Critical examination of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s set-theoretic definition of normative system shows that deductive closure is not an inevitable property. Following von Wright’s conjecture that axioms of standard deontic logic describe perfection-properties of a norm-set, a translation algorithm from the modal to the set-theoretic language is introduced. The translations reveal that the plausibility of metanormative principles rests on different grounds. Using a methodological approach that distinguishes the actor roles in a norm governed interaction, it has been shown that (...) metanormative principles are directed second-order obligations and, in particular, that the requirement related to deductive closure is directed to the norm-applier role rather than to the norm-giver role. The approach has been applied to the case of pure derogation yielding a new result, namely, that an independence property is a perfection-property of a norm-set in view of possible derogation. This paper in a polemical way touches upon several points raised by Kristan in his recent paper. (shrink)

Although there are many points of continuity, there are also a number of changes in the pedagogical form of the anatomy lecture over the longue durée, over centuries of epistemic change, rather than over years or decades. The article begins with an analysis of the physical and technical arrangements of the early modern anatomy lecture, showing how these present a general underlying similarity compared to those in place today. It then goes on to consider examples of elements of speech and (...) presentation, description and illustration that are used in the biology lecture from the early modern (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries) and late modern (or contemporary) eras. The anatomy lecture thus demonstrates a basic physical and technical continuity in the classroom or theater, whereas the larger epistemic functions in which it is embedded have changed: from a descriptive, discursive function, focusing on individual organs and their physicality, to one that is more integrative, systemic and also performative in both form and content. (shrink)

Kritičko čitanje Alchourrónove i Bulyginove skupovnoteorijske defnicije normativnoga sustava pokazuje da njegova deduktivna zatvorenost nije neizbježno svojstvo. Slijedeći von Wrightovu pretpostavku da aksiomi standardne deontične logike opisuju svojstva savršenoga normativnog sustava, uvodi se algoritam za prevođenje iz modalnoga u skupovnoteorijski jezik. Prijevod nam otkriva da plauzibilnost pojedinih metanormativnih načela leži na različitim osnovama. Koristeći se metodološkim pristupom koji prepoznaje različite aktere u normama upravljanome međudjelovanju, pokazuje se da su metanormativna načela obveze drugoga reda upućene različitim ulogama. Poseban slučaj jest zahtjev (...) koji se odnosi na deduktivnu zatvorenost jer se pokazuje da je upućen ulozi koja primjenjuje, a ne onoj koja izdaje norme. Pristup je primijenjen i na slučaj čiste derogacije, što dovodi do novoga rezultata; svojstvo neovisnosti biva svojstvom savršenoga normativnog sustava u odnosu na moguću derogaciju. Ovaj članak na polemički način dodiruje nekoliko točaka iznesenih u Kristanovome nedavnom članku. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen refused to develop a democratic theory of the basic norm. Given that he expounded a strong distinction between law and politics as two separate scientific disciplines he consistently argued against any attempt to politicize legal science and corrupt its object of cognition. As a result, there has been very little discussion of the basic norm in relation to his democratic theory. This article attempts to fill this gap by tracing the relationship between the (...) class='Hi'>basic norm and democracy in Kelsen’s legal and political writings. More precisely, it maps Kelsen’s seminal distinction between autonomy and heteronomy onto his reflections on constitutional making and probes the anti-democratic implications of his theory of the basic norm as they undermine the normative foundations of democratic theory. The article concludes by addressing the question of whether it is possible to articulate a theory of the democratic ground norm, of democratic foundings with a normative content, by proposing the idea of an immanent, performative basic norm as the source of validity of a democratic constitutional order. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen refused to develop a democratic theory of the basic norm. Given that he expounded a strong distinction between law and politics as two separate scientific disciplines he consistently argued against any attempt to politicize legal science and corrupt its object of cognition. As a result, there has been very little discussion of the basic norm in relation to his democratic theory. This article attempts to fill this gap by tracing the relationship between the (...) class='Hi'>basic norm and democracy in Kelsen’s legal and political writings. More precisely, it maps Kelsen’s seminal distinction between autonomy and heteronomy onto his reflections on constitutional making and probes the anti-democratic implications of his theory of the basic norm as they undermine the normative foundations of democratic theory. The article concludes by addressing the question of whether it is possible to articulate a theory of the democratic ground norm, of democratic foundings with a normative content, by proposing the idea of an immanent, performative basic norm as the source of validity of a democratic constitutional order Key Words: Hannah Arendt • basic norm • constitu ere • constitutional making • democracy • immanent norm • Hans Kelsen. (shrink)

The article points to the reasons why Kelsen’s basic norm does not include a transition from is to ought. Alexy’s arguments on why the basic norm would imply a transition from is to ought are presented and discussed. How Hume’s assertions on the impossibility of a transition from is to ought must be seen in the context of Kelsen’s basic norm theory are analyzed. In addition, the question is considered of what sense Hart’s legal (...) theory comprises the idea that a causal connection exists between facts and norms. As a means of rejecting one of Alexy’s key arguments it is argued that the basic norm operates only with posited norms, so that it would not transform facts into norms, but only justify the assertion that already established norms are valid norms. (shrink)

This chapter first considers the most important of Kelsen's own express statements of a connection between his legal theory and the philosophy of Cohen. It then argues that Cohen's interpretations of Kant as well as his own ‘System of Philosophy’ actually differ profoundly from the historical Kant, thus showing the key theorem of Cohen's system to be not Kantian in origin but Platonic. Finally, the chapter considers the centrepiece of Kelsen's theory, the doctrine of the basic norm. It (...) shows that Kelsen's solution to the problem of establishing legal validity by appeal to the basic norm represents a direct application of the key theorem of Cohen's system, and that this theorem offers one plausible possibility — albeit not the only one — for the problem of validity on the basis of a concept of law that refers neither to natural law nor to any metajuridical source. (shrink)

According to Hans Kelsen, the basic norm is the necessary presupposition of the positivistic cognition of law, making possible both descriptive legal cognition and Verbindlichkeit. The nature of the presupposition in question here has been a subject of controversy ever since. Presupposing the basic norm gives rise to formulations that are neither purely descriptive nor purely normative. The author contends that Kelsen's doctrine of the basic norm was intended to apply to all jurists irrespective (...) of function. Kelsen, without being aware of it initially, invested the verb “to presuppose” with an ambiguity that suits precisely this purpose. (shrink)

Of all the various doctrines of Kelsen's legal philosophy it is his theory of the basic norm that has attracted most attention and captured the imagination of many scholars. It has acquired enthusiastic devotees as well as confirmed opponents. Both admirers and critics owe much to the obscure way in which Kelsen explains his theory. The obscurity was criticized and led people to suspect that the whole theory is a myth; but it also provided admirers trading on ambiguities (...) with an easy escape from criticism. This chapter attempts to demythologize the theory. It offers an explanation of the concept of the basic norm as Kelsen's attempt to provide an answer to some well-known jurisprudential problems. It argues that the attempt has not been altogether successful but its failure is illuminating. It sheds light on the intricacies of the problems involved and on their possible solutions. (shrink)

Modern Western medical individualism has had a significant impact on health care in China. This essay demonstrates the ways in which such Western-style individualism has been explicitly endorsed in China’s 2010 directive: The Basic Norms of the Documentation of the Medical Record. The Norms require that the patient himself, rather than a member of his family, sign each informed consent form. This change in clinical practice indicates a shift toward medical individualism in Chinese healthcare legislation. Such individualism, however, is (...) incompatible with the character of Chinese familism that is deeply rooted in the Chinese ethical tradition. It also contradicts family-based patterns of health care in China. Moreover, the requirement for individual informed consent is incompatible with numerous medical regulations promulgated in the past two decades. This essay argues that while Chinese medical legislation should learn from relevant Western ideas, it should not simply copy such practices by importing medical individualism into Chinese health care. Chinese healthcare policy is properly based on Chinese medical familist resources. (shrink)

In the enquiry into the import and function of the basic norm in Hans Kelsen's legal theory, the interpretations of special interest are those dealing with the notion of the basic norm as the ‘logico-transcendental’ condition for cognition in legal science, or with the relation of Kelsen's juridico-scientific method to Kant's practice philosophy. Two thinkers in particular have written along these lines, Norbert Leser and Ralf Dreier, respectively. This chapter begins by describing the positions taken up (...) by the two authors. It then asks, whether in terms of Leser's thesis, it is in fact possible to maintain the notion of the transcendental character of the basic norm. It then turns to Dreier's suggested reinterpretation of the basic norm by appeal to the law of reason, examining the suggestion from the point of view of Kant's philosophy. (shrink)

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm —purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the (...) two positions, I argue, is reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”. (shrink)

Throughout his writings Kelsen ignores, rejects, or misrepresents the most fundamental ideas of Kantian critical idealism and uses Kantian language imprecisely. Consequently, to start an examination of Kelsen's basic norm, as Raz does, with references to Kelsen's use of a Kantian “conceptual framework” or “intellectual tools” does not clarify the issue. Raz sees a double function in Kelsen's basic norm i.e., its function in explaining the identity and unity of a legal order and its functions in (...) establishing the normativity thereof. I contend that the basic norm performs a single function which bears on the identity and unity of an order; but that it altogether fails to establish “normativity” as understood by Raz. Kelsen's account of legal normativity, I contend, is purely technical-juristic; there is no “justified normativity” in Kelsen as Raz claims. Other aspects of Kelsen's theory examined by Raz and considered here are: (1) the possibility of a refusal to pre-suppose the basic norm; (2) the need, alleged by Kelsen at one stage of his work, to see an order as “a meaningful whole”; (3) the inadmissibility, likewise alleged by him at one stage, of conflicting norms. (shrink)

The objective of the article is to present Hans Kelsen’s basic norm concept that allows the combination of the two relevant dimensions in relation to juridical science, namely the positivity and validity of law. The role of the concept of basic norm is presented by the author of the Reine Rechtslehre with reference to Kant as a concept enabling formulation of an answer to the question “To what extent is it possible to interpret certain facts as (...) objectively valid legal norms?” The epistemological problem of the object of cognition of juridical science is connected with the issue of normativity. According to Kelsen, only the assumption of a certain nonpositive hypothetical norm regulating the legislation of norms of a given system enables normative interpretation of certain facts. The basic norm authorizes the way of issuing norms, yet not their content. The structure of the legal order creates a hierarchical system in which the higher category norms delegate the law-making power to create the lower category norms. The legal system creates a dynamic system of norms. (shrink)

This paper proposes a reading of Kelsen’s basic norm based on Kant’s regulative ideas. I begin by exposing Kant’s conception of the principles of reason. Then I criticize an interpretation of the basic norm along the same lines made by Stanley Paulson. Thirdly I analyze two theses from Hermann Cohen that influenced Kelsen greatly and reinforce my stance on the basic norm. Lastly, I explain how the Kelsenian tenet that the basic norm (...) is the transcendental grounding of the normativity of law can be comprehended based on the role the ideas of reason play in the systematization of knowledge. (shrink)

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments (...) showing that the first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments (...) showing that the first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

The traditional and majoritarian view about Kelsen's doctrine of the basic norm has affirmed that Kelsen had drastically changed its philosophical status in the early 1960s, when he allegedly began...

In answering normative questions, researchers sometimes appeal to the concept of basic needs. Their guiding idea is that our first priority should be to ensure that everybody is able to meet these needs—to have enough in terms of food, water, shelter, and so on. This article provides an opinionated overview of basic needs in normative contexts. Any basic needs theory must answer three questions: (1) What are basic needs? (2) To what extent do basic needs (...) generate reasons for action and how are these reasons to be understood? (3) How are basic needs and their satisfaction to be measured? I address these questions in turn. Then I also briefly discuss the theoretical potential of appealing to basic needs in normative contexts. It turns out that future research in this area could benefit from a higher degree of interdisciplinarity and methodological reflection, and that, generally speaking, basic needs theories are more promising than they have often been claimed to be. (shrink)

[Significantly updated in Chapter 7 of Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge] Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge (...) forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. In what follows I offer a way through the apparent dilemma of having to choose between either basic knowledge or the normativity of knowledge. The solution involves homing in on a state of awareness (≈non-accidental true representation) that is distinct from knowledge and which in turn grounds the normativity of knowledge in a way that is fully consistent with the existence of basic knowledge. An upshot of this is that externalist theories of knowledge turn out to be fully compatible with the thesis that knowledgeable beliefs are always beliefs that are justified by the reasons one possesses. (shrink)

This paper is a beginning—an initial attempt to think of the function and character of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm. We draw on social scientific thinking about social norms and the social games to which they respond. Assume that people individually follow epistemic norms for the sake of acquiring a stock of true beliefs. When they live in groups and share information with each other, they will in turn produce a shared store of true beliefs, an (...) epistemic public good. True beliefs, produced individually or in groups, constitute an epistemic good—one commonly stockpiled and distributed within a community. Epistemic norms can then be understood as a kind of socially developed and transmitted normative sensibility having to do with the production of this individual and public good. Epistemic norms should serve to regulate this practice—coordinating the practice of individuals so as to afford the benefits of life in an interdependent epistemic community—and to manage the risks of being epistemically dependent on others within such a community. Here, we provide some attempts to characterize the central aspects of "the epistemic game"—the epistemic choice situation confronted by communities of epistemic agents. (shrink)

A continuoxis t- norm is a continuous map * from [0, 1]² into [0,1] such that is a commutative totally ordered monoid. Since the natural ordering on [0,1] is a complete lattice ordering, each continuous t-norm induces naturally a residuation → and becomes a commutative naturally ordered residuated monoid, also called a hoop. The variety of basic hoops is precisely the variety generated by all algebras, where * is a continuous t-norm. In this paper we investigate (...) the structure of the variety of basic hoops and some of its subvarieties. In particular we provide a complete description of the finite subdirectly irreducible basic hoops, and we show that the variety of basic hoops is generated as a quasivariety by its finite algebras. We extend these results to Hájek's BL-algebras, and we give an alternative proof of the fact that the variety of BL-algebras is generated by all algebras arising from continuous t-norms on [ 0,1] and their residua. The last part of the paper is devoted to the investigation of the subreducts of BL- algebras, of Gödel algebras and of product algebras. (shrink)

A continuoxis t- norm is a continuous map * from [0, 1]² into [0,1] such that ([ 0,1], *, 1) is a commutative totally ordered monoid. Since the natural ordering on [0,1] is a complete lattice ordering, each continuous t-norm induces naturally a residuation → and ([ 0,1], *, →, 1) becomes a commutative naturally ordered residuated monoid, also called a hoop. The variety of basic hoops is precisely the variety generated by all algebras ([ 0,1], *, (...) →, 1), where * is a continuous t-norm. In this paper we investigate the structure of the variety of basic hoops and some of its subvarieties. In particular we provide a complete description of the finite subdirectly irreducible basic hoops, and we show that the variety of basic hoops is generated as a quasivariety by its finite algebras. We extend these results to Hájek's BL-algebras, and we give an alternative proof of the fact that the variety of BL-algebras is generated by all algebras arising from continuous t-norms on [ 0,1] and their residua. The last part of the paper is devoted to the investigation of the subreducts of BL- algebras, of Gödel algebras and of product algebras. (shrink)

John Dewey's project on social philosophy has not been usually considered as an important piece of his thought. However, his writings about such topic constitute a remarkable effort to articulate several novel concepts and ideas which cannot be found elsewhere in his extensive philosophical work. Within this context, the new edition of his "Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy"-a series of lectures Dewey delivered during his stay in China-provides unique material for reviewing his social viewpoint. During this article I aim (...) to explore Dewey's normative perspective on social philosophy. Taking into account that the pragmatist introduces a "normative picture" and that he identifies a set of basic human needs at its very basis, the main arising question is how to interpret that set of human needs so as to fully understand that normative criterion. As hypotheses, I consider that social philosophy is mainly engaged with practical judgments and that it is plausible to interpret these basic human needs as values. In order to support these claims, I firstly reconstruct Dewey's proposal about a third type of social thought. Secondly, I examine his position about values and standards. Thirdly, I analyze his "normative picture" and I consider the "anthropological reading" presented by Roberto Frega. Lastly, I offer a complementary analysis, arguing that it is possible to explain Dewey's normative standard in a coherent way with respect to the aims of his social thought and, furthermore, that it is possible to avoid any essentialist commitment. (shrink)

From the day on which humans are born they need things. Some of these needs seem “basic,” such as our needs for food, water or shelter. Everybody has these needs. We cannot escape them. We also cannot escape the serious harm that arises when these needs remain unsatisfied. It is thus no wonder that in thinking about what we ought to do some researchers have suggested to first and foremost focus on people's basic needs. Such need‐based theories must (...) answer three main questions: What are basic needs? What are their implications for normative questions? And how can these needs and their satisfaction be measured? Proponents must also defend these theories against objections, such as against the objections that the theories are paternalistic, materialistic, and passivity‐promoting. Depending on their goals and contexts (distributive justice, sustainable development, human rights, etc.), appeals to basic needs may take various different forms. (shrink)

O projeto de John Dewey sobre a filosofia social não tem sido considerado como uma peça importante de seu pensamento. Entretanto, seus textos sobre esse tópico constituem um notável esforço para articular diversos novos conceitos e ideias, os quais não podem ser encontrados em outra parte de sua extensa obra filosófica. Inserida nesse contexto, a nova edição de suas “Palestras em filosofia política e social” – série de palestras que Dewey apresentou quando esteve na China – fornece um material único (...) para revisar seu ponto de vista social. Levando-se em consideração que o pragmatista introduz uma “figura normativa” e que ele identifica um conjunto de necessidades humanas básicas de maneira a compreender plenamente esse critério normativo. Como hipótese, considero que a filosofia social está principalmente associada com juízos práticos e que é plausível interpretar essas necessidades humanas básicas como valores. Para sustentar essas afirmações, primeiro, reconstruo a proposta de Dewey sobre um terceiro tipo de pensamento social. Segundo, examino sua posição sobre valores e normas. Terceiro, analiso a “figura normativa” e considero a “leitura antropológica” apresentada por Roberto Frega. Por fim, ofereço uma análise complementar, argumentando que é possível explicar o padrão normativo de Dewey de maneira coerente com respeito aos propósitos do seu pensamento social – e, além disso, que é possível evitar qualquer compromisso essencialista. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author wants to situate Arthur Danto's work in relation to a particular elaboration of it that has emerged at Columbia University, where Arthur presided for so long as a senior philosophical figure. Danto's non‐Cartesian dualism poses a problem of other bodies, which he claims is a much more important philosophical problem than the problem of other minds that is alleged to follow up on the nature of consciousness. Danto would surely be right to insist that the (...) first‐person point of view from which mental agency is exercised, by undertaking irreducibly normative commitments, must also be a first‐person point of view from which embodied agency is exercised so as to effect changes in the world. The quickest route to seeing the normative point of the normative analysis of agent identity lies in the case of group agency. (shrink)

Lewis Carroll’s 1895 paper “Achilles and the Tortoise” showed that we need a distinction between rules of inference and premises. We cannot, on pain of regress, treat all rules simply as further premises in an argument. But Carroll’s paper doesn’t say very much about what rules there must be. Indeed, it is consistent with what Carroll says there to think that the only rule is -elimination. You might think that modern Bayesians, who seem to think that the only rule of (...) inference they need is conditionalisation, have taken just this lesson from Carroll. But obviously nothing in Carroll’s argument rules out there being other rules as well. (shrink)

In sociology, social philosophy, social ontology, and classical choice theory the notion of a social norm is usually introduced by using a rich normative, semantic, and social vocabulary, while the notions that evolutionary game theory proceeds from seem too poor to elucidate the idea of social norms. In this paper, I suggest to define a notion of social norms that is as basic as possible, in the sense that it relies only on notions like affects, feelings as well (...) as regularities, standards, and corrections of behaviour. These notions suffice to explain non-linguistic traditions, practices, sanctions, and, finally, basic social norms. Two of the aims of the paper are, first, to clarify the idea of genuine normativity and second, to explore whether the sort of normativity involved in basic social norms is part of a bridge between nature and the social realm. (shrink)

In this paper, I contrast two approaches to political legitimacy, both influenced by Rawls. One is the classic political liberal picture, according to which a state is legitimate if its “constitutional essentials” could be endorsed by reasonable citizens. The alternative is the idea that what makes a state legitimate is primarily its success at organizing the basic structure in a way that is demonstrably favorable to the governed. Specifically, I suggest that a state is legitimate insofar as it organizes (...) the basic structure in a manner that makes it easier for citizens to behave justly towards one another and adopt autonomous choices. I then move to demonstrate the superiority of this normative impact solution to the problem of legitimacy vis-à-vis political liberalism, even when reasonable disagreement about justice is factored in. (shrink)

"In this article, I argue that under current resource constraints, institutional arrangements seeking to ensure commonly accepted egalitarian goals would engender the decrease of health status of many who do not currently enjoy particularly high levels of health.".

Understanding reasons is essential both for understanding human behavior and for constructing a theory of moral conduct. Reasons have been widely viewed as the most basic elements in normative theory, and moral reasons have been considered the most basic elements in ethics. Arguably, rational acts are those best supported by reasons, and morally right acts are those best supported by moral reasons. There is little doubt, however, that what is good is also important for both the rationality and (...) the morality of actions. Given these points, this paper explores four related questions: What kinds of elements, say facts or propositional attitudes, constitute (normative) reasons for action? What is the relation between considerations of value—for instance regarding the intrinsically good or intrinsically bad—and normative reasons for action? Are reasons—for belief as well as for actions—equivalent to grounds for them? And how do answers to these questions bear on ethical theory? This paper provides a partial theory of reasons, values, and grounds that distinguishes different kinds of reason‐ascribing locutions, reveals, in the light of that distinction, a kind of normative dependence of reasons on values, and represents both reasons and values as metaphysically grounded in elements of experience. (shrink)

This paper contributes to debates regarding the normative justification of basic income (BI) via a critical reevaluation of Philippe Van Parijs’ ‘real-libertarian’ theory. Van Parijs’ work constitutes the most ambitious attempt within the literature to ground a justification of BI within a systematic normative framework. In this paper I argue that key elements of his framework should form part of any progressive justification of BI. Specifically, his linking of the principle of ‘real freedom for all’ with the policy mechanism (...) of the ‘highest sustainable basic income.’ I take issue with Van Parijs’ treatment of compensation for unequal internal endowments based on the criterion of ‘undominated diversity’ and I reject the ‘external resources’ approach to justifying the funding of a substantial BI, including Van Parijs’ ‘jobs as assets’ argument. I introduce the concept of ‘total social productivity’ as a means of understanding the production and reproduction of society in a manner that anchors the justification of BI in a commitment to a ‘deep form of social reciprocity.’ Finally, I suggest that BI be framed as a ‘pragmatic-utopian reform.’. (shrink)

First-order normative theories concerning what’s right and wrong, good and bad, etc. and metanormative theories concerning the nature of first-order normative thought and talk are widely regarded as independent theoretical enterprises. This paper argues that several debates in metanormative theory involve views that have first-order normative implications, even as the implications in question may not be immediately recognizable as normative. I first make my claim more precise by outlining a general recipe for generating this result. I then apply this recipe (...) to three debates in metaethics: the modal status of basic normative principles, normative vagueness and indeterminacy, and the determination of reference for normative predicates. In each case I argue that certain views on each issue carry first-order normative commitments, in accordance with my recipe. (shrink)

En dépit d’une carrière très productive dans les divers champs de la philosophie morale, Torbjörn Tännsjö, philosophe suédois né en 1946, reste sans aucun doute pour les lecteurs français un auteur à découvrir. Sa carrière universitaire le mena de l’Université de Göteborg à celle de Stockholm où il occupe depuis 2002 la chaire « Kristian Claëson » de philosophie pratique. Membre du Comité d’éthique suédois, il est à ce jour l’auteur d’une vingtaine de livres publiés tant en anglais que dans (...) s... (shrink)

Normative notions are central to Husserl’s account of intentionality: intending an object is a normative achievement, essentially admitting of fulfillment or disappointment. So is teleology: intentional conscious life is inseparable from a horizontal orientation toward “ideas in the Kantian sense.” How are they related? Is teleology essential for intentionality as a normative achievement? Or, in Husserl’s way of putting it, do relative truths “demand” ideal truths? This article explores some reasons for agreeing with Husserl that this is indeed the case. (...) In Sec. 2, I will identify a “normative turn” in Husserl’s account of the basic structure of perceptual intentionality and spell out the teleological character of this normative account. This sense of teleology is a minimal one. A more robust teleology, in the sense of an orientation toward infinite ideality, is then justified in Sec. 3 by virtue of its function in the constitution of genuine objectivity. In Sec. 4, I will turn to the noetic, especially the ego-oriented side of Husserl’s analysis, in order to clarify the normative force of infinite telos. All in all, I will argue that the normative and the teleological sides of the story are inextricably intertwined in Husserl’s account of intentional conscious life. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.

John Gibbons presents an original account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms. One task is to say where these standards come from. But the more basic task is to say what those standards are. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they’re supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? (...) The book argues against the teleological or instrumentalist conception of rationality that sees being reasonable as a means to our more objective aims, either knowledge or truth. And it tries to explain both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable. The importance of being reasonable is not explained in terms of what it will get you, or what you think it will get you, or what it would get you if only things were different. The requirement to be reasonable comes from the very idea of what a genuine requirement is. That’s where the built-in standards governing belief come from, and that’s what they are. (shrink)

If there is room for a substantial conception of the will in contemporary theorizing about human agency, it is most likely to be found in the vicinity of the phenomenon of normativity. Rational agency is distinctively responsive to the agent's acknowledgment of reasons, in the basic sense of considerations that speak for and against the alternatives for action that are available. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose that this kind of responsiveness to reasons is possible only for creatures who (...) possess certain unusual volitional powers, beyond the bare susceptibility to beliefs and desires necessary for the kind of rudimentary agency of which the higher animals are arguably capable. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, the first translation into English of the ground-breaking 'Normativität und Macht' (Suhrkamp 2015), Rainer Forst presents a new approach to critical theory. Each essay reflects on the basic principles that guide our normative thinking. Forst's argument goes beyond 'ideal' and 'realist' theories and shows how closely the concepts of normativity and power are interrelated, and how power rests on the capacity to influence, determine, and possibly restrict the space of justifications for others. By combining (...) insights from the disciplines of philosophy, history, and the social sciences, Forst revaluates theories of justice, as well as of power, and provides the tools for a critical theory of relations of justification. Translated from German. (shrink)