In 1498 Cajetan published a short book, On the Analogy of Names, which is often regarded as a masterly summary of Aquinas's doctrine of analogy. It opens in the very first paragraph with an attack on three views of the concept of being (ens): first, that it is a disjunction of concepts; second, that it is an ordered group of concepts; and third, that it is a single, separate concept which is unequally participated by substances and accidents. A (...) number of questions immediately spring to mind. Why are concepts being discussed when analogy is said by Cajetan to be a theory of language? What is meant by ‘concept’? Who held the views under attack and why? So far as I can tell, the extensive literature on both Aquinas and Cajetan offers no satisfactory answers to these questions. (shrink)

This article examines the normative structure of the concept of health and tries to suggest an account of it in a phenomenological-hermeneutic framework. It is argued that the concept of health has a logical priority to illness, though the latter has an experiential priority. The fundamental feature of the concept of health as discussed in the literature is initially recognized in the notion of ‘norm’, in both the bio-statistical and normative-ideal sense. An analysis of this body of literature reveals some (...) weaknesses in bio-statistical definitions of health as well as in those normative ones which endorse a value-relativity thesis. An approach based on the analogical structure of language is then advanced. In this framework, the notion of biological normativeness proposed by G. Canguilhem is connected with an analysis of the language of health through etymologies. It is argued that health can be characterized as an analogy of ‘plenitude’, which is the common ideal reference of the various health-concepts. The analogical structuring of language allows the recognition of different levels of meaning, and therefore of different kinds of normativeness (biological, mental, social, moral). Some hints of a theory of health deriving from this framework are then given. Keywords: analogy, health, hermeneutics, norm, plenitude CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Introduction -- The mathematical roots of the concept of analogy -- Aristotle : the uses of analogy -- Aristotle : analogy and language -- Thomas Aquinas -- Immanuel Kant -- Karl Barth -- Final reflections.

In philosophy of science concept formation and reduction is usually discussed with respect to definability. In the paper at hand this discussion is slightly expanded to an investigation of concept formation and reduction by analogies. It is argued that many kinds of such analogies bear some important features of partial contextual definitions. -/- With the help of a detailed investigation of the so-called gene-meme-analogy it is then demonstrated how the meme-concept is introduced via analogies into an expanded theory of (cultural) (...) evolution. As a consequence it is shown that the diversity of meanings of the meme-concept fits into the current state of establishing this analogy. (shrink)

1. The application of literature to life -- 2. Examples of application -- 3. Application and the act of reading -- 4. Literature and cognitive enrichment -- 5. Transportation and empathy -- 6. Simulation and identification -- 7. The aesthetic approach to literature -- 8. Conceptions of the text -- 9. Literary practice -- 10. The concepts of literature -- 11. Questions of norms and values -- 12. A final look at application.

This paper makes two main arguments. First, that to understand analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas, one must distinguish two logically distinct concepts he inherited from Aristotle: one a kind of likeness between things, the other a kind of relation between linguistic functions. Second, that analogy (in both of these senses) plays a relatively small role in Aquinas's treatment of divine naming, compared to the realist semantic framework in which questions about divine naming are formulated and resolved, and on which (...) the coherence of the doctrine of divine simplicity—which is what gives rise to the questions of divine naming in the first place—depends. (shrink)

Concept formation in science is a reasoned process, commensurate with ordinary problem-solving processes. An account of how analogical reasoning and reasoning from imagistic representations generate new scientific concepts is presented. The account derives from case studies of concept formation in science and from computational theories of analogical problem solving in cognitive science. Concept formation by analogy is seen to be a process of increasing abstraction from existing conceptual structures.

Research on innovation often highlights analogies from sources outside the current problem domain as a major source of novel concepts; however, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well understood. We analyzed the temporal interplay between far analogy use and creative concept generation in a professional design team's brainstorming conversations, investigating the hypothesis that far analogies lead directly to very novel concepts via large steps in conceptual spaces . Surprisingly, we found that concepts were more similar to (...) their preceding concepts after far analogy use compared to baseline situations . Yet far analogies increased the team's concept generation rate compared to baseline conditions. Overall, these results challenge the view that far analogies primarily lead to novel concepts via jumps in conceptual spaces and suggest alternative pathways from far analogies to novel concepts. (shrink)

How do vague notions about how one might understand certain physical phenomena get transformed into scientific concepts such as “field”, “quark”, and “gene”? Philosophers of as disparate views as Reichenbach and Feyerabend have held that the process through which scientific concepts emerge is not a reasoned process. In a manner completely mysterious and unanalyzable, scientific concepts emerge fully grown, like Athena from the head of Zeus. However, when one examines actual cases of concept formation in science, a (...) different picture can be painted: Scientific concepts do not pop out of heads, but are constructed in response to specific problems by utilizing methods appropriate to the solution of the problem. Thus, as with other aspects of the scientific enterprise, concept formation is a problem-solving process that involves the application of systematic procedures in the attempt to solve specific problems. It is a reasoned process. (shrink)

This study focuses on the origin of life as presented in the thought of Anaximander of Miletus but also points to some parallel motifs found in much later conceptions of both the pre-Darwinian German romantic science and post-Darwinian biology. According to Anaximander, life originated in the moisture associated with earth (mud). This moist environment hosted the first living creatures that later populated the dry land. In these descriptions, one can trace the earliest hints of the notion of environmental adaptation. The (...) origin of humans was seen as connected in some way with fish: ancient humans were supposed to have developed inside fish-like animals. Anaximander took into account changes in the development of living creatures (adaptations) and speculated on the origins of humans. Similar ideas are found also in the writings of much later, eighteenth and nineteenth century authors who were close to the tradition of German romantic science. We do not argue that these later concepts are in any way directly linked with those of the pre-Socratics, but they show surprising parallels in, e.g., the hypothesis that life originated in a moist environment or the supposition that human developed from fish-like ancestors. These transformations are seen as a consequence of timeless logic rather than as evolution in historical terms. Despite the accent on the origin of living things, both Anaximander and the later Naturphilosophen lack in their notions the element most characteristic of Darwin’s thought, that is, the emphasis on historicity and uniqueness of all that comes into being. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of Suárez’s conception of being, which prima facie seems to oscillate between a Scotistic univocal conception anda conception of being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez’s doctrine can in no way be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the Uncommon Doctor’s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts of (...) being. In the second part, the paper asks how the concept of being can, without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the third parts, this question receives an answer against the backgroundof Suárez’s critique of Scotus’s conception, and with the help of his theory of the radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section, there follows anexposition of Suárez’s doctrine on the explication of the concept of being. The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of esse for ratio entis. Inthe last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the Metaphysical Disputation. (shrink)

The main goal of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience was to answer Humean objectionsconcerning the aprioricity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. This paper intendsto suggest an interpretation of the Kantian argument that, even though cannot show thatHume should be satisfied with the answer, makes clear Kant’s reasons for that anti-Humeangoal. In the first part of this paper, I intend to discuss summarily Hume’s objection againstthe possibility of a demonstration of the principle “every-event-some-cause” and his thesisconcerning its validity. In the second (...) part, it is the turn of the Kantian answer to thesame question concerning the validity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. (shrink)

The main goal of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience was to answer Humean objectionsconcerning the aprioricity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. This paper intendsto suggest an interpretation of the Kantian argument that, even though cannot show thatHume should be satisfied with the answer, makes clear Kant’s reasons for that anti-Humeangoal. In the first part of this paper, I intend to discuss summarily Hume’s objection againstthe possibility of a demonstration of the principle “every-event-some-cause” and his thesisconcerning its validity. In the second (...) part, it is the turn of the Kantian answer to thesame question concerning the validity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. (shrink)

Many psychologists think that concepts should be understood on analogy with the terms of scientific theories, yet the significance of this claim has always been obscure. In this paper, I clarify the psychological content of the theory analogy, focusing on influential pieces by Susan Carey. Once plainly put, the analogy amounts to the view that a mental representation has its semantic properties by virtue of its role in a restricted knowledge structure. One of the commendable things about Carey's work (...) is that, unlike many other psychologists who appeal to the theory analogy, she takes seriously the need to specify how these structures are constrained. At the same time, the constraints she offers are insufficient. Her account also faces challenges from work in the semantics of natural kind terms. (shrink)

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant’s philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant’s philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to (...) expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant’s philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant’s philosophy of science in crucial respects. (shrink)

Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims involving an emphasis on logical structure and similarity in form between theory and (...) analogy. While formal considerations are often relevant in the employment of an analogy they are neither as extensive as proponents of this viewpoint suggest, nor are they in most cases sufficient for allowing analogies to fulfill the roles imputed to them. Of major importance, and what these authors generally fail to consider, are physical similarities between analogue and theoretical object. Such similarities, which are characteristic in varying degrees of most analogies actually employed, play an important role in affording a better understanding of concepts in the theory and also in the development of the theoretical assumptions. (shrink)

Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, analogical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs different mapping strategies: In problem-solving, it employs analogy-maximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner & Markman 1997); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden 2015). The two strategies interact in analogical reasoning with conceptual metaphors. This interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these hypotheses through case-studies on ‘mind’-metaphors from ordinary discourse, and (...) abstract problem-solving in the philosophy of mind, respectively: It shows that (1) default metaphorical interpretations for vision- and space-cognition metaphors can be derived with a variant of the analogy-minimising ATT-Meta approach, (2) philosophically influential introspective conceptions of the mind can be derived with conceptual metaphors only through an analogy-maximising strategy, and (3) the interaction of these strategies leads to hitherto unrecognised fallacies in analogical reasoning with metaphors. This yields a debunking explanation of introspective conceptions. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Aquinas’ account of analogy provides resources for resolving the prima facie conflict between his claims that (1) the divine relations constituting the persons are “one and the same” with the divine essence; (2) the divine persons are really distinct, (3) the divine essence is absolutely simple. Specifically, I argue that Aquinas adopts an analogical understanding of the concepts of being and unity, and that these concepts are implicit in his formulation of (...) claims about substance and relation in the Trinity. I then show how Aquinas appeals to key structural features of analogical concepts, notably, the simpliciter/secundum quid characterization, to resolve apparent conflicts between the unity of substance and distinction of relations in the Trinity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present two kinds of analogical representational change, both occurring early in the analogy-making process, and then, using these two kinds of change, to present a model unifying one sort of analogy-making and categorization. The proposed unification rests on three key claims: (1) a certain type of rapid representational abstraction is crucial to making the relevant analogies (this is the first kind of representational change; a computer model is presented that demonstrates this kind (...) of abstraction), (2) rapid abstractions are induced by retrieval across large psychological distances, and (3) both categorizations and analogies supply understandings of perceptual input via construing, which is a proposed type of categorization (this is the second kind of representational change). It is construing that finalizes the unification. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the concept of analogy in the late works of St. Thomas Aquinas, i.e., in his two Summas, and to go on to compare this with Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of “family resemblance”, in order to reveal some interesting similarities between the named linguistic-philosophical concepts of these two very different thinkers.

From the political point of view, European Union (EU) integration implies some kind of unity in the community constituted by EU citizens. Unity is difficult to attain if the diversity of citizens (and their nations) is to be respected. A thick bond that melts members' diversity into a 'European pot' is therefore out of the question. On the other hand, giving up unity altogether makes political integration impossible. Through a meta-theoretical analysis of normative positions, this paper proposes a composed notion (...) of European identity that links without binding. It contains four facets – cultural, political, social, external – with nuances, expressed in three binaries, that cut across all of them – history-project, ethos-achievement, commonness-uncommonness. I will submit that a workable European identity (and the related concepts of unity, polity and citizenship) can be better conceived as analogical – a mid way between blending unity and irreconcilable diversity. (shrink)

In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of (...) Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important (...) role in constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

St. Anselm is a master of philosophical prose. His writings on God, truth, and free will are models of clarity born of unflagging concern for argumentative precision. He is especially adept at using analogies to cinch his readers' understanding of these recondite matters. Who could forget the light shed upon the concept of existence by the Painter Analogy in the Ontological Argument or how his River Analogy illumines the unification of the Holy Trinity? Such intellectual insights could only be gifts (...) of the Holy Ghost for the edification of Holy Mother Church. I shall discuss here the three splendid analogies that St. Anselm draws in De Concordia in order to reconcile grace and free will, fostering an understanding of co-operation according to which divine assistance must accentuate, rather than nullify, exercises of human freedom. Central to my discussion is The Father of Scholasticism's four-fold distinction between a power, its exercises, the effects of those exercises, and opportunities to bring about those effects. (shrink)

St. Anselm is a master of philosophical prose. His writings on God, truth, and free will are models of clarity born of unflagging concern for argumentative precision. He is especially adept at using analogies to cinch his readers' understanding of these recondite matters. Who could forget the light shed upon the concept of existence by the Painter Analogy in the Ontological Argument or how his River Analogy illumines the unification of the Holy Trinity? Such intellectual insights could only be gifts (...) of the Holy Ghost for the edification of the Holy Mother Church. I shall discuss here the three splendid analogies that St. Anselm draws in De Concordia in order to reconcile grace and free will, fostering an understanding of cooperation according to which divine assistance must accentuate, rather than nullify, exercises of human freedom. Central to my discussion is The Father of Scholasticism's four-fold distinction between a power, its exercises, the effects of those exercises, and opportunities to bring about those effects. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the concept of analogy. We consider the peculiarities of its use in the history of philosophy, starting from Antiquity, from the school of Pythagoras, which is associated with the origin of this term. The use of analogy by Plato, Aristotle, Renaissance and Modern philosophers is discussed. The definition of analogical inference as a special type of plausible inference is given. The types of analogical inference and the corresponding examples are listed. We also consider (...) the use of reasoning by analogy in the field of mathematics, law, and in scientific research in general. Modeling as one of the most effective research methods is directly related to analogy. Analogy is based on the concept of similarity, and it has its own specifics in various scientific fields. In mathematics and logic, similarity is expressed in concepts such as isomorphism and homomorphism. The analysis of these concepts is provided in the corresponding section. Bionics is based on the analogy between living organisms and technological devices. Some examples of inventions, which were motivated by bionics ideas, are given. The paper also raises the question about the relationship of such concepts as analogy and metaphor, and indicates their essential differences. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to indicate the systematic place of arguments based on the concept of analogy within the theoretical framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments, a new method for describing and classifying arguments that integrates traditional dialectical accounts of arguments and fallacies and rhetorical accounts of the means of persuasion (logos, ethos, pathos) into a comprehensive framework. The paper begins with an inventory of existing approaches to arguments based on analogy, similarity and adjacent concepts. Then, (...) the theoretical framework of the table will be expounded and several concrete examples of arguments based on these concepts will be analyzed in terms of the framework. Finally, the results of these analyses will be summarized and it will be indicated how they can be refined in further research related to the Periodic Table of Arguments. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important (...) role in constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

The method of analogy is considered as it is used in epistemological considérations of both the object of creation and the creative process itself in art and the sciences. Both areas of creativity are considered within the context of the general systems theory concept of an open system which offers a convenient vehicle for relating the scientist and the artist with the product of his creation. It also provides a convenient method for the explanation of the essential nature of the (...) created object. It is shown how the creative process in both art and science can be viewed as a heuristic search for the structure of an open system‐the object of creation.Similarities in the two areas‐art and science‐are emphasized over the differences, in order to demonstrate the power of the method of analogy. (shrink)

Analogy makes possible the dialogue between people. This dialogue, at the intercultural level and from distinct ontological comprehensions of life, cannot be achieved from a univocal pretension of meaning. Analogy permits, especially at the rhetoric level of Political Philosophy, an adequate interpretation of such complex concepts as people, state or rights. A semantics of these concepts by similarity allows us to advance in the process towards a better interpretation of the other interlocutor’s expression though never reaching identity.