This chapter presents “Scenic Narrative Microanalysis” and its potential contribution to research on significant interactive moments. It discusses the method’s roots at the intersection of two paradigm shifts. The first is the interactive turn in psychoanalysis, which itself is situated within the overarching cultural context of a performative turn. Second, as an approach addressing short-term interactions, SNMA points to the temporal turn in sociology, economics and technology, the background for microanalytic infant research approaches that have been influential since the (...) 1970s. Finally, the future prospects of interdisciplinary method triangulation within the research group are discussed. (shrink)

Der Beitrag stellt die exemplarische Untersuchung eines Psychotherapiegesprächs mit Hilfe der »szenisch-narrativen Mikroanalyse« (SNMA) vor. »Jetzt-Momente« (»Now Moments«) und »Begegnungsmomente« (»Moments of Meeting«) im Sinne von Daniel Stern und der Boston Change Process Study Group wurden von unabhängigen geschulten Ratern identifiziert und in einer systematischen, psychoanalytisch interpretierenden Konsentierung evaluiert. Ziel des Verfahrens ist es, durch die Nutzung von Parallelprozessen die Übertragungs-Gegenübertragungs-Bewegung im Therapiedialog zu verdeutlichen und dadurch ein wesentliches Agens in (nicht nur) psychoanalytischen Psychotherapien nachzuweisen.

Forschungsgeschichte - Handbuch/übergreifende Darstellung.

Background: Electroconvulsive therapy is one of the most effective treatments for major depressive disorder. Recently, there has been increasing attention to evaluate the effect of ECT on resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging. This study aims to compare rs-fMRI of depressive disorder patients with healthy participants, investigate whether pre-ECT dynamic functional network connectivity network estimated from patients rs-fMRI is associated with an eventual ECT outcome, and explore the effect of ECT on brain network states.Method: Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data were (...) collected from 119 patients with depression or depressive disorder, and 61 healthy participants, with an age mean of 52.25 years old. The pre-ECT and post-ECT Hamilton Depression Rating Scale were 25.59 ± 6.14 and 11.48 ± 9.07, respectively. Twenty-four independent components from default mode and cognitive control network were extracted, using group-independent component analysis from pre-ECT and post-ECT rs-fMRI. Then, the sliding window approach was used to estimate the pre-and post-ECT dFNC of each subject. Next, k-means clustering was separately applied to pre-ECT dFNC and post-ECT dFNC to assess three distinct states from each participant. We calculated the amount of time each subject spends in each state, which is called “occupancy rate” or OCR. Next, we compared OCR values between HC and DEP participants. We also calculated the partial correlation between pre-ECT OCRs and HDRS change while controlling for age, gender, and site. Finally, we evaluated the effectiveness of ECT by comparing pre- and post-ECT OCR of DEP and HC participants.Results: The main findings include depressive disorder patients had significantly lower OCR values than the HC group in state 2, where connectivity between cognitive control network and default mode network was relatively higher than other states, Pre-ECT OCR of state, with more negative connectivity between CCN and DMN components, is linked with the HDRS changes. This means that those DEP patients who spent less time in this state showed more HDRS change, and The post-ECT OCR analysis suggested that ECT increased the amount of time DEP patients spent in state 2.Conclusion: Our finding suggests that dynamic functional network connectivity features, estimated from CCN and DMN, show promise as a predictive biomarker of the ECT outcome of DEP patients. Also, this study identifies a possible underlying mechanism associated with the ECT effect on DEP patients. (shrink)

In this article I shall argue for an interpretation of Odyssey 19.393–466 as a flash-back taking place in the mind of Eurykleia at the moment she recognises Odysseus' scar. That Eurykleia somehow forms the connection between main story and digression has been suggested before, but so far other interpretations have been defended with more fervour. Most famous of these interpretations is the one given by E. Auerbach in the first chapter of his Mimesis. He had chosen 19.393–466 to illustrate his (...) thesis that in Homer everything is ‘fully externalized’ and that there is no background, only a ‘uniformly illuminated’ foreground. According to Auerbach the digression on the scar stands in complete isolation to its context. It is meant to ‘relax the tension’, to make the hearer/reader ‘forget what had just taken place during the footwashing’, and although it might have been presented as a recollection of Odysseus , this ‘subjectivisticperspectivistic procedure, creating a foreground and background’ was not chosen, being ‘entirely foreign to the Homeric style’. Some twenty years later this interpretation was challenged by A. Köhnken, who, however, stuck to the idea that the digression is not told from the restricted perspective of one of the characters but from the perspective of the omniscient narrator; he claims that foreground and background are marked as such through a difference in narrative style: ‘berichtende Erzählung’ for the digression itself and ‘szenische Darstellung’ for the context. I disagree with both points. (shrink)

Das szenische Verstehen kann mit philosophischen Auffassungen verbunden werden, die dem Menschen eine »szenische Existenzform« zusprechen. Das schließt die Interaktion, v.a. aber die »Konversation« ein, die nach Freuds Vorschlag Ausgangslage aller Theoriebildung ist. Dazu lassen sich die Mittel der Konversationsanalyse nutzen. Die Konversationsanalyse wird mit ihren beiden »Zweigen«, einem sozialwissenschaftlichen und einem linguis­tischen, vorgestellt und an transkribierten Beispielen erläutert. Die Verbindung von szenischem Verstehen und Konversationsanalyse kann das Unbewusste, wie gezeigt wird, um die Dimension der aktuellen Gesprächsdynamik erweitern und damit (...) eine Empirie wissenschaftlich bearbeiten, die anderen, derzeit dominanten empirischen Methoden entgeht. (shrink)

Ausgehend von klinischen Erfahrungen und Erkenntnissen der kritischen Theorie entwickelt Alfred Lorenzer im Laufe seines Wirkens ein umfangreiches Theorie- und Methodeninventar sowohl für eine sozialisationstheoretische Perspektive des kindlichen Bildungsprozesses als auch für die spezifische Methode des psychoanalytischen Verstehens unbewusster Beziehungsmuster. Seine Theorie der »Interaktionsformen« und des »szenischen Verstehens« bildet seither einen festen Bestandteil der Theorie der Psychoanalyse. Schon die innere Natur – den Trieb – versteht Lorenzer nicht als Biologie allein, sondern auch als aus sozial hergestellten Szenen bestehend. So ist (...) das Subjekt für Lorenzer von Anfang an ein Produkt seiner Beziehungserfahrungen, die anfangs über die Vermittlung durch die Mutter-Kind-Dyade auch sozial hergestellt werden. Mit dieser gesellschaftskritischen Fokussierung ist er der vielleicht radikalste Vertreter einer kritischen Psychoanalyse. Der Beitrag stellt die sozialisationstheoretischen wie methodenspezifischen Gedanken Lorenzers dar und skizziert Verbindungslinien zu anderen Theoretikern. Zur Veranschaulichung des Szenischen als methodischer Grundlage des psychoanalytischen Verstehens im Wechselspiel von Übertragung und Gegenübertragung wird die Interpretation einer Therapiesituation mit einer traumatisierten Jugendlichen aus einer neueren filmischen Darstellung entfaltet. (shrink)

In this essay, I develop the concept of episodic value, which describes a form of value connected to a particular object or individual expressed and delivered through a narrative. Narrative can bestow special kinds of value on objects, as exemplified by auction articles or museum collections. To clarify the nature of episodic value, I show how the notion of episodic value fundamentally differs from the traditional axiological picture. I extend my discussion of episodic value to argue that the (...) notion of episodic value readily incorporates the role of narratives into the construction of identity in personal and social contexts. My main contentions are twofold. First, events or experiences from our personal narratives are episodically valuable insofar as they contribute to shaping our narrative identities. Second, when engaged in a collective action, we write a joint narrative with other participants that confers special meanings on the actions of each participant. (shrink)

Das »szenische Verstehen« nimmt seit den Arbeiten von Hermann Argelander (1966, 1968) und Alfred Lorenzer (1970) einen festen Platz in der Theorie der psychoanalytischen Behandlung ein. Diese Form des Verstehens bildete eine wichtige Erweiterung des Umgangs mit Übertragung und Gegenübertragung sowohl im Erstinterview als auch im Verlauf eines analytischen Prozesses. Szenisches Verstehen zielt auf verdrängte und/oder nur unzureichend symbolisierte unbewusste Prozesse, die zur Entstehung spezifischer Leidenszustände eines Menschen geführt haben und sich auch noch in der Gegenwart in Phantasien und Erwartungen (...) äußern. Mittels Übertragung kommen sie sprachlich wie nichtsprachlich zum Ausdruck. Die jeweilige aktuelle Beziehung zum Analytiker wird dabei als »Szene« oder »Situation« zum Ausgangspunkt des szenischen Verstehens. Seit der intersubjektiven und relationalen Wende scheint das szenische Verstehen aber entweder selbstverständlich geworden zu sein, durch Konzepte angloamerikanischer Autoren an den Rand gedrängt oder theoretisch eingemeindet worden zu sein. Der Beitrag skizziert, wie das szenische Verstehen weiterhin einen zentralen Stellenwert im analytischen Prozess des Zuhörens einnehmen und mit anderen Konzepten verbunden werden kann. Dazu werden anhand ­einer Szene in einem Erstinterview einige intersubjektive Komponenten des szenischen Verstehens betrachtet, die für das weitere szenische Geschehen sensibilisieren können. (shrink)

Philosophie ist wissentlicher Einhegungsversuch des Nichtwissens. Wo immer sie daher die Bedeutung und Wirksamkeit des Nichtwissens nicht präsent hält, verfehlt sie ihre Mitte. Das hat sich seit der Antike bis heute nicht geändert. Allerdings blieb es den Interessen der Zeiten und Denker vorbehalten, die Mischformen von Wissen und Nichtwissen in ihrer Eigenart mehr oder weniger eingehend zu analysieren. Selbst wenn die sokratische Formel vom Wissen des Nichtwissens durchgängig gerne zitiert wurde: Wie die Formen des Wissens in ihren schwachen, aber unentbehrlichen (...) Variationen näherhin zu charakterisieren sind, hat über die Zeiten die Philosophen eher selten interessiert. Aber diese schwachen Formen des Wissens wie Ahnung, Mutmaßung und das Gefühl als Grundlage von Situationseinschätzungen sind für unseren Alltag von erheblicher Bedeutung. Wolfram Hogrebe diskutiert in seinem Buch Formen des Wissens in ihrer szenischen Relevanz, ja das Szenische als Wissensform selbst. Ein von der Philosophie bislang völlig ignoriertes Thema. Aber die Philosophie kann gar nicht ignorieren, ohne dennoch auch in ihrem Absehen noch etwas Mitgesehenes hervortreten zu lassen. (shrink)

To raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself. So natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way things really happened, that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent—absent or, as in some domains of Western intellectual and artistic culture, programmatically refused. As (...) a panglobal fact of culture, narrative and narration are less problems than simply data. As the late Roland Barthes remarked, narrative "is simply there like life itself . . . international, transhistorical, transcultural."1 Far from being a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into telling,2 the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific. We may not be able fully to comprehend specific thought patterns of another culture, but we have relatively less difficulty understanding a story coming from another culture, however exotic that culture may appear to us. As Barthes says, "narrative...is translatable without fundamental damage" in a way that a lyric poem or a philosophical discourse is not. · 1. Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," Music, Image, Text, trans. Stephen Heath , p. 79.· 2. The words "narrative," "narration," "to narrate," and so on derive via the Latin gnārus and narro from the Sanskrit root gnâ . The same root yields γνωριμος : see Emile Boisacq, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque , under the entry for this word. My thanks to Ted Morris of Cornell, one of our greatest etymologists. Hayden White, professor in the program of history of consciousness at the University of California, Santa Cruz, is the author of The Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, The Greco-Roman Tradition, and Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe. " The Narrativization of Real Events" appeared in the Summer 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. Critical Responses to the present essay include Louis O. Mink's "Everyman His or Her Own Annalist", and Marilyn Robinson Waldman's "The Otherwise Unnoteworthy Year 711: A Reply to Hayden White," both in the Summer 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

The deceptive clues in the impossible puzzle film confirm the viewer’s internal expectations and allow retrospective attributing. In the film, a transcendental object negates an internal expectation, causing a retrospective blockage. Retrospectivity does not stop there; the transcendental object reinterpreting deceptive clues in the associative area leads to repeated attribution. This article consists of three parts. First, it discusses impossible puzzle films in the context of complex narrative classification. The following section introduces the Jungian concept of synchronicity and illustrates (...) how it works. The article concludes with a case study of Long Day’s Journey into Night (2018), which contains more complicated puzzles and explains how mind-game narrative techniques create deceptive clues and induce deceptive retrospective attribution. (shrink)

The question of 20th century philosophy was: how are we humans situated in our world? In forms of consciousness, as Husserl insistently analyzed, in language games, as Wittgenstein thought, or in a prior understanding of being, as Heidegger recommended? Wolfram Hogrebe summarizes these answers in what he calls scenic existence. This is grounded in certainties in which we experience ourselves sensitively 'tinted'. In this respect, forms of consciousness, language games and understanding of being are only built up from an anonymous (...) sonority. Wolfram Hogrebe has been following these circumstances for several years. In this new book, he delineates the project in historically informed, multi-faceted differentiations, terminating in a plea for a new enlightenment that may be understood as a program for our time. (shrink)

This article studies the narratives of voices identifying the harrowing aftermath of the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, and the representations of the contemporary effects of partition in Bapsi Sidhwa’s novel Ice Candy Man. The narrative unfolds past experiences through the eyes of different characters and surroundings from different social, political and religious backgrounds. The novel vividly portrays the horror of violence during the partition, as communities that once coexisted peacefully become engulfed in a whirlwind of hatred and (...) bloodshed. Sidhwa’s polyphonic narrative experiences reflect the multifaceted nature of violence, from communal riots to personal tragedies creating a poignant portrayal of human suffering and resilience. The theme of partition, violence, and memory permeates throughout the novel, encapsulating the socio-political upheavals that marked the birth of two nations – India and Pakistan. This paper, therefore, attempts to analyse the novel in order to understand the ideas of the ‘polyphonic narrative’ of Mikhael Bakhtin’s theory and many other postcolonial critic’s ideas. For portraying the human experience amidst a backdrop of partition and historical turmoil in shaping narratives as presented in the text by applying the theoretical framework of Postcolonial theory. (shrink)

An increasing number of patients receive diagnoses of disease without having any symptoms. These include diseases detected through screening programs, as incidental findings from unrelated investigations, or via routine checks of various biological variables like blood pressure or cholesterol. In this article, we draw on narrative identity theory to examine how the process of making sense of being diagnosed with asymptomatic disease can trigger certain overlooked forms of harm for patients. We show that the experience of asymptomatic disease can (...) involve ‘mismatches’ between one’s beliefs about one’s health status on the one hand, and bodily sensations or past experience on the other. Patients’ attempts to integrate these diagnoses into their self-narratives often involve either forming inaccurate beliefs about bodily sensations and/or past experience, or coming to believe that feelings and experience do not necessarily track or predict health status, leading to an ongoing sense of vulnerability to ill health. These resulting alterations in self-understanding can sometimes be considered harmful, in view of their implications for ascriptions of responsibility and ongoing anxiety. (shrink)

Schönau et al. (2021) identified four dimensions of agency (authenticity, privacy, self–trust, and responsibility) that may be influenced by the use of neurotechnologies, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) or brain–computer–interfaces (BCI). The Agency Map they proposed depicts the role of each dimension, and indicates how they may interact. The authors emphasize that a strength of their approach is that it allows to capture the agency dimensions that were previously seen as disconnected and independent as intricately interwoven parts of the (...) person’s experience. This intended unification may help to understand personal agency more fully in various contexts important in neuroethical considerations. However, what is missing in Schönau et al.’s analysis is the mechanism—the very link— by which these various dimensions can come together. As Zawadzki (2020) points out discussing his account of the self (PTS–moral aspects)—which also includes the agency dimensions indicated by Schönau et al. (both authenticity, and responsibility, but also autonomy)—what is crucial in order to unify these various dimensions is narrative. (shrink)

Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging (...) from this work, there appear to be a variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life. (shrink)

I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of (...) our material cohere into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography. The chief fictional char- acter . . . of that autobiography is one’s self’ (Dan Dennett). The second is a normative, ethical claim: we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story; a ‘basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives in a narrative’ and have an understanding of our lives ‘as an unfolding story’ (Charles Taylor). A person ‘creates his identity [only] by forming an autobiographical narrative – a story of his life’, and must be in possession of a full and ‘explicit narrative [of his life] to develop fully as a person’ (Marya Schechtman). (shrink)

This text offers a reflection on the nature and significance of narrative in human communication.

In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology (...) of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals, diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally-laden autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational construct. (shrink)

The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) is a recently conceived, late entrant into the contest of trying to understand the basis of our mature folk psychological abilities, those involving our capacity to explain ourselves and comprehend others in terms of reasons. This paper aims to clarify its content, importance and scientific plausibility by: distinguishing its conceptual features from those of its rivals, articulating its philosophical significance, and commenting on its empirical prospects. I begin by clarifying the NPH's target explanandum and (...) the challenge it presents to theory theory (TT), simulation theory (ST) and hybrid combinations of these theories. The NPH competes with them directly for the same explanatory space insofar as these theories purport to explain the core structural basis of our folk psychological (FP)-competence (those of the sort famously but not exclusively deployed in acts of third-personal mindreading). (shrink)

This paper is about visual narratives. Most of the examples used in the philosophical literature on narratives are literary ones. But a general account of narrative needs to be able to cover both pictorial and literary cases. In the first part of the paper, I will argue that none of the most influential accounts of narrative are capable of this. In the second part, I outline an account of visual narratives, or, rather, of our engagement with visual narratives.

This paper responds to Saul Fisher’s critical note (in the current volume) on Peter Lamarque and Nigel Walter’s ‘The Application of Narrative to the Conservation of Historic Buildings’ (Estetika 1/2019). Walter restates the argument, underlining the context of ‘living' buildings whose identities are still in formation. He then responds to points raised by Fisher, commenting on persistence and identity, Noël Carroll’s views on narrative connection, the usefulness of Carroll's engagement with spatial relations, and addressing some of Fisher’s specific (...) challenges. Lamarque then comments, framing the central question as whether conservation work to a building preserves its character, integrity, and coherence, noting that these are core aspects of narrative, before concluding with some reflections on the application of metaphor, including the metaphorical personification of buildings. (shrink)

Despite the ubiquity of healthcare simulation and the humanities in medical education, the two domains of learning remain unintegrated. The stories suffused within healthcare simulation have thus remained unshaped by the developments of narrative medicine and the health humanities. Healthcare simulation, in turn, has yet to utilize concepts like co-construction and narrative competence to enrich learners’ understanding of patient experience alongside their clinical competencies. To create a conceptual bridge between these two fields (including narrative-based inquiry more broadly), (...) we redescribe narrative competence via Ronald Heifetz’s distinction of “technical” and “adaptive” challenges outlined in his adaptive leadership model. Heifetz, we argue, enriches learners’ self-understanding of the unique demands of cultivating narrative competence, which can be both elucidated on the page and tested within the charged yet supportive simulation environment. We introduce Co-constructive Patient Simulation (CCPS) to demonstrate how working with simulated patients can support narrative work by drawing on the clinical vicissitudes of learners in the formulation and enactment of case studies. The three movements of CCPS—resensing, retelling, and retooling—told through learner experiences, describe the affinities and divergences between narrative medicine’s sequence of attention, representation, and affiliation; Montello’s three forms of narrative competence (departure, performance, change), and Heifetz’s three steps (observe, interpret, and intervene) of adaptive leadership. (shrink)

Recent work on the relation between narrative and selfhood has emphasized embodiment as an indispensable foundation for selfhood. This has occasioned an interesting debate on the relation between embodiment and narrative. In this paper, I attempt to mediate the range of conflicting intuitions within the debate by proposing a scalar approach to narrative and an accompanying concept of a split-self. Drawing on theoretical developments from contemporary narratology, I argue that we need to move away from a binary (...) understanding of narrative as something an entity strictly is or is not; rather, we need to see narrative as an attribute admitting of degrees. I suggest that the relation between narrative and embodiment should be seen along these lines, proposing three levels of the narrativity of embodied experiencing: 1) the unnarratable, 2) the narratable and 3) the narrative. Finally, I discuss the implications this framework has for the general question of the narrative constitution of selfhood. (shrink)

In this article, “Narrative Closure,” a theory of the nature of narrative closure is developed. Narrative closure is identified as the phenomenological feeling of finality that is generated when all the questions saliently posed by the narrative are answered. The article also includes a discussion of the intelligibility of attributing questions to narratives as well as a discussion of the mechanisms that achieve this. The article concludes by addressing certain recent criticisms of the view of (...) class='Hi'>narrative expounded by this article. (shrink)

Several scholars observed that narratives about the human past are evaluated comparatively. Few attempts have been made, however, to explore how such evaluations are actually done. Here I look at a lengthy “contest” among several historiographic narratives, all constructed to make sense of another one—the biblical story of the conquest of Canaan. I conclude that the preference of such narratives can be construed as a rational choice. In particular, an easily comprehensible and emotionally evocative narrative will give way to (...) a complex and mundane one, when the latter provides a more coherent account of the consensually accepted body of evidence. This points to a fundamental difference between historiographic narratives and fiction, contrary to some influential opinions in the philosophy of historiography. Such historiographic narratives have similarities with hypotheses and narrative explanations in natural science. (shrink)