Spinoza rejects fundamental tenets of received morality, including the notions of Providence and free will. Yet he retains rich theories of good and evil, virtue, perfection, and freedom. Building interconnected readings of Spinoza's accounts of imagination, error, and desire, Michael LeBuffe defends a comprehensive interpretation of Spinoza's enlightened vision of human excellence. Spinoza holds that what is fundamental to human morality is the fact that we find things to be good or evil, not what we take those designations to mean. (...) When we come to understand the conditions under which we act-that is, when we come to understand the sorts of beings that we are and the ways in which we interact with things in the world-then we can recast traditional moral notions in ways that help us to attain more of what we find to be valuable.For Spinoza, we find value in greater activity. Two hazards impede the search for value. First, we need to know and acquire the means to be good. In this respect, Spinoza's theory is a great deal like Hobbes's: we strive to be active, and in order to do so we need food, security, health, and other necessary components of a decent life. There is another hazard, however, that is more subtle. On Spinoza's theory of the passions, we can misjudge our own natures and fail to understand the sorts of beings that we really are. So we can misjudge what is good and might even seek ends that are evil. Spinoza's account of human nature is thus much deeper and darker than Hobbes's: we are not well known to ourselves, and the self-knowledge that is the foundation of virtue and freedom is elusive and fragile. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFree versus unfree was a fundamental axis of differentiation in ancient Near Eastern societies. Liberty was conceptualized as the power to govern oneself, free from another's domination, thus free to participate in constituting political authority. More concretely, the subject of the state was by definition free, this being the condition of obliging him for duty. Thus the relation between people and polity was predicated on liberty, not servitude as commonly supposed of an area still shackled to the Western ideology of (...) Oriental despotism. I argue that liberty was an operative principle in the organization of ancient Near Eastern polities, basing the case on sources from the Late Bronze Age. The first section sets forth general propositions, and the second puts them in ancient Near Eastern terms. The third and fourth sections examine documents from Ugarit and Emar, two polities under Hittite suzerainty, that illustrate how these principles operated in the lives of individuals. The fifth section examines how they were articulated at the scale of communities, through the lens of the poet who composed the Hurro-Hittite ‘Song of Liberation'. The conclusion draws together the ideas of liberty, bondage and liberation these sources disclose, ideas that remained productive in later ages. (shrink)

Erasmus' preface reviewed (section 1) -- Erasmus' skepticism (sections 2-6) -- The necessity of knowing God and his power (sections 7-8) -- The sovereignty of God (sections 9-27) -- Exordium (sections 28-40) -- Discussion : first part (sections 41-75) -- Discussion : second part (sections 76-134) -- Discussion : third part (sections 135-166) -- Conclusion (sections 167-168).

Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in (...) some way to reasons, our actions are meaningful and can be judged on their moral merit. In this highly original work, Nomy Arpaly argues that a deterministic world does not preclude moral responsibility, rationality, and love--in short, meaningful lives--but that there would still be something lamentable about a deterministic world. A person may respond well to reasons, and her actions may faithfully reflect her true self or values, but she may still feel that she is not free. Arpaly argues that compatibilists and semicompatibilists are wrong to dismiss this feeling--for which there are no philosophical consolations--as philosophically irrelevant. On the way to this bittersweet conclusion, Arpaly sets forth surprising theories about acting for reasons, the widely accepted idea that "ought implies can," moral blame, and more. (shrink)

There are many ways of attaching two objects together: for example, they can be connected, linked, tied or bound together; and the connection, link, tie or bind can be made of chain, rope, or cement. Every one of these binding methods has been used as a metaphor for causation. What is the real significance of these metaphors? They express a commitment to a certain way of thinking about causation, summarized in the following thesis: ‘In any concrete situation, there is an (...) objective fact of the matter as to whether two events are in fact bound by the causal relation. It is the aim of philosophical inquiry to analyze this objective relation.’ Through a variety of examples, I hope to cast doubt on this seemingly innocuous thesis. The problem lies not with the word ‘objective’, but with the word ‘the’. The goal of a philosophical account of causation should not be to capture the causal relation, but rather to capture the many ways in which the events of the world can be bound together. 1 The metaphors 2 Unpacking the metaphors 3 Theories of causation 4 The two assassins 5 The birth control pills 6 The smoker-protector gene 7 The bicycle thief 8 Further examples 8.1 Indeterminism 8.2 Probability-lowering causes 8.3 Parts vs wholes 8.4 Symmetric overdetermination 8.5 Delayers 8.6 Causation by omission 8.7 Double prevention/disconnection 8.8 Preemptive prevention 8.9 Quantitative variables 9 Conclusion. (shrink)

The article examines the use made of hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage in kojeve, sartre and merleau-ponty as a means of discussing the problem of merging a phenomenology of social life with a dialectical conception of philosophical narration. it is argued that neither sartre nor merleau-ponty can reconcile phenomenology and dialectic without an ontologizing of politics which ultimately provides a misleadingly abstract account of political life. while concentrating on the period 1945-1955, the article draws out certain implications for (...) the evaluation of sartre and merleau-ponty's later work. (shrink)

The primary concern in this paper is to examine the nature of Śiva’s aruḷ—his generative and salvific energy—as portrayed in Tiruvācakam, Māṇikkavācakar’s important but understudied text of medieval bhakti poems. Close attention is paid to the poet’s description of Śiva’s aruḷ as inducing seemingly incongruous ontological states of being—one of ecstatic possession that results in rapturous dance and one of spiritual bondage. In doing so, this paper posits that Māṇikkavācakar is using aruḷ as śakti is used in the philosophy (...) of the Sanskrit Śaiva Siddhānta tradition and argues that this is an early attempt to localize the Śaiva Siddhānta in a Tamil milieu, as Tiruvācakam appears several centuries prior to the initial Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta text. In doing so, this paper also highlights the ways in which poetic narratives can embody a broader philosophical debate rather than serving merely as a vehicle for philosophical ideas. (shrink)

There seems to have been a time at which sentient beings have not escaped from the dungeon of individuality. In the East, liberation was elaborated into a fine art, but it may be doubted whether more people may not have made their escape from solitary confinement outside the organized religions than by means of them. In the West reintegration was sporadic but in recent years it has become a widespread preoccupation. Unfortunately its technical dependence on oriental literature- sometimes translated by (...) scholars whose knowledge of the language was greater than their understanding of the subject-has proved a barrier which rendered full comprehension laborious and exceedingly long. There it appears to be essential that such teaching as may be transmissible shall be given in modern idiom and in accordance with out own processes of thought. Enlightenment and the Extinction of 'Me' It: On Realizing the Mind This Phenomenal Absence Potential Reality Potential Being Seeking the Seeker. (shrink)

While popular debate grapples with the legality of gay marriage, networks of medical, political, and juridical discourses produce and situate sexuality in a field of knowledge that is constantly under examination and administration. The rationalization of sexuality, and its dispersion into multiple fields of knowledge, has become part of a system of power relations that produces identities and manages them. Within this context, this paper places Horkheimer and Adorno's excursus on Sade's Juliette in conversation with Foucault's first volume of the (...) History of Sexuality. It explores how instrumental reason and power/knowledge relationships produce discourses of sexuality, which have come to dominate Western society. It also explores possible sites of resistance, through the notion of performativity, that exist within these modes of rationalization and power. I argue that this interlocution of Horkheimer and Adorno with Foucault helps us see sexuality as a site of both domination and resistance. It also shows how sexuality is produced in a field of contestation where possibilities of practices of freedom are always circumscribed by modes of rationalization and networks of power. (shrink)

"a man cannot be thoroughly humbled until he comes to know that his salvation is utterly beyond his own powers, counsel, endeavors, will, and works, and absolutely depending on the will, counsel, pleasure, and work of another, that is, of God only." So speaks Luther in his greatest book, On the Bondage of the Will. In this book, Luther replies to the arguments of Erasmus of Rotterdam, who had pointed to all the commands in Scripture, and believed that they (...) implied that man could obey them. Luther replied that such an argument emptied the Gospel of its power. Luther throwing plenty of entertaining bombshells and insults along the way, but he also gets right to the heart on issues such as grace, human sinfulness, predestination, and man's need for absolute grace and forgiveness. (shrink)

This volume addresses a wide variety of moral concerns regarding slavery as an institutionalized social practice. By considering the slave's critical appropriation of the natural rights doctrine, the ambiguous implications of various notions of consent and liberty are examined. The authors assume that, although slavery is undoubtedly an evil social practice, its moral assessment stands in need of a more nuanced treatment. They address the question of what is wrong with slavery by critically examining, and in some cases endorsing, certain (...) principles derived from communitarianism, paternalism, utilitarianism, and jurisprudence. (shrink)

While popular debate grapples with the legality of gay marriage, networks of medical, political, and juridical discourses produce and situate sexuality in a field of knowledge that is constantly under examination and administration. The rationalization of sexuality, and its dispersion into multiple fields of knowledge, has become part of a system of power relations that produces identities and manages them. Within this context, this paper places Horkheimer and Adorno's excursus on Sade's Juliette in conversation with Foucault's first volume of the (...) History of Sexuality. It explores how instrumental reason and power/knowledge relationships produce discourses of sexuality, which have come to dominate Western society. It also explores possible sites of resistance, through the notion of performativity, that exist within these modes of rationalization and power. I argue that this interlocution of Horkheimer and Adorno with Foucault helps us see sexuality as a site of both domination and resistance. It also shows how sexuality is produced in a field of contestation where possibilities of practices of freedom are always circumscribed by modes of rationalization and networks of power. (shrink)

I believe we could learn more about freedom if we talked less about freedom. Because “freedom” is a word with singular prestige, various moral philosophers have embodied it in their teaching and claimed to set forth its true characteristics. Many words employed in philosophical controversy are ambiguous. “Freedom,” I think, is one of the most troublesome. I propose to attempt some disentanglement. To begin with, there is a sense in which the meaning of “freedom” seems to present no difficulties. This (...) sense occurs in such a remark as: “That animal was in captivity and now it is free.” I shall call this “simple freedom” and what it means is the absence of constraint. Thus applied there would probably be general agreement about the word. The difficulties arise when we come to consider freedom as pertaining to human persons. Here the distinction between simple freedom and the more philosophical definitions of the word will emerge. On the simple definition a man is free if constraint is absent, and that is all there is to it. But this will not do for most philosophers. It is pointed out that man is a special case in that he experiences conflicting desires. He wills a thing and he does not will it; or he wills something and at the same time he wills something else which is incompatible with it. Man, we are reminded, is a rational creature, but besides his rational will he is subject to the solicitations of impulses and desires which are not rational. Therefore, it is argued, the mere absence of constraint is not a sufficient condition of human freedom and hence not a sufficient definition of the word “freedom” as applied to human persons. (shrink)

Martin Luther, to the venerable D. Erasmus of Rotterdam, wishing Grace and Peace in Christ. hat I have been so long answering your Diatribe on Free-will, ...

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Includes bibliography: p. 7-12 and bibliographical references.

The literature on sado‐masochism (S/M) and dominance and submission (D/S) tends to focus either on the psychodynamics of perversion or, in more magnanimous moments, on rites of reversal in the power relations of participants. This paper shifts the focus of analysis to the altered states of consciousness achieved in consensual S/M, bondage and fetish play and demonstrates the self‐conscious affinity between S/M and ecstatic religious practices like those well documented in the anthropological literature. The paper will explore sensory and (...) other shifts used to produce what one informant called "that transformative experience." It is posited that "dominance/ submission" and "top/bottom" are not simply asymmetrical relations in terms of power relations, but that they evoke fundamentally different states of consciousness. Further, altered states in consensual bondage and fetish play differ significantly in hetero‐ and homosexual play. The reasons for this appear to have both historical and political implications which are explored briefly in the paper. (shrink)

Thus Hegel's philosophy did not, as it were, merely paint "gray on gray." Not surprisingly, however, contemporary interest in this "ultimate philosophy" is due chiefly to the suggestive expansion of its insights, rather than to any desire for systematic reconstruction. In a discretionary way, Hegelian problems and patterns have gained a new lease in the fields of social and religious thought and among those for whom classical political theory is not a dead exercise. One might say that Hegel remains vital (...) because he continues to raise polemical questions. When a giant structure of human speculation is superseded—a fate which some feel, wrongly I think, that Hegel tacitly acknowledged for his own philosophy—but survives in membris disjectis, anthologies tend to be compiled for partisan purposes. Karl Löwith reminds us that this was the destiny of the fragile Hegelian balance in the hands of the philosopher's immediate disciples. The last generation has seen a renewal of this Kulturkampf, but now on the far side of total war, Marxism, and religious crisis. The opposition of "What did Hegel mean?" and "What does Hegel mean for us?" is posed and reposed. I personally feel—as a historian of ideas—that some intellectual mischief is caused by the failure to raise the two questions in mutual rapport. (shrink)