On the Connection between Lying, Asserting, and Intending to Cause Beliefs

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,881

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Lying and intentions.Gary E. Jones - 1986 - Journal of Business Ethics 5 (4):347-349.
Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.
Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.
On the definition of lying: A reply to Jones and revisions.Thomas L. Carson - 1988 - Journal of Business Ethics 7 (7):509-514.
Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.
Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.
Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.
A causal theory of intending.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-08-14

Downloads
280 (#72,455)

6 months
53 (#84,997)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vladimir Krstic
United Arab Emirates University

References found in this work

Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.
Lying and Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references