The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...) diagnose what I believe is a structural problem that plagues the debate about practical reasons. A common move in the debate involves a proponent of one type of view offering what she and others proposing that type consider to be a devastating criticism of an opposing type of view, only to find that her criticism is shrugged off by her opponents as easy to answer, misguided, or having little significance for their view. This isn’t due to conceptual blindness or mere slavish devotion to a theory but something fundamental about the argumentative structure of a debate over genuinely shared issues. Hence, the debate about practical reasons suffers from argumentative gridlock. The proposed framework helps us to see why this is so, and what we might do to move beyond it. (shrink)

‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, (...) is mistaken. The plurality of values is also thought to raise problems for rational choice. If two irreducibly distinct values conflict, it seems that there is no common ground that justifies choosing one over the other. The metaphysical plurality of values does not, however, have the implications for rational choice that many have supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a ‘nonreductive’ form of value pluralism. Nonreductive value pluralism maintains that in the context of practical choice, there are differences between values—whether or not those values reduce to a single supervalue—that have important implications for rational choice. This article examines the main arguments for metaphysical value pluralism, argues that metaphysical value pluralism does not have certain implications that it is widely thought to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view (...) of hard choices should be rejected. Incomparabilism about hard choices leads us to an implausible error theory about the phenomenology of hard choices, threatens an unattractive view of human agency, and leaves us in perplexity about what we are doing when we choose in hard choices. The second part of the argument explores the main competitor to comparativist views of practical reason, noncomparativist view, according tow which a choice is justified so long as it is not worse than any of the alternatives. This view is often assumed by rational choice theorists but has its best philosophical defense in work by Joseph Raz. On Raz’s view, incomparabilism about hard choices avoids the problems faced if comparativism is correct, but it faces different difficulties. I argue that Raz’s noncomparativist view mistakenly assimilates practical reason to more restricted normative domains such as the law. (shrink)

A selective history of the benzene problem is presented, starting with August Kekulé's proposal of a hexagonal structure in 1865 and his hypothesis of 1872 that the carbon–carbon bonds oscillate between single and double. Only those theories are included that were accepted or at least discussed by a significant number of chemists. Special attention is given to predictions, their empirical tests, and the effect of the outcomes of those tests on the reception of the theories. At the end of (...) the period covered by this article, chemists generally accepted the valence bond theory proposed by Linus Pauling; some of them considered this a more sophisticated version of Kekulé's oscillation hypothesis. The sequel describes the replacement of the valence bond theory by the molecular orbital theory in the period ending around 1980. (shrink)

Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical terms. In general, this type of difficulty can be expected when a coherent (...) scientific tradition undergoes a theoretical upheaval. The problem may be circumvented through the use of phenomenological theory in experimentation during the period of theoretical instability. (shrink)

Slurs are derogatory words and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs must explain why they are derogatory words, as well as other features like independence and descriptive ineffability. This paper proposes an illocutionary force indicator theory of slurs: they are derogatory terms because their use is to perform the illocutionary act of derogation, which is a declarative illocutionary act to enforce norms against the target. For instance, calling a Chinese person “chink” is an act of (...) derogation to enforce racist norms that license exclusion of the Chinese, deny their rights to dignity, etc. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a more comprehensive explanation of the features of slurs than earlier speech act approaches. Second, it provides a theory that is immune to the problems faced by existing theories, such as wrong predictions of truth-conditions, explaining unacceptability to non-bigots, and explaining slurs against the dominant groups. (shrink)

Do sensory measurements deserve the label of “measurement”? We argue that they do. They fit with an epistemological view of measurement held in current philosophy of science, and they face the same kinds of epistemological challenges as physical measurements do: the problem of coordination and the problem of standardization. These problems are addressed through the process of “epistemic iteration,” for all measurements. We also argue for distinguishing the problem of standardization from the problem of coordination. To (...) exemplify our claims, we draw on olfactory performance tests, especially studies linking olfactory decline to neurodegenerative disorders. (shrink)

Slurs are both derogatory and offensive, and they are said to exhibit “derogatory force” and “offensiveness.” Almost all theories of slurs, except the truth-conditional content theory and the invocational content theory, conflate these two features and use “derogatory force” and “offensiveness” interchangeably. This paper defends and explains the distinction between slurs’ derogatory force and offensiveness by fulfilling three goals. First, it distinguishes between slurs’ being derogatory and their being offensive with four arguments. For instance, ‘Monday’, a slur in (...) the Bostonian argot, is used to secretly derogate African Americans without causing offense. Second, this paper points out that many theories of slurs run into problems because they conflate derogatory force with offensiveness. For example, the prohibition theory’s account of offensiveness in terms of prohibitions struggles to explain why ‘Monday’ is derogatory when it is not a prohibited word in English. Third, this paper offers a new explanation of this distinction from the perspective of a speech act theory of slurs; derogatory force is different from offensiveness because they arise from two different kinds of speech acts that slurs are used to perform, i.e., the illocutionary act of derogation and the perlocutionary act of offending. This new explanation avoids the problems faced by other theories. (shrink)

The development of access rights as, perhaps, a replacement for copyright in digital rights management (DRM) systems, draws our attention to the importance of ‚the balance problem’ between information industries and the individual user. The nature of just what this ‚balance’ is, is often mentioned in copyright writings and judgments, but is rarely discussed. In this paper I focus upon elucidating the idea of balance in intellectual property and propose that the balance concept is not only the most feasible (...) way to examine whether past solutions to copyright problems are fair, but it also provides the ability to predict what will be the better solution for all affected parties. Based upon an envy-free contribution towards predicting the efficient balance, game theory is applied in a novel manner to the DRM problem to infer where and what might be the optimal balance in the debate over the nature of access right. (shrink)

A selective history of the benzene problem is presented, starting with August Kekule's proposal of a hexagonal structure in 1865 and his hypothesis of 1872 that the carbon-carbon bonds oscillate between single and double. Only those theories are included that were accepted or at least discussed by a significant number of chemists. Special attention is given to predictions, their empirical tests, and the effect of the outcomes of those tests on the reception of the theories. At the end of (...) the period covered by this article, chemists generally accepted the valence bond (resonance) theory proposed by Linus Pauling; some of them considered this a more sophisticated version (and thus a vindication) of Kekule's oscillation hypothesis. The sequel (to be published in the following issue) describes the replacement of the valence bond theory by the molecular orbital theory in the period ending around 1980. (shrink)

This study derives an improved model of managers' decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim (Accounting, Organization and Society 24, 173-184, 1999) this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency (...) class='Hi'>problem are present or absent. Also, this study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers' commitment. (shrink)

This study derives an improved model of managers’ decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency problem are present or absent. Also, this (...) study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers’ commitment. (shrink)

Causal and counterfactual thoughts are bound together in Byrne's theory of human imagination. We think there are two issues in her theory that deserve clarification. First, Byrne describes which counterfactual possibilities we think of, but she leaves unexplained the mechanisms by which we generate these possibilities. Second, her exploration of and enablers gives two different predictions of which counterfactuals we think of in causal scenarios. On one account, we think of the counterfactuals which we have control over. On (...) the other, which counterfactuals we think of depends on whether something is a strong cause or an enabler. Although these two accounts sometimes give the same predictions, we present cases in which they differ, and we would like to see Byrne's theory provide a way of reconciling these differences. (shrink)

This study empirically demonstrates significant regional peer effects due to tax avoidance. We used peer companies’ idiosyncratic stock returns as an instrumental variable to address potential endogeneity problems. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that for companies with a stronger intensity of regional tax collection and management, a higher degree of informatization, and companies with a low management shareholding ratio, the regional peer effects of enterprise tax avoidance are more significant. Finally, we determined that the managers’ information learning, reputation consideration, and information (...) communication are key mechanisms propagating peer effects. The conclusions of this paper enrich and expand the peer effect theory of corporate tax avoidance, thereby providing a theoretical basis and empirical evidence for tax authorities in supervising corporate tax avoidance. (shrink)

Transgender women experience serious psychiatric problems and high suicide rates. According to the interpersonal theory of suicide, thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness play major roles in suicidality and can be measured by the Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire. However, no study has validated the use of the INQ in TGW. This study aimed to examine the psychometric properties of the INQ among TGW. We recruited 198 TGW from Shenyang, China, using snowball sampling. The construct validity of the INQ was assessed through (...) factor analysis, and convergent and divergent validity were examined through a structural equation model with other psychosocial factors. The construct validation analysis supported a three-factor model with satisfactory fit indices: χ2/df = 1.54, RMSEA = 0.052, CFI = 0.931, TLI = 0.916, SRMR = 0.053. The thwarted belongingness was significantly associated with self-esteem and social support, and the social exclusion was significantly associated with loneliness, depression, entrapment, and defeat, suggesting satisfactory convergent and divergent validity for the three-factor model. The present findings indicate that for TGW, high social exclusion is important in assessing perceived interpersonal needs, while the notable deviation from previous two-factor model warrants further study. (shrink)

This paper investigates the impact of diversity on corporate philanthropy. Compared to previous studies that have considered the influence of board diversity and CEO gender on corporate philanthropy, this study introduces the concept of operational diversity, which is the implementation of diversity programs at management, employee, and supply chain levels, and further, it explains why operational diversity influences corporate philanthropy, by using the premises of resource dependence theory. Second, this study also investigates the influence of board diversity on corporate (...) philanthropy. Third, this study uses a large sample of U.S. firms over the period of 1991–2009 and tries to mitigate possible omitted variables and endogeneity problems that are often overlooked in previous research. We demonstrate that firms with operational diversity programs are likely more dependent on a broad variety of resources and give more to community as a strategic maneuver; hence, operational diversity is a better indicator for predicting future corporate giving than board diversity alone. However, having a woman or a member of a minority as a company’s chief executive officer is not sufficient to impact its charitable giving. A battery of robustness tests support our conclusion and confirm that our results are not driven by a firm’s general corporate social responsibility (CSR) score, gender or independence of board members, or firm ownership. This paper will assist researchers, practitioners, and other stakeholders in deepening their understanding of the predictors of corporate giving. (shrink)

In this study, experiments were conducted on 30 subjects by means of electrocardiogram and electroencephalogram methodologies as well as a money game to examine the effects of stress on creativity in business problem-solving. The study explained the relationship between creativity and human physiological response using the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat. The subjects were asked to perform a cognitive mapping task. Based on the brain wave theory, we identified the types of brain waves and locations of brain (...) activities that occurred during the creative problem-solving process in a business environment and studied the effects of stress on creativity. The results of the experiments showed significant differences in creativity in business problem-solving depending on whether or not stress was triggered. Differences were found in the time domain and frequency domain of heart rates, a physiological stress indicator, between the stress group and the no-stress group. A brain wave analysis confirmed that alpha waves increased in the frontal lobe of the brain during creative business problem-solving but decreased when the subjects were under stress, during which beta waves in the brain increased. This study seeks to examine creativity in business problem-solving by studying the effects of stress on human physiological response and cognitive functions in the hope of providing a new and objective interpretation of existing research results. (shrink)

A reconsideration of mill's theory of "higher pleasures," construed as a way of evaluating changes in preferences or character that result from changes in social environment. mill's account is criticized and partly reconstructed in light of modern preference theory, but viewed favorably as an illuminating attempt to address a fundamental problem in moral evaluation of social institutions. mill's advocacy of the higher pleasures is defended in particular against the charge that it is incompatible with his commitment to (...) liberty. (shrink)

In my previous article on the benzene problem, I described how Pauling's valence bond (resonance) theory, sometimes regarded as a modernized version of Kekule's oscillation hypothesis, came to be accepted by chemists by the end of World War II. But the alternative molecular orbital theory, proposed by Mulliken, had already been developed and was regarded as quantitatively superior by many quantum chemists, though it was not as easy to visualize and did not seem to harmonize as well (...) with traditional chemical concepts. During the 1950s and 1960s, thanks to the efforts of Charles Coulson and many other theorists, the molecular orbital approach not only dominated theoretical discussions but also started to be accepted by the chemical community as a whole and became the preferred description for benzene. Possible reasons were: its greater calculational convenience when applied to large molecules; better expository methods directed toward chemists; the spectacular success of the Woodward-Hoffmann rules for pericyclic reactions and Fukui's frontier orbital theory; and the development of a general theory of aromaticity, which predicted properties of similar molecules such as cyclobutadiene (C4H4). The relative importance of these reasons is explored through a mail survey of chemists. (shrink)

This article presents a case study from the history of cardiology, namely, the development towards the acceptance of the coronary theory of angina pectoris. I show that the arguments which were considered decisive against the theory were not answered at the time the theory was accepted. I also point out that the experimental and practical success of the theory cannot be used to support the initial choice because, in the subsequent development, the field researchers became preoccupied (...) with new questions and problems. In spite of this, there is a sense in which the field of angina research has progressed, but it remains a challenge to exactly characterise in what sense this is the case. (shrink)

Chakravartty and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.

From interpreting the world to changing it, this book is a synthesis of Chomsky's early work on philosophy, linguistics, and politics.

In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act. Under the terms of the Act---one of the many pieces of moratory legislation enacted due to the Great Depression---mortgagors who found themselves unable to make their payments could turn to the state courts for an alteration of their payment schedule. It is clear that if there ever was a state of affairs in which one could justify the imposition of debtor (...) relief, the circumstances in Minnesota during the early 1930s would have filled the bill. By most accounts, the Act was justifiable from a policy perspective. ;Nevertheless, the outcome did not please everyone. The question before the Court was whether the proceedings authorized by the Act violated the contracts clause of the Constitution. Article 1, §10 provides that "No State...pass any...law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The Act did impair the obligation of mortgage contracts. Furthermore, the Act was exactly the kind of debtor relief legislation that the contracts clause meant to forbid. The basic premise underlying the majority opinion was that a constitutional provision should be interpreted both in the context of the entire Constitution and in the context of the social situation confronting the Court. According to the dissent, the framing of the Constitution fixed the meaning of a provision for all cases arising across time. The two approaches represent two extremes in constitutional interpretation. However, the basic agreement is over how the Constitution should evolve. The basic disagreement concerns the problem of constitutional change. ;In a recent work, Robert Lipkin radically rethinks modern constitutional jurisprudence, challenging the received view of constitutional change. His theory of "constitutional revolutions" implies that conventionalism, coherentism, pragmatism, and naturalism all fall short as the best theory of constitutional change. In addition to offering a critique of Lipkin's theory, the present work conducts an independent investigation the theories Lipkin rejects. Such an investigation will not only help ascertain the legitimacy of Lipkin's theory of constitutional revolutions in particular, but of radical constitutional change in general. (shrink)

Critical social theories look critically at the ways in which particular social arrangements hinder human flourishing, with a view to bringing about social change for the better. In this they are guided by the idea of a good society in which the identified social impediments to human flourishing would once and for all have been removed. The question of how these guiding ideas of the good life can be justified as valid across socio-cultural contexts and historical epochs is the (...) most fundamental difficulty facing critical social theories today. This problem of justification, which can be traced back to certain key shifts in the modern Western social imaginary, calls on contemporary theories to negotiate the tensions between the idea of context-transcendent validity and their own anti-authoritarian impulses. Habermas makes an important contribution towards resolving the problem, but takes a number of wrong turnings. (shrink)

The problem of change recurs across Frantz Fanon's writings. As a philosopher, psychiatrist, and revolutionary, Fanon was deeply committed to theorizing and instigating change in all of its facets. Change is the thread that ties together his critical dialogue with Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche and his intellectual exchange with Césaire, Kojève, and Sartre. It informs his analysis of racism and colonialism, négritude and the veil, language and culture, disalienation and decolonization, and it underpins his reflections (...) on Martinique, Algeria, the Caribbean, Africa, the Third World, and the world at large. Gavin Arnall traces an internal division throughout Fanon's work between two distinct modes of thinking about change. He contends that there are two Fanons: a dominant Fanon who conceives of change as a dialectical process of becoming and a subterranean Fanon who experiments with an even more explosive underground theory of transformation. Arnall offers close readings of Fanon's entire oeuvre, from canonical works like Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth to his psychiatric papers and recently published materials, including his play, Parallel Hands. Speaking both to scholars and to the continued vitality of Fanon's ideas among today's social movements, this book offers a rigorous and profoundly original engagement with Fanon that affirms his importance in the effort to bring about radical change. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some open issues in the philosophy of space-time theories. Emphasis is put on the ontological nature of space and time, the relation between determinism and predictability, the origin of irreversible processes in an expanding Universe, and the compatibility of relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, I argue for a Parmenidean view of time and change, I make clear the difference between ontological determinism and predictability, propose that the origin of the asymmetry observed in physical (...) processes is related to the existence of cosmological horizons, and present a non-local concept of causality that can accommodate both special relativity and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges that human societies have ever faced. After a late start, it is by now rather intensely debated and analysed also in the social sciences and humanities, though mostly through overly generic explanations in terms of an instrumental relation to nature, of capitalist expansion drives or of the human longing for comfort. In contrast, this article concentrates on the socio-political transformations since the middle of the 20th century, which have been referred to (...) as the ‘Great Acceleration’ in the use of biophysical resources and in environmental degradation. It provides an analysis of the socio-political mechanisms that brought the resource-intensive path of social development about, showing how Western democratic societies tended to ‘solve’ difficult social problems by means of a triple displacement: onto other societies; onto nature and the planet; and into the future. As an unintended consequence, this displacement politics led to the globalization of resource-intensive development and to a planetary situation in which, at least as it appears in much of current debate, no further displacement is possible. The article concludes with insights for a more adequate approach to social phenomena of large scale and long duration in social theory. (shrink)

The book focuses on the modern understanding of human life-forms as constructs that followed an evolutionary history. The author thus finds science confronted with two questions: firstly, how the transgression of the virtual threshold between natural and cultural history was possible, secondly, how the socio-cultural constructs were able to develop in the course of history the way they did. The discussion concentrates on the problem of determining a processual logic in the development of societal structures as well as in (...) the development of cognition. The focus of attention is the historico-genetic reconstruction of cognition. The book was originally published in German as Historisch-genetische Theorie der Kultur (Weilerswist 2000: Velbrück). (shrink)

On January, 27, 2017, U.S. President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13769 on immigration and travel, which restricted entry into the U.S. of the citizens of seven primarily Muslim countries. Many academics reacted with outrage, including me and other members of the Academy of Management, of which I was President at the time. Some scholarly associations condemned EO 13769 as immoral, but the AOM did not immediately issue such a condemnation because the AOM’s Constitution included a policy of no-political-stands (...) and a principle that nobody, including the AOM President, could represent personal views as those of the organization. Within a few weeks, the AOM Constitution was changed, and in October, 2017, the AOM joined other associations in issuing a condemnation. An article was published in this journal on this situation that was subsequently amended through a published Correction, but the Correction only partially addressed the problems in the original. The main contribution of this commentary is to take up the invitation in Tsoukas to examine the case for insights on theoretical and conceptual questions raised in the literature on prototypicality and moral imagination. It also briefly outlines the most significant omitted errors of fact in Tsoukas that were not corrected in Tsoukas, and describes the most important methodological problems in Tsoukas. The conclusion suggests that the complex, nuanced, and evolving interactions that unfolded at the AOM are not fully addressed theoretically or conceptually in this literature. (shrink)

What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...) for the possibility of rational choice is that one alternative is not worse than the others. Each challenge is questioned. If comparativism is correct, then no matter what normative theory you favor, your answer to the question, ‘What makes my choice rational?’ must be comparative in form. In this way, comparativism provides a framework for normative theorizing. (shrink)

In this paper I claim that Quinean naturalist accounts of science, that deny that there are any a priori statements in scientific frameworks, cannot account for the foundational role of certain classes of statements in scientific practice. In this I follow Michael Friedman who claims that certain a priori statements must be presupposed in order to formulate empirical hypotheses. I also show that Friedman's account, in spite of his claims to the contrary, is compatible with a type of non-Quinean naturalism (...) that I sketch. Finally I also show that Friedman's account needs amending because it cannot provide a rational account of theory change. I accomplish this by arguing for a structural realist view of theory change. I show how this view fits well with an account like Friedman's and helps it deal with the problem of theory change and in retaining its superiority over Quinean naturalism. (shrink)

G. Cavalleri and G. Spinelli believe that a unique ether frame exists, and they attempt to find this ether frame by using a new method. Certain problems of synchronization raised by them are discussed and clarified.

Green political theory has a problem: it fails to account for human ingenuity. As a result, it has always struggled to refute the technologically optimistic notion that, in an era of rapid technological development, new technologies will materialise to resolve environmental ills. From ecologism’s first emergence, this idea has been its opponents’ ultimate recourse. It is especially significant because it denies the constitutive claim of ecologism that environmental problems require political solutions. It is in this claim that the (...) green alternative to modernity and its ideologies is advanced. Yet, green scholars have never successfully refuted technological optimism; indeed, ecologism has always lost the scholarly battles over technological change, even as technology has failed to mitigate environmental catastrophe in the real world. This article’s green theory of technological change alters this: it shows that the green belief that technological development is unpredictable is in fact well-founded. In so doing, it buttresses the green challenge to modern political ideologies and justifies the movement for ecologism in the world. In short, it reasserts the claim that the natural is political and reinforces the need for a distinctly green version of political theory. (shrink)

This book presents an elaborate analysis of the widely discussed problem of reconstruction of scientific theory change, based on material from theoretical physics. It gives a detailed , although not complete, analysis of the ideas of such authors as T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend, E. Zahar and G. Holton, the empiristic account of the notion of “crucial experiment”, as well as of some leading Russian philosophers of science such as V. Stepin, E. Mamchur and V. Branskii. (...) On the positive side, the book offers an original model of reconstruction of scientific theory change. As the author himself insists on several occasions, his model does not pretend to completeness. Nugayev’ s model of scientific theory change is extensively tested on the example of the Lorentz-Einstein transition. The result is an empirical justification of his model, which shows not only that it works quite well in this particular reconstruction, but also that it explains some historical facts that have been left aside by some other authors. (shrink)

Value dimensions of mature theory change in science are considered. It is argued that the interaction of the values of the cross-theories constitutes the major mechanism of theory change in this dimension. Examples from history of science describing the details of the mechanism are given.

This essay is a logico?philosophical critique of the Marxian system of sociology with special reference to the theory of social change. To every change in the natural order (taken in conjunction with the technological order) corresponds an appropriate change in the human order, that is, in the system of social relations. This, it is shown, is the fundamental Marxian thesis regarding social equilibrium. And accordingly the key idea regarding social change is that a gradually maturing (...) inherent disproportion between the two orders is the basic condition of social change, eventually leading to the establishment of a new social equilibrium at a higher level. A close examination of the concept of mode of production and changes therein is attempted in the course of elucidating the above thesis. It is argued that the technological interpretation of the concept of mode of production conflicts with the Marxian anthropology and that we should have a structural interpretation according to which it will refer to the economy as a whole and will include among other elements production relations. This interpretation leads the discussion into one of the central problems of Marxism, namely, the relation between the mode of production and the social system. It is argued that the social system is basic to Marx and after a close analysis of the concept of system it is shown that the Marxian theory of base and superstructure rests mainly on confusion of conceptual orientations. This, it is shown, is connected with a fundamental idea of Marxism, viz., that of a system without a transcendent centre. This essay endeavours to prove that such an idea is logically untenable. Hence the Marxian Laws of Transformation of Quantity into Quality and Negation of Negation are examined and shown logically untenable. The last section discusses the question about the determinant of technological change and eventually of social change. Three possible Marxian solutions are examined: (a) in terms of needs ? it is argued that this is inconsistent with Marx's theory of man and labour; (b) in terms of science and new ideas ? it is shown that this ultimately goes contrary to Marxian materialism and positivism; and finally, (c) the systemic solution in terms of the dialectic of nature and man is subjected to logical scrutiny and it is shown that this cannot be consistent and valid without involving a trans?historical standpoint; for, it is argued, the idea of the self?directing Humanity on which it rests is a self?contradictory notion. (shrink)

This book presents the concept of “complementary science” which contributes to scientific knowledge through historical and philosophical investigations. It emphasizes the fact that many simple items of knowledge that we take for granted were actually spectacular achievements obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and serious controversies. Each chapter in the book consists of two parts: a narrative part that states the philosophical puzzle and gives a problem-centred narrative on the historical attempts to (...) solve the puzzle; and the analysis part which provides in-depth analyses of certain scientific, historical, and philosophical aspects of the story. (shrink)

What are the reasons for theory change in economics? – The author tries to give a sober answer on the basis of his epistemological model reconstructing the internal aspects of theory change. It is conjectures that a more subtle approach including the external facets can be provided with the “communicative rationality” concept. Key words: economics, theory change, internalism, external factors .

This essay examines a politically engaged research genre, which follows the biography of the author who founded two journals: one on mathematical models published in English (Quality and Quantity) and one on politically committed social and economic research published in Italian (Inchiesta). The research considered focuses on Italy in the 1950s, the research by Lazarsfeld in Vienna in the 1920s and in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, and post-1968 politically committed research in Italy. The analysis of such (...) politically committed types of research (all very different from one another in terms of the interpretative model of reality, the methods used and the relations with the tendering party and the people observed) allows one to understand how this kind of research can be performed with very different methods—all of which do, however, seek to modify reality on the grounds of the research results. The metaphor of the crystal and the flame presented by Italo Calvino in order to “classify facts and ideas and styles and feelings” can also be used to visualise the polarity (and the difficulty/impossibility of contact) that has always been present in sociology between two different tendencies: towards a discipline that offers the most abstract and objective interpretative model of reality possible with the use of mathematical models (the crystal), and, instead, towards a discipline in which an interpretative model of reality is central, one that produces a social change and in which the qualitative and quantitative methods utilised are at the service of this change (the flame). This polarity thus allows us to separate first and foremost all the politically committed research performed by others for different purposes (market research, research to verify some theoretical hypotheses, etc.) but the same polarity also lies within the politically committed research. We can, indeed, identify a type of politically committed research in an area that has, at one extreme, research tending towards the utmost “objectivity” and “scientific quality” of the results and where the co-ordinators try to have all the information on the subjects maintaining the greatest possible distance (the subjects must not know they are being observed); at the other extreme, there is a type of research in which the coordinator completely involves the subjects in the gathering of information that will serve to realise a piece of research whose political aims are explicitly shared. For the identification of a sufficiently articulated typology it has been important to consider five dimensions of politically committed research: (a) the characteristics of the research coordinator (his/her belonging to the type and the academic/non-academic professional status) and his/her interpretative model of reality (b) some general characteristics of the research (the tender and funding, the topic choice, the aims, the contributions to the sociological theory, the duration); (c) the research coordinator’s relations with the political actors (the intensity of the relations, the political use of the research); (d) the relations of the research co-ordinator with the research subjects; (e) the methodological choices (the basic strategies, the methods used, the use of mathematical procedures). The research that exemplifies this typology is all politically committed to the left and was realised in different times and contexts. I start by considering a kind of politically engaged research (co-research) that appeared in Italy in the 1950s; I then analyse two types of politically engaged research realised in Austria at the end of the 1920s and one in the United States in the 1950s; there then follow two kinds of research realised in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and a further two kinds realised in Italy in the 1970s and early 1980s. In order to have other kinds of research please refer to the two Journals of which I am the editor: one is an English language journal of mathematical models (Quality and Quantity, International Journal of Methodology, founded in 1966 and published today by Kluwer of Amsterdam), and a politically engaged review (Inchiesta, founded in 1971 and still published today by Dedalo of Bari). (shrink)

From interpreting the world to changing it, this book is a synthesis of Chomsky's early work on philosophy, linguistics, and politics.

The peculiar features of the climate change problem pose substantial obstacles to our ability to make the hard choices necessary to address it. Climate change involves the convergence of a set of global, intergenerational and theoretical problems. This convergence justifies calling it a 'perfect moral storm'. One consequence of this storm is that, even if the other difficult ethical questions surrounding climate change could be answered, we might still find it difficult to act. For the storm (...) makes us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption. (shrink)

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framework for hypotheses change, and proposes the minimization of the (...) distance between hypotheses as a rationality criterion. Finally the paper discusses the import of this for Bayesian statistical inference. (shrink)

Constructing an intuitive theory from data confronts learners with a “chicken‐and‐egg” problem: The laws can only be expressed in terms of the theory's core concepts, but these concepts are only meaningful in terms of the role they play in the theory's laws; how can a learner discover appropriate concepts and laws simultaneously, knowing neither to begin with? We explore how children can solve this chicken‐and‐egg problem in the domain of magnetism, drawing on perspectives from computational (...) modeling and behavioral experiments. We present 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds with two different simplified magnet‐learning tasks. Children appropriately constrain their beliefs to two hypotheses following ambiguous but informative evidence. Following a critical intervention, they learn the correct theory. In the second study, children infer the correct number of categories given no information about the possible causal laws. Children's hypotheses in these tasks are explained as rational inferences within a Bayesian computational framework. (shrink)

This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better than’, (...) ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view. -/- I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis ‘fourth’ basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing ‘tetrachotomy’ – that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead. -/- Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit’s trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem. (shrink)