Artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are digital technologies that will have significant impact on the development of humanity in the near future. They have raised fundamental questions about what we should do with these systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve, and how we can control these. - After the Introduction to the field (§1), the main themes (§2) of this article are: Ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e., tools made and used (...) by humans. This includes issues of privacy (§2.1) and manipulation (§2.2), opacity (§2.3) and bias (§2.4), human-robot interaction (§2.5), employment (§2.6), and the effects of autonomy (§2.7). Then AI systems as subjects, i.e., ethics for the AI systems themselves in machine ethics (§2.8) and artificial moral agency (§2.9). Finally, the problem of a possible future AI superintelligence leading to a “singularity” (§2.10). We close with a remark on the vision of AI (§3). - For each section within these themes, we provide a general explanation of the ethical issues, outline existing positions and arguments, then analyse how these play out with current technologies and finally, what policy consequences may be drawn. (shrink)

Normand Baillargeon, dans ces Légendes pédagogiques, se veut très mordant, virulent parfois, mais toujours juste et honnete dans ce qui se veut une mise en perspective de nos idées reçues sur l'éducation.--[Memento].

Ce texte de Normand Baillargeon part de son expérience de philosophe ayant œuvré dans un département universitaire de sciences de l’éducation au Québec durant plus de 25 ans. Cette expérience parait étayer deux idées que qui méritent d’être portées à l’attention de quiconque se préoccupe de l’état de notre système d’éducation et des débats qu’il suscite. La première de ces idées est que la philosophie de l’éducation est une discipline trop profondément négligée, tant par les philosophes que par les (...) gens œuvrant en sciences de l’éducation et par les décideurs des politiques publiques. La deuxième est que cette négligence peut avoir, et a bien souvent, des conséquences déplorables, voire dramatiques. En espérant avoir à tout le moins convaincu les lecteurs de la plausibilité de ces deux idées, ce texte se termine par la suggestion de quelques pistes d’action susceptibles de corriger cet état de fait. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that existing ‘self-representational’ theories of phenomenal consciousness do not adequately address the problem of higher-order misrepresentation. Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts literature, a novel self-representational account is introduced that does. This is the quotational theory of phenomenal consciousness, according to which the higher-order component of a conscious state is constituted by the quotational component of a quotational phenomenal concept. According to the quotational theory of consciousness, phenomenal concepts help to account for the (...) very nature of phenomenally conscious states. Thus, the paper integrates two largely distinct explanatory projects in the field of consciousness studies: (i) the project of explaining how we think about our phenomenally conscious states, and (ii) the project of explaining what phenomenally conscious states are in the first place. (shrink)

This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...) the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks’ proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents—Though not for conscious agents. (shrink)

‘From now on, I'll describe the cities to you’, the Khan had said, ‘in your journeys you will see if they exist.’ But the cities visited by Marco Polo were always different from those thought of by...

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a digital technology that will be of major importance for the development of humanity in the near future. AI has raised fundamental questions about what we should do with such systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve and how we can control these. - After the background to the field (1), this article introduces the main debates (2), first on ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e. tools made and (...) used by humans; here, the main sections are privacy (2.1), manipulation (2.2), opacity (2.3), bias (2.4), autonomy & responsibility (2.6) and the singularity (2.7). Then we look at AI systems as subjects, i.e. when ethics is for the AI systems themselves in machine ethics (2.8.) and artificial moral agency (2.9). Finally we look at future developments and the concept of AI (3). For each section within these themes, we provide a general explanation of the ethical issues, we outline existing positions and arguments, then we analyse how this plays out with current technologies and finally what policy conse-quences may be drawn. (shrink)

Will future lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or ‘killer robots’, be a threat to humanity? The European Parliament has called for a moratorium or ban of LAWS; the ‘Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention at the United Nations’ are presently discussing such a ban, which is supported by the great majority of writers and campaigners on the issue. However, the main arguments in favour of a ban are unsound. LAWS do not support extrajudicial killings, they do not take responsibility away (...) from humans; in fact they increase the abil-ity to hold humans accountable for war crimes. Using LAWS in war would probably reduce human suffering overall. Finally, the availability of LAWS would probably not increase the probability of war or other lethal conflict—especially as compared to extant remote-controlled weapons. The widespread fear of killer robots is unfounded: They are probably good news. (shrink)

This book closely examines our commonly held beliefs about human suffering, and offers unique insights into God's role in why we suffer. Dr. Perri critically examines what it means to be human from a Judeo-Christian perspective, and extrapolates from the work of Carl Gustav Jung showing a deeply complex development of human transcendence in human suffering. On an interpersonal level, Dr. Perri elaborates on the work of Martin Buber and Emanuel Levinas and shows how our suffering can be shared and (...) lessened by our unconditionality and presence for the other. Scriptural passages are quoted from both the Hebrew and New Testament texts, and are used to depict the suffering of humankind as seen in the face of Job. It was this face, according to Perri, that Jesus saw in the faces of those He came to redeem, and that ultimately brought Him to the crucifix of redemption. Dr. Perri challenges Sartre's position that our existence precedes our essence, and draws on the work of Abraham Joshua Heschel and Christian theology in this regard. He further elaborates a neurodevelopmental paradigm that creates essence as the basis of our freedom to choose. This book can be read and studied by both professionals in the helping and healing professions, and lay persons seeking to better understand our suffering, and how to better help those who suffer. Dr. Perri offers specific ways in how to be present for those who suffer, how to read and receive the hidden language of human suffering, and how to use silence as a communication skill. (shrink)

Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when nonhuman cases are (...) considered as evidence of moral agency or subjecthood, there has been an anthropocentric tendency to focus on those behaviors that inform our attributions of moral agency to humans. For example, some argue that the ability to evaluate the principles upon which a moral norm is grounded is required for full moral agency. Certainly, if a moral agent must understand what makes an action right or wrong, then most nonhuman animals would not qualify (and perhaps some humans too). However, if we are to understand the evolution of moral psychology and moral practice, we need to turn our attention to the foundations of full moral agency. We must first pay attention to the more broadly normative practices of other animals. Here, we begin that project by considering evidence that great apes and cetaceans participate in normative practices. (shrink)

Résumé Après l’enthousiasme soulevé par le début des années 1990, les peuples autochtones de Sibérie ont dû relever de nombreux défis. Dans le nord-ouest sibérien, au-delà des associations qui militent pour la reconnaissance et les droits autochtones, des expériences individuelles ont vu le jour, qui chacune à leur façon, puisent dans la culture traditionnelle pour s’adapter au cadre complexe de la Fédération de Russie.

Ce texte est le fruit d’une collaboration entre un astrophysicien, Jean-René Roy, et un philosophe de l’éducation, Normand Baillargeon. Ils ont en commun d’avoir été marqués par la fréquentation des oeuvres de Mario Bunge, auxquelles ils attachent un grand prix, sur un plan personnel, d’abord, mais aussi, et c’est ce qu’ils veulent rappeler dans ces pages : parce qu’ils estiment que les oeuvres de Bunge contribuent de manière extrêmement forte et positive à rendre plus salubre la vie de l’esprit, (...) en enrichissant notre intellect et en luttant contre diverses formes troublantes d’obscurantisme qui y sévissent parfois, notamment dans les domaines familiers aux deux auteurs. (shrink)

The point of departure of this article is the trend towards hybridisation in new technology development, which makes classical dichotomies between machines, human life and the environment obsolete and leads to the post-human world we live in today. We critically reflect on the post-human concept of the hybrid world. Although we agree with post-humanists that human life can no longer be opposed to machines but appears as a decentralized human-technology relation, alliance or network that constitutes a hybrid world, we ask (...) for a limit to hybridisation. After rejecting the concept of metabolism as such a limit, we explore the concept of the responsive conativity of material entities. The principle of conativity of material entities provides a materialist perspective on metabolism, which enables us to conceive material entities as self-assertive material entities that are differentiated from the environment. The principle of responsivity of material entities provides a materialist perspective on the post-human world in which material entities are responsive to each other and form alliances and networks. We propose to differentiate between the conativity and responsivity of material entities and propose the conativity of matter as a limit to hybridisation in the post-human world. (shrink)

De manière remarquablement constante, la question de l'éducation a été une préoccupation majeure du mouvement anarchiste tout au long de son histoire. Malheureusement, cet héritage demeure en général méconnu, si ce n'est ignoré. Une des ambitions de cette anthologie, qui réunit des textes importants de penseurs et de praticiens anarchistes d'horizons divers, est précisément de nous permettre de redécouvrir la riche tradition dans le domaine de l'éducation de ce courant politico-philosophique. Qu'est-ce que l'éducation? Sur quels plans et pour quelles raisons (...) l'éducation, telle que généralement pratiquée, est-elle déficiente? Comment devrait-on s'y prendre pour former des êtres libres? À ces questions et à de nombreuses autres semblables, des théoriciens ont tenté de répondre, tandis que des praticiens anarchistes se sont efforcés de mettre en oeuvre leur idéal d'une éducation réellement émancipatrice. La présente anthologie, qui comprend deux tomes, réunit les principaux écrits consacrés à l'éducation de ces théoriciens et praticiens anarchistes, des écrits trop peu connus et souvent difficilement accessibles. On retrouve dans ce premier tome, qui couvre les années 1793 à 1918, des textes de Michel Bakounine, Sébastien Faure, Francesco Ferrer, William Godwin, Pierre Kropotkine, Fernand Pelloutier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Paul Robin et Max Stirner. Ils mettent en lumière une riche et toujours inspirante tradition de pensée, de militantisme et de réalisations concrètes. (shrink)

Le present travail propose une analyse philosophique de l'esthetique d'Andre Breton. ;Meme si, en raison de l'importance du surrealisme au XXeme Siecle, cette doctrine semble bien incontournable pour quiconque s'interesse a l'esthetique, elle n'a guere fait, a ce jour, l'objet d'une veritable reflexion philosophique. Notre travail repose donc d'abord sur l'hypothese que l'oeuvre de Breton presente un interet du point de vue philosophique, hypothese qui est etablie en introduction. Faisant ensuite etat des difficultes que rencontre tout examen philosophique du surrealisme, (...) nous precisons le sujet que nous avons retenu compte tenu de ces difficultes: il s'agit de la question de l'art comme manifestation sociale et donc des deux problemes suivants: celui de l'autonomie de l'art, d'une part; celui de l'engagement de l'artiste, d'autre part. ;La suite de notre travail est consacree a une lecture interne des textes de Breton qui permet de cerner le point de vue surrealiste sur ces deux problemes, cette demarche etant menee selon l'approche diachronique que nous avons retenue. Nous sommes parvenus a etablir que Breton croit d'une part en l'autonomie du probleme artistique et d'autre part que l'art authentique est, par la seule vertu de cette authenticite, revolutionnaire et engage. Les corollaires de ces idees sont qu'aucun artiste ne saurait, au risque de nier la signification et la portee de sa demarche propre, ignorer, dans sa discipline, l'etat donne du probleme artistique; que rien ni personne ne saurait dicter a l'art la nature ou la fonction de sa demarche; enfin, que c'est l'art authentique qui fait l'art revolutionnaire et non pas l'art revolutionnaire qui fait l'art authentique. ;Au total, l'oeuvre de Breton promeut une conception revolutionnaire de l'art dont nous avons cherche a degager l'essentiel du point de vue philosophique--option metaphysique moniste d'un univers cryptogrammatique, surrationalisme, surdetermination de l'esthetique par l'ethique--et qui font de son oeuvre une des plus passionnees et des plus convaincantes defense et illustration de l'art au XXeme Siecle. (shrink)

In recent years, Charles Sanders Peirce has emerged, in the eyes of philosophers both in America and abroad, as one of America’s major philosophical thinkers. His work has forced us back to philosophical reflection about those basic issues that inevitably confront us as human beings, especially in an age of science. Peirce’s concern for experience, for what is actually encountered, means that his philosophy, even in its most technical aspects, forms a reflective commentary on actual life and on the world (...) in which it is lived. In Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals, Potter argues that Peirce’s doctrine of the normative sciences is essential to his pragmatism. No part of Peirce’s philosophy is bolder than his attempt to establish esthetics, ethics, and logic as the three normative sciences and to argue for the priority of esthetics among the trio. Logic, Potter cites, is normative because it governs thought and aims at truth; ethics is normative because it analyzes the ends to which thought should be directed; esthetics is normative and fundamental because it considers what it means to be an end of something good in itself. This study shows that pierce took seriously the trinity of normative sciences and demonstrates that these categories apply both to the conduct of man and to the workings of the cosmos. Professor Potter combines sympathetic and informed exposition with straightforward criticism and he deals in a sensible manner with the gaps and inconsistencies in Peirce’s thought. His study shows that Peirce was above all a cosmological and ontological thinker, one who combined science both as a method and as result with a conception of reasonable actions to form a comprehensive theory of reality. Peirce’s pragmatism, although it has to do with "action and the achievement of results, is not a glorification of action but rather a theory of the dynamic nature of things in which the "ideal" dimension of reality – laws, nature of things, tendencies, and ends – has genuine power for directing the cosmic order, including man, toward reasonable goals. (shrink)

" Façonner le monde atome par atome " : tel est l'objectif incroyablement ambitieux affiché par les promoteurs américains de la " National Nanoinitiative ", lancée en 1999. Un projet global de " convergence des sciences ", visant à " initier une nouvelle Renaissance, incorporant une conception holiste de la technologie fondée sur [..] une analyse causale du monde physique, unifiée depuis l'échelle nano jusqu'à l'échelle planétaire. " Ce projet démiurgique est aujourd'hui au coeur de ce qu'on appelle la " (...) technoscience ", étendard pour certains, repoussoir pour d'autres. En précisant dans ce livre la signification de ce concept, pour sortir enfin du sempiternel conflit entre technophiles et technophobes, son auteur propose d'abord une sorte d'archéologie du terme " technoscience ". Loin d'être un simple renversement de hiérarchie entre science et technique, il s'agit d'un changement de régime de la connaissance scientifique, ayant désormais intégré la logique entrepreneuriale du monde des affaires et mobilisant des moyens considérables. Surtout, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent montre que le brouillage de la frontière entre science et technique n'est que la manifestation d'un tremblement plus général, marqué par l'effacement progressif des distinctions traditionnelles : nature/artifice, inerte/vivant, matière/esprit, homme/machine, etc. Alors que nos sociétés sont silencieusement reconfigurées par les nanotechnologies, Internet, le génie génétique ou les OGM, ce livre montre l'importance de faire enfin pleinement entrer les questions de choix technologiques et scientifiques dans la sphère du politique et dans l'arène publique. Car la technoscience est un processus historique qui engage la nature en la refaçonnant et qui implique la société dans son ensemble. (shrink)

Recent studies have shown that self‐explanation is an effective metacognitive strategy, but how can it be leveraged to improve students' learning in actual classrooms? How do instructional treatments that emphasizes self‐explanation affect students' learning, as compared to other instructional treatments? We investigated whether self‐explanation can be scaffolded effectively in a classroom environment using a Cognitive Tutor, which is intelligent instructional software that supports guided learning by doing. In two classroom experiments, we found that students who explained their steps during problem‐solving (...) practice with a Cognitive Tutor learned with greater understanding compared to students who did not explain steps. The explainers better explained their solutions steps and were more successful on transfer problems. We interpret these results as follows: By engaging in explanation, students acquired better‐integrated visual and verbal declarative knowledge and acquired less shallow procedural knowledge. The research demonstrates that the benefits of self‐explanation can be achieved in a relatively simple computer‐based approach that scales well for classroom use. (shrink)

In philosophical reflections on geoethics, it is primarily the question of what it means to be ‘part’ of the Earth system that is critically reflected upon. As the current geological era of the Anthropocene disrupts the dichotomy between Human agency and the Earth system, philosophers criticise a humanist account of geoethics and call for a post-humanist account. In this chapter, we critically engage with one specific proponent of the post-humanist position, Timothy Morton. We introduce his version of the post-humanist position (...) by focussing on his call for the ‘end-of-the-world’ in the Anthropocene. We subsequently criticise Morton’s rejection of the World for three reasons. We show that the emergence of the Anthropocene is primarily an ontological phenomenon, namely a shift in our ‘being-in-the-world’ and that the concept of World is needed to understand the meaning of our ‘being-in-the-Anthropocene’ in contrast with our ‘being-in-the-Holocene’. We introduce a twofold between our ‘being-in-the-world’ as a symmetric relation and our ‘being-on-Earth’ as an asymmetric relation that constitutes our ‘being-in-the-Anthropocene’. This asymmetry disrupts the post-humanist position and calls for a conceptualisation of the human ethos beyond the post-humanist position. This conceptualisation of the human ethos also has consequences for our understanding of geoethics as geo-ethos. (shrink)

Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulnerable to the ‘blindness to inequality and other values objection’. This objection targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes from relational, and (...) not distributive, inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other, strategies of ‘internalizing’ and ‘externalizing’ relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework are explored. In turn, I suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions, but argue that a particular ‘hybrid view’ about justice is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist. (shrink)

" La formule cartésienne causa sive ratio scande l'histoire de la causalité, entre le privilège suarézien de la cause efficiente et l'invention leibnizienne du principe de raison suffisante. Elle traverse un siècle exactement, des Disputationes metaphysicae de Suarez (1597) aux 24 thèses métaphysiques de Leibniz (1697). La métaphysique s'y constitue en époque de la causalité. Qu'ils la soutiennent ou qu'ils la récusent, les philosophes du XVIIe siècle ont en commun de discuter la thèse qui confère l'intelligibilité à la relation causale (...) ; elle prend la forme exemplaire de l'équivalence cartésienne de la cause et de la raison. Mais la façon dont la relation causale gagne l'intelligibilité demeure à son tour inintelligible, puisqu'elle renvoie à la toute-puissance incompréhensible de celui qui l'exerce, y compris peut-être envers lui-même : sui causa. C'est là précisément la thèse que les post-cartésiens ne cesseront de lire comme un problème et de récuser : Spinoza, en posant que l'ordre et la connexion des idées sont les mêmes que l'ordre et la connexion des choses ; Malebranche, en faisant de la cause occasionnelle une raison inefficace et en concentrant en Dieu toute l'efficace ; Leibniz, en employant le principe de raison suffisante, qui rationalise l'existence en la soustrayant à l'emprise de l'efficience. Loin de la produire, la causalité se voit alors soumise, sous diverses modalités, à l'intelligibilité. Aussi le principe de raison suffisante signe-t-il ce que nous appelons la fin de la cause - par excellence la fin de l'efficience -, qui n'est pas la fin de la question du fondement, mais le déplacement de sa réponse vers plus fondateur que la cause : la raison. Ainsi se trouve accomplie l'essence du fondement à l'époque moderne de l'histoire de la métaphysique. " V. C. (shrink)

what is the ontology of planets?Our access point to this question is the ontology of planet Earth. Although the presence of life marks planet Earth as special among other planets, Earth shares a basic commonality with them – namely, its material existence. We take this commonality as a point of departure for our reflections on the ontology of both planet Earth and other planets. In this chapter, we ask for the ontology of this materiality of planets. We consult the ontology (...) of planet Earth as I developed it in an earlier contribution (Blok, 2019), explore the ontology of planets as absolute boundary of the natural habitats on Earth, and reflect on the opportunities and limitations such ontology provides for future human colonies on other planets. (shrink)

part 1. An annotated translation of Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 24,16-45,20 (Pramāṇavārttika 1.40-91.

Cet ouvrage propose de retracer le parcours intellectuel et spirituel de l’écrivain roumain d’expression française Emil Cioran (1911-1995). Le texte s’appuie sur une approche biographique pour saisir les enjeux philosophiques et identitaires de la vie et de l’oeuvre de Cioran. Tout d’abord son enfance imprégnée de culture allemande où liberté et insouciance cèdent vite la place à l’ennui ; sa fascination pour les thèses ultra-nationalistes pendant sa jeunesse studieuse et angoissée ; la volonté d’aveuglement que lui inspire ensuite son mépris (...) des affaires humaines ; la fuite de la Roumanie pendant la Guerre et l’affirmation de son incertitude identitaire et intellectuelle ; l’abandon finalement de son pays et de sa langue comme refus de sa propre histoire. L’ouvrage tente d’apporter un regard nouveau sur l’homme et son oeuvre pour résoudre les contradictions inhérentes à son renversement identitaire: bien que la mémoire soit au centre de sa pensée, Cioran se dirigea toujours plus vers la nécessité de l’oubli. La démarche de Vincent Piednoir démontre que cette volonté d’oubli a inscrit le philosophe dans la mémoire collective. De nombreux livres ont commenté la pensée de Cioran. L’originalité de celui-ci est de s’étendre, sans esprit de polémique mais sans tabou, sur sa jeunesse roumaine et profasciste. (shrink)

The ante rem structuralist holds that places in ante rem structures are objects with determinate identity conditions, but he cannot justify this view by providing places with criteria of identity. The latest response to this problem holds that no criteria of identity are required because mathematical practice presupposes a primitive identity relation. This paper criticizes this appeal to mathematical practice. Ante rem structuralism interprets mathematics within the theory of universals, holding that mathematical objects are places in universals. The identity problem (...) should be read as challenging this claim about universals. However, what mathematical practice presupposes is only relevant to what is true according to the theory of universals, if one takes it for granted such a theory offers the best interpretation of mathematics. In the current context, taking this for granted begs the question. Therefore, the appeal to mathematical practice in response to the identity problem is illegitimate. (shrink)

An important task in mathematical sciences is to make quantitative predictions, which is often done via the solution of differential equations. In this paper, we investigate why, to perform this task, scientists sometimes choose to use numerical methods instead of analytical solutions. Via several examples, we argue that the choice for numerical methods can be explained by the fact that, while making quantitative predictions seems at first glance to be facilitated by analytical solutions, this is actually often much easier with (...) numerical methods. Thus we challenge the widely presumed superiority of analytical solutions over numerical methods. (shrink)