Reprinted in Colin Murray Turbayne, ed., 'A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays' (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): 37-46.

“Nay, I will go farther, and assert, that he could not so much as prove by any probable arguments, that the future must be conformable to the past. All probable arguments are built on the supposition, that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the past, and therefore can never prove it. This conformity is a matter of fact, and if it must be proved, will admit of no proof but from experience. But our experience in the past can (...) be a proof of nothing for the future, but upon a supposition, that there is a resemblance betwixt them. This therefore is a point, which can admit of no proof at all, and which we take for granted without any proof.”David Hume, Anof a Treatise of Human Nature p. 15In Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits Bertrand Russell recognizes and attempts to deal with what is one of the central questions of philosophy since Descartes, “The relation between individual experience and the general body of scientific knowledge.” He states that his purpose is “to discover the minimum principles required to justify scientific inferences.” The search for such principles arises from his belief that “data are private and individual.” He has only scorn for those who, “finding these problems distasteful” have “tried to deny that these problems exist.”. (shrink)

Every month some one pronounces that science must be rejected if we are to preserve a belief in human freedom, or that only by a faith in freedom that flies in the face of logic and the principle of causality can democracy be justified. Equally often other authors insist that the increase of knowledge in the science of human behavior makes plain the irrelevance and sentimentality of pious talk about free and rational choice. What is the source of this dispute? (...) Why is no resolution of it arrived at? (shrink)

A philosopher who is influential owes his influence to dealing with questions which his readers recognize as questions of importance to themselves as well. It might be thought that since Dewey was so influential in his lifetime, his philosophy is not likely to have much of relevance to generations rising in 1964. It is, however, my belief that the study of Dewey’s writings on certain topics has enabled me to come by ideas that are helpful in getting a clearer understanding (...) of reasoning, choice, and freedom. (shrink)

Most handbooks on statistics and the theory of probability leave the reader in a mysterious tangle of mathematical rules for computing apparently arbitrarily chosen numerical functions. At first sight, then, a treatise on the Logical Foundations of Probability raises hopes that it will be a guide to clarity in these matters. These hopes are strengthened if the reader remembers that the author, Professor Rudolph Carnap of the University of Chicago, is noted for his thesis that philosophy is the study of (...) the logic of science. On the other hand, a first glance into this book may discourage a reader who, though familiar with statistics, is not familiar with modern logic and its notation. For this reason particularly I shall try to give an account of this book that will enable the interested student to form some opinion of its usefulness to him. (shrink)