This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go (...) on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. (shrink)

People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have (...) these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory. (shrink)

This study is a contribution to Chinese-Western dialogue of bioethics but perhaps the first one of its kind. From a Chinese-Western comparative ethical perspective, this work brings Chinese ethical theories, especially Confucian ethics, into a contemporary context of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS, and to see how the deeply-rooted thoughts of Confucius interact, compete, or integrate with concepts from Western ethical traditions. An underlying belief is that some ideas in Confucian ethics are important and insightful beyond their cultural (...) and historical origins in China and other Confucianism influenced societies.Methodologically, this thesis employs two approaches, conceptual normative analysis combined with critical interpretation. The ‘interpretive’ approach I employ, as an important methodology supplementing my normative analysis, not only deals with Chinese ancient texts, but also explains specific beliefs and practices in China.With a critical eye, this thesis carefully examines a number of key topics in the ethics of AIDS in China from a cross-cultural perspective. Topics including: views on personhood and the vulnerability of People Living with HIV/AIDS; prioritising and balancing the role of ‘harm reduction’ and the role of ‘eradication of deviant behaviour’ in AIDS policy in China; rights-based opt-out approach and duty-based family-centred approach in HIV testing and Biobanking; blood donation; moral responsibility and personal responsibility for health; and the popular rhetoric of ‘innocent infection’ versus ‘guilty infection’ in AIDS. My overall aim in this work is to present a cross-cultural bioethics study through the investigation of some ethical issues in AIDS in China from a Chinese-Western comparative perspective and also attempt to suggest a humane and effective policy for HIV/AIDS which I believe is appropriate to both traditions. I believe this work has contributed to our knowledge in three related but independent areas: the control of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in China; medical ethics in China; and to both the methods and the utility of cross-cultural study of bioethics between China and the West. (shrink)

Using the works of Richard Rorty and John Caputo, I want to suggest that we might be better off treating the traditional ethical theories of Kant, Mill, Aristotle and Hobbes as normative narratives rather than as justificatory schemes for moral decision making to be set up against one another. In a spirit akin to Husserl's ‘bracketing’ of metaphysics, when discussing ethical theories in business ethics, we can easily avoid metaphysics and use an approach that sees ethical (...) class='Hi'>theory as socially convincing normative narratives – narratives that unify us with others insofar as they describe our phenomenological experiences in a way with which many of us mutually resonate. I will do this by attempting to show how John Caputo's thinking in Against Ethics and Rorty's postmodern pragmatism might be appropriated to some extent by us in business ethics. (shrink)

Globally, a traditional management model has generally been used to manage disaster situations, including in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the government mostly uses the preparedness policy for pandemic outbreak case management. With regard to the limitations arising from the pandemic outbreak the current research will investigate the following questions: when facing a devastating situation, what exactly is the nature of the pandemic outbreak management model incorporated at the governmental level? Keeping these questions in mind, the intention of the existing model is (...) to provide smooth and appropriate assistance to recover from a pandemic outbreak, and to implement effective governance of the situation. This research will identify deficiencies in the current epidemic management policy in Bangladesh, and will assist in forming a new model and developing a systematic procedure for managing future pandemic outbreak situations. The main deficiency in Bangladesh’s pandemic management is that the policy paper has failed to identify all hazardous events that may occur in a pandemic outbreak. In most cases, it has underestimated the issues of bioethical responsibility toward the different stakeholders affected during the devastating situation of a pandemic outbreak. The policy does not emphasize the bioethical model; therefore, it fails to encourage support for either public protection or an ethically friendly management system. The model proposed in this article demonstrates an appropriate way to reduce or, if possible, avoid potential damages and losses from a pandemic outbreak. The model aims to prioritize the problems that need assistance to recover from the outbreak. (shrink)

Globally, a traditional management model has generally been used to manage disaster situations, including in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the government mostly uses the preparedness policy for pandemic outbreak case management. With regard to the limitations arising from the pandemic outbreak the current research will investigate the following questions: when facing a devastating situation, what exactly is the nature of the pandemic outbreak management model incorporated at the governmental level? Keeping these questions in mind, the intention of the existing model is (...) to provide smooth and appropriate assistance to recover from a pandemic outbreak, and to implement effective governance of the situation. This research will identify deficiencies in the current epidemic management policy in Bangladesh, and will assist in forming a new model and developing a systematic procedure for managing future pandemic outbreak situations. The main deficiency in Bangladesh’s pandemic management is that the policy paper has failed to identify all hazardous events that may occur in a pandemic outbreak. In most cases, it has underestimated the issues of bioethical responsibility toward the different stakeholders affected during the devastating situation of a pandemic outbreak. The policy does not emphasize the bioethical model; therefore, it fails to encourage support for either public protection or an ethically friendly management system. The model proposed in this article demonstrates an appropriate way to reduce or, if possible, avoid potential damages and losses from a pandemic outbreak. The model aims to prioritize the problems that need assistance to recover from the outbreak. (shrink)

Adequate discussion of individuals' moral deliberation is notably absent from much of the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We argue for a refocusing on the role of the individual in that context. In particular we regard this as important in CSR course design, for practical, pedagogical and moral reasons. After addressing some of the theoretical background to our argument, and noting some respects in which individual action features in the context of CSR, we consider the usefulness (or otherwise) of (...) academic ethical theory in relation to CSR issues and dilemmas in practice. It is suggested that, without dispensing entirely with ethical theory, emphasis should be placed on informed debate and moral judgement among members of organisations (or seminar groups) and some short case examples are provided. Finally we suggest that such approaches may be appropriate if trends towards ‘mainstreaming’ concern for CSR throughout business school curricula are realised. (shrink)

Adequate discussion of individuals' moral deliberation is notably absent from much of the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We argue for a refocusing on the role of the individual in that context. In particular we regard this as important in CSR course design, for practical, pedagogical and moral reasons. After addressing some of the theoretical background to our argument, and noting some respects in which individual action features in the context of CSR, we consider the usefulness (or otherwise) of (...) academic ethical theory in relation to CSR issues and dilemmas in practice. It is suggested that, without dispensing entirely with ethical theory, emphasis should be placed on informed debate and moral judgement among members of organisations (or seminar groups) and some short case examples are provided. Finally we suggest that such approaches may be appropriate if trends towards ‘mainstreaming’ concern for CSR throughout business school curricula are realised. (shrink)

In a recent article, Joel Marks presents the amoralist argument against vivisection, or animal laboratory experimentation. He argues that ethical theories that seek to uncover some universal morality are in fact useless and unnecessary for ethical deliberations meant to determine what constitutes an appropriate action in a specific circumstance. I agree with Marks’ conclusion. I too believe that vivisection is indefensible, both from a scientific and philosophical perspective. I also believe that we should become vegan (unfortunately, like (...) the two philosophers mentioned by Marks, I too am still struggling to reduce my meat and dairy consumption). However, I am in the dark as to Marks’ vision of normative deliberations in the spirit of amoralism and desirism. (shrink)

A driving force behind the evolution of the stakeholder concept is the potential of negative outcomes for an organization as the result of conflict between that organization and its stakeholders. Where conflict does arise between an organization and stakeholder how might it be resolved in a manner compatible with stakeholder theory? Applying feminist ethical theory as a theoretical basis for stakeholder theory, mediation provides an appropriate process for resolving such disputes in comparison to traditional adversarial (...) strategies. This paper discusses the attributes of mediation, and its potential benefits as a method to resolve disputes between businesses and their stakeholders. (shrink)

A social responsibility (SR) theory of the press has emerged in various democratic societies worldwide since World War II. The Hutchins Commission in the United States is the source of this paradigm in some cases, but a similar emphasis on serving society rather than commerce or government has also arisen in parallel fashion without any connection to Hutchins. Professionalism and codes of professional ethics are too narrow to serve as the framework for a global SR paradigm of the 21st (...) century. Instead, universal ethical principles are the most appropriate framework, and the cross-cultural axis around which these principles revolve is the sacredness of human life. Embedded in the protonorm of human sacredness are such ethical principles as human dignity, truthtelling, and nonmaleficence. These principles are citizen ethics rather than professional ethics; they are set in the social domain where SR gets its rationale. They provide a frame of reference internationally for assessing local news media practices and formulating codes of ethics. (shrink)

Background Current requirements for ethical research in Canada, specifically the standard of active or signed parental consent, can leave Indigenous children and youth with inequitable access to research opportunities or health screening. Our objective was to examine the literature to identify culturally safe research consent processes that respect the rights of Indigenous children, the rights and responsibilities of parents or caregivers, and community protocols. Methods We followed PRISMA guidelines and Arksey and O’Malley’s approach for charting and synthesizing evidence. We (...) searched MEDLINE, PsycINFO, ERIC, CINAHL, Google Scholar, Web of Science, Informit Indigenous Collection, Bibliography of Native North Americans, and Sociological Abstracts. We included peer-reviewed primary and theoretical research articles written in English from January 1, 2000, to March 31, 2022, examining Indigenous approaches for obtaining informed consent from parents, families, children, or youth. Eligible records were uploaded to Covidence for title and abstract screening. We appraised the findings using a Two-Eyed Seeing approach. These findings were inductively coded using NVivo 12 and analyzed thematically. Results We identified 2,984 records and 11 eligible studies were included after screening. Three key recommendations emerged: addressing tensions in the ethics of consent, embracing wise practices, and using relational approaches to consent. Tensions in consent concerned Research Ethics Board consent requirements that fall short of protecting Indigenous children and communities when culturally incongruent. Wise practices included allowing parents and children to consent together, land-based consenting, and involving communities in decision-making. Using relational approaches to consent embodied community engagement and relationship building while acknowledging consent for Indigenous children cannot be obtained in isolation from family and community. Conclusions Very few studies discussed obtaining child consent in Indigenous communities. While Indigenous communities are not a monolith, the literature identified a need for community-driven, decolonized consent processes prioritizing Indigenous values and protocols. Further research is needed to examine nuances of Indigenized consent processes and determine how to operationalize them, enabling culturally appropriate, equitable access to research and services for all Indigenous children. (shrink)

Background:Despite the growing body of knowledge about surrogate decision making, we know very little about the use of ethical frameworks (including ethical theories, principles, and concepts) to understand surrogates’ day-to-day experiences in end-of-life care planning for incapacitated adults.Objectives and Methods:This qualitative systematic review was conducted to identify the types of ethical frameworks used to address surrogates’ experiences in end-of-life care planning for incapacitated adults as well as the most common themes or patterns found in surrogate decision-making research.Findings:Seven (...) research papers explicitly identified ethical theories, principles, or concepts, such as autonomy, substituted judgment, and best interest standards as guidelines for the research. Surrogate decision making themes included the responsibilities and goals of being a surrogate, factors influencing surrogates’ decision making, outcomes for surrogates, and an overarching theme of “wanting to do the right thing” for their loved one and/or themselves.Discussion:Understanding the complexity of surrogates’ experiences of end-of-life care planning is beyond the scope of conventional ethical frameworks.Conclusion:Ethical frameworks that address individuality and contextual variations related to decision making may more appropriately guide surrogate decision-making research that explores surrogates’ end-of-life care planning experiences. (shrink)

A promising strategy to make progress in the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories is to unravel the background assumptions of the respective views and discuss their plausibility. This paper discusses a background assumption of consequentialism that has not been noticed so far. Consequentialists claim that morality is about maximizing the impersonal good, and the background assumption is that an appropriate response to the impersonal good is necessarily a response to the impersonal good as a whole. (...) In this paper, I argue that we should understand the impersonal good as a complex good, and that an appropriate responses to a complex good need not be a response to that good as whole. This constitutes a novel objection against consequentialism. (shrink)

In the aftermath of various corporate scandals, management research and practice have taken great interest in ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is referred to as “normatively appropriate conduct” (Brown et al. in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 97(2):117–134, 2005), but the prescriptive norms that actually underlie this understanding constitute an open question. We address this research gap by turning to relational models theory (Fiske in Structures of social life: the four elementary forms of human relations, Free Press, (...) New York, 1991), which contextualizes four distinct moralities in four distinct interactional norms (i.e., the relational models). We expect that the norms inherent in each model dictate the type of leader relationship that followers deem ethical. Specifically, we hypothesize that, for each norm, followers will perceive leaders as less ethical the more discrepant, i.e., the more incongruent, followers’ ideal relational norm is with the perceived norm that they attribute to their actual leader–follower interaction. We tested the respective incongruence hypothesis in a cross-sectional survey of 101 Dutch employees. Polynomial regression and surface response analyses provide support for the hypothesized incongruence effects in each of the four relational models, suggesting that normatively appropriate conduct should not be limited to caring (i.e., community-oriented) behaviors. Indeed, all four relational models can predict ethical leadership perceptions. We discuss the implications in the context of ethical leadership research and managerial practice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ancient Quarrel Revisited:Literary Theory and the Return to EthicsJoseph G. KronickThe modern quarrel between theory and practice, like the ancient one between philosophy and poetry, is at once a practical one—at its heart is the question how we should live—and a pedagogical one—who or what is the proper teacher of virtue? Today, the quarrel is between theory and literature rather than between philosophy and poetry, (...) a change that has not been beneficial. The modern complaint against the abstractions of theory reflects a diminution in the quality of the argument. For the ancient Greeks, to ask about the virtuous life was to inquire into what it is to be human, for aretê, which is typically translated as "virtue," but is understood to mean "excellence" or "goodness," meant acting in accordance with what it is to be fully human. 1 The notion that "real issues," as one prominent theorist argues, belong to the realm of action and epistemological and ontological questions to the abstract realm of theory is a simplification of the more serious question of the relation of particulars to universals. It reverses the Platonic and Aristotelian hierarchy that makes thinking the highest form of activity. But something else is going on in this call to action: in denigrating thinking as abstract, it elevates doxa, opinion, in its place. Under the regime of doxa, two things occur: philosophy and poetry are looked upon as useless because utility becomes the criteria for measuring value, and singularity is looked upon with disdain, if it is, indeed, acknowledged at all, because to the extent the world as it appears is common to us all, doxa is not distinct or individual but uniform or the same. Philosophy and poetry share not only the stigma of being deemed useless, but they are dismissed as odd, singular, not common.This essay is concerned with the status of the singular in philosophy [End Page 436] and poetry. The ancient quarrel has not been settled, which may indeed be a good thing because the quarrel keeps alive the question, who is to speak for that which cannot be spoken of, the singular? Silence may be the appropriate response, yet to preserve the experience of that which resists language is the task of philosophy and poetry, hence the quarrel. A long tradition has it that the philosopher seeks universals, while the poet offers particular images of virtue, but at the heart of this argument over ethics is the question of how to account for the singular or unique. To do so, I turn to Socrates, whose singularity remains unaccounted for to this day.Socrates may be said to embody the very problem of the relation between philosophy and literature, for he left us no writings and exists for us primarily through the writings of Plato. Yet there is widespread acceptance of Plato's portrait of him, particularly as to Socrates' method, the elenchus, and his principle of the priority of definitions. However, Socrates' insistence upon the priority of definition is not an example of the philosopher elevating theory over experience but a practical issue involving the care of the self. Furthermore, in ancient Greece, moral and philosophical questions concerning the soul were as much the provenance of poetry as they were of philosophy. The search for truth is a practical matter concerning the conduct of life, but the Platonic philosopher wishes to give a rational account, or logos, that would link conduct to knowledge, whereas the poet's examples are bound to their representations. Nevertheless, to presume that Socrates was seeking a definition of virtue on the grounds that possession of the definition would translate into a good life is an absurdity, for he could never have sought after the knowledge of virtue if his mode of life depended upon the definition rather than on his character. 2The error is to accuse Socrates of placing abstract knowledge before virtuous conduct. When Socrates asks for a definition of the beautiful, for instance, he does not reject the answer, "the beautiful is a beautiful woman," because it confuses a particular with a universal (when compared to the beauty of the gods, the woman is... (shrink)

Strong arguments support the notion that much of modern bioethics is a result of appropriation rather than strict application of traditional moral philosophy. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize these sources and approaches associated with them, even when working with appropriated theories, since traditional ethical theory does and should influence modern bioethics.

Environmental ethics calls into question whether moral obligations invariably arise within relationships and communities, and whether wrong can only be done if some identifiable party is harmed. The aim of this paper is to appraise these assumptions, to argue for negative answers, and to draw appropriate conclusions about the scope of moral standing (or moral considerability). Its findings include the conclusions that our moral obligations (or responsibilities) extend to people and non-human creatures of the foreseeable future, as far as (...) the impacts of present actions and policies can themselves be foreseen, that, that moral standing attaches to the possible people and other living creatures of the future, and (with Derek Parfit) that ethics is to some degree impersonal, being concerned with future quality of life for whoever lives in future centuries, whether they are currently identifiable or not. This in turn requires sustainable forms of social practice and of the human population. Another conclusion is that these findings are compatible with the approach of stewardship which the author has defended elsewhere, since stewardship need neither be anthropocentric nor managerial, and precludes current and future human agents treating the natural world as we please. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis symposium brings together normative and empirical scholars in dialogue on Brooke Ackerly’s innovative and compelling recent monograph, Just Responsibility. Contributors discuss the book’s distinctive grounded normative theory methodology, its arguments for how individuals can take appropriate responsibility for global structural injustices, and its potential for practical impact.

DNR decisions are frequently made in oncology and hematology care and physicians and nurses may face related ethical dilemmas. Ethics is considered a basic competence in health care and can be understood as a capacity to handle a task that involves an ethical dilemma in an adequate, ethically responsible manner. One model of ethical competence for healthcare staff includes three main aspects: being, doing and knowing, suggesting that ethical competence requires abilities of character, action and knowledge. (...) Ethical competence can be developed through experience, communication and education, and a supportive environment is necessary for maintaining a high ethical competence. The aim of the present study was to investigate how nurses and physicians in oncology and hematology care understand the concept of ethical competence in order to make, or be involved in, DNR decisions and how such skills can be learned and developed. A further aim was to investigate the role of guidelines in relation to the development of ethical competence in DNR decisions. Individual interviews were conducted with fifteen nurses and sixteen physicians. The interviews were analyzed using thematic content analysis. Physicians and nurses in the study reflected on their ethical competence in relation to DNR decisions, on what it should comprise and how it could be developed. The ethical competence described by the respondents related to the concepts being, doing and knowing. In order to make ethically sound DNR decisions in oncology and hematology care, physicians and nurses need to develop appropriate virtues, improve their knowledge of ethical theories and relevant clinical guidelines. Ethical competence also includes the ability to act upon ethical judgements. Continued ethical education and discussions for further development of a common ethical language and a good ethical working climate can improve ethical competence and help nurses and physicians cooperate better with regard to patients in relation to DNR decisions, in their efforts to act in the best interest of the patient. (shrink)

Some theorists argue that appropriate responses to terrorism are in part shaped by popular sentiment. In two experiments, using representative design and ecological stimuli (e.g. actual news reports), we present evidence for some of the ways popular sentiment about terrorism tracks theory and can be constructed. In Experiment 1, we document that using the word ‘terrorist’ to describe a group of people decreases willingness to understand the group's grievances, decreases willingness to negotiate with the group, increases perceived permissibility (...) of violence against the group, and decreases the perceived rationality of the group. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that judgment about the permissibility of the use of force against terrorist groups can be biased by simple memory-priming manipulations. Results are interpreted in terms of (1) implications for philosophical theories about terrorism and (2) the role that experimental investigation can play in applied ethics. (shrink)

In this article we distinguish between philosophical bioethics (PB), descriptive policy orientated bioethics (DPOB) and normative policy oriented bioethics (NPOB). We argue that finding an appropriate methodology for combining empirical data and moral theory depends on what the aims of the research endeavour are, and that, for the most part, this combination is only required for NPOB. After briefly discussing the debate around the is/ought problem, and suggesting that both sides of this debate are misunderstanding one another (i.e. (...) one side treats it as a conceptual problem, whilst the other treats it as an empirical claim), we outline and defend a methodological approach to NPOB based on work we have carried out on a project exploring the normative foundations of paternal rights and responsibilities. We suggest that given the prominent role already played by moral intuition in moral theory, one appropriate way to integrate empirical data and philosophical bioethics is to utilize empirically gathered lay intuition as the foundation for ethical reasoning in NPOB. The method we propose involves a modification of a long-established tradition on non-intervention in qualitative data gathering, combined with a form of reflective equilibrium where the demands of theory and data are given equal weight and a pragmatic compromise reached. (shrink)

Background Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into healthcare has raised significant ethical concerns. In pharmacy practice, AI offers promising advances but also poses ethical challenges. Methods A cross-sectional study was conducted in countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region on 501 pharmacy professionals. A 12-item online questionnaire assessed ethical concerns related to the adoption of AI in pharmacy practice. Demographic factors associated with ethical concerns were analyzed via SPSS v.27 software using appropriate statistical (...) tests. Results Participants expressed concerns about patient data privacy (58.9%), cybersecurity threats (58.9%), potential job displacement (62.9%), and lack of legal regulation (67.0%). Tech-savviness and basic AI understanding were correlated with higher concern scores (p < 0.001). Ethical implications include the need for informed consent, beneficence, justice, and transparency in the use of AI. Conclusion The findings emphasize the importance of ethical guidelines, education, and patient autonomy in adopting AI. Collaboration, data privacy, and equitable access are crucial to the responsible use of AI in pharmacy practice. (shrink)

This book discusses the ethical dilemmas of migration in the era of globalization. Centered on the recent influx of large numbers of migrants and refugees to the United States and Europe and viewed through the lens of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants, this book focuses on the problems posed by globalized migration and analyzes proposed responses. Using prominent ethical theories and moral principles, such as Utilitarianism, duty, justice, and integrity, (...) the book proposes a framework for analyzing decision-making by migrants and policymakers and formulating equitable policies to address the migration crisis. Drawing attention to the ethical dilemmas that migrants and policymakers experience, this book fills a gap in the literature and enriches it, adding to the economic, political, and human rights issues that are traditionally part of the migration discussion. Appropriate for students and scholars of ethics, policy, and political science, this book is also meant to be of use to practitioners and decision-makers faced with similar decisions. (shrink)

What responsibility do individuals bear for structural injustice? Iris Marion Young has offered the most fully developed account to date, the Social Connections Model. She argues that we all bear responsibility because we each causally contribute to structural processes that produce injustice. My aim in this article is to motivate and defend an alternative account that improves on Young’s model by addressing five fundamental challenges faced by any such theory. The core idea of what I call the “Role-Ideal Model” (...) is that we are each responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles, i.e. our roles as parents, colleagues, employers, citizens, etc., because roles are the site where structure meets agency. In short, the Role-Ideal Model explains how individual action contributes to structural change, justifies demands for action from each particular agent, specifies what kinds of acts should be undertaken, moderates between demanding too much and too little of individual agents, and provides an account of the critical responses appropriate for holding individuals accountable for structural injustice. (shrink)

The article begins with a view of recent developments in the discipline of business law. A model useful in the study of business ethics is presented. Business ethics is the philosophical examination of the body of values and conceptions that influence business decision making as well as being pervasive components of the social environment in which businesses operate. Our model is a four-part framework for approaching business ethics which is sensitive to its implications for business law. The model's four parts (...) are: (1) ethical theory, (2) institutional frameworks, (3) organizational cultures, and (4) individual moral choice and responsibility. Topics, issues, and kinds of material appropriate for approaching each of these four are presented, and a list of scholarly articles, books, and court cases, is included as a source of additional classroom material. (shrink)

Ethics consultation is a commonly applied mechanism to address clinical ethical dilemmas. However, there is little information on the viewpoints of health care providers towards the relevance of ethics committees and appropriate application of ethics consultation in clinical practice. We sought to use qualitative methodology to evaluate free-text responses to a case-based survey to identify thematically the views of health care professionals towards the role of ethics committees in resolving clinical ethical dilemmas. Using an iterative and reflexive (...) model we identified themes that health care providers support a role for ethics committees and hospitals in resolving clinical ethical dilemmas, that the role should be one of mediation, rather than prescription, but that ultimately legal exposure was dispositive compared to ethical theory. The identified theme of legal fears suggests that the mediation role of ethics committees is viewed by health care professionals primarily as a practical means to avoid more worrisome medico-legal conflict. (shrink)

This paper offers a response retributive theory of punishment, taking the role of the punisher as well as the relations between the parties to punishment to be central to retributive justification. It proposes that punishment is justified in terms of the ethics of appropriate response, and more precisely, in terms of the duty agents have to dissociate from the devaluation inherent in the culpable wrongdoing of others. The paper demonstrates that on such account, while the harm (...) and suffering involved in punishment are rightly imposed, they are not good, grounding a further duty to mitigate our retributive practices. The result is a moderate vision of retributive justification, which has the resources to justify, not only criminal punishment, but punishment as imposed across a wide variety of relations: private, institutional and political. (shrink)

As the practice of medicine inevitably raises both ethical and legal issues, it had been recommended since 1999 that medical ethics and human rights be taught at every medical school. Most Nigerian medical schools still lack a formal undergraduate medical ethics curriculum. Medical education remains largely focused on traditional medical science components, leaving the medical students to develop medical ethical decision-making skills and moral attitudes passively within institutions noted for relatively strong paternalistic traditions. In conducting a needs assessment (...) for developing a curriculum germane to the Nigerian society, and by extension most of Sub-Saharan Africa, this study determined the views of Nigerian medical students on medical ethics education, ethical issues related to the doctor-patient relationship and the ethical/professional dilemmas they are confronted with. Using self-administered 63-item structured questionnaires, a cross-sectional survey of the final year medical students of the University of Nigeria was conducted in July 2015.Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences software (SPSS Version 17), frequency counts and percentages were generated. The sample included 100 males (71.4%) and 40 females (28.6%), with the respective mean (SD) age being 24.6(5.61) and 21.8 (6.38) years. Only 35.7% were satisfied with their medical ethics knowledge, and 97.9% indicated that medical ethics should be taught formally. Only 8.6% had never witnessed a medical teacher act unethically. The dilemmas of poor communication between physicians and patients, and the provision of sub-standard care were reported highest for being encountered ‘often’. A majority (60.7%) indicated that “a doctor should do his best always, irrespective of the patient’s wishes”. No significant difference in responses across gender was noted. There is a strong desire by the contemporary Nigerian medical student for medical ethics education. Their lack of exposure in medical ethics in an ethically challenging environment suggest a dire need for the development of an appropriate medical ethics curriculum for them and the provision of an ethically conducive learning environment. (shrink)

This paper concerns the responsibility of co-authors in cases of scientific misconduct. Arguments in research integrity guidelines and in the bioethics literature concerning authorship responsibilities are discussed. It is argued that it is unreasonable to claim that for every case where a research paper is found to be fraudulent, each author is morally responsible for all aspects of that paper, or that one particular author has such a responsibility. It is further argued that it is more constructive to specify what (...) task responsibilities come with different roles in a project and describe what kinds of situations or events call for some kind of action, and what the appropriate actions might be. (shrink)

The potential development of self-driving cars (also known as autonomous vehicles or AVs – particularly Level 5 AVs) has called the attention of different interested parties. Yet, there are still only a few relevant international regulations on them, no emergency patterns accepted by communities and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), and no publicly accepted solutions to some of their pending ethical problems. Thus, this paper aims to provide some possible answers to these moral and practical dilemmas. In particular, we focus (...) on what AVs should do in no-win scenarios and on who should be held responsible for these types of decisions. A naturalistic perspective on ethics informs our proposal, which, we argue, could represent a pragmatic and realistic solution to the regulation of AVs. We discuss the proposals already set out in the current literature regarding both policy-making strategies and theoretical accounts. In fact, we consider and reject descriptive approaches to the problem as well as the option of using either a strict deontological view or a solely utilitarian one to set AVs’ ethical choices. Instead, to provide concrete answers to AVs’ ethical problems, we examine three hierarchical levels of decision-making processes: country-wide regulations, OEM policies, and buyers’ moral attitudes. By appropriately distributing ethical decisions and considering their practical implications, we maintain that our proposal based on ethical naturalism recognizes the importance of all stakeholders and allows the most able of them to take actions (the OEMs and buyers) to reflect on the moral leeway and weight of their options. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decolonizing Universality:Postcolonial Theory and the Quandary of Ethical AgencyEsha Niyogi De (bio)Living in colonial India, the Bengali thinker and creative writer Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) often meditated on ways that "concord" (milan) and "harmony" (sāmanjasya) could be established between persons and cultures [BIC 450-51]. Noting that "ruptures in balance and harmony" (bhār sāmanjasyer abhāv) that once were more localized now affected the whole world, he maintained that these (...) reinforced the progressive message of the modern age that the local "problems of a people are a part and parcel of humankind's" (swajātir samasyā samasta mānusher samasyār antargata) [RC 279]. In his view, the means to reestablish harmony in this unequal world lay in social practices and ideas conducing "freedom" (mukti) rather than enforcing "power" (shakti) and "coercive discipline" (shāsan) [SaS 408-09]. He argued that such progressive trends of practice and thought would be found not in one culture alone but through traveling across different cultural "seas of knowledge (jnān)" [SwSm 699]. For only through such conceptual journeys would we enkindle in ourselves "arguments with and doubts about" (yukti tarka o sandeher udbhav) our own cultures, and also learn from all the "voyagers in the path of progress" (unnatipather yātri) who emerge in different locations and times [SJ 39-40].As these comments reveal, Rabindranath maintained that inequalities could be rectified by making individual and collective norms and actions accountable to and measurable in terms of a speculative notion of universal humanity. While alert to the injustices proliferating from European colonization, he insisted that coercive practices and imbalances of power could not be entirely localized, and that in order to correct multiple forms of coercion we must seek across cultures and societies for (partial) achievements of human freedom and harmony. In so viewing transcultural negotiations of a common humane proclivity as the means to decolonize the world, Rabindranath did not stand alone but in a diverse company of anti-imperialist thinkers who adapted modern humanism to their ends: W. E. B. Dubois—who lauded Rabindranath's appropriation of [End Page 42] such liberal notions as democracy and equal opportunity "for greater ends" than were allowed by the "inconsistencies" of a racist European perspective [74]—Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and from Rabindranath's own colonial context, the Bengali Anarchist poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (to name but a few). Reflecting upon worldwide experiences of subjection, these radical modern intellectuals tried above all to avoid reinventing separatism by declaring non-Western cultures to be unilaterally superior to Western imperialist culture. Driven by an activist ethics, they attempted instead to correct the roots of separatism through objectively evaluating, against a common frame of reference, right and wrong, relatively successful or failed practices of human empowerment and community.In this essay, I consider if and how we could characterize as "postcolonial" these evaluative ethics that rationally seek to correct coercive relations between persons and societies through referring to an affirmative idea of a human nature shared by all. If we take postcolonial agency to rest on a thorough critique of and resistance to all political and epistemic maneuvers that subordinate or exclude people and cultures, might this form of resistant agency reside in the ethical normativity of anti-imperialist humanism? This question elicits conflicting responses from contemporary postcolonial theorists.The argument, on the one hand, is that if postcolonial theory is to ethically address the multiple and interlocked hierarchies of a postimperial world, it indeed must take into account how people mobilize against separatism by working through critiques of ethnic divisiveness to negotiate a common human ground. Commenting on the universalism of thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore and W. E. B. DuBois, Edward Said, for example, suggests that "vital" critiques of chauvinistic separatism arise only from viewing "local identity as not exhaustive" but as elaborating in reference to "larger, more generous realities of community between cultures, peoples, and societies" [Culture and Imperialism 217, 229]. His implication is that only through evaluating ourselves on the basis of a notion of noncoercive universality are we able to think against the identity politics that pervade our world, stemming at once from a nativist... (shrink)

Until recently, businesses and corporations could argue that their only real commitments were to maximise the return to their shareholders whilst staying within the law. However, the world has changed significantly during the last ten years and now most major corporations recognise that they have significant responsibility to local and global societies beyond simply making profit. This means that there is now an increasing concern with the question of how corporations, and their employees, ought to behave, and this leads us (...) to consider ethics as the appropriate theoretical and philosophical domain.I will bring into the debate two relatively recent approaches to ethics: Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics ; and the critical realist approach of Roy Bhaskar. These are interesting for several reasons: they both draw on traditional ethical theories, although different ones; they bring in innovations of practical relevance; and they both share an over-arching critical perspective. After a critical introduction to both ethical theories, their similarities and differences are explored. The article ends by considering the extent to which they may be practically useful within business. (shrink)

The concept of responsible leadership has garnered increased attention in recent years. Indeed, irresponsibility on the part of organizational leaders appears to represent an area of growing concern to the greater public. Accordingly, it is appropriate that increased scholarly attention be devoted to an understanding of this concept. But with that said, the purpose of this article is to identify three caveats about which researchers and practitioners should be concerned as work in this area proceeds. These caveats pertain to: (...) (1) definitional issues, (2) the importance of theory and research that is not ideologically driven or biased, and (3) the positioning of responsible leadership within the greater body of leadership theory and research. Additional concerns are considered including the measurement of responsible leadership and research strategies. (shrink)

The ideas of Franz Rosenzweig have had relatively little impact outside of the circle of contemporary liberal Jewish thinkers. It is even more unlikely that his name would be found in any of the countless volumes an ethical theory. I argue that the ethical theory implied in his primary philosophical work, The Star of Redemption, is compelling and worth sustained and serious study by a wider audience. ;Rosenzweig rejects an Hegelian totalitarian ontological framework for ethics, in (...) favor of a relational ethics that is based on the immediate demands of a concretely contingent other. I construct the epistemological foundations for such an ethics out of his work, by drawing on an analogy from the new science of chaos and Rosenzweig's avowed reliance on Hermann Cohen's differential calculus of infinitesimals. ;In addition to considering the mathematical symbolic logic that serves to structure his epistemology, I consider how aesthetics plays a role in his ethical theory. I contrast essential elements of Rosenzweig's philosophy with those of Martin Heidegger's in order to specify why these two contemporaries have been so closely associated and why they should be more clearly distinguished from each other. Besides the obvious cultural parameters, what makes them similar is not only their univocal departure from a Western metaphysics of substance, but also a common concern to locate human beings in the vitally relational way that we exist in the world. Their differences are most clearly defined in how each respectively appropriates language and aesthetics in that locative process. ;For Heidegger, art as the way of language par excellence becomes the medium by which a human being becomes aware of his/her own solitary and finite existence through bringing one face-to-face with the ultimate nature of one's own death. For Rosenzweig, that same awareness is countered by his introduction of the revelatory experience of responsible love of one human being for an other, and which he analogically models on a dialogical encounter with God. I argue that the ultimate difference between these two thinkers, then, is that with Rosenzweig we are provided with the tools to develop an ethical theory that has contemporary relevance for responsible relationships, while with Heidegger, who openly rejects ethics as the context for a discourse on human authenticity, we are left with next to nothing. (shrink)

The paper analyses results from a questionnaire-based survey of ethical behavior of members of the Western Australian Senior Executive Service. Relating to definitions of deontology (duty) and teleology (ends over means) the study examines the validity of three hypotheses on ethical behaviour/decision making frameworks. Longitudinal data is related to the 1983–90WA Inc period. The study establishes that SES managers apply ethical frameworks in order to understand the meaning of: ethical behaviour and that there are groups of (...) managers with distinct understandings of what constitutes ethical behavior which is reflective of particular ethics theories. Three groups of managers are identified: (1) emphasises teleology (2) focuses on external influences (rules, standards and codes) and (3) encompasses both teleology and external influences and, to a lesser extent deontology. Only this latter group is regarded as having an appropriate repertoire of potential responses to any given ethical dilemma. There is no support for the view that those beginning employment in the public service post 1984 adversely affected the ethical decision making frameworks of other senior managers. (shrink)

Ordinarily, we take moral responsibility to come in degrees. Despite this commonplace, theories of moral responsibility have focused on the minimum threshold conditions under which agents are morally responsible. But this cannot account for our practices of holding agents to be more or less responsible. In this paper we remedy this omission. More specifically, we extend an account of reasons-responsiveness due to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza according to which an agent is morally responsible only if she is appropriately (...) receptive to and reactive to reasons for action. Building on this, we claim that the degree to which an agent is responsible will depend on the degree to which she is able to recognize and react to reasons. To analyze this, we appeal to relations of comparative similarity between possible worlds, arguing that the degree to which an agent is reasons-reactive depends on the nearest possible world in which given sufficient reason to do otherwise, she does so. Similarly, we argue that the degree to which an agent is reasons-receptive will depend on the intelligibility of her patterned recognition of reasons. By extending an account of reasons-responsiveness in these ways, we are able to rationalize our practice of judging people to be more or less responsible. (shrink)

Debate about the responsibilities of affluent people to act to lessen global poverty has dominated ethics and political philosophy for forty years. But the controversy has reached an impasse, with the main approaches either demanding too much of ordinary mortals or else letting them off the hook. In Distant Strangers I show how a preoccupation with standard moral theories and with the concepts of duty and obligation have led philosophers astray. I argue that there are serious limits to what can (...) be demanded of ordinary human beings, but that this does not mean we must abandon the moral imperative to reduce poverty. Drawing on findings from behavioral economics and psychology, I show how we can motivate better-off people to lessen poverty without excessively taxing their moral virtue. And I argue that this approach is not just pragmatically but morally appropriate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Is Bioethics Applied Ethics?Robert M. VeatchBioethics is often referred to as a kind of applied ethics. The term applied ethics can be controversial if it is taken to imply that ethical theory from philosophy or religious ethics has to be the starting point for ethical analysis of some practical field such as medicine or law or politics. The term can be understood as requiring some premises (...) from an ethical theory that are then "applied" to some problem area, as a "top down" way of doing the work of moral reflection in a way that axioms in geometry are applied to present proofs of mathematical claim.The publication of an important work in the history of medical ethics, A History of Medical Ethics, provides an opportunity to reflect more carefully on what applied ethics means. That massive multi-authored volume edited by Robert Baker and Laurence McCullough (2007) is scheduled for publication this fall. With the permission of the Press, we have asked Baker and McCullough to prepare an article-length version of one of the central essays in that work. Their paper challenges the idea that ethical theory should be "applied" to medicine or other fields, putting forth an alternative of the "appropriation" of an ethical theory by the formulation of concepts, principles, moral rules, or other specifications that may turn out to be unique or at least modified for the particular field in question.In this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, we publish the Baker-McCullough article together with five critical commentaries. We include two medical historians who have a sustained commitment to studying the history of ethics in medicine, two systematic ethicists who have an unusual level of commitment to studying ethics historically, and a physician with unusual sensitivity to the history of medical ethics. Each comments on the Baker-McCullough thesis and offers an alternative view of the link between ethical theory and the field of biomedical ethics.Daniel Fox triggered some of the initial reflection on the history of medical ethics in the 1970s. His work is discussed by Baker and McCullough. Fox is sympathetic with the Baker-McCullough appropriation thesis, viewing their position as complementary to his own, although he [End Page 1] urges more attention to the political aspects of medicine, professional dominance, and professional control of medical resources.Ulf Schmidt, a specialist on the historical aspects of research during the Nazi era, focuses on Baker and McCullough's use of that historical example of the appropriation of medical ethics.The two ethicists who comment both have had many years experience with historical aspects of medical ethics, and both worked on the historically important Belmont Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects. Both question whether Baker and McCullough overstate the problem of the relation between application and appropriation. Albert Jonsen, as a member of the National Commission, concentrates on the Belmont Report, showing how he sees the report appropriating philosophical ethics.Tom Beauchamp, who was the primary staff person responsible for the report, provides a somewhat different read on the report and particularly on the role of Kantian ethics in the report's discussion of autonomy. Beauchamp accuses Baker and McCullough of having too narrow an understanding of the meaning of the term "applied," claiming that no people doing medical ethics today would simply apply ethical theory in a deductivist manner.Finally, Jeremy Sugarman, the physician ethicist, is, in a somewhat surprising turn, the cautious defender of the application that Baker and McCullough challenge. Although he ends up sympathetic with the appropriation that implies going beyond straight-forward top-down application, he outlines the value of ethical theory for the practical analysis of ethical problems in fields such as medicine.ReferenceBaker, Robert, and McCullough, Laurence, eds. 2007. A History of Medical Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, in press. [End Page 2]Google ScholarCopyright © 2007 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

A simple but valuable experience that all humans have in common is that their life and their actions, the things they do and the things they omit to do, their reflection and their praxis are always marked by the tension which exists between what is factual and what is appropriate. Ethics can be described in simple terms as the systematic reflection on this tension, an endeavour to explicate how notions such as ‘appropriateness’ can be translated into categories such as (...) ‘goodness’ and ‘rightness’ in such a way that we do not remain bogged down in this experience but can develop some kind of assessment. One can also say, therefore, that ethics has a critical approach: the aforementioned tension is not merely noted and left at that, it is scrutinised, studied and assessed on the basis of a particular measure or criterion, thus making it possible, for example, to distinguish between the acknowledgement of changes and the appreciation of improvements .Every theory of ethics which consistently aspires to such a critical reflection, therefore, will have to deal with the question how the aforementioned criterion can be put into words. I already pointed to our common experience of the tension between the actual and the appropriate. In an effort to pin down the criterion in question, a useful point of departure might be to reflect for a moment on what is meant by appropriate. The term itself hints at some kind of relation or belonging to. If, then, the appropriate can be formulated in terms of belonging to ‘the human’ then an understanding of what it is to be human will always constitute the point of departure of any critical ethical reflection. For those who might be tempted to view this as too deductive, the whole approach can be turned on its head: the specific sort of reflection in which people engage with respect to the tension between the actual and the appropriate and in which the appropriate can be formulated in terms of the human, is ethics.[...]In the present article I intend to focus on the image of the human person which is compatible with such a notion of ethical obedience as responsibility to-be-taken-up. The fact that people speak today of a ‘changing of the guard’ when it comes to fundamental ethics is certainly no exaggeration. An ethics founded on natural law has been evolving towards the use of the notion personalism as a designation for an inclusive anthropology which is the expression of the appropriate. Experience teaches that a substantive explanation of personalism — which I provide in the third part of this article — is best preceded by a methodical sketch concerning the ‘status’ of personalism as a fundamental ethical category. In the fourth part of the article I will endeavour to outline the contours of a personalist theory of action. (shrink)

Neo-Confucian metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theories provide support for an architectural ethic. The latter can be justified through an emphasis on the humane person who becomes one with all things, appropriate knowing of reality, and an extended theory of virtue. Built space can express a wide range of virtue or excellence, some human-centered, some not, demonstrating how _qi_ 氣 and _li_ 理 present an enormous range of possibilities. A Neo-Confucian approach to built space also aligns with specific (...) themes prevalent in Western “biophilic” design, emphasizing the causal interrelation between a building and its surrounding environment. Finally, the former discussion can serve as a useful response to the tension between contemporary Western architectural principles and the current call toward sustainable design. An architectural ethic rooted in Neo-Confucian philosophy appears to call for a revision of certain prominent design principles while also being sympathetic to particular concerns of aesthetic creativity. (shrink)

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms are triggered by the perception (...) of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account. (shrink)

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms are triggered by the perception (...) of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account. (shrink)

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms are triggered by the perception (...) of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account. (shrink)

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms are triggered by the perception (...) of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account. (shrink)

This paper begins with a simple illustration of the choice between individual and population strategies in population health policy. It describes the traditional approach on which the choice is to be made on the relative merits of the two strategies in each case. It continues by identifying two factors—our knowledge of the consequences of the epidemiological transition and the prevalence of responsibility-sensitive theories of distributive justice—that may distort our moral intuitions when we deliberate about the choice of appropriate risk-management (...) strategies in population health. It argues that the confluence of these two factors may lead us to place too much emphasis on personal responsibility in health policy. (shrink)

A central thesis held by neo-Aristotelian virtue theories is that virtues require robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions. This thesis is challenged by a particular form of situationism, which suggests that human beings cannot develop this kind of emotional disposition because our integral emotions are too easily influenced by morally and epistemically irrelevant incidental affect. If the challenge stands, it implies that human beings cannot be virtuous. In response to the challenge, I propose an agential solution that’s grounded (...) in the affective sciences. Drawing from empirical evidence, I argue that agents can develop ameliorative abilities such as emotion differentiation to guard against the influence of incidental affect, thereby developing more robust emotional dispositions. My arguments thus defend the psychological plausibility of this key component of virtue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethical Theory and Responsibility Ethics: A Metaethical Study of Niebuhr and Levinas by Kevin JungMichael SohnEthical Theory and Responsibility Ethics: A Metaethical Study of Niebuhr and Levinas KEVIN JUNG Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011. 237 pp. $69.95In Ethical Theory and Responsibility Ethics, Kevin Jung presents a historical and constructive analysis of two of the most prominent defenders of responsibility ethics: H. Richard (...) Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas. The Niebuhr and Levinas specialist will find detailed, historical discussions and clear, rigorous analyses of these thinkers’ philosophical and theological thought. But where Jung’s project really makes a distinct contribution to the field of ethics—and where his work may be of interest to the nonspecialist—is when he brings their insights and oversights into critical conversation with analytic philosophy. Rendering a mutually productive dialogue, he persuasively argues that categories within analytic philosophy cohere with and clarify their respective positions; conversely, their concrete responsibility ethics may contribute to analytic philosophy. [End Page 223]Chapter 1 introduces key concepts and issues within contemporary analytic philosophy relevant to responsibility ethics; these concepts and issues resurface toward the end of the book when Jung puts them in dialogue with the ethical theories of Niebuhr and Levinas. Chapter 2 reconstructs the philosophical and theological background of Niebuhr’s moral theory, engaging a number of influential thinkers—Friedrich Schleiermacher, Albrecht Ritschl, Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Barth, Josiah Royce, and Martin Buber—who shaped his thought. Chapter 3 examines more closely Niebuhr’s responsibility ethics itself. In the next two chapters, Jung applies the same structure of analysis to Levinas’s ethical theory: he considers Levinas’s philosophical and theological context; engages the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Franz Rosenzweig, and Buber; and then exposits Levinas’s own distinct position. Jung traverses and navigates complex and divergent concepts and ideas proposed by Niebuhr and Levinas with clarity and finesse. His purpose is to interpret their arguments in light of their respective positions in ethical theory. In the final two chapters, Jung’s work turns more explicitly constructive when he puts their theories into conversation with analytic philosophy.The specialist in Niebuhr or Levinas studies may find that Jung’s attempts to clarify their thought with foreign, extrinsic categories do violence to their works. Indeed, on occasion Jung seems to shoehorn their ideas into analytical concepts that may not do full justice to the full breadth of their thought. For instance, Jung rightly indicates that Levinas rejects a certain kind of abstract ethical universalism on the basis of his emphasis on the concrete relation to the particular other. But to conclude from this that he is an ethical particularist does not adequately account for the categorically imperative nature of the ethical demands and responsibility to the other that Levinas proposes. In other words, it seems to me that Levinas offers a form of ethical universalism that begins precisely in the concrete situation without collapsing into an ethical particularism.Despite these minor reservations, Jung’s work is to be commended not only for its excellent exposition and rigorous studies of Niebuhr and Levinas but also for its successful attempt overall to clarify and give greater coherence to their ideas with the tools of analytic philosophy. In so doing, Jung provides robust theoretical reflection on responsibility ethics in a time of augmented human power and capacities. [End Page 224]Michael SohnCleveland State UniversityCopyright © 2014 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In this paper I offer the term “potato ethics” to describe a particular professional rural health sensibility. I contrast this attitude with the sensibility behind urban professional ethics, which often focus on the narrow doctor–patient treatment relationship. The phrase appropriates a Swedish metaphor, the image of the potato as a humble side dish: plain, useful, versatile, and compatible with any main course. Potato ethics involves making oneself useful, being pragmatic, choosing to be like an invisible elf who prevents discontinuity rather (...) than a more visible observer of formal rules and assigned tasks. It also includes actively taking part in everyday disaster-prevention and fully recognizing the rural context as a vulnerable space. This intersectional argument, which emphasizes the ongoing, holistic responsibility of those involved in rural communities, draws on work from the domains of care ethics, relational ethics, pragmatic psychology, feminist ethics of embodiment, social location theory, and reflections on geographical narcissism. (shrink)

This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known as ‘hermeneutical injustice’, (...) where widespread conceptual ignorance puts members of marginalized groups at risk of their distinctive and important experiences lacking intelligible interpretations. Together, I call the use of problematic concepts or the ignorance of appropriate concepts ‘conceptual incapacities’. I discuss the conditions under which we may be responsible for our conceptual incapacities on several major theories of responsibility, developing my own account of responsibility in the process, according to which we are responsible for something just in case it was caused by one of our reasons-responsive constitutive psychological traits. However, I argue that regardless of whether we are responsible for something, we may still be required to take responsibility for it. Whether or not we are responsible for our conceptual incapacities, we are required to reflect critically upon them in a variety of scenarios that throw our use of those concepts into question. I consider the method of conceptual engineering — the philosophical critique and revision of concepts — as one way we might take responsibility for our concepts, or at least, defer that duty to experts. But, this top-down model of conceptual revision is insufficient. Using a pragmatist model of the social epistemology of morality, I argue that conceptual inquiry is a social endeavour in which we are all required to participate, to some degree. (shrink)