Advances in molecular biological research in the latter half of the twentieth century have made the story of the gene vastly complicated: the more we learn about genes, the less sure we are of what a gene really is. Knowledge about the structure and functioning of genes abounds, but the gene has also become curiously intangible. This collection of essays renews the question: what are genes? Philosophers, historians and working scientists re-evaluate the question in this volume, treating the gene as (...) a focal point of interdisciplinary and international research. It will be of interest to professionals and students in the philosophy and history of science, genetics and molecular biology. (shrink)

This 2001 translation makes one of the most important texts in ancient philosophy available to modern readers. Cicero is increasingly being appreciated as an intelligent and well-educated amateur philosopher, and in this work he presents the major ethical theories of his time in a way designed to get the reader philosophically engaged in the important debates. Raphael Woolf's translation does justice to Cicero's argumentative vigour as well as to the philosophical ideas involved, while Julia Annas's introduction and notes provide a (...) clear and accessible explanation of the philosophical context of the work. This edition will appeal to all readers interested in this central text in ancient philosophy and the history of ethics. (shrink)

Le rapport de la philosophie à l’usage doit-il s’en tenir à la description? Que signifie l’exigence descriptive elle-même? On éclaire ces questions depuis les modes d’approche de l’usage que la description promeut et interdit.Must philosophy’s relation to use be exclusively descriptive? What does the need for description amount to? The issues at stake here benefit from studying which ways of handling use are actually promoted or laid aside by the descriptive claim.

Résumé Nous proposons de considérer la place stratégique accordée aux sourds et muets dans les théories du langage aux xvii e et xviii e siècles comme une voie royale pour interroger ces théories. Nous soutenons en conséquence l’existence de trois paradigmes pour décrire les rapports entre langage et pensée : un paradigme expressif et communicationnel, un paradigme ampliatif et extensionnel, enfin un paradigme corrélationnel. En suivant les transitions entre ces paradigmes, nous expliquons pourquoi Descartes reconnaît aux sourds les mêmes capacités (...) intellectuelles qu’aux autres hommes, alors que Kant les leurs dénie. (shrink)

This book revisits, and sheds fresh light on, some key texts and debates in ancient philosophy. Its twin targets are 'Old Chestnuts' – well-known passages in the works of ancient philosophers about which one might have thought everything there is to say has already been said – and 'Sacred Cows' – views about what ancient philosophers thought, on issues of philosophical importance, that have attained the status of near-unquestioned orthodoxy. Thirteen leading scholars respond to these challenges by offering new perspectives (...) on familiar material and challenging some prevailing orthodoxies. On authors ranging from the Presocratics to Plotinus, the book represents a snapshot of contemporary scholarship in ancient philosophy, and a vigorous and illuminating affirmation of its continuing interest and power. The volume is dedicated to Professor M. M. McCabe, an inspiring scholar and teacher, colleague and friend to both the editors and the contributors. (shrink)

"Jewish Philosophy and the Academy reflects in broad terms on the current state of Jewish philosophy in the university. This generation of university teachers lives at a unique historic junction. It is the last to be taught by the giants of European Wissenschaft des Judentums and the first to experience the remarkable expansion of Judaic scholarship in Israel and abroad." "Emil Fackenheim suggests that if we are indebted to Athens for the philosophical method, we are also indebted to Jerusalem for (...) the ethical content of philosophy, which is both an intellectual and a moral challenge. This dual challenge shapes the diverse papers in this volume."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Raphael Cohen-Almagor, the author of Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side, explains his motivation for exploring the dangerous side of the world wide web. This new book is the first comprehensive book on social responsibility on the Internet.

The agents of a jury have to decide between a good and a bad option through simple majority voting. In this paper the jury consists of N independent couples. Each couple consists of two correlated agents of the same competence level. Different couples may have different competence levels. In addition, each agent is assumed to be better than completely random guessing. We prove tight lower and upper bounds for the quality of the majority decision. The lower bound is the same (...) as the competence of majority voting of N independent agents. The upper bound cases for negatively correlated couples can be much better than the value for 2N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2 \, N$$\end{document} independent agents. (shrink)

The initial paradox is simple: The ideal state, as Plato describes it, is composed of un-ideal individuals. Both the warrior class and the masses are deprived of reason and must be governed by the philosopher-king. How can one legitimately call a community perfect when so many of its members are imperfect ? My point here is logical; the word ‘ideal’ is used in a self-inconsistent manner.

This paper is based on the "cratylus", although there is occasional reference to other dialogues. In plato's contrast between the language of the gods and the language of mortals, we may discern something like the contrast between ideal and ordinary language. By names he means terms which have both reference and sense necessarily; such terms are also verbs, for verbs are names of actions and actions are realities; for instance, a blow. The criterion for the identity of names is that (...) they mean the same thing. "statements".unlike names, statements have meaning without necessarily having any reference. A word is a name "only" if what it names exits, whereas a statement may be false. A statement achieves meaning by purely internal criteria as to its composition. "the structure of statements". A statement is not a list of names; it is a unity and has meaning only in its character as a unity. Ryle's view that the terms in a sentence are not independent constituents and that their meaning is contextual is presented. The author concludes that plato is undecided on this matter. (shrink)

'There is no Nietzsche, just a shifting set of contradictory views' suggests Hayman in this stimulating and provocative guide. Those envious contemporaries who smeared Nietzsche with the mark of madness came closer than they knew in characterising a philosopher in whose thought ambivalence approximated to disintegration of the self. Yet while the nineteenth century's coherent, consistent systems of certainty came crashing down ingloriously at the very first touch of the twentieth, Nietzsche's discourses survived. He was more modern, it seemed, than (...) the moderns. Today is work is more contemporary than ever, his various voices speaking compellingly to a sensibility for which paradox is the only truth. (shrink)

Moralists have raised the question as to how punishment may be justified, and their answers to the question generally have been of two sorts: they have appealed to the principle either of retributive justice or to that of beneficial consequences. I will argue that the question itself is illegitimate and that therefore the answers should be dismissed as irrelevant. For punishment is not a separate act or operation calling for justification; rather it is the last act of a play beginning (...) with a command or regulation which includes a threat and ends up with punishment. The demand for justification is legitimate only when addressed to the command; one may properly ask what are the justifying reasons for the imperative, was it a good law, was the command well-advised, and so forth. And the answers will appeal either to principle or to consequences according to one's ethical position. But in no case will retribution be relevant, since that is not how an imperative may be justified at all. Retributive justice has been thought to be relevant because punishment has been regarded as an independent operation. Now, consider a battle of which an incident is the capturing of a hill from the enemy. What one judges is the plan of the whole battle, of which the taking of the hill is an operation entailed by the general plan. The attack on the hill may require heroics, but heroics are not a consideration in estimating the plan. The question of retributive justice is no more relevant to the justification of the imperative than that of heroics to the drawing up of the battle-plan. Thus, my point is that punishment is, so to speak, built in to the command; what we need then is an analysis of commands--or orders as I prefer to call them--of which punishments are logically necessary incidents. (shrink)