Two centuries after Carl von Clausewitz wrote On War, it lines the shelves of military colleges around the world and even showed up in an Al Qaeda hideout. Though it has shaped much of the common parlance on the subject, On War is perceived by many as a “metaphysical fog,” widely known but hardly read. In War as Paradox, Youri Cormier lifts the fog on this iconic work by explaining its philosophical underpinnings. Building up a genealogy of dialectical (...) war theory and integrating Hegel with Clausewitz as a co-founders of the method, Cormier uncovers a common logic that shaped the fighting doctrines and ethics of modern war. He explains how Hegel and Clausewitz converged on method, but nonetheless arrived at opposite ethics and military doctrines. Ultimately, Cormier seeks out the limits to dialectical war theory and explores the greater paradoxes the method reveals: can so-called “rational” theories of war hold up under the pressures of irrational propositions, such as lone-wolf attacks, the circular logic of a “war to end all wars,” or the apparent folly of mutually assured destruction? Since the Second World War, commentators have described war as obsolete. War as Paradox argues that dialectical war theory may be the key to understanding why, despite this, it continues. (shrink)

This article review the debate on the German Left around the basic income, concentrating on the contribution of the group FELS who see in it the opportunity for a radical transformation of the Welfare State. At a time when the Social-Democrats are transforming the Welfare State into a state, catalytic of civil society, claims to a right to a decent living made on anything other than work is likely to lead to a calling into question of the socialdemocratic politics of (...) the self-regulation of society, based on the figure of the "seller of his own labour power" carrying out "work on his own". Critics from the left of the basic income take into account neither new forms of regulation nor the most recent developments in the world of work. (shrink)

Le problème épistémologique de la confirmation scientifique consiste à déterminer ou comparer le degré de confirmation des hypothèses scientifiques (c’est-à-dire le niveau d’avantage épistémique que nous devons leur accorder) au regard des données empiriques. Ce problème est la plupart du temps traité dans le cadre d’une interprétation probabiliste du raisonnement inductif, notamment au moyen du calcul bayésien, de telle sorte que l’on parle de théorie bayésienne de la confirmation. Nous proposerons ici de considérer la théorie poppérienne de la corroboration comme (...) une théorie alternative de la confirmation scientifique, qui se caractériserait justement par son rejet radical des probabilités et de l’induction. Plus précisément, nous soutiendrons ici, contre certaines lectures de Popper, que le concept poppérien de corroboration peut être assimilé à une forme de confirmation, et nous essaierons d’établir quels seraient les principes d’une théorie poppérienne de la confirmation. Nous souhaitons pouvoir ainsi comparer les approches bayésiennes et poppériennes du problème de la confirmation scientifique, et notamment souligner les différentes incitations méthodologiques qu’elles entraînent dans la recherche scientifique. (shrink)

Le holisme de la réfutation, outhèse de Duhem-Quine, affirme que nous ne pouvons pas tester isolément une hypothèse scientifique, mais seulement des ensembles d’hypothèses. Ainsi, en cas d’échec d’un test, nous pouvons seulement conclure qu’au moins une hypothèse d’un ensemble est falsifiée, mais nous ne pouvons pasdéterminer laquelle.Bien que cette thèse soit partagée par Duhem et Quine, on néglige régulièrementdes différences entre leurs analyses, alors qu’ilsne s’appuient pas sur les mêmes arguments, et parviennent à des conclusions qui se contredisent sur (...) des points essentiels. Nous proposonsdans cet articled’exposer leholisme duhemien, et de le comparer au holisme quinien.Nouscherchons surtout à montrer que le holisme duhemien n’empêche pasla falsifiabilité des hypothèses scientifiques. (shrink)

Under EC law, directives are often used to harmonize legislation of the member states. White directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, they leave the "choice ofform and methods" to the member states. These must then transpose or implement the directives in their national legal order within a fixed period of time. According to 1992 data of the Commission of the European Communities, Belgium occupied a seventh place in the transposition ofdirectives in general. With regard to the (...) implementation of White Book directives concerning the European internal market however, Belgium, in June 1992, occupied the last place.A wide variety of administrative and structural problems were responsible for Belgium's delay in the implementation of EC directives. Late 1992, an urgency programme set up by the Belgian government early 1992 began to succeed in making up for part of the arrearage with regard to the transposition of White Book directives.However, only through the further adaption its political and administrative structures to the actual Europeanization of Belgian political life wilt Belgium become adequately prepared for the timely and correct transposition of EC directives. This implies an active administrative and parliamentary participation in the preparation of EC legislation and an early dissemination of information concerning the EC's legislative process. (shrink)

During the Intergovernmental Conference of1996, the European Union's institutional structure should be adapted, most notably in preparation for the Union's enlargement with the Central and Eastern European countries. The IGC's institutional debate will befar from easy. This is not surprizing since the institutional discussions during the IGC will reflect the grave substantive policy differences between the Member States on the Union's functions in the economy and on the Union's foreign policy role. The IGC is, indeed, largely a position game during (...) which the Member States attempt to create a congenial institutional framework, favourable to their substantive policy preferences. (shrink)

We agree that external validity of social psychological experiments is a concern, we disagree these models are useless. Experiments, reconsidered from a situated cognition perspective and non-linearly combined with other methods allow grasping decision dynamics beyond bias outcomes. Dynamic insights regarding these processes are key to understand missing forces and bias in real-world social groups.

Name der Zeitschrift: Language and Cognition - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language and Cognitive Science Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 4 Seiten: 313-343.

Cet article considère la question de la légitimité du financement public des écoles dites ethnoreligieuses à la lumière du modèle interculturaliste de citoyenneté. La première section dresse un bref portrait historique du débat autour de cette question tel qu’il s’est présenté au Québec. Ensuite, elle explique en quoi cette problématique révèle une tension inhérente aux principes clés de l’interculturalisme. La seconde partie propose une critique de l’approche standard pour aborder l’enjeu du financement public des écoles ethnoreligieuses et défend une approche (...) alternative fondée sur une vision plus globale des finalités politiques de l’interculturalisme. La troisième et dernière section propose, en s’appuyant sur le modèle alternatif défendu, quatre mesures régulatrices visant à répondre aux difficultés que posent les politiques de financement public des écoles ethnoreligieuses. (shrink)

Call generalism about children’s and adults’ wellbeing the thesis that the same theory of wellbeing applies to both children and adults. Our goal is to examine whether generalism is true. While this question has not received much attention in the past, it has recently been suggested that generalism is likely to be false and that we need to elaborate different theories of children’s and adults’ wellbeing. In this paper, we defend generalism against the main objections it faces and make a (...) positive case for it. (shrink)

This paper's purpose is to assess how management's perceptions regarding certain aspects of environmental reporting relate to the firm's actual reporting strategy. Toward that end, we propose a model where a firm's environmental disclosure is conditional upon executive assessments of corporate concerns. The study relies on a survey that was sent to environmental management executives from European and North American multinational firms enquiring about the determinants of corporate environmental disclosure. Responses from these executives were then contrasted with their firms' actual (...) environmental reporting practices, which was measured using a comprehensive multi-criteria grid. Results show that there is a relationship between environmental managers' attitudes toward various stakeholder groups and how those managers respond to the stakeholders via the decision to disclose and the actual disclosures made. Our model provides a perspective as to how a firm responds to the numerous stakeholders to whom it must be accountable. This accountability in turn relates to how the company communicates its actions to society in order to achieve or maintain its social legitimacy. (shrink)

Company–cause fit has been one of the major issues in the domain of corporate social responsibility. This study tries to expand the perspective from company–cause to company–non-profit organization (NPO) fit, and it gives implications to firms looking for long-term collaboration with an NPO. Specifically, it suggests three types of fit, i.e., familiarity, business, and activity fit and investigates the potential effects of these fits in social alliances between companies and the partnering NPOs on consumer attributions of the firms’ motives for (...) the alliances. An experiment that used scenarios revealed that consumers perceive high-fitted alliances on the dimensions of the familiarity and activity fit as being more public-serving than low-matched ones. However, the consumers’ attribution of the motive is not different between the high and low business fit. The implications of the research results are discussed from an academic and practical standpoint. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce complained that James allowed pragmatism to become "infected" with "seeds of death" like the idea that truth is mutable. The Truth is What Works is an attempt to defend James's pragmatic theory of truth from a wide range of critics including Peirce, Betrand Russell, Hilary Putnam, and Cornel West. Cormier runs the gauntlet of historical and contemporary criticism in an attempt to show, not that Jamesian pragmatism does in fact contain a perfectly good theory of objective (...) reality after all, but rather that it doesn't, and is still a kind of realism anyway because it does not leave individuals and their subjective desires behind in an attempt to describe the real world. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that the phenomenon of predation is the source of several problems for Donaldson and Kymlicka's account of our duties towards wild and liminal animals. According to them, humans should adopt a general policy of non-intervention with respect to predatory behaviour involving wild and liminal animals. They justify this recommendation by appealing to the status of those animals as, respectively, members of sovereign communities and denizens of human-animal societies. Our goal is not to question their recommendation, (...) but to challenge the reasons given in its support. On the one hand, we argue that, insofar as wild animal communities are incapable of dealing with massive predation, they do not possess the competence required for sovereignty. Moreover, we argue that, even if we leave the issue of competence aside, attributing sovereignty rights to communities including both predators and preys may not be the best way to protect wild animals’ fundamental interests. On the other hand, we argue that there exist two important disanalogies between human denizens and liminal animals, which render Donaldson and Kymlicka's denizenship framework problematic. We suggest that the ultimate justification for a general policy of non-intervention lies in the significant risk of causing greater harm by acting otherwise, due to our limited knowledge and resources. (shrink)

In recent years, many scholars have offered innovative accounts of social categories such as gender, race, and disability. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done on the category of children. The goal of our paper is to offer a new account of what children are. We start by discussing the two main accounts that have been put forward so far in the literature: naturalistic accounts and normative accounts. According to the former, to be a child is a matter of (...) possessing, or lacking, some ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ properties. According to the latter, to be a child is to possess a particular normative status. We argue that both naturalistic and normative accounts are subject to a variety of objections. We then propose our own social constructivist account. According to it, to be a child in any given society is to be regarded by the dominant ideology of that society as the target of a set of broadly paternalistic norms, in virtue of the possession of a cluster of natural properties such that, according to the dominant ideology of that society, it is justified to subject that individual to such norms. We conclude our paper by showing that our account meets the criteria of success for an account of what it is to be a child and by addressing some objections. (shrink)

Andrée-Anne Cormier and Harry Brighouse explore the question of whether there are good reasons for schools to try and produce citizens disposed to use, and practiced in, civil discourse and behavior, and if so, what this implies for schools. First, the authors propose an account of the value (and disvalue) of civility, drawing on Cheshire Calhoun’s conception. They argue that civility is good in many circumstances, but not always. In some circumstances, it is neither beneficial nor morally required. Second, (...) they elucidate the reasons for teaching civility in schools and what they think that doing so would involve, what demands it would make on teachers, and how the aim of promoting civility would shape the structure of schools. Finally, they identify some reasons for pessimism that schools can be very successful in promoting civility. They do not think that these are conclusive reasons against teaching civility in schools, but they suggest that civility can only be taught well if educators are clear-eyed about the hurdles they will have to overcome. (shrink)

Andrée-Anne Cormier | : Cet article explore la question des implications de l’exclusion des animaux de la catégorie des sujets de justice dans le cadre du libéralisme politique de John Rawls. Plus spécifiquement, j’examine et critique les lectures de Ruth Abbey et de Robert Garner. Abbey suggère que le libéralisme politique est incompatible avec la thèse selon laquelle nous avons des devoirs moraux universels envers les animaux. Garner, pour sa part, avance que la théorie de Rawls n’autorise pas l’État (...) libéral à adopter des mesures de protection des animaux. Dans cet article, je démontre que ces lectures sont erronées, car elles sont fondées sur des interprétations du libéralisme politique qui ne sont pas plausibles. Je soutiens, d’une part, que le libéralisme politique est neutre eu égard à la question de la nature de nos devoirs moraux envers les animaux et, d’autre part, qu’il permet de justifier une gamme considérable d’interventions étatiques visant la protection des animaux. Je suggère donc que la tension entre le libéralisme politique et l’éthique animale est moins forte que ne l’affirment ces auteurs. Enfin, j’identifie des stratégies possibles, cohérentes avec le cadre théorique rawlsien, pour élargir la sphère des sujets de justice de manière à y intégrer les animaux. | : What are the implications of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism for animal ethics? In this paper, I examine Ruth Abbey’s and Robert Garner’s answers to this question. Abbey claims that Political Liberalism is incompatible with the view that there exist universal moral duties toward animals. Garner contends that Rawls’s theory cannot justify state interventions designed to protect animals. I show that these readings are based on implausible interpretations of Rawls’s theory. I argue, on the one hand, that Political Liberalism is neutral with respect to the question of the nature of our moral duties toward animals and, on the other hand, that the theory can potentially justify a significant range of state interventions in the interest of animals. This indicates that the tension between Rawls’s theory and animal ethics is less sharp than Abbey and Garner suggest. Finally, I identify possible strategies, consistent with the Rawlsian framework, for including animals among the subjects of justice. (shrink)

This chapter argues that school should cease to be compulsory at age 16 and that an education resource account (ERA) should be established for students who leave school at that age. The ERA would be sufficient to cover three years of full-time education. It could be linked to inflation and early school leavers could use it in accredited non-profit educational institutions at any later point in their lives. Two sets of arguments are discussed in support of the proposal. The first, (...) building on the empirical literature, focuses on efficiency and highlights the advantages of an ERA with respect to the ‘disruptive’ students issue in particular. The second set of arguments is anti-paternalistic. The chapter distinguishes three anti-paternalistic arguments: the view that individuals are the best judges of their own welfare, the idea that autonomous decision-making is a component of well-being, and a respect-based view of what renders anti-paternalism wrong. (shrink)

Brian Ribeiro argues that the pragmatic theory of truth massively misrepresents the actual use of the terms “true” and “truth.” Truths, he observes, can be distinguished from “illusions.” The latter misrepresent reality and the former do not. Psychologists, as they report on the way mentally healthy people commonly overestimate themselves, draw just this distinction. They tell us of many beliefs that are “adaptive” but illusory. Pragmatists cannot draw this distinction because their theory explains truth as adaptiveness. Therefore no sensible person (...) will be a pragmatist. In fact, however, Ribeiro paints a flawed picture of what both psychologists and pragmatists do. Psychologists provide us not with “reality-based accurate beliefs” but instead with beliefs that work, and pragmatists do not identify all beliefs that are adaptive or useful for individuals as true. Pragmatism turns out to be quite sensible, though often misunderstood. (shrink)

Brian Ribeiro argues that the pragmatic theory of truth massively misrepresents the actual use of the terms “true” and “truth.” Truths, he observes, can be distinguished from “illusions.” The latter misrepresent reality and the former do not. Psychologists, as they report on the way mentally healthy people commonly overestimate themselves, draw just this distinction. They tell us of many beliefs that are “adaptive” but illusory. Pragmatists cannot draw this distinction because their theory explains truth as adaptiveness. Therefore no sensible person (...) will be a pragmatist. In fact, however, Ribeiro paints a flawed picture of what both psychologists and pragmatists do. Psychologists provide us not with “reality-based accurate beliefs” but instead with beliefs that work, and pragmatists do not identify all beliefs that are adaptive or useful for individuals as true. Pragmatism turns out to be quite sensible, though often misunderstood. (shrink)

Two widely different conceptions of electromagnetic radiation were compared by Einstein in his 1916 papers, namely, the classically diffuse form and the fully directional form. The emission process of each kind of radiation is examined hereafter from a relativistic point of view. The necessary covariance of any physical description, further specifying the original directional property, points to a strictly quantized form of radiation as the only one consistent with relativity, thus showing a deep relationship between this latter and quantum theory.

This chapter contains sections titled: What Is in the Head What Ain't in the Head A Change of Mind The Ideal and the Real Facts and Values Is Putnam Postmodern Despite Himself?

Le dépassement phénoménologique du substantialisme métaphysique devrait permettre aujourd’hui d’envisager une refondation de la notion de personne, laquelle s’était quelque peu immobilisée depuis Boèce. Sur ce nouvel horizon, le retour à la fondation première, celle d’Augustin, s’impose. Celui-ci est le premier en effet, pour l’essentiel dans son traité de la Trinité, à avoir clairement pensé la personne comme relation et non comme substance. La réduction augustinienne de la personne à l’ego ou à « l’homme intérieur » ouvre la possibilité d’ (...) « analogies subjectives » avec la Trinité : pensée, amour, connaissance ; mémoire, intelligence, volonté. Cependant, la spéculation augustinienne trouve sa limite en échouant à penser une personne de chair – et, qui plus est, une telle personne comme « en relation ». Ce qui était relation en Dieu reste, en l’homme, substance pensante, seule face à son Dieu.Phenomenology has overcome the old substance of metaphysics and then should permit us today to refound the idea of the person which was in a way, since Boethius, brought to a standstill. Therefore we must to go back to St. Augustine who was actually the first, in his De Trinitate, to conceive, the person as a relation and not as a substance. The person so confined to the ego or to the « inner man » allows some possible « subjective analogies » with the Trinity : thought, love, knowledge, memory, intelligence and will. However the Augustinian theory fails to conceive first the person in her own flesh and blood – a bodily person – and secondly such a person as being « in relation » : man is a thinking substance, alone facing her God. (shrink)

This article explores the question of whether it is morally permissible for the liberal state to require schools to teach religions “neutrally” to children. I examine this question through the normative analysis of Canadian Supreme Court case Loyola High School v. Quebec. I argue that it is in principle morally impermissible for the liberal state to oblige all schools to adopt a neutral approach to teaching children about religious diversity. I propose a normative framework for evaluating the legitimacy of such (...) an imposition and identify a strategy in support of accommodating schools like Loyola that does not appeal to the existence of a strong parental right to control their children’s education. (shrink)