The second analogy and the kantian answer to Hume: why “cause” has to be an a priori concept

Revista de Filosofia Aurora 24 (34):61 (2012)
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The main goal of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience was to answer Humean objectionsconcerning the aprioricity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. This paper intendsto suggest an interpretation of the Kantian argument that, even though cannot show thatHume should be satisfied with the answer, makes clear Kant’s reasons for that anti-Humeangoal. In the first part of this paper, I intend to discuss summarily Hume’s objection againstthe possibility of a demonstration of the principle “every-event-some-cause” and his thesisconcerning its validity. In the second part, it is the turn of the Kantian answer to thesame question concerning the validity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”.



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