Since the English translation first appeared in 1923, Rudolf Otto's volume has established itself as a classic in the field of religious philosophy. It offers an in-depth inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational.

In the face of environmental crises such as climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss—which all adversely impact on health—Gils-Schmidt and Salloch explore whether physicians can be justified in taking climate issues into account in clinical care.1 While their approach centres on the ‘climate-sensitive’ decisions, physicians can carry out on the micro-level of clinical decision-making, they encourage further discussions on how climate-related issues can be included across different levels of decision-making in healthcare. We propose a list of tasks and a model (...) to assist with navigating the range of factors and structural elements an environmentally sensitive ethics must address. Stephen Gardiner’s notion of a perfect moral storm is central to understanding these issues.2 Gardiner describes how a perfect moral storm occurs in the centre of three overlapping conditions for human action and policymaking in the face of climate change. This storm is driven by: (1) a lack of interest among current generations to meet global needs and accommodate the well-being of future generations, (2) a lack of ecological concerns for other parts of nature than humans and (3) weak ethical and political theories and institutions shaping policy decisions on issues with severe implications across borders and generations. Moreover, these conditions are embedded in the existing, complex world of ethically unjustified power imbalances and social injustice. The growing awareness of healthcare’s climate footprint has amplified and accelerated global, grassroots action to make healthcare more environmentally friendly. This includes incorporating environmental impacts into quality improvement methodologies, building communities of practice to explore how to make …. (shrink)

Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I (...) argue that for Helmholtz, the properties we perceive are not monadic properties of either the subject or the object. Rather, Helmholtz endorsed a relationalism about the properties we perceive: the properties of objects we perceive are all relational properties. I then suggest that once we take into account oft-neglected terminological distinctions in Helmholtz’s corpus, we are better able to make sense of his commitment to relationalism. (shrink)

In this, the first of two ground-breaking volumes on the nature of language in the light of the way it evolved, James Hurford looks at how the world first came to have a meaning in the minds of animals and how in humans this meaning eventually came to be expressed as language. He reviews a mass of evidence to show how close some animals, especially primates and more especially apes, are to the brink of human language. Apes may not talk (...) to us but they construct rich cognitive representations of the world around them, and here, he shows, are the evolutionary seeds of abstract thought - the means of referring to objects, the memory of events, even elements of the propositional thinking philosophers have hitherto reserved for humans. What then, he asks, is the evolutionary path between the non-speaking minds of apes and our own speaking minds? Why don't apes communicate the richness of their thoughts to each other? Why do humans alone have a unique disposition to reveal their thoughts in complex detail? Professor Hurford searches a wide range of evidence for the answers to these central questions, including degrees of trust, the role of hormones, the ability to read minds, and the willingness to cooperate. Expressing himself congenially in consistently colloquial language the author builds up a vivid picture of how mind, language, and meaning evolved over millions of years. His book is a landmark contribution to the understanding of linguistic and thinking processes, and the fullest account yet published of the evolution of language and communication."A wonderful read - lucid, informative, and entertaining, while at the same time never talking down to the reader by sacrificing argumentation for the sake of 'simplicity'. Likely to be heralded as the major publication dealing with language evolution to date. Frederick J. Newmeyer, University of Washington. (shrink)

Heidegger’s early project aims to articulate the form of our being as Dasein, and he says that for this usually hidden form to become accessible, a certain kind of “mood” is required of the philosopher. This “ground-mood” he identifies in Sein und Zeit as anxiety. He also, however, presents anxiety as a mood anyone, philosopher or not, experiences when there is some significant breakdown in the living of her life. I argue here that there are largely unrecognized problems with this (...) conflation of methodological and “existential” moods, but that there is nevertheless a compelling methodological account of anxiety that can be teased apart from the existentialist one: methodologically understood, anxiety is a self-affected state of the ontologist, one that results from her asking ontological questions of herself, and, by imagining crisis or breakdown, withdrawing from her determinate situation to a position where she can see the form of her own activity as questioner and imaginer. I draw out some consequences this has for how we should understand the place of ontological understanding in living one’s life, and I conclude by briefly showing how my reading helps us see Heidegger as developing key elements in the work of Descartes and Kant. (shrink)

Further examines the sense in which moral judgements are universalizable. Distinguishes between moral and logical theses of universalizability and shows how the moral does not follow from the logical. Universalizability, in the form maintained in this book, is a logical, not a moral, thesis; furthermore, nothing substantially moral follows from the logical thesis. The chapter presents the exact import of the thesis and considers the role of moral principles.

First published in 1992. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Averroës, 1126-1198; Ibn al-ʻArabī, 1165-1240; theory of knowledge.

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses the sceptical attacks on dogmatic accounts of cause and explanation, beginning with the Eight Modes of Aenesidemus, before moving on to discuss Sextus Empiricus’ general attack on the very coherence of the notions of causation. Aenesidemus’ Eight Modes are a set of arguments of varying scope and power against the Aetiology of the Dogmatists; they demonstrate the fundamental difficulties in any attempt to investigate the hidden structures of things, and also raise methodological difficulties. Sextus Empiricus (...) argues that the very concepts of cause and effect are incoherent, and he also criticizes the notions of agent and patient, and the dogmatist account of sign‐inference. Hankinson also discusses the Modes of Agrippa, according to which an explanation is either circular, infinitely regressive, or arbitrary. The sceptical attacks on astrology and divination are also important in that they undermine the claims of pseudo‐science; such arguments, Hankinson adds, contribute to the understanding of the standards towards which genuine science must strive. (shrink)

Discusses an important objection to the view that moral judgements are prescriptive: the existence of cases in which people act in ways that they know to be wrong. The objection is that if moral judgements are prescriptive, it is impossible to accept a moral judgement and yet act contrary to it; therefore prescriptivism must be wrong. It is argued that cases of moral weakness do not constitute a counterexample to prescriptivism.

Leslie Graves, Barbara Horan and Alex Rosenberg (1999) have argued that the process of evolution is really deterministic, so we should be instrumentalists about our probabilistic evolutionary theory. I criticize the consistency of their view. I argue that because they are realists towards multiple theories (quantum mechanics and macrophysics) their arguments against realism for another scientific theory fail. The main point of this paper is critical, but in order to set up this criticism I explore the ramifications of realism for (...) multiple theories. Finally, I offer a brief metaphysical justification for realism about multiple theories. This view justifies realism for evolutionary theory, which has been defended by Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996). (shrink)

Humans have been modifying plants and animals for millennia. The dawn of molecular genetics, however, has kindled intense public scrutiny and controversy. Crops, and the food products which include them, have dominated molecular modification in agriculture. Organisations have made unsubstantiated claims and scare mongering is common. In this textbook Paul Thompson presents a clear account of the significant issues - identifying harms and benefits, analysing and managing risk - which lie beneath the cacophony of public controversy. His comprehensive analysis looks (...) especially at genetically modified organisms, and includes an explanation of the scientific background, an analysis of ideological objections, a discussion of legal and ethical concerns, a suggested alternative - organic agriculture - and an examination of the controversy's impact on sub-Saharan African countries. His book will be of interest to students and other readers in philosophy, biology, biotechnology and public policy. (shrink)

On the example of the online game Akinator, the basic principles on which programs of this type are built are considered. Effective technics have been proposed by which artificial intelligence systems can build logical inferences that allow to identify an unknown subject from its description. To confirm the considered hypotheses, the terminological analysis of definition of the program "Akinator" offered by the author is carried out. Starting from the assumptions given by the author's definition, the article complements their definitions presented (...) by other researchers and analyzes their constituent theses. Finally, some proposals are made for the next steps in improving the program. The Akinator program, at one time, became one of the most famous online games using artificial intelligence. And although this was not directly stated, it was clear to the experts in the field of artificial intelligence that the program uses the techniques of expert systems and is built on inference rules. At the moment, expert systems have lost their positions in comparison with the direction of neural networks in the field of artificial intelligence, however, in the case considered in the article, we are talking about techniques using both directions – hybrid systems. Games for filling semantics interact with the user, expanding their semantic base and use certain strategies to achieve the best result. The playful form of such semantics filling programs is beneficial for researchers by involving a large number of players. The article examines the techniques used by the Akinator program, and also suggests possible modifications to it in the future. This study, first of all, focuses on how the knowledge base of the Akinator program is built, it consists of incomplete sets, which can be filled and adjusted as a result of further iterations of the program launches. It is important to note our assumption that the order of questions used by the program during the game plays a key role, because it determines its strategy. It was identified that the program is guided by the principles of nonmonotonic logic – the assumptions constructed by the program are not final and can be rejected by it during the game. The three main approaches to acquisite semantics proposed by Jakub Šimko and Mária Bieliková are considered, namely, expert work, crowdsourcing and machine learning. Paying attention to machine learning, the Akinator program using machine learning to build an effective strategy in the game presents a class of hybrid systems that combine the principles of two main areas in artificial intelligence programs – expert systems and neural networks. (shrink)

The meaning of “information and communication technologies (ICT)”, “market of information and communication technologies” were clarified in the article. Components and priority areas for capital investment in the ICT market were determined. The relativity of relationship between the placement of supercomputers in the countries and their level of innovation was revealed. The tendencies of world ICT market development were defined. The place of Ukraine in the world ICT market was established.

This chapter contains sections titled: A Brief History of Corporate Responsibility The Nature of Corporate Obligations and the Scope of Corporate Responsibility Some Promising Approaches to the Study of Corporate Responsibility Corporate Responsibility and the Limits of Minimalism.

This edited volume of original contributions deals with the economic and political thought of Michael Polanyi. Requiring little prior knowledge of Polanyi, this volume further develops a somewhat neglected side of Polanyi's work. In particular it examines the 'tacit integration', of subsidiary details into focal objects or actions as central to all knowing and action. It traces ontological counterparts in the structures of comprehensive entities and complex actions, and a multi-level universe in which lower levels have their boundary conditions, the (...) extents to which they apply, determined by those of the next higher level, whilst each possessing its own laws or operative principles. This schema of 'dual control' preserves the reality and relative autonomy of each level, and its interactions with others, against the various reductions. The essays in this volume also employ and develop important additional concepts and distinctions such as: 'corporate' and 'spontaneous' order; 'public' and 'private' liberties; 'general' and 'specific authority'; and 'moral inversion'; which, as the essays show, are necessary for understanding and maintaining a free society and the freedom of institutions within it. Among the topics treated with them are: more of the prerequisites of freedom in public liberties dedicated to principles and transcendent values; totalitarianism and society as spontaneous order; the balance of general and specific authority in society and particular institutions; reductionism, totalitarianism and consumption in consumer societies, as moral inversions; the mutual interactions of economics and politics as distinct and autonomous but interacting levels; the sociological aspects of economics; and Polanyi's own contributions to sociology. Although, as indicated, Polanyi has his special terms, the essays in this volume, like his works, give them meaning with concrete examples and so avoid merely shuffling a mass of abstractions. Together the essays show that his work is a rich seam of ideas and inspiration for yet further extension and application--Publisher. (shrink)