La 4e de couv. mentionne "Nous admirons la plupart du temps les peintures vénitiennes du Tintoret dans des conditions défavorables : il en est de même pour les textes de Sartre sur la peinture, disséminés au gré des Situations, parfois inédits. On croit alors y trouver une théorie de l'imaginaire focalisée sur l'irréalité du monde des images. La définition des "arts non-signifiants" dans Qu'est-ce que la Littérature, tout comme les articles sur la peinture, rédigés entre 1954 et 1970 corrigent certaines (...) idées reçues, traçant au sein de la philosophie sartrienne une nouvelle approche, plus "matiériste" de l'art. Ces "essais d'esthétique picturale" sauveraient ainsi Sartre d'une théorie iconoclaste de l'imaginaire, faisant apparaitre une possible redéfinition de l'analogon pictural. Mais ils permettent aussi d'inventer une toute nouvelle catégorie, celle des "peintres sartriens", où dialoguent ensemble Le Tintoret, Giacometti, Masson, Wols, Lapoujade et Rebeyrolle.". (shrink)

In “The Bioethics of Environmental Injustice: Ethical, Legal, and Clinical Implications of Unhealthy Environments,” Ray and Cooper (2024) initiate needed discourse on environmental justice and the...

Analytic metaphysics has recently discovered biology as a means of grounding metaphysical theories. This has resulted in long-standing metaphysical puzzles, such as the problems of personal identity and material constitution, being increasingly addressed by appeal to a biological understanding of identity. This development within metaphysics is in significant tension with the growing tendency amongst philosophers of biology to regard biological identity as a deep puzzle in its own right, especially following recent advances in our understanding of symbiosis, the evolution of (...) multi-cellular organisms and the inherently dynamical character of living systems. Moreover, and building on these biological insights, the broadly substance ontological framework of metaphysical theories of biological identity appears problematic to a growing number of philosophers of biology who invoke process ontology instead. This volume addresses this tension, exploring to what extent it can be dissolved. For this purpose, the volume presents the first selection of essays exclusively focused on biological identity and written by experts in metaphysics, the philosophy of biology and biology. The resulting cross-disciplinary dialogue paves the way for a convincing account of biological identity that is both metaphysically constructive and scientifically informed, and will be of interest to metaphysicians, philosophers of biology and theoretical biologists. (shrink)

In science policy, it is generally acknowledged that science-based problem-solving requires interdisciplinary research. For example, policy makers invest in funding programs such as Horizon 2020 that aim to stimulate interdisciplinary research. Yet the epistemological processes that lead to effective interdisciplinary research are poorly understood. This article aims at an epistemology for interdisciplinary research, in particular, IDR for solving ‘real-world’ problems. Focus is on the question why researchers experience cognitive and epistemic difficulties in conducting IDR. Based on a study of educational (...) literature it is concluded that higher-education is missing clear ideas on the epistemology of IDR, and as a consequence, on how to teach it. It is conjectured that the lack of philosophical interest in the epistemology of IDR is due to a philosophical paradigm of science, which prevents recognizing severe epistemological challenges of IDR, both in the philosophy of science as well as in science education and research. The proposed alternative philosophical paradigm entails alternative philosophical presuppositions regarding aspects such as the aim of science, the character of knowledge, the epistemic and pragmatic criteria for accepting knowledge, and the role of technological instruments. This alternative philosophical paradigm assume the production of knowledge for epistemic functions as the aim of science, and interprets ‘knowledge’ as epistemic tools that must allow for conducting epistemic tasks by epistemic agents, rather than interpreting knowledge as representations that objectively represent aspects of the world independent of the way in which it was constructed. The engineering paradigm of science involves that knowledge is indelibly shaped by how it is constructed. Additionally, the way in which scientific disciplines construct knowledge is guided by the specificities of the discipline, which can be analyzed in terms of disciplinary perspectives. This implies that knowledge and the epistemic uses of knowledge cannot be understood without at least some understanding of how the knowledge is constructed. Accordingly, scientific researchers need so-called metacognitive scaffolds to assist in analyzing and reconstructing how ‘knowledge’ is constructed and how different disciplines do this differently. In an engineering paradigm of science, these metacognitive scaffolds can also be interpreted as epistemic tools, but in this case as tools that guide, enable and constrain analyzing and articulating how knowledge is produced. In interdisciplinary research, metacognitive scaffolds assist interdisciplinary communication aiming to analyze and articulate how the discipline constructs knowledge. (shrink)

In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, well-individuated, discrete particulars. However, (...) I argue that this is mistaken. Autopoiesis and biological autonomy, properly understood, require a rigorous commitment to a process ontological view of life. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate whether phenomenological description can help in transforming an unjust or violent situation. If one can agree that describing the situation of a group of marginalised subjects is necessary in order to define what is going wrong, then the question of whether the method can help change these states, remains unanswered. With this in mind, I then suggest that phenomenological description can only serve critical causes, under the condition that it takes the transformative power of language (...) into account: by describing our experiences we already transform them. To this end, I draw on deconstructivist approaches, which focus on language as a social act of addressing oneself to others. I conclude by arguing that description can itself be a transformative tool – if we stress how it takes place under conditions of address that necessarily shape the experience to be described. (shrink)

La catégorie de l'hospitalité ne constitue pas une nouvelle perspective de l'éthique contemporaine; c'est plutôt l'une des plus vieilles notions éthiques que l'histoire de l'humanité nous ait données.Conscient de cette particularité, le philosophe espagnol Daniel Innerarity propose un repositionnement anthropologique de l'hospitalité qui ébranle sérieusement les assises théoriques des perspectives classiques de l'identité, de la subjectivité, de la conscience de l'espace et, particulièrement, du temps. Daniel Innerarity repose la question de l'hospitalité dans une époque déboussolée qui est la nôtre. Il (...) introduit l'idée d'une hospitalité à partir de ce que nous pourrions nommer " une ouverture à l'impromptu ". Une ouverture à la contingence, une éthique de la réception de la fortune, l'hospitalité comme une occasion d'accueillir ce qui arrive sans notre consentement, comme une occasion qui nous est offerte. Pour Daniel Innerarity, notre monde " sans centre " et " sans environs ", tiraillé entre " les impératifs de la modernisation et de la croissance et les exigences d'une éthique de la conservation, de la prudence et de la protection ", nous invite, avant tout, à acquérir de nouvelles attitudes et aptitudes interprétatives. Ce livre n'a pas pour objet l'étude exégétique de l'essai Ethique de l'hospitalité de Daniel Innerarity, mais cherche plutôt à l'inscrire dans un jeu de dialogues avec des chercheurs de différents horizons qui ont comme sens commun de faire résonner le concept d'hospitalité dans leurs perspectives distinctes. Ce jeu de dialogues se termine sur un texte inéditde Daniel Innerarity sur l'hospitalité. (shrink)

In everyday life, we usually go by theone-body-one-person rule: one person has one body. This social belief builds on two assumptions: bodies are individual units and they are the same in different situations. This is also the conceptual resource for social theories that build on the notion of individuals. In this article, we turn it into a sociological topic. We develop a vocabulary for reconstructing bodily one-ness and bodily sameness as practically achieved social order, asbody boundary work: what belongs to (...) a body is a matter of local practices that define its situational contours, limits and margins. Practices of identification and personification draw on social memories and enact bodies as trans-situational entities. Persons and bodies, we argue, evolve in co-individuation. Personal corporality, then, can be conceptualized as abody of workthat encompasses these practical efforts of boundary-making. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of biology, recently promising steps have been made towards a biologically grounded concept of agency. Agency is described as bio-agency: the intrinsically normative adaptive behaviour of human and non-human organisms, arising from their biological autonomy. My paper assesses the bio-agency approach by examining criticism recently directed by its proponents against the project of embodied robotics. Defenders of the bio-agency approach have claimed that embodied robots do not, and for fundamental reasons cannot, qualify as artificial agents because they (...) do not fully realise biological autonomy. More particularly, it has been claimed that embodied robots fail to be agents because agency essentially requires metabolism. I shall argue that this criticism, while being valuable in bringing to the fore important differences between bio-agents and existing embodied robots, nevertheless is too strong. It relies on inferences from agency-as-we-know-it to agency-as-it-could-be which are justified neither empirically nor conceptually. (shrink)

What are persons and how do they exist? The predominant answer to this question in Western metaphysics is that persons, human and others, are, and exist as, substances, i.e., ontologically independent, well-demarcated things defined by an immutable (usually mental) essence. Change, on this view, is not essential for a person's identity; it is in fact more likely to be detrimental to it. In this chapter I want to suggest an alternative view of human persons which is motivated by an appreciation (...) of their biological nature. Organisms, human and non-human, are dynamical systems that for their existence and persistence depend on an ongoing interaction with the environment in which they are embedded. Taking seriously this most fundamental human condition leads to recognising human persons as processes, i.e., as entities for the identity of which change is essential. It also implies a holistic view of the human mind. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of biology, recently promising steps have been made towards a biologically grounded concept of agency. Agency is described as bio-agency: the intrinsically normative adaptive behaviour of human and non-human organisms, arising from their biological autonomy. My paper assesses the bio-agency approach by examining criticism recently directed by its proponents against the project of embodied robotics. Defenders of the bio-agency approach have claimed that embodied robots do not, and for fundamental reasons cannot, qualify as artificial agents because they (...) do not fully realise biological autonomy. More particularly, it has been claimed that embodied robots fail to be agents because agency essentially requires metabolism. I shall argue that this criticism, while being valuable in bringing to the fore important differences between bio-agents and existing embodied robots, nevertheless is too strong. It relies on inferences from agency-as-we-know-it to agency-as-it-could-be which are justified neither empirically nor conceptually. (shrink)

In this monograph, I systematically analyse the debate in recent analytic metaphysics, with a special focus on recent biologically inspired (so-called animalist) theories of personal identity. I argue that the debate is stuck in a dilemma which is neither harmless nor new: the modern antagonism between the reductionist elimination of personal identity on the one hand and its non-reductionist mystification on the other rather repeats the antagonism between rationalist dogmatism and empirical scepticism in the 18th century’s debates on the soul. (...) This latter antagonism has been extensively examined by Kant who also sought for ways to overcome the dilemma. The systematic analysis of the modern ‘analytic’ debate is therefore followed by a presentation and critical discussion of the constructive approaches taken by Kant and post-Kantian ‘continental’ philosophers. From a Kantian perspective, what we are confronted with is a fundamental dialectic, originating in the very structure of human reason and threatening to turn metaphysics altogether into an arena of fruitless battles. The possibility of a satisfactory metaphysical account of transtemporal personal identity reveals itself to be contingent on the possibility of a ‘good’ metaphysics able to overcome that dialectic. (shrink)

For the most part, current reflections on the social seem to overemphasize either homogeneity (society/nation-state, modernization/globalization) or heterogeneity (sociality, cosmopolitanism). Against this, here the argument is put forward that it is appropriate to think of the social as consisting of aspects of homogeneity or shared frames of reference and aspects of heterogeneity at the same time. This thought is developed particularly in contrast to normative concepts such as Bauman's sociality—republicanism nexus or Beck and Grande's ideas on European cosmopolitanism. With the (...) help of concepts such as sociation, glocalization and conflict, a basis will be developed for the elaboration of particular socials (e.g. Europe) as a general social theory. This avoids falling into normative traps, which are usually risky when starting out from a historical particularity to explain current and future structures and features of notions such as European society. (shrink)

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, dispositionalism is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...) This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to elucidate the very foundations of science. In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the state of the debate and explain the twofold aim of the present collection of essays which is (i) to explore the ontological commitments of dispositionalism and (ii) to discuss these against the background of latest scientific research, by bringing together perspectives from both metaphysics and the philosophy of science. I finally provide a summary of this intellectual journey. (shrink)

Do human embryos have a disposition to personhood? This has been argued within recent attempts to reformulate the classical argument from potentiality for the protection of human embryos with the help of the concept of disposition. In this paper, I analyse the central ontological premise of this new approach and show that any hopes of rehabilitating in dispositionalist terms the idea of a potential to personhood inherent in human embryos are mistaken. The dispositionalist version of the potentiality argument navigates in (...) same metaphysical waters as its predecessor and, hence, collides just the same with biological facts concerning human embryogenesis. (shrink)

Sous l’impulsion européenne, le droit de la médiation de la consommation a été profondément renouvelé avec la transposition de la directive 2013/11/UE relative au règlement extrajudiciaire des litiges de consommation par l’ordonnance n°2015-1033 du 20 août 2015. L’accès rapide, efficace et gratuit à un dispositif de médiation de la consommation a été appréhendé comme un droit pour le consommateur, dont la mise en place incombe aux professionnels dans tous les secteurs d’activités économiques. À la différence des autres modes amiables de (...) règlement des litiges, la médiation de la consommation a fait l’objet d’un encadrement strict avec l’élaboration d’un véritable statut de médiateur de la consommation et l’assujettissement du processus de médiation à des garanties d’ordre procédural. Placé sous le contrôle de la Commission d’évaluation et de contrôle de la médiation de la consommation, le dispositif de médiation de la consommation tend à s’imposer comme le mode privilégié de règlement des litiges de consommation. (shrink)

Goffi and Roux are interested in what makes some thought experiments work, while others do not work. They do not attempt to draw an a priori line between two types of thought experiments, but rather ask the following question: inasmuch as thought experiments are arguments, and notwithstanding the fact that some of them might involve the contemplation of an imaginary scenario, how is it that some of them work, while others do not? Taking inspiration from a counterfactual thought experiment presented (...) by Nicholas Rescher, they treat thought experiments as argumentative procedures resembling tests of consistency, which invite the experimenter to seek the weakest link in her body of beliefs. Equipped with this method, they examine two well-known successful thought experiments (Galileo’s two bodies strapped together, and Thomson’s violinist) and discuss Mach’s notion of thought experiments. Thus they reach the hypothesis that successful thought experiments respect the three following conditions: they do not deal with things, but with beliefs; they mobilise a set of beliefs shared by the interlocutors; and this set of beliefs has a hierarchical structure. Using once again examples written at different periods and taken from various disciplines (Descartes’ receding bodies, Aristotle’s weaving shuttles), Goffi and Roux argue that each of those conditions is individually necessary for a thought experiment to work. They finally conclude on the limits and consequences of their approach. (shrink)

After describing the three European strategies focused on social control, this essay will first demonstrate that the first two strategies try less to protect societies than to enforce efficient tools of governance. Additionally, they reinforce stereotypes harming Muslim immigrants. I show that diverse approaches in policing can make a difference in the communities where police forces operate. The third strategy, that of prevention requiring the cooperation of the citizens, may be more sustainable in the long term as it facilitates communication (...) among local politicians and involved actors. Finally, I point out that the interplay of interests, ideas and institutions matter a great deal to the comparison. (shrink)

Free games that are monetized by selling virtual items, such as cosmetic microtransactions for one’s avatar, seem to offer a better gaming experience to paying players. To experimentally explore this phenomenon, the effects of character customization with cosmetic microtransactions on objective and self-estimated player performance, subjective identification with the avatar, fun and the players’ perceived competence were examined in the game League of Legends. This study introduces a new laboratory-based, experimental task to objectively measure within-game player performance. Each participant performed (...) this game-based task in two different conditions: With a character that was customized using a provided set of cosmetic microtransactions and with a default character. Results showed that customization increased subjective identification with the player character. However, objective performance measures were unaffected by this manipulation although the novel experimental approach provided reliable performance results. Additionally, identification was positively related to perceived competence, fun, and self-estimated performance. Implications for the design of cosmetic microtransactions and their influence on competitive gaming are discussed. (shrink)

Was ist das Spezifische der Marx'schen Kritik? Die zahlreichen Versuche, die eine Kritik bei Marx zu identifizieren, ließen bislang oft das verbindende Moment der unterschiedlichen Sprachen der Kritik in seinem Werk außer Acht: ihren politischen Einsatz. Man muss diesen Einsatz als konstitutiv für den Modus seiner Gesellschaftskritik begreifen, den Marx mit dem Bild einer »Kritik im Handgemenge« einfing. Die Beiträge des Bandes binden auf neue Weise Marx' Kritik wieder stärker an deren konkrete politische Situierung und erörtern die Bedeutung des 'Handgemenges' (...) für die Entwicklung seines Denkens - nicht zuletzt um hier auch ein Grundmerkmal moderner Gesellschaftskritik überhaupt auszuweisen. (shrink)

Context can determine whether a given gene acts as an oncogene or a tumor suppressor. Deubiquitinating enzymes (DUBs) regulate the stability of many components of the pathways dictating cell fate so it would be expected that alterations in the levels or activity of these enzymes may have oncogenic or tumor suppressive consequences. In the current review we survey publications reporting that genes encoding DUBs are oncogenes or tumor suppressors. For many DUBs both claims have been made. For such “double agents,” (...) the effects of gain or loss of function will depend on the overall status of a complex of molecular signaling networks subject to extensive crosstalk. As the TGF‐β paradox makes clear context is critical in cell fate decisions, and the disconnect between experimental findings and patient survival outcomes can in part be attributed to disparities between culture conditions and the microenvironment in vivo. Convincing claims for oncogene or tumor suppressor roles require the documentation of gene alterations in patient samples; survival curves are alone inadequate. (shrink)

Analytic metaphysics has recently discovered biology as a means of grounding metaphysical theories. This has resulted in long-standing metaphysical puzzles, such as the problems of personal identity and material constitution, being increasingly addressed by appeal to a biological understanding of identity. This development within metaphysics is in significant tension with the growing tendency amongst philosophers of biology to regard biological identity as a deep puzzle in its own right, especially following recent advances in our understanding of symbiosis, the evolution of (...) multi-cellular organisms and the inherently dynamical character of living systems. Moreover, and building on these biological insights, the broadly substance ontological framework of metaphysical theories of biological identity appears problematic to a growing number of philosophers of biology who invoke process ontology instead. This volume addresses this tension, exploring to what extent it can be dissolved. For this purpose, the volume presents the first selection of essays exclusively focused on biological identity and written by experts in metaphysics, the philosophy of biology and biology. The resulting cross-disciplinary dialogue paves the way for a convincing account of biological identity that is both metaphysically constructive and scientifically informed, and will be of interest to metaphysicians, philosophers of biology and theoretical biologists. (shrink)

In his famous essay „Der Essay als Form“ („The Essay as Form"), Adorno accuses Descartes of committing science to the ideal of absolute certainty (“zweifelsfreie Gewissheit”), thereby preluding the modern organized science (“organisierte Wissenschaft”), which in Adorno’s view has become alienated from real intellectual experience (“geistige Erfahrung”). In my essay, I criticize Adorno’s critique, showing that what Descartes in fact thinks about task and method of science comes much closer to the programmatical essayism of Critical Theory than Adorno supposed.

Can mental causation be naturalised without being eliminated? Thomas Buchheim argues that it can, proposing a neo-Aristotelian account dubbed "Horizontal Dualism". In this paper I assess this proposal. This article is part of a series of articles commenting on Thomas Buchheim's target article "Neuronenfeuer und seelische Tat. Ein neoaristotelischer Vorschlag zum Verständnis mentaler Kausalität", published in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119,2 (2012), 332-346. The article was reprinted in: Mentale Verursachung [Mental Causation], ed. by Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, (Jahrbuch-Kontroversen 1), Freiburg: Alber, 2014.

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...) This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science. The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue. (shrink)

In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute. The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer (...) look at Heidegger’s alternative, true finitude, leads finally to a reflection on some difficulties in Heidegger’s critique of Hegel. (shrink)

N₀-stable N₀-categorical linked quaternionic mappings are studied and are shown to correspond (in some sense) to special groups which are N₀-stable. N₀-categorical, satisfy AP(3) and have finite 2-symbol length. They are also related to special groups whose isometry relation is a finite union of cosets, which are then considered on their own, as well as their links with pseudofinite, profinite and weakly normal special groups.

Cet ouvrage collectif porte sur la place qu’occupent les femmes dans différentes parties de l’Empire romain d’Orient hellénophone. Il résulte de trois rencontres scientifiques organisées dans le cadre du programme GRECS d’ANIHMA entre 2012 et 2014. Comme l’explique Sophie Lalanne dans son introduction, le volume ne reflète que partiellement le contenu de ces rencontres ; l’éditrice formule d’ailleurs des réflexions intéressantes sur la place de l’histoire des femmes et du genre dans le domain...

Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” Call this idea the “Non-Akrasia Constraint”. Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act, an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by her evidence. The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic. In a number of recent papers, the (...) Non-Akrasia Constraint has been called into question. The goal of this paper is to defend it... for the most part. (shrink)

Social representations research is often undertaken by scholars who seek to ‘give voice’ to knowledge that are held by socially disenfranchised individuals and groups. However, this endeavour poses a number of problems in practice, not least because it assumes that the ‘voices’ voiced by individuals and/or groups in social research will be unambiguous and uniform, and unchanged by the research encounter. Despite the growth of attention to the critical potential of social representations theory, there remains a lack of scholarship on (...) the relationship between the theory's emphasis on the relational, or dialogical, nature of social life and the implications of this for critical research. In this article, I argue that the dialogical epistemology from which social representations research must depart incites reflection upon the design of empirical studies, which must equally attend to both ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, and the researcher-researched relationship, which may itself be best viewed as an Ego-Alter interaction. I make the case for adopting dialogical epistemology in critical social psychology, and argue that this is essential to undertaking ethical social research. I conclude by suggesting that claims to ‘giving voice’ have little place in critical social psychology in general, and social representations scholarship in particular. (shrink)

Believing rationally is epistemically valuable, or so we tend to think. It’s something we strive for in our own beliefs, and we criticize others for falling short of it. We theorize about rationality, in part, because we want to be rational. But why? I argue that how we answer this question depends on how permissive our theory of rationality is. Impermissive and extremely permissive views can give good answers; moderately permissive views cannot.

Epistemologists often assume that rationality bears an important connection to the truth. In this paper I examine the implications of this commitment for permissivism: if rationality is a guide to the truth, can it also allow some leeway in how we should respond to our evidence? I first discuss a particular strategy for connecting permissive rationality and the truth, developed in a recent paper by Miriam Schoenfield. I argue that this limited truth-connection is unsatisfying, and the version of permissivism that (...) supports it faces serious challenges; so, for mainstream permissivism, the truth problem is still unsolved. I then discuss a strategy available to impermissivists, according to which rationality bears a quite strong connection to truth. I argue that this second strategy is successful. (shrink)

This paper studies some model-theoretic properties of special groups of finite type. Special groups are a first-order axiomatization of the algebraic theory of quadratic forms, introduced by Dickmann and Miraglia, which is essentially equivalent to abstract Witt rings. More precisely, we consider elementary equivalence, saturation, elementary embeddings, quantifier elimination, stability and Morley rank.

Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify (...) certain coherence constraints on rational credence, such as probabilism. The chapter concludes by discussing some advantages of the guessing account over rival accounts of accuracy. (shrink)

William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue that epistemic consequentialism (...) doesn’t allow for this kind of permissivism and goes on to argue that this reveals a deep disanalogy between decision theory and the formally similar epistemic utility theory. This raises the question whether epistemic utility theory is a genuinely consequentialist theory at all. (shrink)