La región de Pulmarí, en el Departamento Aluminé, en el sur de la Argentina (Provincia de Neuquén) se caracteriza por una destacada presencia del pueblo indígena Mapuche, que ha protagonizado intensas movilizaciones desde la década de 1990 por su territorio ancestral y frente al avance de diferentes agentes estatales y privados. En contraste con la tendencia que afecta a otras poblaciones, en la región se vienen dando procesos de “territorialización” de estas familias indígenas y desaceleración de las históricas migraciones rural (...) – urbanas, lo que conlleva profundas redefiniciones y reconfiguraciones de estos ámbitos rurales -tendencias explicables a partir de la aplicación de diferentes políticas y planes sociales-. El objetivo principal es analizar la dinámica de las fuentes de ingresos de estos pequeños productores rurales Mapuche, atendiendo a estas particularidades y vinculándolas con el contexto de conflictividad y disputas entre los diferentes sectores que caracteriza a la región desde hace años. (shrink)

Esta obra ofrece un panorama completo de los problemas fundamentales de la Metafísica, bien presentado, ordenado y estructurado, concediendo a cada tema su propia categoría dentro de la escala de importancia que hoy día le corresponde. Aborda por ello cuestiones de gran actualidad e interés para el hombre de nuestro tiempo, que invitan a una reflexión serena siguiendo siempre el acertado criterio orientador y cristiano que inspira su excelente desarrollo. La obra, por tanto, quiere prestar un gran servicio tanto en (...) los centros superiores de la Iglesia como en los de la universidad civil. (shrink)

There has recently been work by multiple groups in extracting the properties associated with cardinal invariants of the continuum and translating these properties into similar analogous combinatorial properties of computational oracles. Each property yields a highness notion in the Turing degrees. In this paper we study the highness notions that result from the translation of the evasion number and its dual, the prediction number, as well as two versions of the rearrangement number. When translated appropriately, these yield four new highness (...) notions. We will define these new notions, show some of their basic properties and place them in the computability-theoretic version of Cichoń's diagram. (shrink)

In the first half of this paper, we study the way that sets of real numbers closed under Turing equivalence sit inside the real line from the perspective of algebra, measure and orders. Afterwards, we combine the results from our study of these sets as orders with a classical construction from Avraham to obtain a restriction about how non trivial automorphism of the Turing degrees (if they exist) interact with 1-generic degrees.

Las exposiciones de Rolando Castellón han tenido espacio en varias partes del mundo. El artista ha ganado premios en su natal Nicaragua y fuera de ella. Reside en Costa Rica actualmente, y no se ha detenido allí. Se le puede encontrar con varios nombres y con cada uno de ellos desarrolla una actividad distinta, es así de multifacético. Él se ha construido a sí mismo desde su propia experiencia, sin la academia de por medio. Este trabajo quiere dar un recorrido (...) sobre el trabajo y obra del artista. (shrink)

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

In Of Apes and Ancestors, Ian Hesketh attempts to de-mythologize the famous Oxford debate between Samuel Wilberforce, the bishop of Oxford, and Charles Darwin’s friends, Thomas Huxley and Joseph Hooker. Hooker and Huxley clashed publicly with Wilberforce at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) in June of 1860. At issue was the scientific content and general implication of Darwin’s Origin of Species. Hesketh argues that this event is best understood as a minor episode in (...) a complex web of personal and professional rivalries between two generations of naturalists. He further argues that Huxley aggressively reinterpreted the actual events of the debate for years afterwards, turning them into a “Galileo moment” for the nineteenth century, a moment in which science bravely stood up to religious authority and refused to back down. While his treatment of the debate and its context is well supported, the connection Hesketh draws between Huxley’s narrative and modern historiography is somewhat tenuous. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

El igualitarismo de la suerte es una teoría de justicia distributiva que incluye consideraciones de responsabilidad atributiva individual para definir las obligaciones distributivas. Se presenta como un intento de recomponer cierta consistencia interna a la teoría rawlsiana y evitar algunas de sus consecuencias “inequitativas”. El artículo defiende la consistencia interna del proyecto rawlsiano sin necesidad de incluir un criterio sensible a la responsabilidad atributiva individual, ya que la inclusión de tal criterio resultaría ilegítima desde el punto de vista rawlsiano.

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

Giacomo Zabarella es considerado uno de los aristotélicos más prestigiosos y más influyentes del siglo XVI. Su obra lógica, sus escritos sobre física y sus comentarios, publicados póstumamente, tuvieron un enorme impacto especialmente en las primeras décadas del siglo XVII, y sirvieron como verdaderos manuales con los que se formaron muchos universitarios europeos. Este artículo analiza la figura de Zabarella centrándose en su obra sobre física, el De rebus naturalibus libri XXX, editado en 1590, apenas unos días antes de su (...) muerte. (shrink)

According to Ladyman, the world consists of nothing more than relations that relate to no particulars. Could the world be nothing but structure? In this chapter it is argued that even though there are a number of problems with the standard view of relations accompanied by a particularist ontology, substituting for it a world of pure structure is not progress. A world of pure structure would be no more than a Platonic entity, lacking any resources for concretization. Consequently, there would (...) be no possibility of distinguishing between a world-kind and its concrete instance or instances. It is also argued that the view has insufficient empirical motivation. The history of science does not support the claim that structure is preserved through theory change nor that the structural components of a theory are extricable from its ontological commitments. (shrink)

In the context of the growing popularity of the ethical consumer movement and the appearance of different types of ethical collective communities, the current article explores the meanings drawn from the participation in Responsible Consumption Cooperatives. In existing research, the overriding focus has been on examining individual ethical consumer behaviour at the expense of advancing our understanding of how ethical consumers behave collectively. Hence, this article examines the meanings derived from participating in ethical consumer groups. A qualitative multi-method approach is (...) adopted to increase the validity of findings. This includes focus groups, in-depth interviews, observation and document analysis. Results show that ethical consumption in a group project offers a greater sense of effectiveness and control when compared to individual actions. Furthermore, these groups facilitate the creation of a social circle and encourage new learning as a result of the social interaction that takes place in the ethical community of the cooperative. (shrink)

A partir de El Conocimiento del Amor, Martha Nussbaum emprendió un novedoso proyecto teórico, el de construir una vinculación productiva y no colonizadora entre la literatura y la reflexión moral. Una de las tesis que aúnan sus múltiples textos sobre este proyecto es que la lectura de textos literarios puede ser un componente no solo importante, sino necesario en el desarrollo moral de los sujetos. Por medio de una determinada forma de lectura y de un lector activo y crítico al (...) mismo tiempo, el sujeto podría desarrollar en mayor grado una capacidad empática que le permita reconocer injusticias, afectos y vulnerabilidades en situaciones allende la propia y en otros individuos (Nussbaum, 1997a, p. 111). El objetivo de esta presentación es contrastar esta tesis con un texto central de la literatura argentina moderna, El Juguete Rabioso2 de Roberto Arlt. Escritor, periodista e inventor, Roberto Arlt (1900-1942) es considerado como uno de los primeros escritores modernos de Argentina que incorporó materiales heterogéneos para su obra literaria –textos periodísticos, manuales químicos, etcetera– y que ofreció una interpretación particularísima de la vida urbana cambiante, desigual y políticamente movilizada de las primeras décadas del siglo XX. Construida como una novela de iniciación, el texto arltiano acompaña las desventuras existenciales de Silvio Astier, un joven marginado de los años 30 del siglo pasado que, a pesar de buscar el éxito a cada paso, solo encuentra el fracaso. El punto central de nuestro interés estará colocado en que el acto trascendental de su vida, una acción cruel y vil contra un amigo es llevada a cabo y justificada como producto de leer determinadas novelas literarias. La cuestión problemática de esta contrastación será cómo interpretar esta acción de Astier. ¿Es una refutación parcial de la tesis de Nussbaum, ya que las lecturas de Astier guían esta acción moralmente incorrecta?, ¿o es solo una advertencia contra las esperanzas exageradas de Nussbaum en la capacidad transformadora de la literatura?, ¿o, por el contrario, es una confirmación de la tesis, ya que esa acción no se seguiría del tipo específico de lectura que propone Nussbaum?, ¿o es, en este mismo sentido, una advertencia de que las condiciones capitalistas e individualistas representan obstáculos para el tipo de lectura que promueve Nussbaum?. En este artículo, defenderé que la interpretación más adecuada de la acción trascendental de Astier es que ella no surge de una experiencia lectora demasiado empática, sino de una experiencia lectora que rechaza la empatía, ya que implica la fusión total entre el personaje ficticio arltiano y aquellas novelas que conforman su experiencia literaria. La estructura del trabajo es la siguiente: En la primera sección, reconstruiré lo que Nussbaum denominó la promesa política de la literatura y cómo ella se basa en el mayor desarrollo de las capacidades empática y compasiva que puede ofrecer, en especial cuando se la compara con las teorías éticas generales tradicionales. En la segunda sección, confrontaré dos tipos de respuesta moralizante que la teoría de Nussbaum podría dar frente al “caso Astier” y mostraré que existe una respuesta no-moralizante y que refuerza la teoría de la filósofa. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper elaborates on a theory of the ideological public sphere in the age of digital media. It describes the public sphere as an initially ascending and then descending communication process that includes both polarising and integrating publics, which are organised by antagonistic media and compromise-building mass media. This framework allows us to distinguish between hegemonic, populist, and popular-oriented flows of communication, as well as register changes in the interplay of different publics driven by digital media platforms. Digital transformations of (...) the public sphere give rise to antagonistic and networked-individualistic flows of populist communication that put public hegemony under constant pressure. The challenge is to find ways to strengthen popular communications that enable democratic learning processes and the flourishing of communicative competences of all citizens. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

El artículo presenta los principales resultados de un estudio realizado entre 1998 y 2000 con hombres jóvenes de la Ciudad de Cali, Colombia, profundizando en sus prácticas de distinción en torno al cuerpo, la vestimenta, los espacios de sociabilidad, las mujeres como objetos de ostentación y sus dinámicas de prestigio. El estudio es desarrollado en base a observación participante y a la implementación de entrevistas con grupos de jóvenes entre 14 y 22 años, tanto de sectores medios bajos, como medios (...) altos, e indaga en sus opiniones sobre la moda, el prestigio, la distinción social y los comportamientos que otorgan o quitan el estatus. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...) their phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)

Im Alltag äußern wir nicht nur Aussagen darüber, wie die Welt tatsächlich beschaffen ist, sondern auch darüber, was notwendigerweise oder möglicherweise der Fall ist. Doch worin ist die Wahrheit solcher sogenannten Modalaussagen fundiert? Auf diese Frage gibt Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit eine höchst interessante Antwort: Für ihn sind modale Wahrheiten im Intellekt Gottes fundiert. Diese Modalitätskonzeption analysiert Sebastian Bender in der vorliegenden Studie auf systematisch informierte Weise. Dabei kommt er zu folgenden Ergebnissen: Erstens vertritt Leibniz, anders (...) als häufig angenommen, eine nicht-reduktionistische Metaphysik der Modalität– Modales wird von ihm also nicht auf etwas Nicht-Modales reduziert. Zweitens ist Leibniz' Theorie der Modalität kombinatorisch geprägt. Drittens repräsentieren mögliche Welten für Leibniz nicht alles metaphysisch Mögliche. Gott kann im Prinzip auch Ansammlungen von Substanzen erschaffen, die keine Welten konstituieren. Viertens schließlich ist das für Leibniz zentrale Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes kontingent und nicht, wie häufig vorausgesetzt, notwendig. Auf diese Weise gelingt es Leibniz, seinen Rationalismus mit seinem Theismus zu verbinden. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt at the investigation of the nature of polarity contrast in natural languages. Truth conditions for natural language sentences are incomplete unless they include a proper definition of the conditions under which they are false. It is argued that the tertium non datur principle of classical bivalent logical systems is empirically invalid for natural languages: falsity cannot be equated with non-truth. Lacking a direct intuition about the conditions under which a sentence is false, we need (...) an independent foundation of the concept of falsity. The solution I offer is a definition of falsity in terms of the truth of a syntactic negation of the sentence. A definition of syntactic negation is proposed for English. (shrink)

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9045-2.

It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already (...) anticipated by Bradley. (shrink)