A fresh explication of the Thomist justification of self-defense casts off the hobbles of the principle of double effects to find a more secure footing in the historicaldevelopment of subjective natural rights by medieval jurists, and a straight-forward application to the latent threat of death in childbirth posed by non-consensual pregnancy. By articulating the implicit Thomistic right to defensive abortion in terms of conditional rights bestowed in Creation as correlative to particular natural law duties, justly proportionate limits to defensive abortion (...) are identified, and balanced against the forfeited or reserved natural rights variously imputed to conceptus and embryo in non-consensual pregnancies. Subsequently, the varieties of involuntary consent are examined from a Thomist perspective with a view to their relevance in justifying recourse to a rehabilitated practice of defensive abortion when free and full consent to impregnation and childbirth is absent. (shrink)

R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises (e.g. Newton's Principia and Opticks ) and journal articles (by Einstein, Bohm and Pines, Aharonov and Bohm). By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following 6 essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy of physics such as laws, (...) disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics. (shrink)

We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...) a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Emotional Responding Is to Blame It Might Not Be to ResponsibilityR. J. R. Blair (bio)Keywordsblame, responsibility, emotional responses, psychopathyIn this interesting paper, Levy argues that by failing the moral/conventional distinction task (Blair 1995), individuals with psychopathy show a fundamental inability to categorize moral harms and as such their moral responsibility for their actions is reduced. He argues that, although we might still wish to incarcerate such individuals to (...) prevent them inflicting further harm on others, we should be less enthusiastic to blame them for their actions.In many respects, I agree with much of Levy's treatise. I certainly do not regard ascriptions of blame as useful in my own work with this population. I believe that our goal should be to fully understand the nature of their emotional deficit to be able to treat it similarly to other researchers who work to treat other emotional disorders. To me, Levy's argument appears sound.However, I offer three considerations and raise questions within these considerations that might further the debate. First, not all rules involve care-based emotional responses to victims. As Levy notes, this is the origin of the moral/conventional distinction. The problem here is that we do consider someone responsible if they break a conventional transgression. The student talking in class is generally considered blameworthy for this action as long as they knew that the rule of not talking during the lesson applied to that classroom. Yet, there is no victim and no care-based emotional response. Here, the only thing necessary to ascribe blame and responsibility is that the individual knew that a rule exists. Given this holds for conventional transgressions, why must we necessarily make a special case, with respect to responsibility, for moral transgressions?I believe that Levy is fully aware of this concern. He specifically makes reference to moral responsibility and writes that:the kind and degree of wrongness, and therefore blame, which attaches to infringements of the rules [against double parking or line-jumping] is very different, and usually much less significant, than the kind and degree attaching to moral wrongs. For psychopaths, all offences are merely conventional, and therefore—from their point of view—none of them are all that serious.(2007, p. 132)But the danger here is that issues of blame and responsibility may become highly relativistic and hinge on the strength of the emotional reaction. This is a problem because, although we might judge someone as more blameworthy if he intentionally [End Page 149] runs over five people rather than one, do we really consider that there is a distinction in moral responsibility between these two cases? If not, might not responsibility relate to factual knowledge of the existence of the rule against the transgression rather than the emotional response to the transgression?Second, there is considerable debate regarding whether psychopathy represents a taxon or a continuum (e.g., Vasey et al. 2005; Edens et al. 2006). Assuming it does represent a continuum, then we have an additional concern. How little of an emotional response to the transgression reduces one's moral responsibility and blame? Is it only the very reduced (although usually not absent) levels of emotional response that are shown by individuals with psychopathy? Or should we consider moral responsibility and blame proportional to the level of the emotional response? If this latter option is adopted, then what should we do about individuals who show heightened emotional responses, for example, patients with specific anxiety disorders (Rauch, Shin, and Wright 2003)? There are already some data that inhibited children (a developmental precursor to some anxiety disorders; Kagan and Snidman 1999) show heightened conscience development (Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler 1992). If such children commit moral transgressions, should we regard them as more morally responsible and more blameworthy than regular folks?Third, the issue of intention received little attention in this paper. I have been considered to show a similar lack of attention to intention in the past (Nichols 2002) and, moreover, in some respects the issue was of limited concern given Levy's main goals. However, I mention it because so much of whether we consider someone responsible for their actions and... (shrink)

The author's motivation for constructing the calculi of this paper\nis so that time and tense can be "discussed together in the same\nlanguage" (p. 282). Two types of enriched propositional caluli for\ntense logic are considered, both containing ordinary propositional\nvariables for which any proposition may be substituted. One type\nalso contains "clock-propositional" variables, a,b,c, etc., for\nwhich only clock-propositional variables may be substituted and that\ncorrespond to instants or moments in the semantics. The other type\nalso contains "history-propositional" variables, u,v,w, etc., for\nwhich only history-propositional variables may (...) be substituted and\nthat correspond to maximally linearly ordered subsets of instants.\nThis second type is for tense logics in which time is not linear\nand where at any moment there may exist alternative future courses\nof events. Quantifiers are included in both types but only for clock-\nand history-propositional variables. However, these quantifiers are\ngiven an essentially substitutional interpretation. In addition,\nbesides each clock-propositional variable being true at exactly one\ninstant, the semantics requires that for each instant there be at\nleast one clock-propositional variable true at that instant, which\nin effect amounts to having each instant of the model "denoted" in\nthe formalism by some clock-propositional variable. Thus it is not\nsurprising that quantification over clock-propositional variables\nturns out to have a "well behaved first-order semantics" (p. 284).\n{One axiom relating history- with clock-propositions seems to need\nrevision: CKTauTbuAUabUba. Since the clock-propositional variables\nmight be true at the same instant the consequent should include an\nalternative, namely, LCab.} Besides the standard truth-functional\nand tense operators G,H,F,P, the author includes L for "it is\nalways the case that". The model-theoretic earlier-than relation\nordering instants and the semantic truth-at (an instant) relation\nare formalized by Uab and Taα (for a wff α) which\nare defined respectively as LCbPa (whenever the clock-proposition\nb is the case the clock-proposition a was the case) and LCaα\n(α is the case whenever the clock-proposition a is the case).\nBecause the future tense operators are definable in terms of U\nand T and the latter are definable in terms of L and P, the\ndual of H, the author notes that his completeness proofs can be\nrestricted to L and H as primitive and with the future tense\noperators used for other interpretations, especially Prior, A.'s\nindeterminist "it will be the case that", where time is not linear.\nThe author concludes with some rather technical observations showing\nthat "in ordinary tense logics the instants are nonstandard elements\nof the models. This provides", according to the author, "a semantic\npressure to build the instants into tense logic, so that they will\nappear as standard elements in the models" (p. 283). (shrink)

I am interested in extending modal calculi by adding propositional quantifiers, given by the rules for quantifier introduction: provided that p does not occur free in A.

this article is based on a paper that I presented during the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, as a keynote speaker in the Coss Dialogue sessions. I was pleasantly surprised to hear that most participants of SAAP use the term "American" in its continental, rather than in the US-centric sense. I am glad that many of the philosophers of this community of knowledge have opened their dialogues to the voices and experiences south of the (...) Río Bravo. We are living during very difficult times in which cultures and practices of violence, as well as aggressive exclusion and intolerance, are affecting our communities on both sides of the border. In this context of multiple... (shrink)

What kind of knowledge is medical knowledge? Can medicine be explained scientifically? Is disease a scientific concept, or do explanations of disease depend on values? What is ‘evidence-based’ medicine? Are advances in neuroscience bringing us closer to a scientific understanding of the mind? The nature of medicine raises fundamental questions about explanation, causation, knowledge and ontology – questions that are central to philosophy as well as medicine. In this book Paul R. Thompson and Ross E. G. Upshur introduce the fundamental (...) issues in philosophy of medicine for those coming to the subject for the first time. They introduce and explain the following key topics: Understanding the physician-patient relationship: the phenomenology of the medical encounter. Models and theories in biology and medicine: what role do theories play in medicine? Are they similar to scientific theories? Randomised controlled trials: can scientific experiments be replicated in clinical medicine? What are the philosophical criticisms levelled at RCTs? The concept of evidence in medical research: what do we mean by ‘Evidence-based medicine?’ Should all medicine be based on evidence? Causation in medicine What do advances in neuroscience reveal about the relationship between mind and body? Defining health and disease: are explanations of disease objective or do they depend on values? Evolutionary medicine: what is the role of evolutionary biology in understanding medicine? Is it relevant? Extensive use of empirical examples and case studies is made throughout the book. These include debates about smoking and cancer, the use of placebos in randomised controlled trials and controversies about research into the causes of HIV and autism. This is an indispendable introduction to those teaching philosophy of medicine and philosophy of science. (shrink)

R K Elliott; Education, Love of One’s Subject, and the Love of Truth, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 135–153, https:/.

Did Plato abandon, or sharply modify, the Theory of Forms in later life? In the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic it is generally agreed that Plato held that universals exist. But in Parmenides, he subjected that theory to criticism. If the criticism were valid, and Plato knew so, then the Parmenides marks a turning point in his thought. If, however, Plato became aware that there are radical differences in the logical behaviour of concepts, and the later dialogues are a record of (...) his attempt to analyse those differences, then Plato’s thought can be said to have moved in a new and vitally important direction after the Parmenides . Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics brings together twenty essays by leading philosophers from the UK and the USA reflecting upon this important issue and upon the questions arising from it. (shrink)

It is a common complaint against moral philosophers that their abstract theorising bears little relation to the practical problems of everyday life. Professor Braithwaite believes that this criticism need not be inevitable. With the help of the Theory of Games he shows how arbitration is possible between two neighbours, a jazz trumpeter and a classical pianist, whose performances are a source of mutual discord. The solution of the problem in the lecture is geometrical, and is based on the formal analogy (...) between the logic of the situation and the geometry of a parabola. But an appendix provides the alternative algebraic treatment of a general two-person collaboration situation. (shrink)

In Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, R. Zachary Manis examines in detail the several facets of the problem of hell, considers the reasons why the usual responses to the problem are unsatisfying, and suggests how an adequate solution to the problem can be constructed.

R K Elliott; Aestheticism, Imagination and Schooling: a reply to Ruby Meager, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 33–42.

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 71-73.

Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i et skille mellom samfunnsstrukturer som avgrenser legers skjønnsmessige utfoldelse på den ene siden, og profesjonens tilrettelegging for kultiveringen av erkjennelsesmessige ferdigheter på den annen. Ved å videreføre H. Grimen og A. Molanders anvendelse av S.E. Toulmins modell for praktisk resonnering i en klinisk kontekst redegjør jeg for legeskjønnets multidimensjonale, epistemiske struktur. Gjennomgangen viser hvordan skjønnsanvendelse i legerollen kan analyseres i henhold til en fagteknisk, en distributiv og en relasjonell dimensjon. Mot denne bakgrunnen diskuterer jeg så (...) spenninger som oppstår i skjæringspunktet mellom strukturering og kultivering av skjønnets ulike dimensjoner. Diskusjonen tydeliggjør at den medisinske profesjonen ikke kan betraktes som en selvtilstrekkelig premissleverandør når det gjelder å sikre adekvat kultivering av medlemmenes skjønnsutøvelse i en klinisk kontekst. Ved å synliggjøre og vektlegge de relevante profesjonseksterne bidragene i profesjonens pågående selvregulering kan befolkningens berettigete tillit til profesjonen styrkes ytterligere.Nøkkelord: strukturelt skjønn, epistemisk skjønn, profesjon, selvregulering, tillitEnglish summary: In Between Structures of Society and Profession: On Delimitation, Cultivation and Premises for Adequately Exercising Judgment in the Role as PhysicianThe point of departure of this article is a distinction between societal structures that delimit the discretion of the physician on the one hand and the profession's arrangements for the cultivation of the physician's judgment on the other. By developing H. Grimen and A. Molander's application of S.E. Toulmin's model for practical reasoning in a clinical context, the multi-dimensional epistemic structure of the physician's judgment in terms of technical, distributive, and relational judgment is accounted for. Against this backdrop, tensions emerging in the intersection between delimitation and cultivation of professional judgment in its various dimensions are discussed. The discussion clarifies that the medical profession is not a self-sufficient provider when it comes to ensuring an adequate cultivation of its members' judgment in a clinical context. It is argued that by emphasising and implementing the relevant external contributions to the profession's ongoing self-regulation, the public's justified trust in the medical profession can be strengthened. (shrink)

Bu araştırma Hz. Peygamber’e izafe edilen “Dünya müminin zindanı, kâfirin cennetidir” rivayetini konu edinmektedir. Zikri geçen hadisle ilgili literatür taraması yapıldığında müstakil bir araştırmaya rastlanmamaktadır. Esasında ilim geleneğimizde tek bir hadisi bütün yönleriyle inceleyen pek çok araştırma vardır. Ancak söz konusu haberin müsellem ve mesajı açık kabul edilmesi hem Arap hem de Batı araştırmalarına konu edilmemesinin gerekçesi olabilir. İlgili rivayetin temel hadis kaynaklarında muhtelif metinlerle, beş ayrı sahâbîden aktarıldığı tespit edilmiştir. Araştırmamızda sözü edilen metin ve senedler ayrı ayrı incelenerek rivayetin (...) hadis ilmi açısından değeri tartışılmıştır. Rivayetin pek çok tariki olduğu için araştırma merfu‘ haberlerle sınırlandırılmıştır. Sözü edilen rivayete temel hadis metinlerinde hangi bâb başlığı altında yer verildiği ve klasik hadis şerhlerinde metne nasıl yaklaşıldığı tetkik edilmiştir. Rivayetin “zühd” konusunun ayrılmaz bir parçası haline geldiği ve buna bağlı olarak vaaz ve irşad literatüründe önemli bir yer tuttuğu tespit edilmiştir. Hadiste müminin dünya hayatıyla ilişkisine dair serdedilen ifadeler, kabaca “fâni olan her şeye yüz çevirmek” şeklinde tanımlayabileceğimiz zühdle ilişkilendirilmesine yol açmıştır. Hadis şârihleri ise mezkûr haberi dünya arzularının cezb ediciliğiyle, süreklilik arz eden meşakkatli ibadetlerle mükellef olmanın verdiği zorlukla ve dünyada bireylerin başına gelen musibetlere karşı sabretmesi gerektiğiyle ilişkilendirmişlerdir. Bu bakımdan musannifler ile şârihlerin hadisi benzer perspektifle değerlendirdikleri görülmüştür. Çalışmamızda, Kur’an ve hadis metinlerinde yer alan metaforik anlatı biçimi göz önünde tutulduğunda hadisi farklı bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirmenin mümkün olup olmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Zira metafor, retorik sanatların önemli bir unsuru olup, benzetme edatlarını kullanmadan farklı konular arasında anlam bağlantısı kurma sanatıdır. İstiare, teşbih, alegori ve kinaye gibi türlerle benzerlikler taşısa da anlatılan konudan ziyade anlatım tarzını vurgulayarak sözleri güçlendirmesiyle diğerlerinden ayrılmaktadır. Metaforlar düşünce dünyasına derinlik katmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda karmaşık veya soyut kavramların daha anlaşılır ifade edilmesine imkân tanır. Dilin gücünü ortaya çıkarırken, yaratıcı düşünce ve duygusal bağlantılar kurma becerisini pekiştirerek anlatının içerdiği mesajın vurgusunu artırır ve muhatapta daha derin etki bırakmayı sağlar. Tüm bunlardan hareketle ilgili metinde yer alan “zindan” kavramının metaforik bir anlam içerdiği kabul edildiğinde yeni bir yorum denemesine açık olduğu söylenebilir. Özellikle modern dönemde belirgin, açık ve fark edilir düzeyde ortaya çıkan düşünce ve ahlak krizine karşı bir anlamlandırma yolu seçerek ilgili rivayeti “medeniyet ve sünnet” ilişkisini göz önünde tutarak metaforik bir yorum denemesiyle ele aldık. Zira bu sözleriyle Resûl-i Ekrem’in çökmüş ve çürümekte olan medeniyetlerin haksızlık ve sefaletin kaynağı haline getirdiği tek dünyacı anlayışı reddettiği, nimetlere ve mahrumiyetlere karşı gereğinden fazla ya da az değer atfetmeyi kabul etmediği ve ölümle her şeyini kaybedeceğini düşünenlere karşı bilinç uyandırmaya çalıştığı iddia edilmektedir. Bunun yanında modern insanın İslâm medeniyetini yeniden canlandırabilmesini engelleyen bir dizi kriz vardır. Bunlar ruhsal, bireysel, düşünsel, metafizik ve toplumsal krizlerdir. İnsan, ruhsal krizi manevi ilerleme ve aydınlanmayla; bireysel krizi değerleri arzulara bırakmamakla; düşünsel krizi farklı düşüncelere açık bir şekilde eleştirel düşünceyi geliştirmekle; metafizik krizi dünyevi cazibelerden arınarak varoluşsal kısıtlamalara sırt çevirip bilgi ve anlam arayışına yönelmekle; toplumsal krizi toplumdaki değişimlere katkıda bulunarak insan hakları mücadelesi vermekle alt edebilir. Araştırmamızda insanın bu krizlerle başa çıkıp zindandan kurtularak özgürlüğe kavuşacağı ve kendi medeniyetini kurabileceği fikri metaforik bir yorum denemesiyle ileri sürülmüştür. Modern dönemde karşımıza çıkan sorunların tespitinin ve bu sorunlara dair çözüm önerilerinin rivayet kültüründen beslenmek suretiyle yapılmasının mümkün olup olmadığı da bu sayede tetkik edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda “Dünya müminin zindanı, kâfirin cennetidir” rivayetinin ne şekilde anlaşıldığı veya anlaşılması gerektiği etrafındaki tartışmalara temas edilerek yeni bir yorum arayışına gidilmiştir. Söz konusu arayış “deneme” olarak isimlendirilmiş ve sonraki araştırmacıların çok daha kapsamlı denemelerde bulunması hedeflenmiştir. (shrink)

Background: Patient autonomy has been promoted as the most important principle to guide difficult clinical decisions. To examine whether practising physicians indeed value patient autonomy above other considerations, physicians were asked to weight patient autonomy against three other criteria that often influence doctors’ decisions. Associations between physicians’ religious characteristics and their weighting of the criteria were also examined. Methods: Mailed survey in 2007 of a stratified random sample of 1000 US primary care physicians, selected from the American Medical Association masterfile. (...) Physicians were asked how much weight should be given to the following: (1) the patient’s expressed wishes and values, (2) the physician’s own judgment about what is in the patient’s best interest, (3) standards and recommendations from professional medical bodies and (4) moral guidelines from religious traditions. Results: Response rate 51% (446/879). Half of physicians (55%) gave the patient’s expressed wishes and values “the highest possible weight”. In comparative analysis, 40% gave patient wishes more weight than the other three factors, and 13% ranked patient wishes behind some other factor. Religious doctors tended to give less weight to the patient’s expressed wishes. For example, 47% of doctors with high intrinsic religious motivation gave patient wishes the “highest possible weight”, versus 67% of those with low (OR 0.5; 95% CI 0.3 to 0.8). Conclusions: Doctors believe patient wishes and values are important, but other considerations are often equally or more important. This suggests that patient autonomy does not guide physicians’ decisions as much as is often recommended in the ethics literature. (shrink)

In _Sentient Flesh _R. A. Judy takes up freedman Tom Windham’s 1937 remark “we should have our liberty 'cause... us is human flesh" as a point of departure for an extended meditation on questions of the human, epistemology, and the historical ways in which the black being is understood. Drawing on numerous fields, from literary theory and musicology, to political theory and phenomenology, as well as Greek and Arabic philosophy, Judy engages literary texts and performative practices such as music and (...) dance that express knowledge and conceptions of humanity appositional to those grounding modern racialized capitalism. Operating as critiques of Western humanism, these practices and modes of being-in-the-world—which he theorizes as “thinking in disorder,” or “poiēsis in black”—foreground the irreducible concomitance of flesh, thinking, and personhood. As Judy demonstrates, recognizing this concomitance is central to finding a way past the destructive force of ontology that still holds us in thrall. Erudite and capacious, _Sentient Flesh _offers a major intervention in the black study of life. (shrink)

The problem that confronts us when we try to compare the structure of discourse and explanation in different domains of knowledge is that no one is an insider in more than one field, and insider information is essential. An observer who is not immersed in the practice of a particular scholarship and who wants to understand it is at the mercy of the practitioners. Yet those practitioners are themselves mystified by a largely unexamined communal myth of how scholarship is carried (...) on. R. G. Collingwood, although primarily a philosopher, was immersed in the community of historians and understood how history is done, so that he has had an immense influence on our ideas about historiography. Every historian knows The Idea of History.1 He was also a metaphysician, yet his influence on scientists’ understanding of nature, and of science, has been nil, and it is a rare scientist indeed who has ever heard of Collingwood or read The Idea of Nature.2 Collingwood’s views of the structure of science had to be constructed in large part from the elaborate fictions created by scientists and by an earlier generation of philosophers and historians of science who participated in the Baconian myth of the hypothetical-deductive scheme. 1. See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History .2. See Collingwood, The Idea of Nature . R. C. Lewontin is Alexander Agassiz Professor at Harvard University. He is an experimental and theoretical evolutionary geneticist who has also worked extensively on epistemological issues in biology. He is the author of The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change and, with Richard Levins, of The Dialectical Biologist . His current research concerns the nature of genetic variation among individuals within species. (shrink)

Human societies are extraordinarily cooperative compared to those of most other animals. In the vast majority of species, individuals live solitary lives, meeting to only to mate and, sometimes, raise their young. In social species, cooperation is limited to relatives and (maybe) small groups of reciprocators. After a brief period of maternal support, individuals acquire virtually all of the food that they eat. There is little division of labor, no trade, and no large scale conflict. Communication is limited to a (...) small repertoire of self-verifying signals. No one cares for the sick, or feeds the hungry or disabled. The strong take from the weak without fear of sanctions by third parties. Amend Hobbes to account for nepotism, and his picture of the state of nature is not so far off for most other animals. In contrast, people in even the simplest human societies regularly cooperate with many unrelated individuals. Human language allows low-cost honest communication of virtually unlimited complexity. The sick are cared for, and sharing leads to substantial flows of food from the middle aged to the young and old. Division of labor and trade are prominent features of every historically known human society, and archaeology indicates that they have a long history. Violent conflict among sizable groups is common. In every human society, social life is regulated by commonly held moral systems that specify the rights and duties of individuals enforced, albeit imperfectly, by third party sanctions. (shrink)

R W K Paterson; Towards an Axiology of Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.