We live in a world in which every aspect of our existence is influenced by inordinate amounts of complexity. Technical Complexity, for example, is not necessarily the same as Economic Complexity although the two are related. Similarly, Public Health and Social Complexity are different as well. Nonetheless, one thing above all is a prominent feature of today's world; all the various types and forms of complexity are not only related, but deeply intertwined. Today, an idea can travel the globe in (...) mere seconds thanks to the internet and social media! These factors make our world today so complex and extremely different from previous ages in history. (shrink)

Provides layman with clear, concise and correct definitions and descriptions of philosophical terms throughout the range of philosophic thought.

This article examines the drivers and barriers for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Norwegian graduate uniform industry, which is a market devoid of large corporations, consisting entirely of two small businesses. It finds that these small businesses' CSR activities are not particularly well explained by the existing literature on CSR in small- and medium-sized enterprises, which assumes the presence of large competitors. This raises the question of whether small businesses that do not compete against large corporations may actually behave (...) more like ‘little big firms’ when it comes to CSR. The article finds that the two businesses studied are mostly driven by external pressure to improve their social responsibility. Such pressure stems partly from news reports on their activities and partly from increasing competition leading to a situation where the small businesses operating in the market scrutinise each others' activities. (shrink)

This article highlights a use of analogies in science that so far has received relatively little systematic discussion: providing reasons for pursuing a model or theory. Using the development of the liquid drop model as a test case, I critically assess two extant pursuit worthiness accounts: that analogies justify pursuit by supporting plausibility arguments and that analogies can serve as a guide to potential theoretical unification. Neither of these fit the liquid drop model case. Instead, I develop an alternative account, (...) based on the idea that analogies facilitate the transfer of a well-understood modelling strategy to a new domain. 1Introduction2Case Study: The Development of the Liquid Drop Model3Plausibility Accounts 3.1Bartha on plausibility and analogical inference3.2Plausibility and the drop analogy4Analogies as a Guide to Unification5Generative Accounts 5.1Analogy-based modelling strategies5.2Did analogies play a merely generative role?6A New Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies 6.1Transferring understanding-with through analogies6.2Understanding-with and the liquid drop model7Conclusion. (shrink)

"Methods of the Way: Early Chinese Ethical Thought" gives a detailed account of the textual history as well as the early development of 112 ethical terms defined in the chapter "Methods ot the Way (Daoshu)" ascribed to Jia Yi (200-168 B.C.). An important contribution to our understanding of the roles of ethics in early China.

This article examines the drivers and barriers for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Norwegian graduate uniform industry, which is a market devoid of large corporations, consisting entirely of two small businesses. It finds that these small businesses' CSR activities are not particularly well explained by the existing literature on CSR in small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises, which assumes the presence of large competitors. This raises the question of whether small businesses that do not compete against large corporations may actually behave (...) more like ‘little big firms’ when it comes to CSR. The article finds that the two businesses studied are mostly driven by external pressure to improve their social responsibility. Such pressure stems partly from news reports on their activities and partly from increasing competition leading to a situation where the small businesses operating in the market scrutinise each others' activities. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of explanatory reasoning generally, and inference to the best explanation in particular, according to which it first and foremost justifies pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This side-steps the problem of why better explanations should be more likely to be true. I argue that this account faces no analogous problems. I propose an account of justification for pursuit and show how this provides a simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit.

This article offers reinterpretation of the current economic and political crisis through the lens of Gramsci’s concept of “interregnum,” departing from the model of “punctured equilibrium” to analyze the specific political dynamics of nonhegemonic periods between the breakdown of one ideological order and the emergence of a new one. Although political science has a range theories about periods of hegemony and paradigmatic stability, the periods between stable hegemonies remain distinctly undertheorized. A theoretical concept describing periods of interregnum is offered and (...) applied to the changes in economic ideology and political alignments that followed the breakdown of the liberal order in the interwar period and the postwar Keynesian consensus of the 1970s. The concept is then applied to the current juncture, in which the hegemony of neoliberalism has been shaken by the 2008 financial crisis but no clear successor has emerged. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationships between organizational change and trust in management. It is argued that organizational change represents a critical episode for the production and destruction of trust in management. Although trust in management is seen as a semi stable psychological state, changes in organizations make trust issues salient and organizational members attend to and process trust relevant information resulting in a reassessment of their trust in management. The direction and magnitude of change in trust is dependent on a (...) set of change dimensions that reflect trust relevant experiences and information. We distinguish between dimensions related to trust relevant consequences of the change and trust relevant aspects of how the change process is performed. Empirical results indicate that increases in post change emotional stress and the use of referential accounts for justifying change are both negatively related to post change trust in management. The use of ideological accounts and participation were found to be positively related to post change trust in management, so was perceived decision quality. Findings also indicate that the effects of change on trust are negatively moderated by tenure. (shrink)

Transparency has been proposed as a way of handling value-ladenness in machine learning (ML). This article highlights limits to this strategy. I distinguish three kinds of transparency: epistemic transparency, retrospective value transparency, and prospective value transparency. This corresponds to different approaches to transparency in ML, including so-called explainable artificial intelligence and governance based on disclosing information about the design process. I discuss three sources of value-ladenness in ML—problem formulation, inductive risk, and specification gaming—and argue that retrospective value transparency is only (...) well-suited for dealing with the first, while the third raises serious challenges even for prospective value transparency. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 310-328, September 2022.

Climate change is an existential risk reinforced by ordinary actions in afuent societies—often silently present in comfortable and enjoyable habits. This silence is sometimes broken, presenting itself as a nagging reminder of how our habits fuel a catastrophe. As a case in point, global warming has created a state of urgency among wine makers in Spain, as the alcohol level has risen to a point where it jeopardises wine quality and thereby Spanish viticulture. Eforts are currently being made to solve (...) this problem technologically by developing (non-GMO) strains of yeast that produce less alcohol. If successful, this could help save Spanish viticulture. This kind of technological solution is routinely criticised for ofering simplistic “techno-fx” solutions to solve complex societal problems. However, it is not clear what features are criticised by the notion of techno-fx and hence how to avoid this criticism. In our interpretation, the techno-fx notion is not exclusively used as a dismissive term. The notion points to a general virtue of engineering: to create technological solutions that work silently in the background. This asset of technological solutions might sometimes be problematic and sometimes not. Hence, it needs to be analysed case-by-case by paying attention to the moral relevance of the hidden implications of the technology and of the unrefective actions and habits that they facilitate. Such moral analysis will in turn inform strategies for foregrounding this technology to counteract silencing. We discuss what this means in the case of modifying yeast as a viticultural climate resilience strategy. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp defend a non-anthropocentric account of trustworthy AI, based on the idea that the obligations of AI systems should be sourced in purely functional norms. In this commentary, I highlight some pressing counterexamples to their account, involving AI systems that reliably fulfil their functions but are untrustworthy because those functions are antagonistic to the interests of the trustor. Instead, I outline an alternative account, based on the idea that AI systems should not be considered primarily as tools but (...) as technological participants in social practices. Specifically, I propose to source the obligations of an AI system in the norms that should govern the role it plays within the social practices it participates in, taking into account any changes to the social practices that its participation may bring about. This proposal is anthropocentric insofar as it ascribes obligations to AI systems that are similar to those of human participants in social practices, but only modestly so, as it does not require trustworthy AI to have contentious anthropomorphic capacities (e.g. for consciousness or moral responsibility). (shrink)

Concerns about threats to human autonomy feature prominently in the field of AI ethics. One aspect of this concern relates to the use of AI systems for problematically manipulative influence. In response to this, the European Union’s draft AI Act (AIA) includes a prohibition on AI systems deploying subliminal techniques that alter people’s behavior in ways that are reasonably likely to cause harm (Article 5(1)(a)). Critics have argued that the term ‘subliminal techniques’ is too narrow to capture the target cases (...) of AI-based manipulation. We propose a definition of ‘subliminal techniques’ that (a) is grounded on a plausible interpretation of the legal text; (b) addresses all or most of the underlying ethical concerns motivating the prohibition; (c) is defensible from a scientific and philosophical perspective; and (d) does not over-reach in ways that impose excessive administrative and regulatory burdens. The definition is meant to provide guidance for design teams seeking to pursue responsible and ethically aligned AI innovation. (shrink)

This article examines the myth of the supposed superiority of the desert noble savage over civilized man. With the Bedouin of Arabia and the Aborigines of Australia as its two prime examples, the article argues that two versions of this myth can be traced: one in which the desert noble savage is valorized due to his valour, physical prowess and martial skill (Bedouin); and another, later version, where the desert noble savage is valorized as a pacifist, an ecologist and a (...) mythmaker/storyteller (Aborigines). The article concludes by examining the way in which this turn from one type of desert noble savage to another reflects the manner in which western modernity has shifted its values from Cartesian dualities and Enlightenment rationalism to that of networks, potentialities, ecology and myth. (shrink)

This article traces the metamorphoses of Norwegian reformism during the last two centuries. In the Norwegian system, the shifting political regimes have to a remarkable extent been accompanied by shifting knowledge discourses. Regardless of whether its ideological dress was liberalism or socialism, a central feature of Norwegian reformism has been its basis in different versions of social science: it has been a scientific reformism. The legal knowledge regime of the civil servants’ state was towards the end of the 19th century (...) replaced by a democratic-pedagogical knowledge regime. When the Labour Party gained control of the political centre in 1945, it did so in coalition with the new economists. Following the demise of the Labour Party state in the 1980s, some features of a new knowledge regime have become visible. (shrink)

In this paper, we tell the story of efforts currently underway, on diverse fronts, to build digital knowledge repositories to support research in the life sciences. If successful, knowledge bases will be part of a new knowledge infrastructure—capable of facilitating ever-more comprehensive, computational models of biological systems. Such an infrastructure would, however, represent a sea-change in the technological management and manipulation of complex data, inducing a generational shift in how questions are asked and answered and results published and circulated. Integrating (...) such knowledge bases into the daily workflow of the lab thus destabilizes a number of well-established habits which biologists rely on to ensure the quality of the knowledge they produce, evaluate, communicate and exploit. As the story we tell here shows, such destabilization introduces a situation of unfamiliarity, one that carries with it epistemic risks. It should elicit—to use Niklas Luhmann’s terms—the question of trust: a shared recognition that the reliability of research practices is being risked, but that such a risk is worth taking in view of what may be gained. And yet, the problem of trust is being unexpectedly silenced. How that silencing has come about, why it matters, and what might yet be done forms the heart of this paper. (shrink)

I highlight a lacuna in recent debates concerning analogies in science. Most philosophers focus on analogical inferences as a way to justify accepting hypotheses. I argue that analogies play another important role, namely to justify pursuing hypotheses. In particular, I argue that both Paul Bartha's formal account and John Norton's material view of analogical inference, as they stand, fail to address this issue. I present my own account of justification for pursuit and show how analogies on this account can justify (...) pursuit independently of whether they can also justify acceptance. (shrink)

Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...) trust on the formulation stage. It should also benefit from exploring the structuring effects of trust in organizations. Throughout this chapter, ways to extend current research on trust in organizations are suggested. The chapter also provides examples of relevant contributions where available. In order to capture organizational effects of trust, it is suggested that trust should be studied over longer time intervals, and include several referents of trust, spanning both horizontal and vertical relationships in the organization. (shrink)

Readily conjured images of “grotesque” behavior—such as, say, vomiting on one’s plate during dinner or fornicating in public—are hard to envisage as acts of “sophistication.” In fact it seems that the grotesque constitutes the exact opposite of sophistication. For whereas the grotesque is loud and insistent, “characteristically [evoking] a sudden shock,” sophistication is characterized by that which is subdued and refined.1 Unlike the grotesque, which is to some extent defined by spectacle, sophistication is at its finest when it remains unnoticed. (...) Similarly, where the grotesque mixes categories, placing objects in frames in which they do not belong, sophistication is constantly at work to uphold categories so as.. (shrink)

Dette nummeret av Etikk i praksis fokuserer på et av de største, om ikke det største, satsningsområdet vi har sett innenfor forskningsverdenen. Det handler om nanoteknologi, et felt som forventes å få betydelige positive samfunnsmessige konsekvenser i form av industriutvikling og forbedrede produkter for befolkningen. Nanoteknologien er et omfattende og uoversiktlig fagfelt, der det viktigste felles kjennetegnet er at en opererer med strukturer som er 100 nanometer eller mindre. Materialer i denne størrelsesorden har endrete egenskaper som innebærer en rekke nye (...) anvendelsesmuligheter innen medisin, elektronikk, fysikk og energiproduksjon. Artiklene i temadelen omhandler utfordringer og muligheter for utvikling av en etikk-komponent innenfor dette satsningsområdet. Når vi ser på hvor tidlig vi er i utvikling av nanoetikk som fagfelt, kan man spørre om det er for tidlig å ha et temanummer i et nordisk tidsskrift. Tross alt trenger en tid for å kunne si noe forskningsmessig interessant om et fagområde. Samtidig er det første internasjonale tidsskriftet for nanoetikk over ett år gammelt, og de nordiske land er generelt langt framme i teknologiutvikling, så det skulle være god grunn til å presentere feltet. I tillegg er de senere års studier av teknologiutvikling som en etisk og samfunnsmessig størrelse i økende grad opptatt av å være i forkant av utviklingen, og da er det rimelig å formidle tidlige resultat av denne oppstrømsforskningen. (shrink)

Healthcare applications of AI have the potential to produce great benefit, but also come with significant ethical risks. This has brought ethics to the forefront of academic, policy and public debates about AI in healthcare. To help navigate these debates, we distinguish three general modes of ethical theorizing in contemporary secular AI ethics: (1) idealism, which seeks to articulate moral ideals that can be applied to concrete problems; (2) realism, which focuses on understanding complex social realities that underpin ethical problems; (...) and (3) pragmatism, which promotes deliberate methods that allow joint action in the present but also enable to future moral growth and progress. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each of these modes and illustrate their relevance to salient ethical problems arising from AI in healthcare. Finally, we argue that, while all three have merits, pragmatist approaches deserve more attention they have received thus far. (shrink)

pt. I. Ethics, by J. H. Tufts. Aesthetics, by D. H. Parker. Axiology, by W. M. Urban. Philosophy of law, by Roscoe Pound. Philosophy of history, by J. E. Boodin. Philosophy of science, by V. F. Lenzen. Philosophy of life, by A. N. Whitehead. Metaphysics, by E. W. Hall. Theology and metaphysics, by D. C. Mackintosh.--pt. II. Philosophy of the twentieth century, by Bertrand Russell. Kantianism, by A. C. Ewing. Philosophy of Hegelianism, by Richard Hoenigswald. The humanism of St. Thomas (...) Aquinas, by Jacques Maritain. Transcendental absolutism, by George Santayana. (shrink)

Many authors have proposed constraining the behaviour of intelligent systems with ‘machine ethics’ to ensure positive social outcomes from the development of such systems. This paper critically analyses the prospects for machine ethics, identifying several inherent limitations. While machine ethics may increase the probability of ethical behaviour in some situations, it cannot guarantee it due to the nature of ethics, the computational limitations of computational agents and the complexity of the world. In addition, machine ethics, even if it were to (...) be ‘solved’ at a technical level, would be insufficient to ensure positive social outcomes from intelligent systems. (shrink)

Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to new domains. While the first (...) is plausible for some cases, only the second can account for the liquid drop case study. (shrink)

In European research and innovation policy, Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) and Open Science (OS) encompass two co-existing sets of ambitions concerning systemic change in the practice of research and innovation. This paper is an exploratory attempt to uncover synergies and differences between RRI and OS, by interrogating what motivates their respective transformative agendas. We offer two storylines that account for the specific contexts and dynamics from which RRI and OS have emerged, which in turn offer entrance points to further (...) unpacking what ‘opening up’ to society means with respect to the transformative change agendas that are implicit in the two agendas. We compare differences regarding the ‘how’ of opening up in light of the ‘why’ to explore common areas of emphasis in both OS and RRI. We argue that while both agendas align with mission-oriented narratives around grand societal challenges, OS tends to emphasize efficiency and technical optimisation over RRI’s emphasis on normative concerns and democracy deficits, and that the two agendas thus contrast in their relative legitimate emphasis on doable outcomes versus desirable outcomes. In our conclusion, we reflect on the future outlook for RRI and OS’ co-existence and uptake, and on what their respective ambitions for transformation might mean for science-society scholars and scholarship. (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is an emerging, multidisciplinary field of research that seeks to develop methods and tools for making AI systems more explainable or interpretable. XAI researchers increasingly recognise explainability as a context-, audience- and purpose-sensitive phenomenon, rather than a single well-defined property that can be directly measured and optimised. However, since there is currently no overarching definition of explainability, this poses a risk of miscommunication between the many different researchers within this multidisciplinary space. This is the problem we (...) seek to address in this paper. We outline a framework, called Explanatory Pragmatism, which we argue has two attractive features. First, it allows us to conceptualise explainability in explicitly context-, audience- and purpose-relative terms, while retaining a unified underlying definition of explainability. Second, it makes visible any normative disagreements that may underpin conflicting claims about explainability regarding the purposes for which explanations are sought. Third, it allows us to distinguish several dimensions of AI explainability. We illustrate this framework by applying it to a case study involving a machine learning model for predicting whether patients suffering disorders of consciousness were likely to recover consciousness. (shrink)

Most optimistic accounts of analogies in archaeology focus on cases where analogies lead to accurate or well-supported interpretations of the past. This chapter offers a complementary argument: analogies can also provide a valuable form of understanding of cultural and social phenomena when they fail, in the sense of either being shown inaccurate or the evidence being insufficient to determine their accuracy. This type of situation is illustrated through a case study involving the mortarium, a characteristic type of Roman pottery, and (...) its relation to the so-called Romanization debate in Romano-British archaeology. I develop an account of comparative understanding, based on the idea that humans have a natural desire to understand ourselves comparatively, i.e., in terms of how we resemble and differ from societies at other times and places. Pursuing analogies can provide this type of understanding regardless of whether they turn out to be accurate. Furthermore, analogies can provide a similar form of understanding even when the evidence turns out to be insufficient to determine their accuracy. (shrink)

It is often observed that explanatory reasoning, especially the so-called inference to best explanation, plays a crucial role in theory choice in scientific practice. This paper defends an alternative account of the justificatory role of explanatory reasoning in general, and IBE in particular, inspired by C.S. Peirce's account of abduction. Most contemporary proponents of IBE take it to provide justification for accepting hypotheses as true. In contrast to this, the Peircean view defended here takes explanatory reasoning to first and foremost (...) provide justification for pursuing hypotheses, i.e. to subject them to empirical testing. The standard view of IBE faces a problem of accounting for the connection between explanatoriness and truth-likeliness : Why should the fact that a hypothesis would be a good explanation if it were true give us any reason to regard it as actually true? The Peircean view avoids this problem since justification for pursuing a hypothesis H does not require showing H any more probable. Furthermore, the Peircean view faces no analogous challenge: I develop an account of pursuit where the connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit is simple and intuitive. Briefly: assuming that one important goal of science is to find good explanations, showing that H would provide a better explanation than previously thought also shows that it would be more valuable to learn whether H is actually true, thus increasing the justification for pursuing H. Finally, the Peircean view provides an alternative account of the role played by explanatory reasoning in many of the historical case studies cited by proponents of IBE. This undermines historical-empirical arguments for the reliability of explanatory reasoning as a guide to true hypotheses. (shrink)