ObjectiveTo present (1) the ethical concepts related to the debate on resuscitation of extremely premature infants (EPIs) as they are described in the ethical literature; and (2) the ethical arguments based on these concepts.DesignWe conducted a systematic review of the ethical literature. We selected articles based on the following predefined inclusion/exclusion criteria: (1) English language articles (2) presenting fully elaborated ethical arguments (3) on resuscitation (4) of EPIs, that is, infants born before 28 weeks of gestation.AnalysisAfter repeated reading of articles, (...) we developed individual summaries, conceptual schemes and an overall conceptual scheme. Ethical arguments and concepts were identified and analysed.ResultsForty articles were included out of 4709 screened. Personhood, best interest, autonomy and justice were concepts grounding the various arguments. Regarding these concepts, included authors agreed that the best interest principle should guide resuscitation decisions, whereas justice seemed the least important concept. The arguments addressed two questions: Should we resuscitate EPIs? Who should decide? Included authors agreed that not all EPIs should be resuscitated but disagreed on what criteria should ground this decision. Overall, included authors agreed that both parents and physicians should contribute to the decision.ConclusionsThe included publications suggest that while the best interest is the main concept guiding resuscitation decisions, justice is the least important. The included authors also agree that both parents and physicians should be actively involved in resuscitation decisions for EPIs. However, our results suggest that parents’ decision should be over-ridden when in contrast with the EPI’s best interest. (shrink)

In her article Reification and assent in research involving those who lack capacity, Anna Smajdor shows how excluding adults with impairments of capacity (AWICs) to protect them from the risks of medical research has the paradoxical effect of harming them by reifying them.1 While the medical risks of excluding vulnerable populations in general from medical research are well known, the main risk being the creation of therapeutic orphans, the risk of reifying these populations is less discussed. Hence, we commend Smajdor (...) for introducing an essential nuance in the debate on inclusion of AWICs in medical research. We also agree with her on the importance of acquiring assent from those who cannot legally consent rather than automatically excluding them from research, as we already do in paediatric research. However, we believe that she fails to acknowledge some practical challenges already observed in paediatric research that hinder the retrieval of assent from AWICs and, consequently, their inclusion in medical research. In this commentary, we will first introduce the main challenge to using assent to include AWICs in research, that is, the fact that individuals might oscillate within the capacity spectrum. We will then provide other examples of practical obstacles to the inclusion of AWICs …. (shrink)

Recently, interest in the unique pathways linking discrete positive emotions to specific health outcomes has gained increasing attention, but the role of awe is yet to be elucidated. Awe is a complex and transformative emotion that can restructure individuals' mental frames so deeply that it could be considered a therapeutic asset for major mental health major issues, including depression. Despite sparse evidence showing a potential connection between depression and awe, this link has not been combined into a proposal resulting in (...) specific intervention guidelines. The aim of this perspective was three-fold: to provide a new unifying model of awe's functioning—the Matryoshka model; to show systematic and explicit connections between this emotion and depression; and to suggest specific guidelines of intervention utilizing the potential therapeutic role of awe for mental health, specifically for depression. This theoretical endeavor in its entirety has been framed within the health domain. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of moral individualism. I introduce the topic of moral individualism by discussing how its characteristic assumptions play an organizing role in contemporary conversations about how animals should be treated. I counter that moral individualism fails to do justice not only to our ethical relationships with animals but also to our ethical relationships with human beings. My main argument draws on elements of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of psychology, and in presenting the argument I address the case (...) of human beings before returning to the case of animals. Given that moral individualists frequently defend what I call the ethical view of animals, i.e., the view that animals are in themselves proper objects of ethical concern, it is worth stressing that it is no part ofmy project to undermine this view. On the contrary, the critique of moral individualism I develop makes available a better understanding of what is right about the idea that animals as such merit certain forms of respect and attention. (shrink)

This chapter provides a roadmap of ongoing conversations about cognitive disability and moral status. Its aim is to highlight the political stakes of these conversations for advocates for the cognitively disabled while at the same time bringing out how a fundamental point of divergence within the conversations has to do with what count as appropriate methods of ethics. The main divide is between thinkers who take ethical neutrality to be a regulative ideal for doing empirical justice to the lives of (...) people with cognitive disabilities and those who reject this methodological precept as unduly restrictive. What results is a debate between, on the one hand, fans of various familiar forms of moral individualism and Kantian approaches in ethics and, on the other, a range of disability scholars and activists who implicitly or explicitly make use of philosophically more radical methods. (shrink)

"In this volume, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak engages with 16 photographs by photographer Alice Attie as she attempts telepoiesis, a reaching toward the distant other through the empathetic power of the imagination."-- dust jacket.

The ArgumentThis paper applies the approach developed by the congnitive sciences to a classical field of social anthropology—i.e., the analysis of represetations and behaviors relative to misfortune in “traditional” societies.The initial argument is that the conceptual division and the modes of description and explanation of anthropology suffer from serious weaknesses: these concepts cannot serve to understand empirical phenomena ; they rely on a confused and erroneous conception of the different domains involved and the causalities between them; and they use simplistic (...) hypotheses about the existence and causal status of the entities that usually form the ultima ratio of anthropological reasoning. These entities would directly “cause” other individual representations or behaviors. This simplification also affects the analysis of states of belief in these entities, to which individuals would supposedly “adhere”.I argue here that the cognitivist approach, within a “methodological individualism” framework, provides a more adequate description of phenomena observed in the field. This enables the various levels and domains to be more finely defined. The analysis of “typical” utterances and inferences in a “tranditional” society, the Senufo of the Ivory Coast, is here used to clarify these anthropological problems. Two levels can be distinguished: a priori representations, which are underdetermined, enabling them to occur within valid inferences; perception and/or action, which obeys different cognitive constraints. The existential status of unobservable entities appearing in causal inferences is not equivalent depending on whether they are determined as antecedent or consequent.This paper suggests a theory of interpretive processes and beliefs having flexible references, because they are incomplete and domain-specific. It allows a comparison with facts observed in Western societies. It is also in contrast to the ordinary conception of religious states of belief — i.e., these states would be purely psychological, states of “adherence,” collective, autonomous, obligatory, part of a systemized set of knowledge; collective notions would here logically precede individual representations. (shrink)

According to the received view in the literature on homonymy and polysemy representation, there is a difference between how polysemes and homonyms are represented in our mental lexicons. More concretely, the received view holds that whereas the meanings associated with a homonymous expression are (mentally) represented in separate lexical entries, the meanings associated with a polysemous expression are represented together in a single lexical entry. It is usually argued that this is the picture that is supported by the growing body (...) of empirical evidence coming from psycholinguistics. Empirical studies of ambiguity processing and resolution consistently show that polysemous expressions enjoy various processing advantages compared to homonyms, and the received view is generally taken to be required in order to explain these results. The aim of this paper is not only to show that this is not the case but also, and more fundamentally, that the received view falls far short of explaining the available data to a sufficient degree. As a result, the received view is caught up in an explanatory dilemma that I dub the Continuum Puzzle. I then claim that the best way to escape this puzzle is to give up the received view’s core thesis in favor of an alternative view consistent with the empirical evidence. Reaching such an alternative will require rejecting the following pervasive but ill-motivated assumption: Differences in ambiguity processing and resolution can only be explained by there being some corresponding differences in the architecture of our mental lexicons. (shrink)

This article is a study of formulaic passages in the Sanskrit Avadanasataka. Alongside a preliminary discussion of work on oral studies within Buddhism, and some recourse to wider oral studies on Indian texts, the focus of this article is a two-part study of formulae and constituents of formulae. The first part of the article details formulaic sections from the Avadanasataka, from short formulae about wealthy merchants to lengthy counterparts that detail the consequences of a Buddha's smile. The second part looks (...) in detail at constituents of the formulaic passages. The passages are constructed around semantic lists, which either constitute the whole formulaic phrase or passages, or can be identified as the building blocks for the passages. To my knowledge this is the first study of semantic list-based formulae in a Sanskrit text. (shrink)

En racontant de très belle manière la vie de Madame Luce, enseignante française et arabophone dans l’Algérie de la fin du xixe siècle, Rebecca Rogers enrichit les travaux, de plus en plus nombreux, sur les Européennes installées dans la colonie dans les premières décennies de la colonisation. Centré sur une femme ordinaire, qui a laissé peu de traces dans les archives publiques, ce travail est en réalité une étude plus large, consacrée à l’histoire sociale des changements de pratiques éducati...

A core philosophical use of the term “objectivity” is to talk about a central metaphysical ideal. The term is employed to pick out aspects of the world that are there in the sense that any thinker who fails to register them can be said to be missing something. If we speak in this connection of a guiding concept of objectivity, we can ask what can be said about the nature of the things that fall under it. We might then speak (...) in this further connection of different possible conceptions of objectivity. Today, thought about objectivity is dominated by a conception on which objectivity is taken to have as its hallmark the exclusion of everything subjective. Starting from a description of the relevant conception of objectivity, this chapter criticizes the kinds of considerations most commonly adduced in the conception’s favor. Along the way, the chapter uses passages from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein as its main reference points. A notable virtue of this method is that it sheds light on the transformative significance of Wittgenstein’s thought for how we construe the concept of objectivity. (shrink)

This brief note aims at contributing to the study of the reception of parabiblical narratives in hadith literature and Islamic historiography. Taking the Testament of Abraham as a case study, it sets out to analyse a particular literary motif shared by this text and an early version of the miʿrāǧ (Ascension) of the Prophet Muhammad. The comparative analysis demonstrates that the Testament of Abraham could have provided a number of elements for the redaction of at least one particular section of (...) the miʿrāǧ. This hypothesis finds support in other cases of textual correspondence between several sections of the Testament of Abraham and other Islamic works such as the Tafsīr of Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767), the unedited Kitāb Mubtadaʾ al-dunyā wa-qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ of Abū Ḥuḏayfa al-Buḫārī Isḥāq ibn Bišr (d. 206/821) and Ibn ʿAsākir’s Taʾrīḫ madīnat Dimašq (d. 571/1176). The examined material thus throws additional light on the continuity between late antique apocrypha and nascent Arabic literature. (shrink)

Three speakers engaged with theatre in different ways got inspired by the dialogical structure of Brecht’s Buying Brass and staged a similarly structured conversation. This conversation imitated the way how thespians and intellectual met in Brecht’s original text, but it was thematically focused on the current socio-cultural context. The research question was: How can we today make use of Brecht´s dialectic methodology in order to re-think the institutional situation of theatre as a starting point of social transformation? Which contemporary philosophies (...) can help in this re-thinking? Is theatre interested in them and is there any transformational potential in the opposite direction: from the theatre practice to the philosophical accounts of the contemporary world? The fragment collection under the title Buying Brass, unfinished and unedited by Brecht himself, anyhow belongs among the most extensive and sophisticated of Brecht’s treatises on theatre. It questions theatre in its very being, in its social and cultural function and in its epistemological potential. Staging a conversation of agents with different interests, attitudes, desires and functions in the theatrical apparatus, Brecht succeeds to provide a plastic methodology that tackles theatre dilemmas without reducing them to a one-dimensional view. The very format of a dialogue is congenial with theatrical practice and has a history among philosophers since Plato. Philosopher Denis Diderot as well as theatre practitioners Konstantin Stanislavsky and Richard Boleslavsky have presented their ideas for a rejuvenation of theatre in the format of written dialogues. Contradictions and objections are made manifest and also shown as anchored in a specific working role or institutional function. Moreover, the dialogue format allows and recognizes the imperfections, fallacies and misunderstandings of human conversations, as relevant aspects of contingency. And this contingency is of importance when we consider systemic, institutional or networked social situations. Thus, concerning the different background of the three presenters, we found the dialogue between us a relevant format, because it allows the realism of misunderstanding of each other as well as misrepresenting our selves. The three speakers choose different entries to the dialogue format, depending on their respective professional roles. This momentum of role-taking, reductively labeling oneself and each other as representatives of institutional functions, would also add a non-all dimension to the event of performing our dialogue: what was not said was somehow still inferred by suspicion or imagination. This approach has also an ambition to renew the customary way of paper presentations at research conferences and symposiums. (shrink)

Une des grandes figures de la philosophie russe du XXe siècle, qui s'est voulu le Job de la philosophie, en lutte avec la raison et ses évidences, avec les représentations de Dieu et avec Dieu lui-même.

Resenha do livro: MACINTYRE, Alasdair. _Deus, a Filosofia e as Universidades: Uma história seletiva da Tradição Filosófica Católica_. Brasília: Editora Devenir, 2022.

Confucianism has been historically intertwined with authoritarianism in general and monarchy in specific. Various contemporary attempts to reconcile Confucianism with democracy have yielded controversial results mostly due to the theoretical tension between the authoritarian character of the former and the liberal one of the latter. This article seeks to develop an alternative route to Confucian democracy by drawing from Huang Zongxi’s 黃宗羲 Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. In this well-known work, Huang argues for a form of (...) limited government that is built upon laws, political protection of academic freedom, good institutional designs, and separation of governmental powers. While these features seem to qualify Huang only as a defective liberal, this article argues that they are in much coherence with the insights of republicanism concerning good governance. This article will argue that the republican themes embodied in Waiting for the Dawn can justify and support a particular form of Confucian republican democracy. (shrink)

A major obstacle to the political revival of Confucianism has been its tension with the rule of law. Systemic features of Confucianism such as social hierarchy (and the corresponding social inequal...

Este artigo busca desenvolver a ideia de pop’filosofia, noção presente em Deleuze, como base para uma pop’educação. Buscaremos ferramentas de leitura presentes em Deleuze, Espinosa, Nietzsche, Paulo Freire e Manoel de Barros para com elas tematizarmos as relações de ensino e aprendizado a partir do cinema.

O trabalho apresenta os resultados de um estudo realizado em torno do tema da qualidade nas políticas educacionais para a educação básica. Destaca o significado do termo em documentos exarados pelo MEC nesta primeira década de século e o compara com os resultados educacionais alcançados por um conjunto de municípios catarinenses no tocante às suas metas de qualidade. Realça que o cenário desafiador que se impõe aos municípios pesquisados traduz-se tanto no encargo pelo alcance das metas nacionais do IDEB, diretamente (...) implicado na melhoria do desempenho dos estudantes na Prova Brasil, quanto na devida atenção a outros referenciais orientadores das ações voltadas à construção da qualidade social da educação, dentre eles projeto político-pedagógico e as diferenças sociais. Conclui apontando a necessidade de acompanhamento atendo das condições que consubstanciariam a qualidade social almejada, em um contexto de crescente tendência ao uso de informações majoritariamente quantitativas na formulação de políticas educacionais. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Shakespeare’s Troilus and CressidaW. R. EltonIn Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida there occurs a particular pattern of parallels with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics regarding ethical-legal questions surrounding an action: issues of the role of the voluntary or the involuntary, of volition and choice, of choice and virtue, and of virtue and habitual action. 1Aristotle’s EN was familiar to Elizabethan higher education and was reprinted in translation in (...) numerous editions, with commentaries, in the sixteenth century. 2 Twice Shakespeare alludes to Aristotle by name: first, recalling his ethics, in Taming of the Shrew (I.i.32)—cf. I.i.18–20 on [End Page 331]Virtue and that part of philosophy... that treats of happiness By virtue specially to be achiev’d,and second, in Troilus (II.ii.166–67) on Aristotle and “moral philosophy.” 3Opening EN, III, Aristotle distinguishes those actions that are “voluntary” from those that are “involuntary,” remarking the necessity to determine their limits. Such a course, he adds, is “useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments” (1109 b 32–34). What Aristotle examines, in effect, is the procedure of determining culpability for an act. 4Under what circumstances and to what extent is one responsible for his action? In addition to the voluntary and the involuntary, there are such act-related dualisms as volition and choice, choice and virtue, and virtue and habitual practice. Such ethical-legal issues are appropriate to a play whose war-plot turns on an abductor’s culpability for an action and the subsequent issue of prescriptive possession—the Grecian claim to Helen against her Trojan possessors. 5The VoluntaryIn Troilus Aristotle’s voluntary-involuntary distinctions seem exemplified. 6 A passage (I.iii.354–56), previously glossed by the present writer, suggests a [End Page 332] parallel EN instance of the voluntary. 7 Aristotle defines the voluntary as “that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself “ (1111 a 23–24). In Troilus Nestor, recalling the agent’s responsibility for acts, explains:Limbes are in his instruments, In no lesse working, then are Swords and Bowes Directiue by the Limbes(I.iii.368–70).These lines occur in Troilus, Folio (1623), and are omitted, along with other relatively specialized lines, from Quarto (1609): 8 according to Aristotle, “the movement of the limbs instrumental to the action originates in the agent himself, and when this is so it is in a man’s own power to act or not to act.” 9 Where EN has “limbs... are the instruments,” F Troilus has “Limbes are in his instruments” (cf. Walker ed., I.iii.354).Limbs are instruments of the agent’s responsibility, as are the swords and bows employed by those limbs. Such a passage in Troilus on the responsibility and voluntariness of acts could have been recognizable to an academic (especially legal) audience and, as rehearsed by the ancient Nestor, might have drawn reminiscent response.The InvoluntaryIf Nestor (I.iii.354–56) had been voice of the voluntary, the combat-withdrawn Achilles is arbitrator of the involuntary. Responding to Thersites’ “I serve here voluntary,” Achilles adjudicates, “Your last service was sufferance, ‘twas not voluntary. No man is beaten voluntary. Ajax was here the voluntary, and you as under an impress” (II.i.94–97). Mocking Thersites’s “service,” including being beaten, Achilles argues this could not be “voluntary.” His “no man is beaten voluntary” echoes Aristotle’s own familiar terms, denying that a man can be wronged or injured voluntarily. In his commentary on EN John Case [End Page 333] gives the assurance that “No one voluntarily suffers injury..., no one voluntarily and maliciously harms himself: therefore no one willingly suffers injury.” 10In such instances as those above, Troilus (II.i.94–97) recalls basic legal procedure, including determination of the degree of responsibility for an action. What is the minimum requirement of the law before a man can be held accountable? “Those things... are thought involuntary,” says Aristotle, “which take place under compulsion... and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle... (shrink)

The following article evaluates two common arguments for preterist interpretations of Mark 13:24-27, collectively dubbed the ‘time-text’ argument. These two arguments support symbolic and/or historicised interpretations. Our thesis is that the first argument is unsound and the second commits the informal fallacy of false dilemma. Owing to these problems, the arguments and preterist interpretations should be rejected in favour of more plausible futurist interpretations.

Dancy, J., Reading ParfitMillgram, E., Practical Induction.