Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what (...) I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...) And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

We prove, in ZFC,the existence of a definable, countably saturated elementary extension of the reals.

A generic extension L[x]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{L}[x]}$$\end{document} by a real x is defined, in which the E0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{E}_0}$$\end{document}-class of x is a lightface Π21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\it \Pi}^1_2}$$\end{document} set containing no ordinal-definable reals.

It is true in the Cohen, Solovay-random, dominaning, and Sacks generic extension, that every countable ordinal-definable set of reals belongs to the ground universe. It is true in the Solovay collapse model that every non-empty OD countable set of sets of reals consists of \ elements.

Qu'est-ce que la nostalgie sinon une mélancolie humaine rendue possible par la conscience de quelque chose d'autre, d'un ailleurs, d'un contraste entre passé et présent? Et cette nostalgie n'est-elle pas aussi provoquée essentiellement par l'irréversibilité du temps? Car on ne saurait remonter le cours du temps, tel est l'obstacle insurmontable qu'il oppose à nos entreprises. C'est notre impuissance devant cette impossibilité qui fait toute l'amertume de la nostalgie et l'absurdité des chimères du rajeunissement. La nostalgie n'est pas le mal (lu (...) retour: on peut toujours revenir à son point de départ, à son lieu natal (l'espace se prête docilement à toutes nos allées et venues) mais il est impossible de redevenir celui qu'on était au moment du départ. Mais si le temps s'oppose irréductiblement à la rétrogradation il ouvre devant nous une carrière infinie à la liberté. L'homme peut s'ouvrir à l'idée du futur et confirmer ce que le temps affirme. Se servant d'exemples tirés de la vie quotidienne aussi bien que d'oeuvres poétiques, philosophiques ou musicales, Vladimir Jankélévitch démontre en fin de compte que l'irréversible n'admet qu'un seul remède : le consentement joyeux de l'homme à l'avenir, au futur. (shrink)

Traditionalists affirm that in self-deception I intend to deceive myself; but, on the standard account of interpersonal deception, according to which deceiver intend to make their target believe a falsehood, traditionalism generates paradoxes, arising from the fact that I will surely know that I want to make myself believe a falsehood. In this thesis, I argue that these well-known paradoxes need not arise under my manipulativist account of deception. In particular, I defend traditionalism about self-deception by showing that what causes (...) paradoxes is not the idea that self-deception is an intrapersonal analogue of interpersonal deception but rather our incorrect conceptions of deception, interpersonal deception, and lying. I show, by way of counterexamples, that the essence of deception is not ending up epistemically worse off but rather being intentionally manipulated into forming or retaining a certain truth-evaluable mental state. Vitally, contra the standard view, the deceiver need not hold that the mental state he intends to produce in the deceived involves a falsehood; in fact, the targeted effect may involve a proposition believed by the deceiver to be true or about whose truth the deceiver suspends belief. Any phenomenon rightly called self-deception, I argue, involves an action in which the person intentionally manipulates (by way of a trick) her own way of forming or retaining some truth-evaluable mental state of her own (belief or a belief-like thought). Thus, on the manipulativist view, a self-deceiver may non-paradoxically intend to deceive himself: the relevant intention is to affect a particular truth-evaluable thought by way of non-deviantly manipulating his agential use of his own cognitive capacities. While all cases of self-deception involve intentional manipulation of the self by the self, how this manipulative trick works out varies in different kinds of cases. In some cases, the self-deceptive manipulative trick is not intentional under that description, a description that captures the so-called deflationary view. Although the manipulativist account allows for numerous different strategies of self-deception, and is consistent with both traditionalism and deflationism, it cannot, by itself, vindicate the idea of lying to oneself. On the standard conception, lying to myself is practically impossible (if the mind is not partitioned) and this is because the very forming the intention to lie to myself – as including the intention to make myself believe my own lie – seems very unlikely. Arguably, people will not φ if they think that φ-ing is impossible. I argue that some kinds of behaviour typically understood as self-deception are actually cases in which the person is lying to herself without the intention to deceive herself; rather, she avoids legitimising an unfavourable state of affairs by openly affirming its contrary. It may also be the case, however, that some lies to oneself are aimed at deceiving – this is because, as I argue, liars need not assert what they believe is false; hence, by lying to myself, I may intend to increase my confidence in the belief I already hold. Finally, the motive for self-deception is always a matter of preserving the person’s endorsed idealised picture of reality. This account allows me to explain all possible cases of self-deception. In the last chapter, I apply my theory to some paradigmatic cases first outlined in my introduction. (shrink)

Le tome 2 du Traité des vertus, intitulé Les Vertus et l'Amour, est consacré à la description des " vertus ", depuis celle du commencement jusqu'à celle de la terminaison, en passant par celles de la continuation et de la conservation. Il distingue en outre deux plans tout à fait hétérogènes : celui des vertus de l'intervalle, que l'homme peut " posséder " et " garder ", mais qui, à peine acquises, tournent en mécanique vertueuse, radotage, complaisance pharisienne et hypocrisie (...) ; et les vertus de pointe que l'homme ne possède jamais, qu'il effleure seulement, d'une tangence impondérable, le temps d'une étincelle et d'une " apparition disparaissante ". Vaut-il mieux être au premier sens, un rentier de la vertu et un vertueux gredin, ou, au sens métempirique, le saint ou le héros d'un instant? L'amour résout peut-être, dans une certaine mesure, cette alternative, qui est aussi celle du bonheur et de la joie. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la musique? Selon Jankélévitch, il y a dans la musique une double complication, génératrice de problèmes métaphysiques et de problèmes moraux. Car la musique est à la fois expressive et inexpressive, sérieuse et frivole, profonde et superficielle ; elle a un sens et n'en a pas. Il y a une ironique disproportion entre la puissance incantatoire de la musique et l'inévidence foncière du beau musical.

An application of diagrams for separating modes of theory development.

The author examines the key philosophical problem of theodicy and freedom as it was first formulated by Fyodor Dostoevsky and later developed by Nikolai Berdyaev.

It is proposed to analyze the unity of scientific knowledge in terms of its structure-nominative reconstruction. -/- .

Im Unterschied zum christlichen Begriff der Gerechtigkeit als einer sittlichen Tugend, wie es Thomas von Aquin zusammenfasste, als einer Einstellung, kraft deren ein Mensch festen und steten Willens jedem sein Recht zukommen lässt, erkennt Nietzsche die Herkunft der Gerechtigkeit im Ausgleich oder Kompromiss zwischen ungefähr gleich Mächtigen sowie im Zwang der weniger Mächtigen zu einem Ausgleich. Zur Untermauerung dieser Einstellung, die sich auf der Behauptung gründet, dass das Leben seinem innersten Wesen nach eine Aneignung sei bzw. dass der Wille zur (...) Macht den Lebenswillen schlechthin ausmache, griff Nietzsche auf den von Thukydides geschilderten Dialog der Athener und Melier zurück. Der Autor kommt jedoch zu dem Schluss, dass Nietzsche nicht nur ein Denker der Macht war, sondern nach einem neuen Verständnis der Gerechtigkeit trachtete, das aus der Gesamtheit seines Denkens zu deuten sei. (shrink)

We propose a canonization scheme for smooth equivalence relations on Rω modulo restriction to E0-large infinite products. It shows that, given a pair of Borel smooth equivalence relations E, F on Rω, there is an infinite E0-large perfect product P⊆Rω such that either F⊆E on P, or, for some ℓ<ω, the following is true for all x,y∈P: xEy implies x(ℓ)=y(ℓ), and x↾(ω∖{ℓ})=y↾(ω∖{ℓ}) implies xFy.

In continuation of our study of HST, Hrbaek set theory (a nonstandard set theory which includes, in particular, the ZFC Replacement and Separation schemata in the st--language, and Saturation for well-orderable families of internal sets), we consider the problem of existence of elementary extensions of inner "external" subclasses of the HST universe.We show that, given a standard cardinal , any set R * generates an "internal" class S(R) of all sets standard relatively to elements of R, and an "external" class (...) L[S(R)] of all sets constructible (in a sense close to the Gödel constructibility) from sets in S(R). We prove that under some mild saturation-like requirements for R the class L[S(R)] models a certain -version of HST including the principle of +-saturation; moreover, in this case L[S(R)] is an elementary extension of L[S(R)] in the st--language whenever sets R R satisfy the requirements. (shrink)

We study those models of ZFCwhich are embeddable, as the class of all standard sets, in a model of internal set theory >ISTor models of some other nonstandard set theories.

A hyperfinitely long coin flipping game between the Gambler and the Casino, associated with a given set A, is considered. It turns out that the Gambler has a winning strategy if and only if A has Loeb measure 0. The Casino has a winning strategy if and only if A contains an internal subset of positive Loeb measure.

In this article, the author examines the work of Boris Pasternak, primarily his novel Doctor Zhivago, in the context of his Marburg experience and Kantian ideas as the basis of his moral-aesthetic...