Hegel: Dialectic

N. Wiener's negative definition of information is well known: it states what information is not. According to this definition, it is neither matter nor energy. But what is it? It is shown how one can follow the lead of dialectical logic as expounded by G.W.F. Hegel in his main work -- "The Science of Logic" -- to answer this and some related questions.

The absence of Islam from recent scholarship on Hegel's account of world religions is puzzling. In the first part of the article, we argue that Hegel's neglect of Islam in his systematic account of religious phenomena is not accidental and that he did not think of Islam as a determinate religion. Its size and believers aside, we suggest that it is not possible to assign any determinacy to Islam as a world-historical phenomenon under Hegel's rubric, because such determinacy that applies (...) to other religions would be in conflict with what Hegel takes to be Islam's emphasis on the negative moment of truth, its revolutionary tendencies, and its lack of any novel conceptual content as a response to Christianity. In the second part of the article, we point out how one could respond to Hegel's characterization of Islam when it is mentioned in relation to other religious traditions. First, we argue that Hegel overemphasizes the significance of Islam qua religion in explaining the history of Muslim peoples. More than that, Hegel does not see that the history of Islamic philosophy and science can be characterized by sublation and that it can be integrated into conceptual developments in the West on these terms. However, our critique of Hegel's Eurocentrism does not remain at this level, for in the third part of the article we argue for the significance of considering the response of Muslim philosophers to Hegel. In particular, we look at the responses by Mohammed al-Khosht and Mahmoud Haider, respectively. We conclude that Hegel's exclusion of Islam from any involvement in the history of the Concept indicates an undialectical commitment on his part and that to this extent being Hegelian today requires that we rectify this oversight. (shrink)

Engels’ name stands and falls today with a variety of his contributions to socialist thought and Marxist philosophy. Yet there is one particular component of the Marxist body of thought that has been subject to a group of controversies for quite some time for which Engels is usually held responsible: dialectics and dialectics of nature. It is curious and ironic that a theoretical contribution to an intellectual tradi tion within the history of European political philosophy could be perceived and depicted (...) as a major distortion of that tradition. In Engels’ case, this irony is captured by the phrase “the Engels problem.” In this chapter, I will first briefly summarize what “the Engels problem” is about and lay out its connection to the reception his tory of Engels’ dialectics. Then, I will delve into the general outlines of Engels’ dialectics and focus on his intentions, tasks, and purposes in pursuing dialectics in some of his prominent works on this theme from 1870s to 1880s, most notably in Anti-Dühring and the Dialectics of Nature. In the final section, I will briefly discuss some of the open questions of Engels’ natural dialectics. (shrink)

Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) (...) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologismbeiherspielen, in whichBeispielis understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). ABeispielin the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play. (shrink)

In the comprehension of many 19th century European philosophers, there seems ever present in much of the work, a shared notion of struggle. This notion seems mainly to arise within the confines of human consciousness. The notion of struggle is in fact pervasive in contemporary thought as well, and could simply be inherent to human nature. However, I will maintain specific focus on the notion of struggle as brought to light by a sampling of works by three relevant 19th century (...) philosophers, namely Fichte, Hegel, and Kierkegaard. I look into some of the foundational claims made by these thinkers to see what can be discovered about their reasoning and what sense can be made of this seemingly unavoidable aspect of the human condition. The goal is to see what relations can be made among their ideas and where conflict and contradiction may arise. Once these elucidations have been made, I argue for my own stance on the notion of struggle both within the confines of human consciousness and on the outset to explain my arguments in terms of human behavior. I argue that there is one thinker amongst the three covered that offers a methodology of practical application in a person’s life in terms of human nature as opposed to the formulations made by the remaining two who I consider only to offer general descriptions of human consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper, we interpret a 19th century diagram, which is meant to visualise G.W.F. Hegel’s entire method of the `Science of Logic' on the basis of bitwise operations. For the interpretation of the diagram we use a binary numeral system, and discuss whether the anti-Hegelian argument associated with it is valid or not. The reinterpretation is intended to make more precise rules of construction, a stricter binary code and a review of strengths and weaknesses of the critique.

By the beginning of the 19th century Hegel's dialectic turned contradiction (conceived as unity of a concept with its determined negation) into distinguished inference. In the course of 20th century a family of systems known as "paraconsistent" formalized dialectical logic according to the contemporary paradigm of inference, oriented to truth-preserving, and not powered anymore solely by contradiction. In this way, nevertheless, Hegel's idea of logic as unfolding of concepts ordered by degree of "determination" reached at every step of the process, (...) was put aside. We attempt to recover the importance of that idea for the hegelian concept of "logical necessity", pointing out in addition that it may well play the role of an order relation for dialectical inference. (shrink)

ANTONIO LABRIOLA’S THEORY OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM. The author examines Antonio Labriola’s interpretation of historical materialism in the Saggi intorno alla concezione materialistica della storia (Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History). The author identifies the key element to grasp the relevance of Labriola’s reading of Marxism in the concept of the theory developed in the Saggi. After reviewing the main interpretations of the Saggi, the author focuses on the relationship between history and theory showing up in Labriola’s reading. Firstly, the (...) sense of the theory as an expression of the self-consciousness of a real process is examined by the author in connection with the meaning of dialectics as a self-criticism of historical development. Secondly, the author deals with the method of historical materialism and its impact on the historiographical research. Finally, the author discusses the link between the genesis of historical materialism and its scientific validity, focusing on the problems of class consciousness and ideology for this purpose. (shrink)

“It is probably justified in requiring a transformation of the image of the real world as it has been constructed in the last 300 years… [for] now it seems to work no longer. One must therefore go back 300 years and reflect on how one could have proceeded differently at that time, and how the whole subsequent development would then be modified. No wonder that puts us into boundless confusion!” :: a letter from Schrödinger to Einstein in 1950 -/- The (...) theme of the new book, Idols of the Mind vs True Reality by Bhakti Madhava Puri, Ph.D. is concerned with the clear exposition of the pivotal conceptions and misconceptions of Galileo’s and others’ ideas that produced the subsequent development of what would become modern mathematized science. -/- The confusions and almost complete ignorance that exist today regarding something so fundamental as consciousness is immediately cleared up when the obvious errors are seen in the ad hoc presumptions of the original founders of modern science who were blindsided by the metaphysical ontologies that held sway during their lives, but to which we no longer adhere, thanks to the development of philosophy beyond that period. We trace this progress out in a concise way in the book. -/- The modern mind, thanks to science education, is focused on the one-sided empirical approach to knowledge by sensuous perception, but this fails to account for the role of subjective cognition or conception – the role of consciousness in such perceptions. This artificial separation of the original unity-in-difference between conception and content has been rendered impossible to broach because of the historical metaphysical tradition of dualism firmly held by the fathers of modern science such as Galileo and Descartes. -/- The presumed impossible gap between subject and object is bridged once we realize that the object is what the subject knows it to be. This does not reduce the object to the subject as the abstract idealists (monists) naively are only too hasty to presume as an immediate identity (oneness). Mediation is involved; there are both difference and identity at play. It is merely lazy un-thinking that ignores the intricate dynamic in the mediating activity that is the heart and life of consciousness. The main purpose of the book is to restore the central importance of the conceptual moment that is integral to science and which makes it truly worthy of the name Science or scientific knowledge. (shrink)

For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s so-called “dialectical method”. Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To (...) my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method. (shrink)

The article focuses on a chapter of the biography of Angela Davis which, unless mistaken, has not yet received due attention: the training and intellectual experience with her German professors, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno. From the philosophical studies in Frankfurt in the 1960s to the more recent reflections on movements such as Black Lives Matter, there seems to be a continuity in the way she approaches contemporary social reality, a démarche that draws its strength from the original combination (...) of two traditions of radical critical thinking: Frankfurtian and Afro-American. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy,” Robert Gooding-Williams offers an insight. He writes: “Our sense of ourselves and of the possibilities existing for us is, to a significant degree, a function of the descriptions we have available to us to conceptualize our intended actions and prospective lives…. ‘Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities of action come into being in consequence.’” In this article, I discuss the philosopher's role in the articulation of new descriptions and thus (...) new possibilities. I argue that potential modes of bold and assertive comportment are conjured when new insurrectionist descriptions are articulated within oppressed populations. To bring this to a higher resolution, I discuss the pervasiveness of dialectical conflict, the need to creatively reorient the descriptions of oppressed groups toward liberation, and the need for more than one prescriptive mode of social amelioration. (shrink)

Some developments of the last century’s philosophical culture show instances of solidarity between phenomenology and dialectical materialism. This paper discusses an aspect of these reconciliatory attempts, in order to clarify a few key features of the political projects they imply. I argue that the varying political outcomes of these theoretical operations depend on different conceptions of the transition between phenomenology and materialism. The perspective on this connection can be either materialistic or phenomenological. After an ahistorical introduction to the issue, I (...) present both cases through an examination of Thao’s and Paci’s viewpoints on the matter. The aporetic result of Thao’s investigations ensues from his dogmatic stance towards this transition, whereas the theoretical and political fertility of Paci’s project follows from his phenomenological approach to the problem. However, Thao’s proposal remains relevant for the possibility of a phenomenological praxis: Neri, a student of Paci, underlines this potentiality in his reception of Thao’s work. (shrink)

Der Denkweg Hegels kann als ein Bildungsprozess von Einheitsbegriffen angesehen werden. Dieser Weg lässt sich in zwei Phasen einteilen: eine spekulative und eine vorspekulative Phase. Die These dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, dass der Begriff der Einheit sich innerhalb beider Phasen jenes Denkweges entwickelte und dabei die gleichen allgemeinen Formen annimmt. Von daher kann der Weg dieses Denkens durch einen Doppel-Begriff, den der spekulativen und den der vorspekulativen Einheit, rekonstruiert werden. Im Blick auf das Ganze lässt sich also sagen, dass beide (...) Phasen am Ende durch die fundamentale Entscheidung Hegels eines „Eingreifens in das Leben der Menschen“ verbunden sind. Und die letzte Form der Einheit in der spekulativen Phase – die der absoluten Idee – wird dementsprechend eine gewisse aufgehobene Bewegung der Subjektivität und der Objektivität sein, an der sich die Einheit als Freiheit zeigt. (shrink)

This paper examines Lukács’ interpretation of Lenin, with particular focus on his Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought (1924), and the Postscript which was added to the book in January 1967. From 1924 onward, Lukács mainly focuses on the methodological basis of Lenin’s political thought, which vital point lays in applying the category of totality in order to grasp the complexity of the socio-historical conjuncture. In addition, Lukács deals with some ethical aspects of Lenin’s personality, i.e. his (...) human attitude. The ethical aspects are but the weakest point in Lukács’ interpretation. Diametrically opposed to any form of decisionism, Lenin embodies for Lukács both a politician and a political scientist. (shrink)

Tout au long de son chemin de pensée, Heidegger a nourri une patiente explication avec Hegel, qu’il considérait comme son plus coriace adversaire. Or il s’avère que le litige qui les oppose concerne au premier chef le statut et l’origine de la négativité – problème qui s’impose, selon l’aveu même de Heidegger, à titre d’« unique pensée d’une pensée qui pose la question de l’être ». Partant du constat d’une affinité indéniable entre les deux penseurs quant au rôle insigne qui (...) doit revenir à la négation en philosophie, cette étude entend percer à jour les motifs de la constante fin de non-recevoir que Heidegger oppose pourtant à la méthode dialectique de son prédécesseur. C’est qu’il dispute à Hegel un concept de négation qu’il juge plus originaire que son contrepoids dialectique, négation qui doit se faire l’écho de l’abyssal néant qui avoisine l’être. Dans son irréductible retrait, l’être se refuserait ainsi à toute résorption synthétique au sein d’un système totalisant, préservant ainsi pour la pensée un éventail de possibilités insoupçonnées. Mais Heidegger parvient-il, en définitive, à se libérer de l’embarras dialectique qui semble coller à sa pensée et qui exige de lui un constant effort de distanciation ? (shrink)

I argue that it is through an integrative dialogue based on the Ijing model of cooperative and cyclical change rather, than a Marxist or neo-Marxist dialectical model of change based upon the Hegelian model of conflict and replacement, that promises the greatest possibility of peaceful coexistence. As a case study of a dialogue between civilizations, I utilize both a mythical and an historical encounter between Martin Buber, representing the West, and Zhuangzi, representing the East. I show that despite the vast (...) temporal, historic, linguistic and cultural differences, that the dialogue between Zhuangzi and Buber is complementary and not adversarial. (shrink)

I put forward the case that comparative philosophy is best practiced as integrative philosophy. The model for integrative philosophy employed embodies its own methodology, integrating the Hegelian dialectic and the Yin-Yang 陰陽, cyclical model of change illustrated by the Yijing 易經 as strategies for integrating philosophical traditions. As an object lesson, I integrate a real, historical one-way encounter with an imagined two-way encounter between Martin Buber and Zhuangzi 莊子, to provide a counter-example to replace Huntington’s clash of civilizations with a (...) meeting of civilizations. (shrink)

In this paper I expose Caligaris and Starostas argument on the logical character of the initial moments in Hegels and Marxs dialectics; I argue that the categories of Marxs theory of labor-value must be read in such a way that value, or substance of value, is taken non-substantially, arising only with the emergence of exchange value, or the value-form; Finally, I attempt to justify this reading from the standpoint of the idea of self-posited presuppositions, as developed by Slavoj Zizek.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel states unequivocally that the category of “life” is a strictly logical, or pure, form of thinking. His treatment of actual life – i.e., that which empirically constitutes nature – arises first in his *Philosophy of Nature* when the logic is applied under the conditions of space and time. Nevertheless, many commentators find Hegel’s development of this category as a purely logical one especially difficult to accept. Indeed, they find this development only comprehensible as long (...) as one simultaneously assumes that Hegel breaks his promise to let the logic do the leading. However, if Hegel were to in fact allow the logical development to be led by biological analogies at this point, problems would ensue. Not only would it contradict his own speculative method, which should secure the necessity of the categories, but it would also endanger the ontological generality of the category of life itself. Beyond undermining his method and the logical integrity of the category, however, I will argue that such a reading makes the transition to the next category of “cognition” unintelligible and problematic. My aim in the first part of this paper is to argue how logical life can be read as a pure category. I then argue in the second part how my reconstruction makes the transition to cognition intelligible without resorting to profane or supernatural interpretations. (shrink)

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics (...) presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau- Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history. (shrink)

Nishida Kitarō is considered Japan's first and greatest modern philosopher. As founder of the Kyoto School, he began a rigorous philosophical engagement and dialogue with Western philosophical traditions, especially the work of G. W. F. Hegel. John W. M. Krummel explores the Buddhist roots of Nishida’s thought and places him in connection with Hegel and other philosophers of the Continental tradition. Krummel develops notions of self-awareness, will, being, place, the environment, religion, and politics in Nishida’s thought and shows how his (...) ethics of humility may best serve us in our complex world. (shrink)

The analytical understanding cannot deal with integral wholes and therefore cannot understand the soul or God. The material body is illusory in the sense that it cannot be understood in its true identity without knowing its relationship to God. Analyzing its composition in terms of separated molecules or neurons is also illusory. To understand how to go from an untrue or partially true part to its truth in the whole a method developed by Hegel called conceptual thinking is required. Reproduction (...) is not merely concerned with individuals, it involves the genus or genus process. The universal that determines the species is not changed when particulars under the universal change, die, reproduce according to their “own kind” or species. Without connecting the individual organisms with their species we may wrongly think they can evolve into any species by chance. But this is not how individual and species are related to each other. The species determines how the individuals will appear and controls their reproduction, growth, and so on. They are not independent to become what they want by choice or by chance. Everyone calls themselves “I” so “I” is a universal, although each means only oneself. In the same way each organism is identified with its species, although we mean its own particular organism – for example, a dog and not canine in general. Thus the universal and particular cannot be separated from each other. Similarly individuals who identify only personal reason independent of universal Reason are misconceiving their true identity. At the same time universal and particular are related, they are not the same but a unity in difference. The universal by itself is as abstract as the particular by itself. At the same time their relation can only be comprehended within a higher unity, the higher Self or Supreme Individual. (shrink)

Misunderstanding occurs between speakers when they disagree about the meaning of words in use. In the case of truth-values, Frege took these to be referents of sentences which consist of classes of accepted (i.e. “true”) or rejected (i.e. “false”) sentences. From this usual depiction of truth and falsity, a general algebraic framework is proposed to systematize the use of truth-values from a dialogical point of view of logic. A special attention will be paid to two radically opposed pseudo-speakers: Heraclites and (...) Nagarjuna, according to whom truth-values respectively refer to everything or nothing. Finally, dialectical (pseudo-Hegelian) negation will be rendered as a very special function: an ontological object-forming operator, similar to the arithmetic successor-forming operator Sn+1(x) on integers and consistent within our generalized theory of truth-values as variable referents. (shrink)

Quel message est apporté par le courant littéraire de la négritude, et comment procède-t-il pour le transmettre? C'est par le biais d'une écriture introspective que la diaspora noire a conquis sa dignité et dépassé le stade victimaire, par-delà le seul cadre de la communauté francophone. A travers l'histoire de la traite et de la colonisation, notre lecture procédera en trois phases: une phase locutoire, consacrée à un rappel chronologique du contexte noir dans l'Histoire; une phase illocutoire, où seront exposées les (...) différentes réactions de l'intelligentsia noire face à la ségrégation et au passif colonial; une phase perlocutoire, qui conclura l'étude en observant l'impact de la négritude sur la réalité sociale du genre noir. Au-delà du courant historique francophone, l'idée de négritude incarne le problème des constructions d'identité et illustre parfaitement la difficulté de la condition humaine: être ce que nous voulons de ce que les autres veulent faire de nous. (shrink)

Não é raro quando se trata da Lógica pensar na lógica aristotélica e toda a tradição que se efetivou posteriormente, sendo esta considerada como uma ciência finalizada e que, qualquer acréscimo lhe parece desnecessário. O que este trabalho busca mostrar é um modo diferente e possível para se pensar a lógica, sem que essa fique presa a uma construção puramente formal e fechada. Para tal tarefa, será definida a perspectiva que Hegel dá a essa ciência. A Lógica hegeliana possui desdobramentos (...) que a distingue do que se vinha concebendo, desde Aristóteles, por “Lógica", por não se tratar de uma lógica puramente subjetiva, mas cuja verdade efetiva foi assentada na união autodeterminadora ao mesmo tempo do sujeito e do objeto, o que pode ser compreendido como dar vida aos processos lógicos. Constitui o norte dessa pesquisa e percorrer os seus desdobramentos, contrapondo e analisando em paralelo algumas abordagens anteriores da Lógica (como em Aristóteles, Kant e Fichte). Trataremos de expor o desenvolvimento da Lógica Objetiva, explicitada nos livros primeiro e segundo da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel. Trata-se de mostrar que a realidade é pensada como desenvolvida no pensar do Conceito enquanto unificação dos opostos. Para isso o Lógico tem de ser concebido como um movimento do pensar, como junção do ser e do pensar, do objeto e do sujeito, da forma e do conteúdo, sendo que se apresenta nessa união o elemento que dá vida ao Lógico, pois este é o movimento no qual se realiza a verdade do Conceito. E é neste contexto que o Silogismo é inserido como elemento mediatizante, cuja função por vezes passa despercebida, mas que tem um papel significativo no conjunto. O silogismo dá o elo que vinha faltando quando se pensava na conciliação de elementos opostos, o que acabava os transformando em opostos inconciliáveis. (shrink)

This article contests the division that, up to now, has characterized the two fundamental approaches to the philosophy of Alain Badiou. The first concentrates its attention upon the domain of being and being-there, while the other is concerned with the event and the retroactive coming-to-be of truths. As a matter of fact, it argues that this division misses Badiou’s core proposal: his attempt to renovate materialistic dialectics in order to account for the emergence of novelty in a divided situation. -/- (...) With this context in mind, the focus of the paper is Badiou’s uninterrupted confrontation with Hegel as the source of the most important concepts that build up his post-dialectical dialectics, even after the so called ‘mathematical turn’, that is to say, the notions of scission and subject. Hence, it analyses these categories as they first appear in Théorie du sujet’s dialectics between algebra and topology. Secondly, it explores how they are transposed in L’Être et l’événement, emphasising the latter’s profoundly dialectical articulation notwithstanding its overly structural and potentially misleading orientation. Thirdly, it tries to underline how Logiques des mondes supplements this one-sidedness with the topological approach of a (new) theory of the subject, where Théorie du sujet represents the ‘vanishing mediator’ between the two tomes of Badiou’s magnum opus. Finally, it concludes that Badiou finds in Hegel a doctrine of the event, motivated by the creation of a new figure of man against those of reaction and obscurantism that dominate modern democratic materialism. (shrink)

In his Science of Logic Hegel purports to give an account of a dialectical logic that generates the totality of being’s fundamental structures. This totality does not exhaust the richness of being, but it exhausts the basis of this richness. Any phenomenon, whether cognitive, scientific, social or political, is based upon some or all of those structures. The paper presents and examines the logic of a structure which pervades each and every phenomenon: the border(die Grenze). It is analyzed as an (...) advanced manifestation of “determinateness,” an even more primitive structure of being, which makes explicit its intrinsic connection with not-being. What is distinctive about Hegel’s analysis is that it establishes a logical character concerning the concept of “border” that precedes empirical observation and a connection with space. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Hegel’s dialectic of the border in such a way as to make this logical character apparent and convincing to contemporary audience, who begin from the assumption that all discourse about border has an empirical basis and presupposes reference to space. It will be argued that, contrary to received opinion, the very phenomenon of “border” has certain universal and necessary features which explain its very possibility, are completely a priori and are established prior to any reference to space. A discussion about “borders” that excludes any a priori investigation into this phenomenon from its domain simply fails to illuminate its most important dimension: its logical core or, if you will, its universal and necessary attributes. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta elucidar el carácter dual de la razón que ha propuesto la filosofía de Hegel. A partir de ello investiga la coincidencia que logran estos dos momentos, la negatividad y la creatividad de la razón con la realidad efectiva [Wirklichkeit], proponiendo una serie de pares categoriales que nos permitan pensar este específico doble concepto de razón y su posible vínculo con la primera obra de Slavoj Žižek, El sublime objeto de la ideología. Abstract: This paper tries to clarify (...) the dual nature of reason proposed by Hegel's philosophy. Based on this research the coincidence that achieve these two moments, negativity and creativity of reason with actuality [Wirklichkeit], proposing a series of categorical couple that allow us to think this double specific concept of reason, and its possible link to the first work of Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. (shrink)

This book proposes a treatise on the Hegelian dialectical method as based on dialectical logic. Part One explores sources of dialectical logic before Hegel in ancient thought. Part Two examines dialectical logic and the dialectical method in Hegel, with attention to the relationship between dialectical logic and contemporary formal logic. Part Three concerns the dialectical method after Hegel, in which we seek to show that the method is available for uses other than the one to which the historical Hegel put (...) it. My intention has been constructive. I want to take issue with those who have contested the existence or validity of any dialectical logic, and of the dialectical method as well.1 The payoff for studying dialectical logic is the dialectical method. By using it one can reconstruct, rethink, and relive a historical course of dialectical deduction with the purpose of achieving deeper self-comprehension, i.e., comprehension of oneself by retraveling one’s past path of dialectical assumptions, contradictions, and corrections. Dialectical self-comprehension is possible when one’s present identity has historically constituted itself through such a path. It is possible when the individual is conscious of herself as triumphant over the contradictions of the past. Part Three, treating the dialectical method after Hegel, includes a reconstruction of American history since World War II in chapter 8, according to INTRODUCTION 9 1 0 Introduction the dialectical method. We will see how a Hegelian use of the method can assist in comprehending a post-Hegelian historical standpoint present to us but unknown to Hegel. (shrink)

Tout au long de sa carrière philosophique, Heidegger s’est livré à une constante explication avec Hegel, qu’il considérait comme son plus vif antagoniste. Dans le cadre de cet article, nous entendons nous rapporter aux origines de leur différend et prendre la mesure des griefs du jeune Heidegger à l’endroit de la dialectique hégélienne. Nous tenterons en un second lieu de démontrer que son opposition frontale camoufle en fait une secrète appropriation, puisque Heidegger aurait préalablement fait sienne l’idée d’un usage productif (...) de la négation en philosophie. (shrink)

Previously it was found that the Thing is both One Thing and another Thing at the same time. The Understanding rejects such a contradiction but Reason accepts what comes before it and allows the necessity in thought to proceed to its own conclusion. The attempt to maintain distinctions such as essential vs. unessential, singleness vs. universality, etc. may appeal to what is called ‘ordinary common sense,’ but it can now be seen that they are really only abstractions from the actual (...) truth that constitutes the entirety of perceptual consciousness. Those who do not have the presence of mind to rise above the being of the material of sense may proudly assert what they consider to be real and solid, while in truth it is only the play of abstractions that they deal with, so that such boasting is poorest where it fancies itself to be the richest. Rather than apprehending Truth, such an attitude sets itself against the Truth by calling it mere thought, ‘only in the mind’, etc. It is not possible for them to engage in scientific philosophy in which one result proceeds from another by rational necessity because they think that convincing by argument (holding one side against the other) is the natural process for winning Truth. But this is the definition of sophistry, directly the opposite of scientific philosophy in which Truth unveils itself by the rational necessity of its own dialectical development. In fact, Philosophy does also deal with mental entities but at the same time it recognizes thought as the pure essentiality that it is. It is the ignorance of our ‘scientific age’ that we neither appreciate, understand or even know how to comprehend the origin and nature of thought which is so fundamentally essential to human culture. Those who are the most neglectful of such knowledge are at the same time those who most vehemently propound sensuous materialism in the name of realism and seek to annul the place of thought altogether, thus sapping Truth of its own essence. Perceptual understanding holds on to mere abstract fixed essentialities without comprehending their specific determinations, i.e. it apprehends concepts as simple familiarities and therefore does not penetrate into the actual determinateness that constitutes such concepts. In that way it fails to master them; rather such abstract essentialities become the master of this understanding, constraining it to an endless bondage in opposing dualities. By holding on to only one determinateness as truth in opposition to its other and then turning to the opposite one (e.g., as we find in Kant’s antinomies) the ultimate unessentiality of both is established, yet it ignores this fact. What perceptual consciousness should do is accept the unessentiality of both sides and thereby recognize the sublimation of these opposing elements in a higher unity. Instead of doing that, however, it resorts to the in so far as and thus leads itself into abstractions and untruth. (shrink)

In Sense-certainty, the being of the particular object of sense was found to belong to the universality - of consciousness. This relationship between the universal truth of the object and its sensuous determinate particularity is called the Thing of Perception, basically a Thing and its perceived properties. However, in perception it was concluded that the particular Thing is ultimately resolved into the unconditioned universality of the Understanding. Thus in both Sense-certainty and Perception the particular object or Thing proves to be (...) essentially universality. It is important to recollect the development that has taken place up to this point, i.e., the various moments and movements of thinking that constitute the activity, or dynamic essence, of what is called, in totality, consciousness or knowing. The full explication of what consciousness is in its completely developed form has not yet been reached, but only what may broadly be referred to as the first three stages (Sense-certainty, Perception, Understanding) in the complete activity that will be necessary and sufficient to adequately comprehend consciousness. When the movement of consciousness is completed, the development will continue onward to the stages of Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. (shrink)

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

It is best to study Hegel as he presents himself in the context of his own writings. In this way we allow Hegel to teach us what the Science of Philosophy is, and how, through such Science, the Absolute Truth reveals or rationally unfolds itself, although this may challenge, in a radical and transformative way, the accepted ideas and methods we may currently have of philosophy and science. By taking the approach of simply following Hegel’s thought in its own development, (...) we discover in the process that we have actually re-invented Philosophy and Science in a such a totally comprehensive and systematic way that we are finally able to integrate Mind and Matter into an Absolute Whole that transcends and encompasses both while yet maintaining a clear differentiation and distinction between them – a genuine unity in diversity that has been the cynosure of philosophical inquiry from time immemorial. (shrink)

The objective here will be to take the subject (ego) and object (thing) that are held fixed, separate and in opposition to each other by the understanding and explicitly show them to be dialectically related in the dynamical movement of thinking. The dialectical movement of thought was explained by example in the propositional statement, S is P. The movement of the unified Concept as a whole, in which the fixed subject and object are considered as mere moments, constitutes the basic (...) underlying dynamic truth or reality. And the totality of the movements and moments in this dialectical relationship constitute the self-determining Concept. The thinking is involved in this dynamic movement of the Concept is called conceptual thinking. It is left to us to demonstrate that this thinking belongs to the Concept and not to the ego. We can understand this intuitively at this point by realizing that in the dialectical relationship of the propositional form, S is P, the object becomes as fluid and active as the subject or ego. Therefore it is not a mere egoic activity. (shrink)

To claim that there is a scientific Concept of knowledge may seem unfounded since it is only an assertion here at this point. We still have to demonstrate this claim. It will do no good to merely argue against the ideas of knowledge as instrument, etc. that may already be accepted since these are also unfounded assertions. What we will therefore actually do is to show that the Concept of knowledge is not a mere assertion like the others by turning (...) knowledge against itself as an assertion. An assertion may be considered what is merely given to us, and what is given to us may also be considered to be what appears or manifests. In this sense we will be considering knowledge as it appears or in its phenomenality, i.e. as it appears to natural consciousness, and work through knowledge or knowing in this modality until we arrive at the proper Concept of knowledge which gives us Truth in and for itself. This is what we would intuitively expect of knowledge so now we have to explicitly and scientifically show in what way knowledge and Truth can be understood to give this relation. (shrink)

The consciousness of sense-certainty proves itself to be dialectical. It starts out with the certainty that its object is a singular immediate being. But it is just this ‘singular immediate being’ that turns around into its opposite to become a universal – i.e. it is true not only for a single but all individual objects since everything is a ‘singular immediate being’. ‘Every individual is different’ because each has free will and is independent of others. If this is universally true (...) then it dialectically turns around to its opposite and becomes ‘everyone is the same.’ This is called “negative movement” or dialectical because each side of the individual-universal relation negates itself to become the other. Immediate consciousness is called ego. The consciousness of immediate sense-certainty is not aware that ego is related to the object which it considers as immediately being. The admission of relationship cancels immediacy because a relation is something that mediates between two things that unites them, i.e. changes them from two independent beings into a unity or oneness. This change is negation, thus the many-ness is negated to become one-ness or unity as a relation. Of course the many-ness is not destroyed in a relation, or the relationship itself could not exist as such. This is the nature of negation – it does not annihilate but sublimates; unity implies that two or more things have been united, i.e. the explicit multiplicity is sublimated (becomes implicit) in the concept of unity. The change in going from one moment to another in this movement or process is called experience (as discussed in the November 2011 issue). [1] Taken together these experiences of consciousness are called its history. It is not a history of the world, or the development of consciousness through historical time. It is simply the experience or change due to the movement of thought explained previously – involving the purely philosophical, logical or conceptual events. The series of these experiences is called its history. (shrink)

Religion is basically a consciousness or awareness of God. This means that Religion depends upon a difference between the finite subject or consciousness and the infinite object or God. This difference is maintained because of the way Man relates to God in religion, i.e. through feeling, love, etc. Philosophy is the scientific comprehension of Truth, in which an identity-in-difference is sought between the subject and object or concept and object. This is attained through thinking, and not through feeling. Religion and (...) Philosophy often seem to be at odds in the beginning. This opposition is, however, reconciled by absolute knowledge. The love that is found in Religion is represented by the identity-in-difference principle that is found in Philosophy. The urge that the philosopher feels in the necessity to come to truth or oneness with truth, is the same urge that religion expresses in the feeling of love of God. It is merely a difference in the way they each proceed in fulfilling that need or necessity – one through thinking the other through feeling. The identity and difference of thinking and feeling is another topic that is dealt with by Hegel in his system. (shrink)

Progress in philosophy means to understand and accept one point and from there go on to develop the next. The whole is made up of many parts just as a building is composed of many floors – we cannot take out one or more of the beginning floors and expect that the building can thereby be erected. The overall system of Hegel’s philosophy requires an understanding of each of the parts within it, especially the beginning steps. In the earlier articles (...) on this subject the essential point has been made that the subjective and objective aspects of reality cannot be understood separately from each other. There is no meaning to concept without that of which it is the concept, as much as there is no meaning to an object without a subject. With that basic and simple principle of the “distinct but inseparable” notion of the two, further progress was made to the details of the relationship between subject and object. The subject-predicate proposition was introduced to show how thinking takes on a dialectical nature and described this dialectical unity as being the first basic form in understanding the Concept as a dynamic unity of subject and object. Further determinations lay hidden in this structure which have not yet been made explicit for understanding. Only some general ideas or an outline for a basic understanding of what the basic principles are has been presented thus far. A more detailed comprehension is required to go further. The experiences that consciousness goes through in its development in learning about itself display the entire system of the truth of consciousness or the realm of spirit. These are not mere abstract thoughts but appear in relation to consciousness as actual shapes or stages of itself. The development of these determinate moments constitutes consciousness as a whole in its true existence. At that point in the developement of consciousness when it is no longer burdened with itself as that which appears to exist merely for it and as an other, its alien nature is overcome and appearance becomes identical to its own essence. This marks the entrance to the platform of the genuine science of spirit in which consciousness grasps its own essence or is absolute knowing. (shrink)

Tong Shijun holds a concept of dialectics which can also be found in Mao’s writings and in classical Chinese philosophy. Tong, however, is ambivalent in his attitude to dialectics in this sense, and for this reason he recommends Chinese philosophy to focus more on formal logic. My point will be that with another concept of dialectics Tong can have dialectics without giving up on logic and epistemology. This argument is given substance by an analysis of texts by Mao, Tong and (...) Hegel. (shrink)

Hegel begins the third main part of the Science of Logic, the “logic of the concept,” with the dialectic of universality. This dialectic, however, proves to be insufficient for the exposition of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, because it is dominated by the perspective of self-identity. For this reason speculative logic develops a dialectic of particularity whose domain is dominated by the perspective of difference. While the dialectic of universality made explicit the meaning of the proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is universal, the (...) dialectic of particularity aspires to make explicit the meaning of the conflicting proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is particular. The present paper attempts a detailed reconstruction of this dialectic and thereby a disclosure of the meaning of the onto-logical claim that being-as-concept is particular. It is first shown how Hegel’s account of the particular relates to the expression of a totality of particulars. Next it is argued that the speculative notion of the particular is extremely complex and that this complexity can be decoded by means of four dimensions. Third, it is explained how abstraction comes to be regarded by Hegel as the essence of the particular. I end the paper by discussing how the collapse of the dialectic of particularity gives rise to the category of the individual and its peculiar dialectic. (shrink)