Social scientists have not integrated relevant knowledge from the biological sciences into their explanations of human behavior. This failure is due to a longstanding antireductionistic bias against the natural sciences, which follows on a commitment to the view that social facts must be explained by social laws. This belief has led many social scientists into the error of reifying abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency. It has also led to a false nature-culture dichotomy that effectively undermines (...) the place of biology in social scientific explanation. Following the principles of methodological individualism, we show how behavioral explanations supported by data and theory from the neurosciences can be used to correct the errors of reificationist thinking in the social sciences. We outline a mechanistic approach to the explanation of human behavior with the hope that the biological sciences will begin to find greater acceptance among social scientists. (shrink)

This book interprets Thomas Hardy’s _Tess of the D’Urbervilles_ with the openness toward experience recommended by John Dewey’s _Art as Experience_. The characters of _Tess_ are considered as real people with sexual bodies and complex minds. Efron identifies the “experience blockers” that the critical tradition has stumbled upon, and defends Hardy’s involvement in telling his story. Efron offers a new way of evaluating literature inspired by Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics.

This book interprets Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles with the openness toward experience recommended by John Dewey’s Art as Experience . The characters of Tess are considered as real people with sexual bodies and complex minds. Efron identifies the “experience blockers” that the critical tradition has stumbled upon, and defends Hardy’s involvement in telling his story. Efron offers a new way of evaluating literature inspired by Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics.

In the early 18th Century, Daniel Defoe found it natural to write a novel whose heroine was a sexually adventurous, socially marginal property offender. Only half a century later, this would have been next to unthinkable. In this paper, the disappearance of Moll Flanders, and her supercession in the annals of literary female offenders by heroines like Tess of the d'Urbervilles, serves as a metaphor for fundamental changes in ideas of selfhood, gender and social order in 18th and 19th Century (...) England. Drawing on law, literature, philosophy and social history, I argue that these broad changes underpinned a radical shift in mechanisms of responsibility-attribution, with decisive implications for the criminalisation of women. I focus in particular on the question of how the treatment and understanding of female criminality was changing during the era which saw the construction of the main building blocks of the modern criminal process, and of how these understandings related in turn to broader ideas about gender, social order and individual agency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:^ be clear and sometimes ambiguous. For example, Del Castillo warns readers ^ that Dewey will be ambivalent about when and where the actions of the KH state or of the free market are needed to deal with social problems. The ^* ambivalence is, in part, Del Castillo argues, because Dewey's view of the / complexities of social life prevented him from adopting simplistic political stands (p. 33). Del (...) Castillo's argument is correct, but a more straightforward explanation is that Dewey was a contextualist and that, therefore, the theoretical task of trying to set the proper limits of the state is ideological and non-intelligent. This is how one can stand on the ideal of democracy without the need to decide between laissez-faire liberalism and socialism for all times and places. Del Castillo warns the reader not to expect from The Public and its Problems the precision and systematic character of recent works on political theory, but that it has an energetic and provocative character missing in much contemporary works in this area of inquiry. Del Castillo is correct and part of the reason is the book's continued relevance to present conditions in the U.S. If things in the U.S. had gone in the direction that Dewey pointed toward, there would be no need today to read or to translate The Public and its Problems. As Del Castillo says in his final sentences, "abundance ended up replacing the civic citizen by the consumer", "American democracy does not look at all like what Dewey envisioned" (p. 54). Does this means that Lippman was right after all? Does it mean that we have not even tried, or tried hard enough, to implement what Dewey proposed? Del CastiUo, does not address these questions, but there is no reason why he should. It is enough that Del Castillo has made available to a larger audience a text and an insightful introduction that helps us have a thoughtful discussion about these important issues. Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas A&M Univeristy, [email protected] Arthur Efron Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles: A Deweyan Account Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005. xiii+248 pp. $ 72.00 cloth. In Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles, Arthur Efron has accomplished a rather extraordinary task. The book consists primarily of an extended reading of Thomas Hardy's novel using some of John Dewey's main philosophical ideas and concepts, most notably those present in Art as Experience, as a guide. As such, Efron's text amplifies and enriches our understanding of Hardy, Dewey, and their work. I am not using the word "enrich" casually. Through Efron's emotionally charged reading of Tess, Experiencing Tess, becomes an ongoing effort to reclaim what Dewey, in Art as Experience calls oje) "human experience." In that text, Dewey contrasts "human experience" to stagnant and encrusted modes of criticism that fail to "cope with the emer- 7° gence of new modes of life," and this matters because, to use Dewey's own words again, "the very meaning of an important new movement in any art κ-1 is that it expresses something new in human experience, some new form of. interaction of the live creature with his surroundings, and hence the release, of powers previously cramped or inert." Efron 's book is enriching in that sense, in offering readers an "experience," a completely novel way of doing criticism, of reading, and of "feeling" together with a text. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that I do not know of any other work of recent literary criticism that accomplishes this. Experiencing Tess focuses most particularly on what we might call the vicissitudes of Tess's character and humanity. Yet, as is noted recurrently throughout the text, these ideas can never be entirely separated from Tess's interaction with the various characters that populate Hardy's text, especially of course Angel and Alec. Because Tess's fortunes (or, rather, misfortunes) throughout the novel are, in this richly textured book, carefully digested and interpreted in light of Dewey's understanding of experience, Efron invites us, further, to consider our own relationships with authority and with often unreflective critical practices. Let me specify. It is all too easy to... (shrink)

Some philosophers, like Alex Rosenberg, claim that natural science delivers epistemic values such as knowledge and understanding, whereas, say, literature and, according to some, literary studies, merely have aesthetic value. Many of those working in the field of literary studies oppose this idea. But it is not clear exactly how works of literary art embody knowledge and understanding and how literary studies can bring these to the light. After all, literary works of art are pieces of fiction, which suggests that (...) they are not meant to represent the actual world. How then can they deliver knowledge and understanding? I argue that literature and literary studies confer knowledge and understanding in at least five ways: they give us insight into the work and the world of the work of art in question, they shape our intellectual virtues, they invite us to apply various hypotheses, they deliver moral propositional knowledge, and they increase or bring about full understanding with respect to meaning, virtue, and significance. In the course of my argument, I refer at several junctures to Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles and Edith Wharton’s Summer, in order to illustrate each of these claims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:^ be clear and sometimes ambiguous. For example, Del Castillo warns readers ^ that Dewey will be ambivalent about when and where the actions of the KH state or of the free market are needed to deal with social problems. The ^* ambivalence is, in part, Del Castillo argues, because Dewey's view of the / complexities of social life prevented him from adopting simplistic political stands (p. 33). Del (...) Castillo's argument is correct, but a more straightforward explanation is that Dewey was a contextualist and that, therefore, the theoretical task of trying to set the proper limits of the state is ideological and non-intelligent. This is how one can stand on the ideal of democracy without the need to decide between laissez-faire liberalism and socialism for all times and places. Del Castillo warns the reader not to expect from The Public and its Problems the precision and systematic character of recent works on political theory, but that it has an energetic and provocative character missing in much contemporary works in this area of inquiry. Del Castillo is correct and part of the reason is the book's continued relevance to present conditions in the U.S. If things in the U.S. had gone in the direction that Dewey pointed toward, there would be no need today to read or to translate The Public and its Problems. As Del Castillo says in his final sentences, "abundance ended up replacing the civic citizen by the consumer", "American democracy does not look at all like what Dewey envisioned" (p. 54). Does this means that Lippman was right after all? Does it mean that we have not even tried, or tried hard enough, to implement what Dewey proposed? Del CastiUo, does not address these questions, but there is no reason why he should. It is enough that Del Castillo has made available to a larger audience a text and an insightful introduction that helps us have a thoughtful discussion about these important issues. Gregory Fernando Pappas Texas A&M Univeristy, [email protected] Arthur Efron Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles: A Deweyan Account Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005. xiii+248 pp. $ 72.00 cloth. In Experiencing Tess of the d'Urbervilles, Arthur Efron has accomplished a rather extraordinary task. The book consists primarily of an extended reading of Thomas Hardy's novel using some of John Dewey's main philosophical ideas and concepts, most notably those present in Art as Experience, as a guide. As such, Efron's text amplifies and enriches our understanding of Hardy, Dewey, and their work. I am not using the word "enrich" casually. Through Efron's emotionally charged reading of Tess, Experiencing Tess, becomes an ongoing effort to reclaim what Dewey, in Art as Experience calls oje) "human experience." In that text, Dewey contrasts "human experience" to stagnant and encrusted modes of criticism that fail to "cope with the emer- 7° gence of new modes of life," and this matters because, to use Dewey's own words again, "the very meaning of an important new movement in any art κ-1 is that it expresses something new in human experience, some new form of. interaction of the live creature with his surroundings, and hence the release, of powers previously cramped or inert." Efron 's book is enriching in that sense, in offering readers an "experience," a completely novel way of doing criticism, of reading, and of "feeling" together with a text. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that I do not know of any other work of recent literary criticism that accomplishes this. Experiencing Tess focuses most particularly on what we might call the vicissitudes of Tess's character and humanity. Yet, as is noted recurrently throughout the text, these ideas can never be entirely separated from Tess's interaction with the various characters that populate Hardy's text, especially of course Angel and Alec. Because Tess's fortunes (or, rather, misfortunes) throughout the novel are, in this richly textured book, carefully digested and interpreted in light of Dewey's understanding of experience, Efron invites us, further, to consider our own relationships with authority and with often unreflective critical practices. Let me specify. It is all too easy to... (shrink)

In Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the innocent Tess is the object of Alec d’Urberville’s dishonorable intentions. Alec uses every wile he can think of to seduce the poor and ignorant Tess, who works keeping hens in his mother’s house: he flatters her, he impresses her with a show of wealth, he gives help to her family to win her gratitude, and he reacts with irritation and indignation when she nonetheless continues to repulse his advances, causing her to feel shame at (...) her own ingratitude and confusion as to what is right. Tess, anchored both by her own sense of virtue and her distrust of Alec’s character, continues to hold out until one fatal night when, through Alec’s machinations, they are lost together in a wood. At Tess’s insistence Alec leaves her to scout out the path home. When he returns, he finds her asleep under a tree. Hardy does not go into detail at this critical juncture. Rather, he reflects “why it was that upon this beautiful feminine tissue, sensitive as gossamer, and practically blank as snow as yet, there should have been traced such a coarse pattern as it was doomed to receive; why so often the coarse appropriates the finer thus, the wrong man the woman, the wrong woman the man, many thousand years of analytical philosophy have failed to explain to our sense of order.”. (shrink)

It is a truth universally acknowledged that great works of literature have an impact on people's lives. Well known literary characters—Oedipus, Hamlet, Faustus, Don Quixote—acquire iconic or mythic status and their stories, in more or less detail, are revered and recalled often in contexts far beyond the strictly literary. At the level of national literatures, familiar characters and plots are assimilated into a wider cultural consciousness and help define national stereotypes and norms of behaviour. In the English speaking world, Shakespeare's (...) plays or the novels of Jane Austen, the Bronte sisters, Dickens, and Trollope, provide imaginative material that reverberates in people's lives every bit as much as do the great historical figures, like Julius Caesar, Elizabeth I, Horatio Nelson, or Winston Churchill. What is striking is how often fictional characters from the literary tradition—like the well-loved Elizabeth Bennett, Jane Eyre, Oliver Twist, Pip, Tess of the d'Ubervilles—enter readers' lives at a highly personal level. They become, as Martha Nussbaum puts it, our ‘friends’, and for many readers the lives of these characters become closely entwined with their own. Happy and unhappy incidents in the fictional worlds are held up against similar incidents in the real lives of readers and such readers take inspiration from the courage, ingenuity, or good fortune of their fictional heroines and heroes. Nowhere is it more true that life imitates art. (shrink)

This article is a response to an essay written by an academic in English Literature, Professor John Sutherland. Through close textual analysis,Sutherland purports to resolve a well-known literary question: whether the sexual encounter outlined in the Victorian novel Tess of the d'Urbervilles should be classified as rape or seduction. The present article rejects his conclusion on the matter. An(equally) close analysis of the fictional text in question and of Sutherland's gloss, demonstrates the partiality of his critique, both in literary-critical and (...) critical-legal terms. In addition, examination of the conceptual and historico-legal context regarding the notions of rape and seduction on both sides of the Atlantic highlights parallels between Sutherland's own partiality and that of the law. In short, the apparent objectivity of the textual analysis and subsequent critique undertaken by Sutherland is revealed as a continuation of legal and patriarchal prejudices defining rape and seduction. The use of close textual analysis as the key critical device promotes the apparent probity of his findings. Locating them in an essay collection designed for mass lay public consumption completes the circle – from partisan scholarship to `informed' popular prejudice. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reconsider Barthes’s theory of textuality, as presented in his The Pleasure of the Text. Barthes’s approach is based on the rejection of the “referential” or “realistic” theories of literary text: the Barthesian pleasure is drawn from the texture of the text itself rather that from its alleged referential character. In this sense, the author’s suggestion is to return to the notion of representation rejected by Barthes, even though this representation should not be identical (...) with the reference in the classical sense of the word. The notion of “weak representation”, suggested by the author, does not mean a return to a naïve conception of realism. It rather implies that the referent would be a fantasmatic rather than “realistic” entity. The notions of representation and reference are exemplified by the interpretation of Richardson’s Clarissa and Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbevilles. (shrink)

Vendler’s :161–173, 1979) puzzle about imagination is that the sentences ‘Imagine swimming in that water’ and ‘Imagine yourself swimming in that water’ seem at once semantically different and semantically the same. They seem semantically different, since the first requires you to imagine ’from the inside’, while the second allows you to imagine ’from the outside.’ They seem semantically the same, since despite superficial dissimilarity, there is good reason to think that they are syntactically and lexically identical. This paper sets out (...) the puzzle and offers a novel solution. Our proposal is that, just as there is knowledge-wh, there is also imagining-wh and that the inside/outside distinction Vendler points to is properly understood as a distinction within imagining-wh. In particular, to imagine swimming from the inside is to imagine what it feels like to swim, while to imagine swimming from the outside is to imagine what it looks like to swim. We show that this proposal is well grounded in both the semantics and syntax of ‘imagine.’ We also argue it makes better sense than its rivals of the data Vendler found so puzzling. (shrink)

Background While there are many guidelines on how to make ethical decisions at the end of life, there is little evidence regarding the quality of this sort of ethical guidelines. Objectives First, this study aims to demonstrate the conceptual transferability of the Appraisal of Guidelines for Research and Evaluation (AGREE) instrument for the quality assessment of ethical guidelines. Second, it aims to illustrate the status quo of the quality of guidelines on end-of-life decision-making by using the AGREE instrument in a (...) first practice test. Method The transferability of the AGREE instrument on the quality assessment of ethical guidelines is demonstrated by conceptual analysis. Guidelines on end-of-life decisions in medicine are identified through a systematic search in MEDLINE (from June 1999 to June 2009). The quality of all included guidelines was assessed with a slightly modified AGREE instrument. Results Of 103 guidelines identified, 34 were included as relevant. The majority of the guidelines analysed in this study were assessed as qualitatively insufficient in five out of six AGREE quality domains. A few guidelines demonstrated, however, that a high level of quality in accordance with the AGREE requirements is possible. Conclusion This review concludes that the quality of many ethical guidelines should and can be improved in all quality domains specified by the AGREE instrument. Furthermore, conceptual analysis indicates that a slightly modified AGREE instrument is transferable to the comprehensive evaluation of the quality of ethical guidelines. Nevertheless, future research is needed to improve the assessment of the presentation of the guidelines' normative basis. (shrink)

The subject of the present inquiry is the approach-to-the-truth research, which started with the publication of Sir Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. In the decade before this publication, Popper fiercely attacked the ideas of Rudolf Carnap about confirmation and induction; and ten years later, in the famous tenth chapter of Conjectures he introduced his own ideas about scientific progress and verisimilitude. Abhorring inductivism for its apprecia tion of logical weakness rather than strength, Popper tried to show that fallibilism could serve (...) the purpose of approach to the truth. To substantiate this idea he formalized the common sense intuition about preferences, that is: B is to be preferred to A if B has more advantages andfewer drawbacks than A. In 1974, however, David Millerand Pavel Tichy proved that Popper's formal explication could not be used to compare false theories. Subsequently, many researchers proposed alternatives or tried to improve Popper's original definition. (shrink)

According to historical theories of biological function, a trait's function is determined by natural selection in the past. I argue that, in addition to historical functions, ahistorical functions ought to be recognized. I propose a theory of biological function which accommodates both. The function of a trait is the way it contributes to fitness and fitness can only be determined relative to a selective regime. Therefore, the function of a trait can only be specified relative to a selective regime. Apart (...) from its desirable pluralism, only this view of relational function can support the function/accident and function/malfunction distinctions commonly thought to be part of the concept of function. Furthermore, only relational function correctly characterizes the explanatory consequences of function attributions in evolutionary biology. (shrink)

This article suggests that Chomsky’s notorious ‘London’ argument against semantics looks much more plausible that it is usually interpreted as being when seen in the light of something apparently remote from its concerns, viz., David Lewis’s distinction between natural and non-natural properties.

"Deductivism" is the thesis that all logic is deductive. Stove lays out the arguments for the existence of non-deductive logic.

Most contributions to the current debate about the consideration and application of empirical information in ethics scholarship deal with epistemological issues such as the role and the meaning of empirical research in ethical reasoning. Despite the increased publication of empirical data in ethics literature we still lack systematic analyses and conceptual frameworks that would help us to understand the rarely discussed methodological and practical problems in appraising empirical research. This paper demonstrates the need for critical appraisal and its crucial methodological (...) role in the application of empirical information in ethical reasoning. Furthermore, it systematically examines the criteria and the appropriate appraisal of empirical research and the associated challenges by highlighting current problems in empirical ethics literature. These problems reveal the following challenges for a critical and responsible consideration of empirical information in ethical reasoning: (i) training in the basic skills of locating and communicating empirical data from the relevant studies; (ii) training in basic knowledge of how to critically appraise empirical (qualitative and quantitative) research and its results; (iii) determination of quality standards for empirical ethics research; (iv) adequate reporting of the methodology and results of empirical ethics research in scientific journals. (shrink)

The principle that physicians should always act in the best interests of the present patient is widely endorsed. At the same time, and often within the same document, it is recognised that there are appropriate exceptions to this principle. Unfortunately, little, if any, guidance is provided regarding which exceptions are appropriate and how they should be handled. These circumstances might be tenable if the appropriate exceptions were rare. Yet, evaluation of the literature reveals that there are numerous exceptions, several of (...) which pervade clinical medicine. This situation leaves physicians without adequate guidance on when to allow exceptions and how to address them, increasing the chances for unfairness in practice. The present article considers the range of exceptions, illustrates how the lack of guidance poses ethical concern and describes an alternative account of physician obligations to address this concern. (shrink)

Dual-track assessment directs research ethics committees to assess the risks of research interventions based on the unclear distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions. The net risks test, in contrast, relies on the clinically familiar method of assessing the risks and benefits of interventions in comparison to the available alternatives and also focuses attention of the RECs on the central challenge of protecting research participants.Research guidelines around the world recognise that clinical research is ethical only when the risks to participants are (...) reasonable.1 Appropriate implementation of this requirement is vital to protecting research participants and allowing research to proceed when it poses acceptable risks. Unfortunately, as the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission notes: “current regulations do not further elaborate how risks and potential benefits are to be assessed, and little additional guidance is available to IRBs.”1The NBAC, as well as numerous commentators, recommend that research ethics committees , ethics review committees and institutional review boards should adopt what may be called dual-track risk assessment.2–5 Yet, dual-track assessment unnecessarily divides research interventions into two different categories before assessing their risks and relies on the unclear distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions. As a result, dual-track assessment provides RECs with confusing guidance and has the potential to block valuable research that poses acceptable risks. This paper describes one alternative, the net risks test, and argues that this approach offers a better method for assessing research risks, one that puts RECs in a position to protect participants without blocking appropriate research studies.BACKGROUNDClinical research exposes participants to interventions and procedures to gather systematic data that may be used to improve overall health and well-being. To ensure that research is ethical, RECs must ensure that the risks and burdens to participants are not excessive and that …. (shrink)

Part of the work for this paper was done during the tenure of a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I am grateful for financial support provided by the National Science Foundation, Grant #BNS-8011494, and for the assistance of the staff of the Center. I also want to thank David Bloor, Stephen Downes, David Hull and Andy Pickering for offering good advice and criticism, some of which I have heeded.

In [Ono 1987] H. Ono put the question about axiomatizing the intermediate predicate logicLFin characterized by the class of all finite Kripke frames. It was established in [ Skvortsov 1988] thatLFin is not recursively axiomatizable. One can easily show that for any finite posetM, the predicate logic characterized byM is recursively axiomatizable, and its axiomatization can be constructed effectively fromM. Namely, the set of formulas belonging to this logic is recursively enumerable, since it is embeddable in the two-sorted classical predicate (...) calculusCPC 2. Thus the logicLFin is II 2 0 -arithmetical.Here we give a more explicit II 2 0 -description ofLFin: it is presented as the intersection of a denumerable sequence of finitely axiomatizable Kripke-complete logics. Namely, we give an axiomatization of the logicLB n P m + characterized by the class of all posets of the finite height m and the finite branching n. A finite axiomatization of the predicate logicLP m + characterized by the class of all posets of the height m is known from [Yokota 1989]. We prove thatLB n P m + =,B n being the propositional axiom of the branching n. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000) 87-101 [Access article in PDF] Collingwood on Re-Enactment and The Identity of Thought Giuseppina D'oro University of Keele Collingwood's The Idea of History is often discussed in the context of the issue of the reducibility/non-reducibility of explanations in the social sciences to explanations in the natural sciences. In the 1950s and 60s, following the publication of Hempel's influential article, "The Function (...) of General Laws in History,"1 many looked at Collingwood's defence of the autonomy of history as providing the appropriate conceptual resources to counter Hempel's claim that explanations in history and in the natural sciences share the same logical structure. Collingwood was recruited as an ally in a number of debates in analytical philosophy of history with a view to clarifying the nature of appropriately historical explanations and the proper subject matter of historical science. In this paper, I wish to consider Collingwood's account of historical understanding from a related but distinct perspective, that is, I wish to consider re-enactment from the perspective of Collingwood's (controversial) claim that thought stands outside time, and that it is because thought stands outside time that it is possible to understand the thoughts of other agents, including those of agents who lived in a distant past. Although Collingwood's account of re-enactment is developed in the context of his philosophy of history, it addresses some very general issues within the philosophy of mind. It is with Collingwood's approach to these general issues that the present paper is concerned: First, I explicate Collingwood's account of re-enactment against the background of his philosophy of mind and, second, attempt to show that one important goal of Collingwood's account of re-enactment is to undermine a certain type of scepticism about the possibility of sharing the thoughts of others, rather than provide a straightforward refutation of this sceptical position. While I believe Collingwood's claim that thought stands outside time to have important repercussions on how to understand [End Page 87] issues more closely related to the philosophy of history, I will not attempt, for reasons of space, to cash out these implications here.In The Idea of History2 the concept of re-enactment is expounded largely via an engagement with an imaginary objector. The position that Collingwood attributes to the imaginary objector can be preliminarily summarized as saying that the objector identifies thoughts with token acts of thinking which can be spatio-temporally located, rather than with the propositional content expressed by those token acts. It is because the objector holds thoughts to be token acts which can be spatio-temporally located that s/he denies that two agents can have or share one and the same thought. Collingwood's reply to the imaginary objector relies on a philosophy of mind that is developed elsewhere3 but whose key elements are presupposed by his discussion of re-enactment in The Idea of History, and essential to an understanding of Collingwood's position.4An important aspect of Collingwood's philosophy of mind concerns his understanding of what is meant by an 'object of thought': When I call a thing subjective I mean that it is or pertains to a subject or conscious mind. When I call it objective I mean that it is or pertains to the object of which such a mind is conscious. I do not call a real rose objective and an imaginary one subjective, or the molecules in it objective and the beauty of it subjective. A real rose I call real and an imaginary rose I call imaginary; and I call them both objective because they are the objects of a perceiving and imagining mind respectively. (SM, 11)5For the sake of clarity I shall refer to the subjective/objective distinction as used by Collingwood as subjective2 and objective2 and to the subjective/objective distinction against which it is contrasted as subjective1 and objective1. Objective1 means existing in... (shrink)

Many studies examine a stressors-professional burnout (PB) relation, but only few consider the role of ethical conflicts (ECs) in this context. The aim of this study was to characterize ECs' frequency and level of burden with them among nurses and to establish the relations between ECs' frequency, burden and PB. One hundred nurses participated in this study. ECs' frequency and burden were tested with an originally developed questionnaire. PB was examined with Maslach Burnout Inventory. Most frequent ECs concerned a nurse-patient (...) relationship. PB was positively related to ECs' frequency (r = .54; p = .001) and burden (r = .22; p = .03). Frequency of specific conflict did not imply burden with it and vice versa. ECs' frequency seems more important for PB than a level of burden with them. The most frequent and the most burdening conflicts may lead to development of PB but the less frequent and less burdening ones are also dangerous. (shrink)

The foundation of the mathematical theory of probabilities is still a controversial subject. There are schools of insufficient reasoning and of cogent reasoning, of a priori determination and of frequency determination, of subjective and of objective probability. Two main difficulties exist. The first is the definition of equally like events. The second difficulty is the relation between the laws of causal natural science and the laws of statistical regularity. Is it really necessary to add to the laws of mechanics one (...) or more independent “laws of large numbers” to explain the regularities in dice throwing? In all these cases different answers exist, and the existence of a mathematical theory of probabilities remains a kind of miracle, as esoteric to the further domain of natural science as the resurrection of the dead. (shrink)

[book blurb:] The world is changing so fast that it's hard to know how to think about what we ought to do. We barely have time to reflect on how scientific advances will affect our lives before they're upon us. New kinds of dilemma are springing up. Can robots be held responsible for their actions? Will artificial intelligence be able to predict criminal activity? Is the future gender-fluid? Should we strive to become post-human? Should we use drugs to improve our (...) intimate relationships — or to reduce crime? Our intuitions about questions like these are often both weak and confused. -/- David Edmonds has put together a philosophical task force to get to grips with these challenges. Twenty-nine philosophers present provocative and engaging pieces about aspects of life today, and life tomorrow — birth and death, health and medicine, brain and body, personal relationships, wrongdoing and justice, the internet, animals, and the environment. The future won't look the same when you've finished this book. (shrink)