This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different (...) principles of justice can yield the same concrete distributive judgments, and the ambiguity of key terms. The third part distinguishes and evaluates three versions of the claim that normative theorising about justice can profit from empirical research into public opinion: that its findings are food for thought, that they amount to feasibility constraints, and that they are constitutive of normatively justified principles of justice. The view that popular opinion about justice has a strongly constitutive role to play in justifying principles of distributive justice stricto sensu is rejected, but it is argued that what the people think (and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think) on distributive matters can be an important factor for the political theorist to take into account, for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both. (shrink)

Data fraud and selective reporting both present serious threats to the credibility of science. However, there remains considerable disagreement among scientists about how best to sanction data fraud, and about the ethicality of selective reporting. The public is arguably the largest stakeholder in the reproducibility of science; research is primarily paid for with public funds, and flawed science threatens the public’s welfare. Members of the public are able to make meaningful judgments about the morality of (...) different behaviors using moral intuitions. Legal scholars emphasize that to maintain legitimacy, social control policies must be developed with some consideration given to the public’s moral intuitions. Although there is a large literature on popular attitudes toward science, there is no existing evidence about public opinion on data fraud or selective reporting. We conducted two studies—a survey experiment with a nationwide convenience sample, and a follow-up survey with a representative sample of US adults —to explore community members’ judgments about the morality of data fraud and selective reporting in science. The findings show that community members make a moral distinction between data fraud and selective reporting, but overwhelmingly judge both behaviors to be immoral and deserving of punishment. Community members believe that scientists who commit data fraud or selective reporting should be fired and banned from receiving funding. For data fraud, most Americans support criminal penalties. Results from an ordered logistic regression analysis reveal few demographic and no significant partisan differences in punitiveness toward data fraud. (shrink)

The issue of religious freedom while serving a sentence of imprisonment often occupies scientists from around the world. Basically, they agree that a prisoner, regardless of the act for which he or she has been convicted, has the right to religious freedom. Problems are posed, however, by the question of delimiting this freedom, especially at the level of the right to practise a chosen religion during prison isolation. The decisions of international tribunals and national courts are not uniform owing (...) to the generality of the rules governing this issue. The initial research question that we pose is this: how does society perceive the right to religious freedom in prisons? Does a convict have the right to demand respect for the rules of his or her religion regarding diet, clothes, appearance and participation in religious services? We look for answers to these questions in research conducted in Polish society, one that is confronted by international regulations. (shrink)

We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the judgments of climate scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3367) about the factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of disagreement within climate science and astrophysics and about how one should respond to expert disagreement. We found that, as compared to non-experts, climate experts believe that within climate science (i) there is less disagreement about climate change, (ii) methodological factors play less of a role (...) in generating disagreements, (iii) fewer personal or institutional biases influence climate research, and (iv) there is more agreement about which methods should be used to examine relevant phenomena we also observed that the uniquely American political context predicted experts’ judgments about some of these factors. We also found that, in regard to disagreements concerning cosmic ray physics, and commensurate with the greater inherent uncertainty and data lacunae in their field, astrophysicists working on cosmic rays were generally more willing to acknowledge expert disagreement, more open to the idea that a set of data can have multiple valid interpretations, and generally less quick to dismiss someone articulating a non-standard view as non-expert, than climate scientists were in regard to climate science. (shrink)

Animal research remains a deeply controversial topic in biomedical science. While a vast amount has been written about the ethical status of laboratory animals, far less academic attention has been devoted to the public and, more specifically, to public opinion. Rather than what the public think, this article considers the role of ‘public opinion’. It draws on a recent empirical study which involved interviews with laboratory scientists who use animals in their research, and with other (...) UK stakeholders. The first section of the paper demonstrates that public opinion has become a kind of resource in the animal research debate. Public opinion polls, in particular, are frequently cited. The second section explores this further and argues that, for all sides, appealing to public opinion is a key way to show legitimacy. Finally, the paper shifts gear to consider whether public opinion should matter, both for ethical reasoning and for science policy. (shrink)

Social Justice and Political Change, involves the collaboration of thirty social scientists in twelve countries, and represents broad-ranging comparative ...

This article seeks to address current debates comparing polls and opinion mining as empirically based figuration models of public opinion in the light of in-depth intellectual debates on the role and nature of public opinion that began after the French Revolution and the controversy over public opinion spurred by the invention of polls. Issues of historical quantification and re-conceptualisation of public opinion are addressed in four parts. The first summarises the history of the rise and fall (...) of the concept of public opinion. The second re-examines the key controversies in the debates on the theoretical, empirical and social implications and consequences of the invention of polling. The third part scrutinises the datafication of public opinion that started with polling industry and continues in the age of big data and data mining. The final section discusses the controversial potentials of opinion-mining technology and suggests ways in which social scientists could critically respond to the big data and opinion-mining challenges in order to reintegrate the ideas of publicness, the public and public sphere into public opinion research. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The paper is aimed at identifying the ways of scientist’s influence on the development of modern society as compared to those of intellectuals. _Theoretical basis._ The socio-anthropological approach to the role of scientists in post-industrial society shows the leading role of people of science as a social group in present-day society. However, philosophical axiology reveals that scientists in today’s society do not have the appropriate social status: neither in state governance nor in the sphere of forming (...) class='Hi'>public opinion. The classical doctrine concerning intellectuals has suffered a crisis in recent decades, which is due to the growing gap between the group of intellectuals recognized by society and the sphere of science. A new theoretical approach to determining the role of present-day research scientists as intellectuals is necessary. _Originality._ Successful development of modern society in conditions of growing social turbulence necessitates the access of research scientists to the sphere of public communication. This is required both by the needs of science advancement itself – to receive its adequate funding and win wide public recognition, and by society’s needs – as it is scientists who can provide reliable diagnostics of social problems and formulate well-grounded programs for overcoming them. _Conclusions._ For overcoming social barriers and getting access to public space, scientists themselves have to recognize themselves as a destitute social group – those who are unfairly deprived of making principal decisions in today’s society. For that, scientists should become modern intellectuals. Unlike media intellectuals, scientists are to interact not with social masses but, first and foremost, with public elites. The scientist has to gain his/her independent status by achieving the recognition of his/her own ideas among social elites rather than by winning wide personal popularity. Hence, scientists must aim at obtaining the status of the elite for elites – this would reveal in scientists the deepest potential of a modern man. (shrink)

This survey on biotechnology and bioethics was carried out onnational random samples of the public and scientists in November2000-January 2000 throughout Japan, and attendees at theNovartis Life Science Forum held on 29 September, 1999 inTokyo. The sample size was 297, 370, and 74 respectively. Whilethere is better awareness of GMOs in 2000 compared to 1991; thetrend shows an increase in the perceived risks of GMOs followedby growing resistance in Japan. While a majority of personsbelieved genetic engineering would make (...) life better over the nexttwenty years , the proportion of respondents who thoughtgenetic engineering would make life worse over the next twentyyears doubled from 1997 to 2000 .Respondents were asked whether they had heard aboutapplications in several areas and the order of familiarity was: pest-resistant crops, human genes in bacteria, mouseto develop cancer, food and drinks, pigs with human hearts andpre-implantation diagnosis. A divide of opinion can be seen whenthe results on benefit, risk and moral acceptability of applicationsof biotechnology by the public are compared to the forum andscientist samples.A significant change in the acceptance of the public occurred in2000 where only 22% agreed on the moral acceptability of GMfood compared to 41% in 1997. In 2000 fewer people said they arewilling to buy genetically modified fruits that taste bettercompared to 1997 . The results show less public support foruse of gene therapy than 1993 and twice as many scientistsrejected gene therapy than they did in 1991.When asked whom is best placed to regulate modernbiotechnology, the respondents were overwhelmingly in favor ofinternational regulatory bodies, such as the United Nations andthe World Health Organization , rather than national bodies.The comparison between scientists and public is interesting,however the more enthusastic sample were participants from theNovartis Life Science Forum with its mixed occupations. (shrink)

This survey on biotechnology and bioethics was carried out on national random samples of the public and scientists in November 2000-January 2000 throughout Japan, and attendees at the Novartis Life Science Forum held on 29 September, 1999 in Tokyo. The sample size was 297, 370, and 74 respectively. While there is better awareness of GMOs in 2000 compared to 1991; the trend shows an increase in the perceived risks of GMOs followed by growing resistance in Japan. While a (...) majority of persons believed genetic engineering would make life better over the next twenty years, the proportion of respondents who thought genetic engineering would make life worse over the next twenty years doubled from 1997 to 2000. Respondents were asked whether they had heard about applications in several areas and the order of familiarity was: pest-resistant crops, human genes in bacteria, mouse to develop cancer, food and drinks, pigs with human hearts and pre-implantation diagnosis. A divide of opinion can be seen when the results on benefit, risk and moral acceptability of applications of biotechnology by the public are compared to the forum and scientist samples.A significant change in the acceptance of the public occurred in 2000 where only 22% agreed on the moral acceptability of GM food compared to 41% in 1997. In 2000 fewer people said they are willing to buy genetically modified fruits that taste better compared to 1997. The results show less public support for use of gene therapy than 1993 and twice as many scientists rejected gene therapy than they did in 1991.When asked whom is best placed to regulate modern biotechnology, the respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of international regulatory bodies, such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization, rather than national bodies. The comparison between scientists and public is interesting, however the more enthusastic sample were participants from the Novartis Life Science Forum with its mixed occupations. (shrink)

The extent of the consensus among scientists on anthropogenic global warming (AGW) has the potential to influence public opinion and the attitude of political leaders and thus matters greatly to society. The history of science demonstrates that if we wish to judge the level of a scientific consensus and whether the consensus position is likely to be correct, the only reliable source is the peer-reviewed literature. During 2013 and 2014, only 4 of 69,406 authors of peer-reviewed articles on (...) global warming, 0.0058% or 1 in 17,352, rejected AGW. Thus, the consensus on AGW among publishing scientists is above 99.99%, verging on unanimity. The U.S. House of Representatives holds 40 times as many global warming rejecters as are found among the authors of scientific articles. The peer-reviewed literature contains no convincing evidence against AGW. (shrink)

Today, “scientism“ is a concept with a negative connotation in every language. Although many definitions are circulating, they have the assessment in common that scientism implicates a blind faith in science, which is wrong, simple-minded and even dangerous. However, the question is, who actually is defending that kind of position? Is scientism not just a ghost, a projection, an intellectual scarecrow in order to use many people’s fear of science in order to bash rationalistic opinions? This article develops the argument (...) that scientism is a real historical current which can be analyzed in a concrete way. It starts by outlining the history of the French word “scientisme” and the debates around it and discovers that the word is not at all of recent invention, but goes back to the 1840s and received its negative emphasis in the late nineteenth century when “scientific spiritism” on the one hand and Catholicism on the other were struggling against the “exaggerated” claims of natural science. A polemical counter-concept was therefore needed. Soon afterward some scientists and philosophers emerge, like Félix Le Dantec, Abel Rey or Marcel Boll, who turn around the invective in order to describe their own optimistic and rationalistic conception of science. In conclusion the article argues that scientism has to be understood as an intellectual project and as an optimistic thought-style in science that does not at all correspond to the prejudices of the amoral scientist or the power-hungry technocrat, but is represented mostly by outsiders and nonconformists. (shrink)

In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns is that numbers of philosophical publications that mention “scientism” are a “poor proxy for scholarly sentiment” (Bryant 2020, 31). In reply, I conduct a sentiment analysis that is designed to find out whether academic philosophers have negative, positive, or neutral sentiments (...) toward “scientism.” The results of this analysis suggest that, for the most part, articles on “scientism” written by academic philosophers tend to contain mostly negative rather than positive (or neutral) sentiments about “scientism.”. (shrink)

Possible measures to mitigate climate change require global collective actions whose impacts will be felt by many, if not all. Implementing such actions requires successful communication of the reasons for them, and hence the underlying climate science, to a degree that far exceeds typical scientific issues which do not require large-scale societal response. Empirical studies have identified factors, such as the perceived level of consensus in scientific opinion and the perceived reliability of scientists, that can limit people's trust in (...) science communicators and their subsequent acceptance of climate change claims. Little consideration has been given, however, to recent formal results within philosophy concerning the relationship between truth, the reliability of evidence sources, the coherence of multiple pieces of evidence/testimonies, and the impact of independence between sources of evidence. This study draws on these results to evaluate exactly what has been established in the empirical literature about the factors that bias the public's reception of scientific communications about climate change. (shrink)

James Wynn’s timely investigation highlights scientific studies grounded in publicly gathered data and probes the rhetoric these studies employ. Many of these endeavors, such as the widely used SETI@home project, simply draw on the processing power of participants’ home computers; others, like the protein-folding game FoldIt, ask users to take a more active role in solving scientific problems. In Citizen Science in the Digital Age: Rhetoric, Science, and Public Engagement, Wynn analyzes the discourse that enables these scientific ventures, as (...) well as the difficulties that arise in communication between scientists and lay people and the potential for misuse of publicly gathered data. (shrink)

Video streaming has become very popular among game enthusiasts. Live streams of computer games, where there is the possibility of communi­cation, are developing as community meeting places; a number of social scientists are calling this a trend towards new online “third places”. To­day’s debate draws attention to the reproduction of a participation culture trough streaming, in the space of which everyone can express themselves creatively, share their opinion, experiences, and information. At the same time, there is a tendency towards (...) the capitalist appropriation of streaming by media businesspersons who stimulate the monetization of participation. Investigating the “sociality of streaming”, the authors highlight the supplementation of the “Let’s Play” discourse with topics from the current agenda, understanding live streams as public media arenas. In the public arenas of computer game live streams, the dramatization and selection of global or local news information in a specific media format takes place. The article demonstrates this phenomenon using the example of the corona­virus, the most prominent topic of spring 2020. The pandemic vocabulary appears in different sections of Twitch game streams, such as titles, audio/ video content, and the chat. Banter and obscene vocabulary are charac­teristic of the game stream space, however, this is combined with charity fund-raising broadcasts in support of doctors. ­. (shrink)

This article will investigate the ways in which Polish illustrated press contributed to communicating and reporting the work of Polish émigré naturalists working in Latin America to the Polish general public living in the Prussian, Russian and Austrian partitions of the Polish‐Lithuanian Commonwealth 1844–1885. It examines the ways in which illustrations were used to shape the public's opinion about the significance of these migrants’ scientific achievements. The Polish illustrated press, its authors and editors were instrumental in shaping the (...) public's perceptions of the reach of Polish scientists, and exploring their impact on broader scientific debates, thereby situating Polish people and their work in a global context. The didactic and opinion‐making role of the illustrated press was highly influential among Polish audiences during this period, at a time when the survival of Polish identity, culture, language, and education was uncertain. Illustrated weeklies were one of the vectors through which high science was made accessible to the Polish public. A study of pictures in Polish illustrated press will help to explain how they contributed towards shaping the images in the public eye of naturalists’ scientific work, and discourses about science and its actors more broadly. (shrink)

Since its first publication in 1818, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus has transcended genres and cultures to become a foundational myth about science and technology across a multitude of media forms and adaptations. Following in the footsteps of the brilliant yet troubled Victor Frankenstein, professionals and practitioners have been debating the scientific ethics of creating life for decades, never before have powerful tools for doing so been so widely available. This paper investigates how engaging with the Frankenstein myth (...) may help scientists gain a more accurate understanding of their own beliefs and opinions about the social and ethical aspects of their profession and their work. The paper presents findings from phenomenological interviews with twelve scientists working on biotechnology, robotics, or artificial intelligence projects. The results suggest that the Frankenstein myth, and the figure of Victor Frankenstein in particular, establishes norms for scientists about what is considered unethical and dangerous in scientific work. The Frankenstein myth both serves as a social and ethical reference for scientists and a mediator between scientists and the society. Grappling with the cultural ubiquity of the Frankenstein myth prepares scientists to face their ethical dilemmas and create a more transparent research agenda. Meanwhile, by focusing on the differences between real scientists and the imaginary figure of Victor Frankenstein, scientists may avoid being labeled as dangerous individuals, and could better conceptualize the potential societal and ethical perceptions and implications of their research. (shrink)

In this article there is analysed an independent criminal punishment – public works, which was determined by the Criminal Code and the Punishment Enforcement Code of the Republic of Lithuania as alternative punishment to freedom deprivation punishment. Without looking into the process of historical development, it is made an attempt to overview the tendency of public works’ spreading, to analyse the problems of public works’ realisation and how to deal with them. There is compared Lithuanian legal regulations (...) with international documents, which are related with alternative punishment as alternative to freedom deprivation punishment. There is also looked over public works’ legal regulations in foreign countries, an experience of public works implementation in Lithuania and abroad and, the most important, there had been given landmarks of public works institution improvement. The article is based upon the documents of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, legal regulations and practice of public works in foreign countries, opinion and studies of foreign scientists and the other authors, the data of statistics and questioning of the officers of correctional inspections. (shrink)

In historiography there is a tendency to see the Great War as marking the end of scientific optimism and the period that followed the war as a time of discord. Connecting to current (inter)national historiographical debate on the question of whether the First World War meant a disruption from the pre-war period or not, this article strives to prove that faith in scientific progress still prevailed in the 1920s. This is shown through the use of Belgium as a case study, (...) which suggests that the generally adopted cultural pessimism in the post-war years did not apply to the public rhetoric of science in this country. Diverse actors—scientists, industrialists, politicians, the public opinion and the military staff—declared a confidence in science, enhanced by wartime results. Furthermore, belief in science in Belgium was not affected by public outcry over the use of mustard gas, unlike in the former belligerent countries where the gas became an unpleasant reminder of how science was used during the war. Even German science with its industrial applications remained the norm after 1918. In fact, the faith in science exhibited during the pre-war years continued to exist, at least until the 1920s, despite anti-German sentiments being voiced by many sections of Belgian society in the immediate aftermath of the war. (shrink)

The role played by scientists in opposing nuclear weapons policy in Britain has been underestimated or discounted in much of the historical literature on the 1940s and 1950s. In fact an active and vocal section of scientific opinion attempted to organize public opposition to nuclear weapons. This article describes their activities. It also assesses their significance in the wider anti-nuclear weapons movement in the years leading to the foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

ABSTRACT Benjamin Page's thoughtful critique of my book, The Illusion of Public Opinion, strives to reassure readers that all is well—despite the book's extensive documentation of measurement‐error artifacts in numerous public opinion surveys. Page's own careful polling practices are not followed outside of elite academic survey centers. Moreover, even in such well‐run surveys, the respondents are often ignorant of the issues being probed. The fact that nonrandom reasons of some sort must be determining on‐the‐spot survey responses may allow (...) us to call the respondents “rational” in a loose sense. But the responses still don't represent actual opinions about the specific policy issues being probed—let alone well‐informed answers. Finally, while Page argues that measurement errors are most likely random, and should cancel out in the aggregate, the “miracle of aggregation” doesn't occur when the form, wording, and context of questions varies from survey to survey. And even when wording and context are held constant, the respondents' understanding of the same words can vary dramatically or subtly over time, due to new political events and their changing interpretation. (shrink)

Generally, public opinion is measured via polls or survey instruments, with a majority of responses in a particular direction taken to indicate the presence of a given ‘public opinion’. However, discursive psychological and related scholarship has shown that the ontological status of both individual opinion and public opinion is highly suspect. In the first part of this article I draw on this body of work to demonstrate that there is currently no meaningful theoretical foundation for the construct (...) of public opinion as it is typically measured in surveys, polls, or focus groups. I then argue that there is a particular sense in which the construct of public opinion does make sense. In deliberative democratic forums participants engage in dialogue with the aim of coming to collective positions on particular issues. Here I draw on examples of deliberative democratic forums conducted on the social and ethical implications of science and technology. Conversation between participants in deliberative democratic forums is ideally characterized by individuals becoming informed about the issues being discussed, respectful interactions between participants, individuals being open to changing their positions, and a convergence towards collective positions in the interest of formulating civic solutions. The end-product of deliberation on a given issue might thus be termed a deliberative public opinion. ‘Deliberative public opinion’ is neither a cognitive nor an aggregate construct, but rather a socio-historical product. Criteria for its legitimacy rely on the inclusiveness of diversity of perspectives and the degree to which collective positions are defensible to a larger society. (shrink)

To understand the prospects for global order and progress in the coming years, we explore the joint implications of three premises: (1) states advantaged by the current international order have stakes in its regularity and predictability, and thus in moving to counter or prevent threats to those stakes; (2) along impure public and club goods lines, they are more likely to make efforts to do so when some private or club benefits result; and (3) public opinion provides a (...) bounded policy acceptance envelope offering incentives and disincentives to national political elites to act as envisioned by the first two premises. We present a mosaic of public opinion in major OECD countries (the US, Japan, and major EU members) on three policy areas that contain international public goods elements. Actual contribution tendencies in those areas found in our previous work largely conform to the public opinion patterns reported here. Within the limits of available data, domestic political incentives as represented by public opinion warrant neither extreme optimism nor pessimism about the prospects for continuing contributions by OECD states to sustaining orderly functioning of the current world system. (shrink)

Abstract Building on Philip Converse's understanding of public opinion, John Zaller sees the evidence for the public's ?nonattitudes? as reflecting individuals? ambivalence concerning political issues. Because neither individuals nor the public collectively have what Zaller would call real attitudes, he concludes that the effectiveness of democracy rests on competition among intellectual and political elites. In truth, however, the public has many real attitudes that depend heavily on elite leadership, in ways that Converse did not initially emphasize (...) but that are consistent with both his observations and Zaller's model of mass opinion. The quality of the public's attitudes are, however, a point of serious contention. (shrink)

The quasi-ubiquity of ICT is transforming contemporary politics and seems to deteriorate democracy, for the technologies undermine debates, contest the grounds of reason and truth, and influence people’s votes. Donald Trump’s election and Brexit are good examples of their effects on public opinion. More fundamentally, these technologies cause theoretical problems to the way we traditionally conceive public opinion. Thus, I seek to rethink public opinion beyond conventional approaches. Departing from Deleuze and Guattari’s work, I develop the first (...) steps of a post-representational theory of public opinion as a regime of political truths that has new dimensions of truth production with information and communications technologies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT George Bishop’s The Illusion of Public Opinion does a superb job of showing how various errors and malfeasances in conducting and interpreting surveys have created illusions about public opinion. It thereby offers a very useful compendium on how to do, and especially how not to do, survey research. Nothing in the book, however, provides persuasive evidence for either of two more troubling “illusion” arguments: that collective public preferences on policy issues do not exist; or that surveys (...) cannot measure them. Instead, Bishop’s examples show that even in obscure, low‐information situations, well‐designed survey questions generally reveal meaningful collective policy preferences that are coherent, well differentiated, and reflective of citizens’ basic interests and values. (shrink)

In recent years, institutional financial institutions such as the World Bank have taken a keen interest in the links between governance and economic development in East Asia and in other regions of the world. However, the concept of governance has proven difficult to measure in cross-national studies and its meaning in the minds of citizens and experts may differ noticeably. This article examines elite and mass perceptions of governance using the World Governance Indicators developed by scholars affiliated with the World (...) Bank and survey data derived from the 2006 wave of the AsiaBarometer Survey conducted in seven societies. The results of the analysis capture considerable variation at the country and individual levels for how citizens and experts perceive governance in this region of the world. In addition, a multivariate test uncovered some convergence between citizen and expert assessments but only for some of the various governance components. (shrink)

This major work surveys the historical roots, theoretical foundations, and normative claims of 20th-century conceptualizations of public opinion. It reanalyzes leading traditions, such as those of Lippmann, Dewey, and Noelle-Neumann, and reinvents some unjustly ignored ones, such as Toennies, Harrisson, and Wilson. The book critically examines popular modern research strategies such as polling and the 'spiral of silence' model and looks at the role of mass media in the formation and expression of public opinion.

(1996). Public opinion and democratic culture: The French revolution. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 175-180.

(1996). Public opinion and democratic culture: The French revolution. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 175-180.

Public legitimacy consists of beliefs among the mass public that an international court has the right to exercise authority in a certain domain. If publics strongly support such authority, it may be more difficult for governments to undermine an international court that takes controversial decisions. However, early studies found that while a majority of the public trusts international courts, this was based on weak attitudes derivative from more general legal values and support for the international institutions. I (...) reexamine these claims with data for European courts, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice. First, using Google search data and media-analysis I find that, at least in Europe, information-seeking about international courts has increased and is at similar levels to national high courts and prominent international institutions. Second, trust in international courts remains strongly correlated with trust in international and domestic institutions. Countries in which more individuals trust their national courts are also countries in which more individuals trust international courts. Individuals who trust their national courts more are also more trusting of international courts. This undermines at least some interpretations of the credible commitment argument: in the minds of the general public, international courts may not be substitutes for poorly performing domestic courts, but extensions of a functioning rule of law system that they already trust. (shrink)

The rapid development of Internet technology has facilitated the dissemination of information that can threaten national security and public health, and effectively controlling the process of public opinion communication is an important topic in contemporary social network research. This paper establishes an official information-controlled public opinion propagation model based on the delay, latency, and conversion of public opinion communication under the control of official information. According to the influence and importance of the network nodes, we theoretically (...) derive the attitude conversion probability of the nodes, making the model more in line with the actual situation. Through actual cases, we analyzed the important influence of official information on the public opinion communication process and provided a theoretical basis for the government and relevant departments to supervise and correctly guide the public opinion network, which has certain practical significance. (shrink)

Anticipatory policy for gene editing requires assessing public opinion about this new technology. Although previous surveys have examined respondents’ views on the moral acceptability of various hypothetical uses of CRISPR, they have not considered whether these scenarios are perceived as plausible. Research in construal level theory indicates that participants make different moral judgments about scenarios seen as likely or near and those seen as unlikely or distant. Therefore, we surveyed a representative sample of 400 Americans and Canadians about both (...) the likelihood and the permissibility of 23 commonly discussed uses of gene editing. Respondents with more knowledge of gene editing generally thought these applications would be more likely within the next 20 years. There was a strong positive relationship between the perceived likelihood and permissibility of most CRISPR applications. Our results suggest that ongoing public engagement efforts for gene editing could be improved by taking its perceived time-frames into account. (shrink)

Using a recent example from US politics as representative of contemporary liberal democracies, this chapter highlights how public opinion is shaped through the exploitation of our epistemic interdependence and partisan bias. Climate change was an important issue leading into the 2010 US mid-term elections. Public opinion on climate change was subject to a number of willfully disseminated distorting influences, having a significant impact on the election’s outcome and subsequent political discourse surrounding climate change policies. One impact of this (...) type of exploitation is that it has epistemically compromising effects on the electorate, which in turn undermines democratic legitimacy. In the interest of defending democratic legitimacy, this chapter suggests we re-evaluate and update those liberal institutions necessary for informed public opinion surrounding our current political epistemic needs. (shrink)

The need for those who govern to be accountable to the governed often conflicts with the right of an individual, albeit a public leader, to privacy. This survey found that most Ohio residents believe job performance can be affected by what goes on in private lives, but most don't believe scrutiny of private matters is a media responsibility and find such coverage excessive and unfair. Belief in importance of accountability was related to support for media's responsibility to provide scrutiny, (...) but not to concern with excessiveness and fairness. (shrink)

In bioethics as in other areas of health policy, historical institutional factors can shape policy independently of interests or public opinion. This article finds policy divergence among countries with similar national moral views of stem cell research, and explains that divergence as the product of path-dependency.

Before expressing opinions, most people usually consider the standpoint of their friends nearby to avoid being isolated, which may lead to the herding effect. The words of celebrities in social networks usually attract public attention and affect the opinion evolution in the entire network. This process also causes the similar status quo. In this study, we find that the key figures play the guiding roles in public opinions who undertake the group pressure from information amount. Therefore, we build (...) the cost function on opinion changes to study opinion evolution rules for public persons based on the spreading scope of information and information amount. Simulation analysis reveals that the information amount held by agents will affect the converging speed of public opinions, while enhancing the ability of key nodes may no more effective in guiding public opinion. (shrink)