Authors
Thomas Metzinger
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Abstract
A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal transparency are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Representation  Self-reference  Transparency
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,541
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 60 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood.Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-13.

View all 44 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Scents and Sensibilia.Clare Batty - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):103-118.
Doublemindedness: A Model for a Dual Content Cognitive Architecture.Jenann Ismael - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Transparently Oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One.Dorothée Legrand - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
What’s so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
361 ( #29,477 of 2,533,478 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #64,689 of 2,533,478 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes