in the pineal gland (Descartes), and generally in the brain. When the deeper parts of the brain came within the reach of neurosurgeons, the brainstem proved exceptionally delicate and vulnerable. The concept of brain death after irreversible damage to it has made all of us aware of 'the cocktail of brain soup and spark' in the brainstem so necessary for life. If there be a soul in each of us, surely, it is enshrined here. (shrink)

Substantial evidence indicates that cognitive training can be efficacious for older adults, but findings regarding training-related brain plasticity have been mixed and vary depending on the imaging modality. Recent years have seen a growth in recognition of the importance of large-scale brain networks on cognition. In particular, task-induced deactivation within the default mode network is thought to facilitate externally directed cognition, while aging-related decrements in this neural process are related to reduced cognitive performance. It is not yet clear (...) whether task-induced deactivation within the DMN can be enhanced by cognitive training in the elderly. We previously reported durable cognitive improvements in a sample of healthy older adults who completed 6 weeks of process-based object-location memory training compared to an active control training group. The primary aim of the current study is to evaluate whether these cognitive gains are accompanied by training-related changes in task-related DMN deactivation. Given the evidence for heterogeneity of the DMN, we examine task-related activation/deactivation within two separate DMN branches, a ventral branch related to episodic memory and a dorsal branch more closely resembling the canonical DMN. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing an untrained object-location memory task at four time points before, during, and after the training period. Task-induced activation values were extracted for the ventral and dorsal DMN branches at each time point. Relative to visual fixation baseline: the dorsal DMN was deactivated during the scanner task, while the ventral DMN was activated; the object-location memory training group exhibited an increase in dorsal DMN deactivation relative to the active control group over the course of training and follow-up; changes in dorsal DMN deactivation did not correlate with task improvement. These results indicate a training-related enhancement of task-induced deactivation of the dorsal DMN, although the specificity of this improvement to the cognitive task performed in the scanner is not clear. (shrink)

One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this (...) paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. The recommendation to emerge is that we step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is. (shrink)

E. Fuller Torrey draws on cutting-edge neuroscience research to propose a startling answer to the ultimate question. Evolving Brains, Emerging Gods locates the origin of gods within the human brain, arguing that religious belief is a by-product of evolution.

This issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy contains three papers on a topic of increasing importance within the field of "neurolaw"-namely, the implications for criminal law of direct brain intervention based mind altering techniques. To locate these papers' topic within a broader context, I begin with an overview of some prominent topics in the field of neurolaw, where possible providing some references to relevant literature. The specific questions asked by the three authors, as well as their answers and central (...) claims, are then sketched out, and I end with a brief comment to explain why this particular topic can be expected to gain more prominence in coming years. (shrink)

Data from published case and group studies bear on the trace deletion hypothesis. The deficit-lesion correlational literature does not support Grodzinsky's claim that lesions in and around Broca's area inevitably lead to comprehension deficits specifically related to coindexation of traces or his claim that other lesions spare this function.

Cet article interroge les échelles multiples à travers lesquelles nos imaginaires scientifiques actuels cadrent et cartographient les activités de notre cerveau. Le réduit-on à l’encéphale? au système nerveux qui le nourrit de stimuli, depuis les doigts jusqu’aux talons? aux réseaux de communication qui alimentent nos sensations d’images et de sons venant des quatre coins de la planète? La façon dont Gilbert Simondon modélise la dynamique transindividuelle des images dans son cours sur l’imagination et l’invention offre des ressources encore insuffisamment exploitées (...) pour nous aider à imaginer notre cerveau individuel comme un nœud formé de lignes s’étendant bien au-delà de nos personnes corporelles. Notre cerveau apparaît alors tout autant comme un lieu occupé par les images qui circulent à travers nous que comme un lieu d’émergence d’images inédites. This article questions the multiple scales though which our current scientific imagination frames and maps our brain’s agency. Do we focus exclusively on the chestnut-shaped organ located inside of the skull? Do we extend it to the whole nervous system, from the toes to the fingertips? Why not include the network of wires which fuels our senses with sensations, coming from the four corners of the world? The way Gilbert Simondon conceptualises the transindividual dynamics of images, in his course on Imagination and Invention, helps us envision our individual brain as a knot within a meshwork of lines extending a long way beyond the limits of our individual body. Under this light, our brain appears as much as a place of “occupation”, invaded by the flows of images which circulate through us, as a place of emergence for innovative ideas. (shrink)

Theorists concerned about the distributive effects of skilled emigration (brain drain) often argue that its harmful effects can be justly mitigated by restricting emigration from sending countries or by limiting immigration opportunities to receiving countries. I raise moral and practical concerns against restricting the movement of skilled migrants and contend that conceptualizing the moral issue in these terms leads theorists to neglect the moral salience of institutions that determine the distributive effects of migration. Using an analogy to skilled migration (...) in a domestic context, I argue for locating brain drain in a more holistic, institutional context that includes the reform of global institutions and of policies affecting migration. (shrink)

I offer some clarification concerning the kind of contradiction that Hoerl & McCormack's account could help explain and the scope of the metaphysical intuitions that could be explained by such a theory. I conclude that we need to know more about the sense in which the temporal reasoning system would represent time as a dimension.

Recent evidence in natural and semi-natural settings has revealed a variety of left-right perceptual asymmetries among vertebrates. These include preferential use of the left or right visual hemifield during activities such as searching for food, agonistic responses, or escape from predators in animals as different as fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. There are obvious disadvantages in showing such directional asymmetries because relevant stimuli may be located to the animal's left or right at random; there is no a priori association (...) between the meaning of a stimulus (e.g., its being a predator or a food item) and its being located to the animal's left or right. Moreover, other organisms (e.g., predators) could exploit the predictability of behavior that arises from population-level lateral biases. It might be argued that lateralization of function enhances cognitive capacity and efficiency of the brain, thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behavior. However, such an increase in brain efficiency could be obtained by each individual being lateralized without any need to align the direction of the asymmetry in the majority of the individuals of the population. Here we argue that the alignment of the direction of behavioral asymmetries at the population level arises as an “evolutionarily stable strategy” under “social” pressures occurring when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behavior with the behavior of other asymmetrical organisms of the same or different species. Key Words: asymmetry; brain evolution; brain lateralization; development; hemispheric specialization; laterality; lateralization of behavior; social behavior; theory of games. (shrink)

In a companion review1 we discussed the data supporting the conclusion that at least two subtypes of spectrin exist in mammalian brain. One form is found in the cell bodies, dendrites, and post‐synaptic terminals of neurons (brain spectrin(240/235E)) and the other subtype is located in the axons and presynaptic terminals (brain spectrin(240/235)). Our recent understanding of brain spectrin subtype localization suggests a possible explanation for a conundrum concerning brain 4.1 localization. Amelin, an immunoreactive analogue of (...) red blood cell (rbc) cytoskeletal protein 4.1, is localized in neuronal cell bodies and dendrites when brain sections are stained with antibody against rbc protein 4.1. However, it has recently been suggested that synapsin I, a neuron‐specific phosphoprotein associated with the cytoplasmic surface of small synaptic vesicles, is related to erythrocyte 4.1. In this review we hypothesize that there are at least two forms of brain 4.1: a cell body/dendritic form (amelin) which is detected with rbc protein 4.1 antibody, and a unique form found exclusively in the presynaptic terminal (synapsin I). The binding of synapsin I to brain spectrin(240/235), and its ability to stimulate the spectrin/F‐actin interaction in a phosphorylation‐dependent manner suggests a model for the regulation of synaptic transmission mediated by the neuronal cytoskeleton. (shrink)

Landmarks play a crucial role in bootstrapping both spatial and temporal cognition. Given the similarity in the underlying demands of representing spatial and temporal relations, we ask here whether animals can be trained to reason about temporal relations by providing them with temporal landmark cues, proposing a line of future research complementary to those suggested by the authors.

ObjectiveLeveraging an integrative multimodal MRI paradigm to elaborate on the hippocampus-derived structural and functional changes in children and adolescents with juvenile idiopathic arthritis and to explore potential correlations within the “joint-inflammation-brain” axis during the period of central neural system development.MethodsTwenty-one patients with JIA all completed the multimodal MRI scanning, laboratory tests, and neuropsychological assessments; meanwhile, 23 matched controls were recruited. We then harnessed the spherical harmonics with a point distribution model and the ROI-to-voxel functional connectivity to measure the hippocampal (...) shape and hippocampo-cortical FC patterns. Correlation analysis was performed to explore the potential links in neuroimaging features with disease-related indices.ResultsCompared to controls, JIA patients only presented an atrophic tendency in the posterior part of the bilateral hippocampus. The hippocampo-cortical FC revealed the between-group divergences mainly located at the pain matrix, striatum, and temporal lobe. Remarkably, the enhanced FC between the right hippocampus and postcentral cortex is positively correlated with the disability index, while the weakened FC of right anterior hippocampus with right insula and that of left posterior hippocampus with left superior temporal gyrus was inversely related to the erythrocyte sedimentation rate and anxiety status, separately.ConclusionAs with macroscopic damages, the altered functional-connectome patterns of the hippocampus in JIA patients might be more sensitive to detect the early neuropathological changes. Moreover, the functional disturbances were demonstrated associated with the physical disability, inflammation, and emotional status. These findings may enlighten us on the underlying neuropathological mechanism of CNS comorbidities in JIA. (shrink)

This commentary contests Wynn's diagnosis of the cognitive implications of the earliest stone tools and Acheulian tools. I argue that the earliest stone tools imply greater cognitive abilities than those of great apes, and that Acheulian tools imply more than the preoperational cognitive abilities Wynn suggests. Finally, I suggest an alternative adaptive scenario for the evolution of hominid cognitive abilities.

This article presents a historical overview of the role played by neurology patients and clinicians in the development of understanding brain–behavior relationships and argues that, even with the advent of sophisticated functional brain imaging techniques, this clinical approach remains valuable. It is particularly important in the biological study of religion, where there is a danger that piecemeal and reductionist approaches will come to dominate. It is argued that religion is a socially located, multifaceted, and embodied phenomenon that occurs (...) not in the brain but in the lives of human persons. Insights drawn from people living with conditions affecting the brain are thus vital for a full understanding of human identity, spirituality, and religion. (shrink)

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) survey a substantial body of theory and evidence on which there is broad agreement in the cognitive science of religion. Some parts of their argument (for instance, concerning the causes of costly commitment to religious beliefs) are more speculative and remain a focus of lively debate and further research.

Neuroscience has become increasingly reliant on multi-subject research in addition to studies of unusual single patients. This research has brought with it a challenge: how are data from different human brains to be combined? The dominant strategy for aggregating data across brains is what I call the ‘cartographic approach’, which involves mapping data from individuals to a spatial template. Here I characterize the cartographic approach and argue that one of its key steps, registration, should be carried out in a way (...) that is sensitive to the target of investigation. Because registration aims to align homologous brain locations, but not all homologous locations can be simultaneously aligned, a multiplicity of registration methods is required to meet the needs of researchers investigating different phenomena. I call this position ‘registration pluralism’. Registration pluralism has potential implications for neuroscientific practice, three of which I discuss here. This work shows the importance of reflecting more carefully on data aggregation methods, especially in light of the substantial individual differences that exist between brains. (shrink)

Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that (...) the location was not more central. The illusory AI was predicted from the known non-linearity in the retina and this is the first case of a clear cut type-type identity of a sensation and a neural process. Some implications for the concepts of the explanatory gap between neurology and consciousness and multiple neural realizations of conscious states and topic neutrality are discussed. (shrink)

What processes underlie the formation of new memories? What determines their strength? Where are the changes underlying memory located? With contributions from leading experts, this book offers the most up-to-date attempts to answer these and many more critical questions.

The aim of this study was to verify whether chimpanzees demonstrate an auditory laterality during the orientation reaction, and which hemisphere is responsible for processing the emotional stimuli and which for the species-specific vocalizations. The study involved nine chimpanzees from the Warsaw Municipal Zoological Garden. They were tested individually in their bedrooms. Chimpanzees approached a tube filled with food, located in the centre of the cage. Randomly selected sounds were played from the speakers when the subject was focused on getting (...) food. Individual reactions were observed and outcomes reported. The four types of sound used: thunderstorm, dog barking, chimpanzee vocalization and a zookeeper’s voice. To test whether chimpanzees demonstrate auditory laterality we used a single sample X2 test. The existence of auditory laterality has been confirmed. The sound of the storm caused the orientation reaction to the left, while chimpanzee vocalization - to the right. On this basis we can conclude that among chimpanzees, arousing stimuli are being processed by the right hemisphere, and species-specific vocalizations by the left. However, the set of stimuli was limited so the study did not unequivocally resolve this issue. (shrink)

Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults ( (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and (mean age of 68.92 (...) ± 5.72)). The analysis reveals the benefits of training, showing that it lowers cerebral activation while increasing the number of correct responses in the trained reasoning task (). The brain source generators were identified by time-averaging low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) current density images. In both groups, a bilateral overactivation associated with the task and not with age was identified. However, while the profile of bilateral activation in younger adults was symmetrical in anterior areas, in the older ones, the profile was located asymmetrically in anterior and posterior areas. Consequently, bilaterality may be a marker of how the brain adapts to maintain cognitive function in demanding tasks in both age groups. However, the differential bilateral locations across age groups indicate that the tendency to brain modulation is determined by age. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe argues in Personal Agency that the self is physically embodied yet not identical with any physical body, nor with any part of a physical body, such as the brain. For Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of carrying out intentional actions. Call this the thesis about the self (TS). In this paper my purpose is to develop and defend TS and argue that Frank Jackson’s serious metaphysics (SM) fails to account for the nature (...) of the self. This paper is outlined as follows: Section I presents Lowe’s theory of the self. In section II, I present Jackson’s central claims of SM. In section III, I develop Jackson’s SM as an objection against Lowe’s TS. In section IV, I respond to objections raised against Lowe’s TS and then critique Jackson’s claim that if an entity is not locatable within the framework of physicalism it should be eliminated. In section V, I conclude that Lowe’s TS is superior to Jackson’s SM. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe argues in Personal Agency that the self is physically embodied yet not identical with any physical body, nor with any part of a physical body, such as the brain. For Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of carrying out intentional actions. Call this the thesis about the self (TS). In this paper my purpose is to develop and defend TS and argue that Frank Jackson’s serious metaphysics (SM) fails to account for the nature (...) of the self. This paper is outlined as follows: Section I presents Lowe’s theory of the self. In section II, I present Jackson’s central claims of SM. In section III, I develop Jackson’s SM as an objection against Lowe’s TS. In section IV, I respond to objections raised against Lowe’s TS and then critique Jackson’s claim that if an entity is not locatable within the framework of physicalism it should be eliminated. In section V, I conclude that Lowe’s TS is superior to Jackson’s SM. (shrink)

Questionable research practices are a well-recognized problem in psychology. Coding bias, or the tendency of review studies to disproportionately cite positive findings from original research, has received comparatively little attention. Coding bias is more likely to occur when original research, such as neuroimaging, includes large numbers of effects, and is most concerning in applied contexts. We evaluated coding bias in reviews of structural magnetic resonance imaging studies of PCL-R psychopathy. We used PRISMA guidelines to locate all relevant original sMRI studies (...) and reviews. The proportion of null-findings cited in reviews was significantly lower than those reported in original research, indicating coding bias. Coding bias was not affected by publication date or review design. Reviews recommending forensic applications—such as treatment amenability or reduced criminal responsibility—were no more accurate than purely theoretical reviews. Coding bias may have contributed to a perception that structural brain abnormalities in psychopaths are more consistent than they actually are, and by extension that sMRI findings are suitable for forensic application. We discuss possible sources for the pervasive coding bias we observed, and we provide recommendations to counteract this bias in review studies. Until coding bias is addressed, we argue that this literature should not inform conclusions about psychopaths' neurobiology, especially in forensic contexts. (shrink)

Falls are a leading cause of serious injury and restricted participation among persons with stroke (PwS). Reactive balance control is essential for fall prevention, however, only a few studies have explored the effects of lesion characteristics (location and extent) on balance control in PwS. We aimed to assess the impact of lesion characteristics on reactive and anticipatory balance capacity, gait, and hemiparetic lower limb function, in PwS. Forty-six subacute PwS were exposed to forward, backward, right and left unannounced horizontal (...) surface translations in 6 increasing intensities, while standing. Fall threshold (i.e., perturbation intensity that results in a fall into the harness system) was measured. In addition, the Berg Balance Scale (BBS), 6 Minute Walk Test (6MWT) and Lower Extremity Fugl-Meyer (LEFM) were measured. Lesion effects were analyzed separately for left- and right-hemisphere damaged (LHD, RHD) patients, using voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM). Our results show that voxel clusters where damage exerted a significant impact on balance, gait and lower-limb function were found in the corticospinal tract, in its passage in the corona radiata and in the posterior limb of the internal capsule. Additional significant impact was found to lesions affecting the putamen and the external capsule. Balance, gait, and hemiparetic lower limb function showed much overlap of the corresponding ‘significant’ voxel clusters. Test scores of RHD and LHD patients were affected largely by damage to homologous regions, with the LHD group showing a wider distribution of ‘significant’ voxels. The study corroborates and extends previous findings by demonstrating that balance control, gait, and lower limb function are all affected mainly by damage to essentially the same brain structures, namely - the corticospinal tract and adjacent structures in the capsular-putaminal region. (shrink)

Where is the self located in the brain? This is a question that has intrigued philosophers and scientists for quite some time. Four centuries ago, the French philosopher René Descartes thought that the self resided in the pineal gland, a small structure centrally positioned in the lower brain.

Hypocretin regulates brain reward function and cocaine consumption in rats. The hypocretinergic (Hcrt) system is implicated in energy homeostasis, feeding and sleep regulation. Hypocretinergic cell bodies are located in the lateral hypothalamus (LH) and project throughout the brain. The aim of the present studies was to investigate the role of the Hcrt system in regulating brain reward function and the reinforcing properties of cocaine in rats. Intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) thresholds provide an accurate measure of brain reward (...) function in rats. Here we show that a single injection of Hcrt-1 (5 µg icv) induced persistent, long-lasting elevations in ICSS thresholds in drug-naïve rats. Indeed, Hrct-1 elevated ICSS thresholds for 36 h, with peak elevations between 6 and 12 hours after injection. Hrct-1-induced threshold elevations were attenuated by an antibody known to neutralize the binding of hcrt-1 to its receptors. Taken together, these observations suggest that Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function in rats. Because Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function, we hypothesized that it may attenuate the increased brain reward function usually observed after cocaine consumption, and thereby alter cocaine self-administration behavior. A daily injection of Hrct-1 (1 µg icv), for 4 consecutive days, slightly increased cocaine self-administration (0.25 mg/infusion) in rats. Overall, these data demonstrate that Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function, and as such may indirectly alter cocaine self-administration. Given the well-established role of hypocretin neurons in regulating feeding behavior and sleep, we hypothesize that hypocretinergic regulation of brain reward function may provide a mechanism by which appropriate and competing behaviors (e.g. sleep or feeding) may be engaged to maintain energy homeostasis. (shrink)

Thelen and her colleagues' model overemphasizes the role of action in cognitive development. Recent research has shown that infants do not have to be trained to reach for a hidden object. By 7.5 months of age, infants can recall the location of a hidden object with no practice trials. Thelen at al.'s goal to design a parsimonious account of A-not-B behaviors was successful, but at the expense of focusing primarily on implicit and ignoring explicit memory.

For vocal animals, recognizing species-specific vocalizations is important for survival and social interactions. In humans, a voice region has been identified that is sensitive to human voices and vocalizations. As this region also strongly responds to speech, it is unclear whether it is tightly associated with linguistic processing and is thus unique to humans. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging of macaque monkeys (Old World primates, Macaca mulatta) we discovered a high-level auditory region that prefers species-specific vocalizations over other vocalizations and (...) sounds. This region not only showed sensitivity to the ‘voice’ of the species, but also to the vocal identify of conspecific individuals. The monkey voice region is located on the superior-temporal plane and belongs to an anterior auditory ‘what’ pathway. These results establish functional relationships with the human voice region and support the notion that, for different primate species, the anterior temporal regions of the brain are adapted for.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ideas in the Brain: The Localization of Memory Traces in the Eighteenth CenturyTimo KaitaroPlato suggests in the Theaetetus that we imagine a piece of wax in our soul, a gift from the goddess of Memory. We are able to remember things when our perceptions or thoughts imprint a trace upon this piece of wax, in the same manner as a seal is stamped on wax. Plato uses this (...) metaphor to explain the errors which arise when we mistake something for something else: we connect the perception of an object with the trace belonging to another. The metaphor can also be used in explaining differences in people’s mnestic capacities: rapid learning and forgetting correspond to soft wax, impure wax results in muddled traces, etc.1 If we locate the traces in the brain instead of in the soul, Plato’s metaphor gains consistency and turns into a testable hypothesis. This move was already made by Quintilian.2So, the metaphor of memory as traces in the brain is evidently not a modern invention. This is easy to understand. To frame the hypothesis one needs only to reflect on how we use objects outside our brains for mnemonic purposes. We conserve ideas by tracing or printing letters and words on paper. We are also able to conserve images in drawings, paintings and prints. What could be more natural than to think of memory as the formation of traces in the brain? The development of even better information storage techniques in the form of pictures, symbols, and signs provides the metaphor extra plausibility. Plato’s seal allows us to imagine the imprint of a person’s likeness, but modern techniques of information storage and retrieval make it even easier to imagine memory in general as the formation of material traces.Explaining memory in terms of material traces could, of course, be taken [End Page 301] to mean that the formation of material traces in the brain is merely a necessary condition of memory. But one could also take a more reductionistic stance which identifies memory with the formation of material traces. Furthermore, one could identify specific mental items (sensations, ideas, memories) with specific physiological events or anatomical entities in the brain. This seems especially plausible if we imagine that the traces in the brain are as discrete and separate as ideas or memories are in our minds. Since the traces we form or print on paper consist of discrete letters and words, the thought that the traces in the brain are equally discrete and separate comes easily. Plato, in fact, made separateness a condition for the memory to work properly: it is not easy to read signs printed on one another.3 Of course, no traces are actually visible in the brain. But they are easy to imagine, as it is to imagine explanations of psychological phenomena, such as association, based on these traces.At the end of the seventeenth century, explanations of mental phenomena referring to material traces in the brain were used by writers, from Platonists to materialists, who supported widely different theories about the nature of the human mind.4 In fact, as I will show later in this paper, the question of the possible identity of mental entities, like ideas or sensations, with material entities or traces in the brain is relatively independent of the question of the existence of an immaterial soul. Or rather, if there is a systematic connection between the answers proposed to these two questions in the eighteenth century, it is not the connection one would expect. Nowadays we often tend to think of a prototypical materialist as someone who makes radical reductionistic claims about the identity of mental phenomena with brain states. We also tend to think of the eighteenth-century French materialists as “mechanistic.”5 In view of this reputation, it may come as a surprise to find that some eighteenth-century materialists, notably Denis Diderot, were in fact consistent anti-reductionists and opposed to mechanical or mechanistic explanations of the mental.6 In fact, the epithet “mechanistic” is misleading even when applied to the philosopher who is traditionally presented as the paradigmatic example of a “mechanistic materialist,” Julien Offray... (shrink)