My father would have loved the idea of me writing this introduction on behalf of my family, a task which is, to be frank, a little intimidating, given this audience that he held in such high esteem. My father’s mind could take him anywhere, to many places where—especially in the last year of his life—his body could not. Anyone lucky enough to have conversed with him knows that with Dr. Joseph Ransdell (Joe to many, and Dad to his daughters), (...) you started off a conversation in one place, and for the next hour at least, you followed his mind around subjects like perception, belief, the nature of reality, until, as in the T.S. Eliot quote he loved, you arrived where you started and knew the place for the first time.As.. (shrink)

: My contribution to the present symposium on Short's book is an assessment of it as an attempt to provide a reliable starting understanding of Peirce's semeiotic for anyone interested in its relevance to contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, which is the special (but somewhat limited) perspective from which Short himself views Peirce's work. I suggest that although the central core of the book—meaning those chapters (3 through 9) which present the basic conceptions of Peirce's theory of (...) thought as representation—is successful in providing an unusually lucid account of its basic process conceptions (subject to important qualification), and is clearly of special interest in that part of it in which Short applies Peirce's conceptions in the context of current problematics in analytic philosophy (Chs. 10–12), it is seriously flawed as a book by the gratuitous inclusion (in Ch. 2) of a methodologically unsound and implausibly argued thesis about the development of Peirce's thought which serves no useful purpose relative to the rest of the book. As regards the qualification referred to above the one provided here concerns his account of Peirce's conception of symbolism in particular, which is based on a misunderstanding of its proper interpretant. (shrink)

The changes from the original version are relatively minor, but enough to make it necessary to treat the present version as a distinct text for purposes of exact reference. Since there is no normal pagination on a web page, I assign in lieu of that paragraph numbers, included in brackets and placed flush right, just above the paragraph, for purposes of scholarly reference.

Joseph Ransdell posted the following draft of an introduction to a work in progress to the peirce-l email list on September 22, 2000. The post triggered a long thread of discussion in which he participated quite actively. At least one later and much longer version of the introduction exists. Still, this draft will give a concentrated “taste” of a side of Ransdell more familiar perhaps to long-time peirce-l subscribers than to those who have read only his published works. (...) In the message containing the draft, Ransdell characterized the draft as follows: “What follows below is an introductory section to some work that has actually been in progress for some five years or more now, which began as an explication of.. (shrink)

In a post to peirce-l on May 23, 2003, Ransdell included the following chapter from an unpublished work in progress, The Meanings in Things (also sometimes called The Meaning in Things). In the chapter, he attempts to answer how it is that an object determines the sign that represents it. The material for the above abstract is from his not quite formal prefatory remarks sent with an earlier version to peirce-l on May 8, 2001. The chapter is a good (...) illustration of Ransdell’s careful argumentation through an extended example, in this case an amusing one involving the counting of chairs.Semiotic is phenomenologically based and thus does not involve any assumptions or presuppositions about the existence or reality of.. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is that Peirce's conception of the iconic sign provides the key conceptual element required to solve the major problem traditionally associated with the doctrine of representative perception, according to which all perceptual awareness of things is mediated through representations or "ideas" of them. The problem this has generated in the philosophical tradition is based on construing the representation not merely as..

This is a preprint of a paper originally read at the meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society in Boston, December 28, 1999 and due to appear in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society , Summer 2000. Critical feedback would be greatly appreciated and duly acknowledged in subsequent versions. Paragraph numbers have been added to this on-line version for purposes of scholarly reference. The URL for this version of the paper is.

Joseph Morton Ransdell left a record of experimentation with the communicational process of philosophy from 1992 to his passing in 2010. This record includes the Arisbe website and the peirce-l e-forum and its archives, of which the earliest are not on the Internet, but may yet be recovered and made available. Philosophy’s communication process, and the possibility of creating and developing a telecommunity, as Ransdell called it, were among his chief theoretical and practical interests. Such interests were focused (...) in terms of the ideas of Charles S. Peirce, including fallibilism, pragmaticism, and semiotic, in particular the sign’s determination by the represented object, and iconicity in relation especially to.. (shrink)

“Peirce and the Socratic Tradition” is a bold and suggestive paper. In it, Joseph Ransdell draws out a particular tradition of modesty allegedly exemplified by Socrates, Peirce, and few others in philosophy. At its heart, this tradition involves a clear-headed acceptance of some surprising implications of an obvious fact, viz. that human wisdom cannot involve taking a god’s eye view of things. The elenchus of Socrates and the doubt-belief theory of Peirce, Ransdell thinks, accurately reflect the starting points (...) and aspirations appropriate to inquiring creatures like us. This linkage of Peirce and Socrates is surprising enough to be exciting and yet intuitively plausible enough to be promising. Ransdell’s.. (shrink)

Joseph Ransdell (1931–2010), who received his Ph.D in philosophy from Columbia University in 1966, where he was advised by Sidney Morgenbesser, and spent most of his career at Texas Tech University, offered an original and focused challenge to academic philosophy at the end of the Second Millennium. His guiding philosophical passion was understanding how communication might best encourage and support truth seeking. This introduction to a special edition of the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society which is devoted (...) to Joe's legacy presents his philosophical interests, and the distinctive and valuable role he played in establishing the "Peirce Telecommunity", which has nurtured a range of Peirce scholars outside of the normal institutional frameworks for philosophical research and discussion. (shrink)

Of the many teachings on triadic semiotic that I was fortunate to receive in my life, none was more long-lasting and stimulating than what I learned by reading and exchanging ideas with Joseph Ransdell. And most salient among the ideas he explained with such admirable clarity were those related to iconicity, that apparently simple but most enigmatic relationship of formal identity between a sign and its object. That is why the main objective of this article is a discussion of (...) the semiotic quality that is embodied in some kind of material substance, called ‘hypoicon’ in Peircean semiotic.1 The hypoicon is the kind of sign whose functioning is based on its likeness to its dynamical object,2.. (shrink)

There seem to be two distinct aspects to the role played by the Interpretant in Peirce’s account of the sign relation. On the one hand, the Interpretant is said to establish the relation between the Sign and Object. That is, the Sign can “stand for” its Object, and thereby actually function as a Sign, only by virtue of its being interpreted as such by an Interpretant. On the other hand, the Interpretant is said to be “determined” by the Sign in (...) such a way that it is thereby mediately determined by the Sign’s Object. How can we understand the relation between these two aspects of the Interpretant? This is the question with which this paper is concerned. I begin by drawing a distinction between what I call the first-order function and second-order function of the Interpretant, and illustrating this distinction using Peirce’s example of comparing the letters p and b in § 9 of the 1867 “On a New List of Categories.” I then show that this same distinction can be discerned in a significant passage in the second section of Peirce’s 1903 “A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic,” as well as in his early definition of the Interpretant in the “New List.” This double function of the Interpretant has been noted in the Peircean literature, specifically by Joseph Ransdell in his 1966 dissertation, and more recently by André De Tienne. However, an important aspect of what I call the second-order function of the Interpretant remains unclarified in Ransdell and De Tienne’s approaches, namely, its relation to the logical operation of hypostatic abstraction. I will show that the Interpretant, in its second-order function, plays a role formally identical in the sign process to the role played by hypostatic abstraction in Peirce’s demonstrations of the Reduction Thesis. This formal identity will afford us with a way of understanding the relation between the two aspects of the Interpretant in terms of hypostatic abstraction. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the limits of (...) knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

"Seymon Lyudvigovich Frank, the author of the volume here made available for the first time in English translation, was one of the leading Russian philosophers of this century; some authorities consider him the most outstanding Russian philosopher of any age...._ " _Man's Soul__ is a book which perfectly exemplifies the generous conception of the mission and competence of philosophy characteristic of Frank and the other members of the Russian metaphysical movement. Frank's stated aim in the treatise is to reclaim for (...) philosophy a field of investigation which, from the time of Plato and Aristotle to that of the Russian Idealists, philosophers had viewed as properly theirs, but which, since the mid-nineteenth century, they had allowed to fall into almost complete neglect: the study of the nature of the human soul...._ "The moral message of _Man's Soul__ is well summed up by its epigraph, quoted from St. Augustine: 'Let man first of all return to his own self, so that once he has, as it were, stepped therein, he may rise from thence and be elevated to God.'" -- from the foreword by Philip J. Swoboda. (shrink)

Many books explain what is known about the universe. This book investigates what cannot be known. Rather than exploring the amazing facts that science, mathematics, and reason have revealed to us, this work studies what science, mathematics, and reason tell us cannot be revealed. In The Outer Limits of Reason, Noson Yanofsky considers what cannot be predicted, described, or known, and what will never be understood. He discusses the limitations of computers, physics, logic, and our own thought processes. Yanofsky describes (...) simple tasks that would take computers trillions of centuries to complete and other problems that computers can never solve; perfectly formed English sentences that make no sense; different levels of infinity; the bizarre world of the quantum; the relevance of relativity theory; the causes of chaos theory; math problems that cannot be solved by normal means; and statements that are true but cannot be proven. He explains the limitations of our intuitions about the world -- our ideas about space, time, and motion, and the complex relationship between the knower and the known. Moving from the concrete to the abstract, from problems of everyday language to straightforward philosophical questions to the formalities of physics and mathematics, Yanofsky demonstrates a myriad of unsolvable problems and paradoxes. Exploring the various limitations of our knowledge, he shows that many of these limitations have a similar pattern and that by investigating these patterns, we can better understand the structure and limitations of reason itself. Yanofsky even attempts to look beyond the borders of reason to see what, if anything, is out there. (shrink)

We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining elements from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explanation for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multiple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore overlapping causal (...) patterns of variable granularity and scope. We characterise the conditions under which such a game is almost surely guaranteed to converge on a optimal explanation surface in polynomial time, and highlight obstacles that will tend to prevent the players from advancing beyond certain explanatory thresholds. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing a conceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as design new and improved solutions. (shrink)

Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason ranks with Being and Nothingness as a work of major philosophical significance, but it has been largely neglected. The first volume, published in 1960, was dismissed as a Marxist work at a time when structuralism was coming into vogue; the incomplete second volume has only recently been published in France. In this commentary on the first volume, Joseph S. Catalano restores the Critique to its deserved place among Sartre’s works and within philosophical discourse as a (...) whole. Sartre attempts one of the most needed tasks of our times, Catalano asserts—the delivery of history into the hands of the average person. Sartre’s concern in the Critique is with the historical significance of everyday life. Can we, he asks, as individuals or even collectively, direct the course of our history? A historical context for our lives is given to us at birth, but we sustain that context with even our most mundane actions—buying a newspaper, waiting in line, eating a meal. In looking at history, Sartre argues, reason can never separate the historical situation of the investigator from the investigation. Thus reason falls into a dialectic, always depending upon the past for guidance but always being reshaped by the present. Clearly showing the influence of Marx on Sartre’s thought, the Critique adds the historical dimension lacking in Being and Nothingness. In placing the Critique within the corpus of Sartre’s philosophical writings, Catalano argues that it represents a development rather than a break from Sartre’s existentialist phase. Catalano has organized his commentary to follow the Critique and has supplied clear examples and concrete expositions of the most difficult ideas. He explicates the dialogue between Marx and Sartre that is internal to the text, and he also discusses Sartre’s Search for Method, which is published separately from the Critique in English editions. (shrink)

This article is the guest editors’ introduction to the special issue in Business & Society on “SMEs and CSR in Developing Countries.” The special issue includes four original research articles by Hamann, Smith, Tashman, and Marshall; Allet; Egels-Zandén; and Puppim de Oliveira and Jabbour on various aspects of the relationship of small and medium enterprises to corporate social responsibility in developing countries.

In 'Een handvol filosofen' staan de filosofen centraal die sinds de oprichting van de Vrije Universiteit in 1880 aan deze instelling verbonden zijn geweest. Het gaat hierbij niet alleen om de inhoud van hun werk, maar ook om de personen zelf. Er waren filosofiedocenten die zich met de universiteit identificeerden en zich volledig konden ontplooien. Er waren er echter ook voor wie dit niet gold, die geïsoleerd of in gewetensnood raakten. Veel filosofiestudenten waren actief betrokken bij wat er in hun (...) faculteit gebeurde. Zij namen initiatieven, protesteerden soms tegen de gang van zaken en kozen partij in conflictsituaties. Sinds het eind van de jaren zestig van de twintigste eeuw verloor de Vrije Universiteit geleidelijk haar christelijk karakter. Tegenwoordig werken alle stafleden vanuit hun eigen motivatie mee aan een hoofdzakelijk seculier geworden universiteit, die ruimte biedt voor religieuze en levensbeschouwelijke diversiteit. (shrink)

t. 1. Apo ton prōto skeptomeno anthrōpo mechri ton 6. aiōna M.Ch. -- t. 2. Apo ton 7. aiōna M.Ch. mechri to sēmera.

Through an analysis of key themes in Heidegger's work, the book challenges the traditional theological appropriation of Heidegger and the usual characterizations of religious thinking in terms of faith or belief in, or experience of, some ultimate reality. Heidegger, it is argued, offers a unique approach to a variety of issues and problems in contemporary religious thought and philosophy of religion that results in understanding religious thinking as a resolute openness to the holiness and meaningfulness of the world.

Richard Janko's acclaimed translation of Aristotle's _Poetics_ is accompanied by the most comprehensive commentary available in English that does not presume knowledge of the original Greek. Two other unique features are Janko's translations with notes of both the _Tractatus Coislinianus_, which is argued to be a summary of the lost second book of the Poetics, and fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Poets, including recently discovered texts about catharsis, which appear in English for the first time.

From the concrete experience of war, Michael S. Yandell constructs a phenomenology of “negative revelation” in which false or distorted claims of goodness and justice disintegrate and become meaningless, adding depth to the term moral injury.

Capital punishment—the legally authorized killing of a criminal offender by an agent of the state for the commission of a crime—stands in special need of moral justification. This is because execution is a particularly severe punishment. Execution is different in kind from monetary and custodial penalties in an obvious way: execution causes the death of an offender. While fines and incarceration set back some of one’s interests, death eliminates the possibility of setting and pursuing ends. While fines and incarceration narrow (...) one’s routes to happiness, death eliminates its possibility. Not surprisingly, there is much debate about the moral permissibility of capital punishment. This entry maps the terrain of this debate. The first section discusses justifications of the death penalty as they appear in major theories of punishment. The second section surveys moral objections to execution that apply to most justifications. The third addresses procedural criticisms, which do not target the morality of execution so much as the justice of its implementation. (shrink)

Ptolemy reports three dated lunar eclipses observed by Hipparchus, and also refers to two more, without identifying them, which Hipparchus compared with two earlier counterparts (apparently, observed in Mesopotamia) to assess the validity of the Babylonian period relations of the lunar motion. Also, in Pliny the Elder’s Historia naturalis, we are told that a horizontal lunar eclipse (selenelion) at sunrise and moonset was reported (observed?) by Hipparchus. Reviewing a paper by G.J. Toomer in 1980, it is shown that the pairs (...) of the eclipses were, almost certainly, the ones occurring on “31 January 486 b.c. and 27 January 141 b.c.” and “19 November 502 b.c. and 14 November 157 b.c.”; and if Hipparchus observed from St. Stephen’s Hill in Rhodes, the most probable candidate for the selenelion at moonset was the lunar eclipse of 7 February 142 b.c., although he also had the chance to observe any of the four others, occurring on 3 July 150 b.c., 10 April 145 b.c., 26 November 139 b.c., and 15 November 138 b.c., on a sufficiently elevated mountain on the island. (shrink)

The practical goal of preventing premature death seems uncontroversial. But the term ‘premature death’ is vague with several, sometimes conflicting definitions. This ambiguity results in several conceptions with which not all will agree. Moreover, the normative rationale behind the goal of preventing premature deaths is masked by the operational definition of existing measures. In this article, we argue that ‘premature death’ should be recognized as a normative concept. We propose that normative theories should be used to justify measures of premature (...) death to provide them with normative validity and public legitimacy. (shrink)