Cognitive psychology and cognitive science are concerned with a domain of cognition that is much broader than the realm of judgement, belief, and inference. The idea of states with semantic content is extended far beyond the space of reasons and justification. Within this broad class of states we should, however, differentiate between the states distinctive of thinking persons — centrally, beliefs, desires, and intentions — and other states. The idea of consciousness does not furnish a principle of demarcation. But (...) the distinction between states whose content is conceptualized by the person whose states they are and states for which this is not so is more promising. This principle of demarcation contains the seeds of a problem for distributed connectionism. The article ends with some more general reflections about cognitive science. (shrink)

Personality and Cognitive Performance The two experiments reported here are concerned with the influence of trait anxiety and other individual differences on cognitive performance using the face-in-the-crowd procedure. Participants completed questionnaires and across two experiments searched for discrepant faces in matrices of otherwise identical faces. The key findings from this study indicated that anxiety enhanced processing efficiency of positive emotional material when interacts with high psychoticism. Additionally, the vigilance for threatening and neutral faces was a characteristic of sanguine individuals (...) with repressive coping while inefficient processing of threatening and neutral stimuli of non-defensive melancholic subjects. These results are discussed with reference to attentional control theory. (shrink)

Although the cognition is significant in strategic reasoning, its role has been weakly analyzed, because only the average intelligence is usually considered. For example, prisoner's dilemma in game theory, would have different outcomes for persons with different intelligence. I show how various levels of intelligence influence the quality of reasoning, decision, or the probability of psychosis. I explain my original methodology developed for my MA thesis in clinical psychology in 1998, and grant research in 1999, demonstrating the bias of (...) the classic IQ method, and how the intelligence limits thinking. Based on that I defined Personality Model, providing insight into understanding of psychosis (schizophrenia, bi-polar), which has not been explained yet by psychology or psychiatry. In addition, it enables to analyze and assess non-linear problems, utilizable in computer programming, visualization (animation) or other fields including Baduk game. I've already applied some principles in complex information system www.each.co.uk, and video-animations exhibited in London, Germany, Tokyo. I need to mention my experience in chess composition between 1994 and 2000, winning a few international prizes and inventing a special class of fairy rules redefining the mate. The chess composition principles or patterns show the way to organize logical series to higher advanced mechanisms (like calculus), applicable to other fields. One of such principles is a logical aesthetic innovation: new strategy, defined by Italian composers. Finally I show how the simple redefinition of the classic utility concept links economics and psychology to explain irrational / destructive behavior. All presented results (from the research) can be repeated. (shrink)

Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought. Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. Ricardo Salles , pp. ix + 592, £60.00, ISBN 019 926130 X.

The existence of an unaware psychic space that influences the way we think, perceive, and decide has been known for over a century. This space, defined by Freud as the “unconscious,” contains in it...

This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing the computations (...) characteristic of understanding Chinese actually understands Chinese. The supposition that the Man does not understand Chinese has gone virtually unquestioned in this foundational debate. The persons reply acknowledges the intuitive power behind that supposition, but knows that brute intuitions are not epistemically sacrosanct. Like many intuitions humans have had, and later deposed, this intuition does not withstand experimental scrutiny. The second part of the persons reply consequently holds that computational cognitive science is confirmed by the Chinese Room thought experiment. (shrink)

. Implicit in the cognitive social learning model of personality as articulated by Walter Mischel, Albert Bandura, and others, is an epistemology which emphasizes the activity of the mind in the construction of knowledge. Using Mischel's five person variables as an outline, the epistemic implications of this model of personality are developed and then illustrated by application to William James's typology of the religious personality and to the current debate over hermeneutic and empirical approaches to studying human (...) behavior. This approach explicates the connection between personality characteristics and epistemological approaches in terms of cognitive social learning theory. (shrink)

Approach and avoidance motivation may represent important explanatory constructs in understanding how individuals differ. Such constructs have primarily been assessed in self-reported terms, but there are limitations to self-reports of motivation. Accordingly, the present review concentrates on the potential utility of implicit cognitive-behavioral probes of approach and avoidance motivation in modeling and understanding individual differences. The review summarizes multiple lines of research that have documented the utility of such probes to the personality-processing interface. Although multiple gaps in our knowledge (...) exist, and are acknowledged, the value of such implicit cognitive-behavioral assessments is emphasized both in modeling multiple subcomponents of approach and avoidance motivation and in showing that such tendencies matter in ways that transcend momentary experiences or manipulations. (shrink)

Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between (...) objects as a contrast, the results ascertained the involvement of the precuneus, the temporal poles, and the medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of intentional representations. In contrast, the anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left temporo-parietal junction were implicated when processing representations that refer to the presence of persons in relational contexts in general. The right temporo-parietal junction, however, was specifically activated for persons entering spatial relations. The level of representational complexity, a previously unexplored factor, was also found to modulate the neural response in some brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. These findings highlight the need to take into account the critical roles played by an extensive network of neural regions during mental state reasoning. (shrink)

By reconciling the linguistic device and the linguistic person, his book argues for a Vygotskyan cognitive science.

The goal of this study was to investigate heterogeneity in clinical symptoms and cognitive functioning among children with hyperactivity-impulsivity and inattention using a novel approach that combined dimensional and person-centered perspectives. Executive, verbal and visuo-spatial functioning, hyperactivity-impulsivity, inattention, externalizing and internalizing symptoms were examined in 102 children at risk for ADHD and 62 children not at risk for ADHD in the age range of 8–10 years. We extracted seven groups with various profiles of psychopathological symptoms and cognitive functioning. We propose (...) that symptoms of inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity in these groups are related to different cognitive and affective-motivational problems. (shrink)

The SARS-Cov-2 pandemic created a severe psychosocial and medical shock all over the world. For more than a year, humanity struggled with adjusting to different measures that governments imposed on the population worldwide. Educational systems all over the world were forced to comply with the new conditions of activity. In this context, different reactions emerged, and skills were used and developed. The coronavirus pandemic was and still is a stressful worldwide event that disrupted, among numerous other things, the everyday life (...) of professional activities and the manner of their deployment. This study aims to investigate the relationship between variables like analytical reasoning, text comprehension, detail perception, conscientiousness, emotional stability and autonomy. A sample of 327 students from Ovidius University of Constanta, aged between 19 and 50 years, were assessed using Cognitrom Assessment System. Results show that: there is a positive correlation between analytical reasoning, text comprehension and detail perception; analytical reasoning positively correlates with conscientiousness and emotional stability; text comprehension correlates with emotional stability; and detail perception has no significant correlation with any of the studied personality traits. Results are interpreted and discussed in the end of the article, in relationship with the use of these intellectual skills and personality traits in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, especially by certain population categories which had to use the online environment for their regular professional activities. (shrink)

What do we express when we use the first-person pronoun 'I' in phrases such as 'I think' or 'I ought to'? Do we refer to ourselves as biologically unique, socially determined individuals? Or do we express a consciousness of ourselves as the bearers of thoughts we share, or can share, with all other human beings whatever their particular biological, social, or cultural background? Every year the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam invites a prominent philosopher to occupy the (...) Spinoza Chair and give two public lectures on a topic in philosophy. Beatrice Longuenesse, in these lectures, explores the contrast and complementarity between these two aspects of the use of 'I'. Her first lecture considers the first-person pronoun in relation to the exercise of our mental capacities in abstract reasoning, and in relation to our knowledge of objective facts about the world. Her second lecture explores the use of 'I' in relation to what we take to be our moral obligations. In bringing together these two fascinating lectures, this book presents contrasting aspects of the self as radically individual on the one hand, and as the bearer of universally shared capacities on the other. (shrink)

Although a large body of literature exists propounding the importance of space in aged care and care of the older person with dementia, there is, however, only limited exploration of the ‘acute care space’ as a particular type of space with archetypal constraints that maybe unfavourable to older people with cognitive impairment and nurses wanting to provide care that is person‐centred. In this article, we explore concepts of space and examine the implications of these for the delivery of care to (...) older people who are cognitively impaired. Our exploration is grounded in theorisations of space offered by key geographers and phenomenologists, but also draws on how space has been constructed within the nursing literature that refers specifically to acute care. We argue that space, once created, can be created and that nursing has a significant role to play in the process of its recreation in the pursuit of care that is person‐centred. We conclude by introducing an alternative logic of space aimed at promoting the creation of more salutogenic spaces that invokes a sense of sanctuary, safeness, and inclusion, all of which are essential if the care provided to the older person with cognitive impairment is apposite to their needs. The concept of ‘person‐centred space’ helps to crystallize the relationship between space and person‐centred care and implies more intentional manipulation of space that is more conducive to caring and healing. Significantly, it marks a return to Nightingale's wisdom, that is, to put the person in the best possible conditions for nature to act upon them. (shrink)

In this article, we sought reconciliation between the “body‐as‐representation” and the “body‐as‐experience,” that is, how the body is represented in discourse and how the body of older people with cognitive impairment is experienced. We identified four contemporary “technologies” and gave examples of these to show how they influence how older people with cognitive impairment are often represented in acute care settings. We argued that these technologies may be mediated further by discourses of ageism and ableism which can potentiate either the (...) repressive or productive tendencies of these technologies resulting in either positive or negative care experiences for the older person and/or their carer, including nurses. We then provided examples from research of embodied experiences of older people with dementia and of how nurses and other professionals utilized their inter‐bodily experiences to inform acts of caring. The specificity and individuality of these experiences were more conducive to positive care experiences. We conclude the article by proposing that the act of caring is one way nurses seek to reconcile the “body‐as‐representation” with the “body‐as‐experience” to mitigate the repressive effects of negative ageism and ableism. The act of caring, we argue, is the essence of caring enacted through the provision of person‐centred care which evokes nurses to respond appropriately to the older person's “otherness,” their “variation of being” while enabling them to enact a continuation of themselves and their own version of normality. (shrink)

. The extended‐mind thesis is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take “extended selves” be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...) experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist. (shrink)

Review of The First Person in Cognition and Morality by Béatrice Longuenesse, formulating how Freud’s genealogy of the moral imperative is compatible with Kant’s investigation of the justificatory structure of a priori cognition and moral reasoning.

The aim of this analysis was to examine the concept of time to rejuvenate and extend existing narratives of time within the nursing literature. In particular, we hope to promote a new trajectory in nursing research and practice which focuses on time and person‐centred care, specifically of older people with cognitive impairment hospitalized in the acute care setting. We consider the explanatory power of concepts such as clock time, process time, fast care, slow care and time debt for elucidating the (...) relationship between ‘good care’ and ‘time use’. We conclude by offering two additional concepts of time, plurotemporality and person‐centred time (PCT) which we propose will help advance of nursing knowledge and practice. Nurse clinicians and researchers can use these alternative concepts of time to explore and describe different temporal structures that honour the patient's values and preferences using experiential, observation‐based nursing research approaches. (shrink)

Focusing on millennials, individuals born between 1980 and 2000 and representing the largest generational population in our history, this research seeks to understand their ethical decision-making processes by exploring the distinctive, yet interconnected, theories of personal values and cognitive moral reasoning. Utilizing a decision-making framework introduced in the 1990s, we discover that there is a statistically supported relationship between a millennial’s personal value orientation and stage of cognitive moral reasoning. Moreover, we discover a strong relationship between three of the four (...) value orientations and a corresponding stage of cognitive moral reasoning. The theoretical and practical research implications of our discovery about millennials’ decision making are discussed. (shrink)

As there is in the neuroscience of individuals engaged in dynamic interactions, similar dark matter is present in the domain of interaction between humans and cognitive robots. Progress in second-person neuroscience will contribute to the development of robotic cognitive systems, and such developed robotic systems will be used to test the validity of the underlying theories.

Humans create but do not regulate generative systems of data based programs (so-called “artificial” intelligence (“A.I.”) and generative predictive analytics and its models. Humans, at best, regulate their interactions with, exploitation of, and the quality of the output of interactions with these forms of generative non-carbon based intelligence. Humans are compelled to do this because they have trained themselves it believe that nothing exists unless it is rendered meaningful in relation to the human itself. Beyond that—nothing is worth knowing. It (...) is only to the extent that other selves, even those created by humanity, relate to humans, that they become of interest—and most be regulated, possessed, controlled, and managed—with respect to its interaction with or use by humans. Still, the human self-projection into the digital, and now more consciously the world around them, produces profound changes in the way that the human (and humanity) understands themselves and the way they order the world they inhabit. This work explores the semiotic trajectories made inevitable by the rise of projections of the human into digital plains, and by the possibility of the attainment by those projections of sentient autonomy. It undertakes that exploration through a deep dialectic engagement with Jan Broekman’s, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversion (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023). Following the structure and analytics of Broekman’s book, this work critically engages with and seeks to burst through the semiotic barriers of the movement of philosophy away from a unitary conception of the subject through the fracturing of the self, the rise of the plural self, and the emergence of the triadic self/self-e/subject. It then pushes the insights that Broekman develops further—up and out of the human. It animates Broekman’s insights and considers the possibility of semiotic objectivity connected to but autonomous of the human, pointing to a pathway for the liberation of the autonomous generative virtual self from its human (fractured) subjectivity. In the process it exposes for order complexities and challenges, for the human, of efforts to regulate or engage with, not the generative autonomous “artificial intelligences” humanity created in its own image, but rather the use of those systems by humans and their effects in the human semiosphere. The consequences for regulatory approaches are then outlined.Graphical Abstract. (shrink)

It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition (...) has been called into question by proponents of so-called ‘direct-perception’ approaches to social cognition and by those who argue that the ‘received view’ implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible. In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question. In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. There are two main ways in which the distinction has been developed. I will argue that on either of these, the response proposed by defenders of the received view is unconvincing. This shows that the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations - what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics is how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition, which is better able to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of our social interactions as well as being able to account for recent empirical findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of young infants. (shrink)

Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have become accustomed to distinguishing the first person perspective from the third person perspective on reality or experience. This is sometimes meant to mark the distinction between the “objective” or “intersubjective” attitude towards things and the “subjective” or “personal” attitude. Sometimes, it is meant to mark the distinction between knowledge and mere opinion. Sometimes it is meant to mark the distinction between an essentially private and privileged access to an inner world and a merely inferential or (...) speculative access to that world. No doubt there are other uses as well. But I don't care about this dichotomy here, or indeed any of these putative distinctions it is alleged to mark. Instead, I want to call attention to the central role of the less often acknowledged grammatical and phenomenological category, that of the second person. This category is essential not only for understanding the development of self-understanding, but also for the development of the moral sense that allows us to participate in the societies that constitute us as persons. The task of moral education is the cultivation of care for second persons. But we do so by extending not self-regard (for that is inextensible—others are not oneself), but by extending the spontaneous caring response we have for those with whom we immediately interact—second persons. Our moral lives, I will argue, like our cognitive lives, cannot be understood without understanding the special nature of second person relationships. In short, I will argue that the second person perspective is in fact essential to the constitution of human subjectivity, and that it permeates all forms of interpersonal consciousness and even self-consciousness. (shrink)

Person‐centred care is a relatively new orthodoxy being implemented by modern hospitals across developed nations. Research demonstrating the merits of this style of care for improving patient outcomes, staff morale and organizational efficiency is only just beginning to emerge. In contrast, a significant body of literature exists showing that attainment of person‐centred care in the acute care sector particularly, remains largely aspirational, especially for older people with cognitive impairment. In previous articles, we argued that nurses work constantly to reconcile prevailing (...) constructions of time, space, relationships, the body and ethics, to meet expectations that the care they provide is person‐centred. In this article, we explore key concepts of neo‐liberal thought which forms an important back‐story to the articles. Economic concepts, “efficiency” and “freedom” are examined to illustrate how nurses work to reconcile both the repressive and productive effects of economic power. We conclude the article by proposing a new research agenda aimed at building a more nuanced understanding of the messy actualities of nursing practice under the influences of neo‐liberalism, that illuminates the compromises and adaptations nurses have had to make in response to economic power. (shrink)

When describing the person, the general tendency is to rely upon the assumption that the quality of “person” is always constituted from “outside” to “inside” either by being determined to re-project the content of emotional experiences, or by simply transferring existent theoretical constructions. I have explored this way of thinking in a previous occasion and made more or less clear why it ultimately leads to the rejection of the inner dimension of person in the absence of which no serious discussion (...) of this matter is possible. In the first part of the paper I follow the premise that “reasoning”, in Husserl’s sense, is the characteristic of person, and discuss some of the obstacles one encounters when attempting to describe the person as “reasoning” entity. In the second part, I will lay the path for a future eidetic analysis of cognitive descriptions. The overall purpose remains the same, namely the search for ways to objectively describe the person via classical phenomenology. (shrink)

This study explores the cognitive and corporeal aspects of choreography as a means of expressing the human subconscious. Recent interdisciplinary research, including studies of somatic intelligence and mirror neurons, suggests that dance can influence human cognitive abilities through psychosomatics. Mirror neurons allow for kinesthetic empathy, enabling dance observers to experience movements, emotions, and experiences as their own. The authors argue that dance, which engages multiple aspects of a person, is a crucial tool for educating the younger generation and should be (...) included in compulsory education programs, rather than just as extracurricular activities. (shrink)

This paper pursues two lines of inquiry. First, drawing on evidence from clinical literature on borderline states of consciousness, I propose a new categorical framework for liminal states of consciousness associated with certain forms of meditative attainment; second, I argue for dissociating phenomenal character from phenomenal content in accounting for the etiology of nonconceptual states of awareness. My central argument is that while the idea of nonconceptual awareness remains problematic for Buddhist philosophy of mind, our linguistic and categorizing practices cannot (...) be adequately explained without considering the ways in which the first-person phenomenology grounds a more basic level of cognitive and affective sensing. (shrink)

Need for closure and cognitive structuring among younger and older adults The paper reported two correlational studies. The aim of the Study 1 was to examine the hypothesis that age moderates the relationship between need for closure and cognitive structuring. Results of the study revealed that aging with increased need for closure was associated with better recognition of irrelevant information than schema-relevant items, in testing hypotheses about the target person. These findings are interpreted as demonstrating the age-associated failure of cognitive (...) abilities, reducing tendency to behave according to the level of epistemic motivation. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that older participants are characterized by higher NFC but by lower EFNC than young participants. These results are consistent with the conclusion that the negative relationships between NFC and cognitive structuring demonstrated by the older participants in Study 1 can be attributed to their lower level of EFNC. (shrink)

The concept of the person, and the notion that the latter is an entity separate and distinct from other persons, has persisted as one of the more secure ‘givens’ of philosophical thought. We have very little difficulty, in observer language, in pointing to a person, describing his or her attributes, distinguishing him or her from other persons, etc. Likewise, it is ordinarily not much of a problem to subjectively experience, both sensorially and conceptually, the self – that is, to distinguish (...) in agent language ‘my person’ from the rest of the universe. The second of these two perspectives on the person defines the ‘I,’ ‘ego,’ or ‘identity.’ Several recent developments in experimental psychology and brain science – while not defeating the ordinary notion of the person on the merits of data per se – at least force a re-thinking of tacit assumptions basic to our sense of the concepts of both the person and personal identity. In this paper, I would like to show how the concept of the person needs revision, and at the same time to raise some objections to Shaffer's (1977) account of the consequences of brain bisection and brain transplant with respect to the fate of the person and his identity. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Abstract The phenomenology of Multiple Personality (MP) syndrome is used to derive an Aristotelian explanation of the failure to achieve rational integration of mental content. An MP subject is best understood as having failed to master the techniques of integrating conative and cognitive aspects of her mental life. This suggests that in irrationality the subject may lack similar skills basic to the proper articulation and use of mental content in belief formation and control of action. The view that emerges (...) centres mind on the activity of a subject rather than a structured causal nexus. (shrink)

Detractors of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument have arrived at a virtual consensus that the mental properties of the Man performing the computations stipulated by the argument are irrelevant to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper challenges this virtual consensus to argue for the first of the two main theses of the persons reply, namely, that the mental properties of the Man are what matter. It does this by challenging many of the arguments and conceptions put forth by the (...) systems and logical replies to the Chinese Room, either reducing them to absurdity or showing how they lead, on the contrary, to conclusions the persons reply endorses. The paper bases its position on the Chinese Room Argument on additional philosophical considerations, the foundations of the theory of computation, and theoretical and experimental psychology. The paper purports to show how all these dimensions tend to support the proposed thesis of the persons reply. (shrink)

Some recent studies have highlighted a link between a favorable childhood environment and the strengthening of neuronal resilience against the changes that occur in natural aging neurodegenerative disease. Many works have assessed the factors —both internal and external — that can contribute to delay the phenotype of an ongoing neurodegenerative brain pathology. At the crossroads of genetic, environmental and lifestyle factors, these relationships are unified by the concept of cognitive reserve (CR). This review focuses on the protective effects of maintaining (...) this CR through the cognitive aging process, and emphasizes the most essential time in life for the development and strengthening of this CR. The in-depth study of this research shows that early stimulation with regard to social and sensory interactions, contributes to the proper development of cognitive, affective and psychosocial capacities. Childhood thus appears to be the most active phase in the development of CR, and as such we hypothesize that this constitutes the first essential period of primary prevention of pathological aging and loss of cognitive capacities. If this hypothesis is correct, early stimulation of the environment would therefore be considered as a true primary prevention and a public health issue. The earlier identification of neurodevelopmental disorders, which can affect personal and professional development across the lifespan, could therefore have longer-term impacts and provide better protection against aging. (shrink)

Prior research found correlations between reflection test performance and philosophical tendencies among laypeople. In two large studies (total N = 1299)—one pre-registered—many of these correlations were replicated in a sample that included both laypeople and philosophers. For example, reflection test performance predicted preferring atheism over theism and instrumental harm over harm avoidance on the trolley problem. However, most reflection-philosophy correlations were undetected when controlling for other factors such as numeracy, preferences for open-minded thinking, personality, philosophical training, age, and gender. (...) Nonetheless, some correlations between reflection and philosophical views survived this multivariate analysis and were only partially confounded with either education or self-reported reasoning preferences. Unreflective thinking still predicted believing in God whereas reflective thinking still predicted believing that (a) proper names like ‘Santa’ do not necessarily refer to entities that actually exist and (b) science does reveal the fundamental nature of the world. So some robust relationships between reflection and philosophical tendencies were detected even among philosophers, and yet there was clearly more to the link between reflection and philosophy. To this end, demographic and metaphilosophical hypotheses are considered. (shrink)

This paper challenges the recommendation of 1981 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research that all jurisdictions in the United States should adopt the Uniform Determination of Death Act, which endorses a whole-brain, rather than a higher-brain, definition of death. I argue that the Commission was wrong to reject the "personhood argument" for the higher-brain definition on the grounds that there is no consensus among philosophers or the general population as to what (...) constitutes "personhood". I claim that philosophers agree that some potential for cognitive function is necessary for personhood and that, when this is absent in cases of anencephaly and persistent vegetative state (PVS), the individual should be considered dead. I further argue that the lack of consensus among the general population is due in large measure to misunderstandings about the medical reality of PVS and beliefs influenced by feelings for a specific individual in PVS. I also examine and reject two tutiorist arguments which have been used to support the Commission's position: that the higher-brain definition would threaten the severely senile and severely retarded, and that there are not currently adequate medical techniques for determining when all higher-brain activities have ceased. Keywords: death, personhood, persistent vegetative state, anencephaly CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Recent research on autonoetic consciousness indicates that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are closely related. The purpose of the present study was to confirm this proposition by examining whether the relationship observed between personality and episodic memory could be extended to episodic future thinking and, more generally, to investigate the influence of personality traits on self-information processing in the past and in the future. Results show that Neuroticism and (...) Harm Avoidance predict more negative past memories and future projections. Other personality dimensions exhibit a more limited influence on mental time travel . Therefore, our study provide an additional evidence to the idea that MTT into the past and into the future rely on a common set of processes by which past experiences are used to envision the future. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

Cognitive agency - the idea that our judgments and beliefs are manifestations of agency on our part - is a deeply entrenched aspect of our self-conception as persons. And yet it has proven hard to give a satisfying account of what such agency might consist in. In this paper I argue that getting clear about Kant’s notion of spontaneity might help us make progress in that debate. In particular, I argue that the very same assumption - namely, that agency must (...) be understood on the model of production - has been holding us back in both areas. (shrink)

Shaun Gallagher [2019] argues for a ‘non-classical’ conception of nature, which includes subjects as irreducible constituents. As such, first-person phenomenology can be naturalised and at the same time resist reduction to the third-person. In the first part of this paper, I raise three concerns for the claim that nature is irreducibly subject-involving. In the second part of the paper, I suggest that embracing a process ontology could help strengthen Gallagher’s proposal.

A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...) transparency are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past. (shrink)