In Republic VIII, oligarchy is represented as a transitional or hybrid regime combining features of aristocracy and timocracy with the rule of appetitive desire characteristic of democracy and tyranny. The apparently anomalous intermediary position of oligarchy, in which an object of appetitive soul provides the foundation for interpersonal and political norms, demonstrates the complexity of the interaction between ruling soul parts and underlying rational structures that give unity to each constitution and character type. This interaction cannot be adequately (...) accounted for in terms of the activity of autonomous soul parts whose interactions are wholly reduced to quantitative relations of force. (shrink)

This is a critical appreciation of Govier’s 2006 ISSA keynote address on the fallacy of composition, and of economists’ writings on this fallacy in economics. I argue that the “fallacy of composition” is a problematical concept, because it does not denote a distinctive kind of argument but rather a plurality, and does not constitute a distinctive kind of error, but rather reduces to oversimplification in arguing from micro to macro. Finally, I propose further testing of this claim based on examples (...) involving public vs. private debt in economics; oligarchic tendencies in politics, and the emergence of societal wholes in sociology. (shrink)

We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that it has (...) some decisive power (semi-decisiveness), and at least one of the most preferred alternatives of every its member is always chosen by any social choice correspondence. (2) Strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences is equivalent to modified monotonicity. (shrink)

The language of politics knows “good words” and “bad”. One criterion is obvious. The former lend themselves to fraud and deception, the latter mean what they say. The prime specimen is oligarchy.

Unlike the Senate of Republican Rome, this essay argues that councils were not the dominant or governing power in Greek oligarchies. Together with powerful officials and other powerful individuals, citizen assemblies mainly governed oligarchies, but admission to oligarchic assemblies was restricted by wealth. Before Solon, did the Areopagos Council govern oligarchic Athens? The principal source for this claim, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 2-8, at least assigns the early Areopagos a broad judicial competence. Where did Ath. Pol.’s notion come from, and what (...) is it worth? Although ‘some people’ or ‘most people’ believed that Solon established the Areopagos Council, Ath. Pol. rejected that notion, possibly because along with others, Ath. Pol. and Aristotle thought that Solon founded Athens’ democracy, while for fourth century conservatives the early Areopagos was non-democratic. In part the competence of Ath. Pol.’s pre-Solonian Areopagos derives from and expanded its Solonian competence in Ath. Pol. 8.4, so that for Ath. Pol. democratic Solon will have reduced the Areopagos’ powers. In part it derives from fourth century conservative propaganda. This evidence is inadequate to claim that the Areopagos Council governed oligarchic Athens. (shrink)

Most studies of academic inbreeding have focused on assessing its impact on scholarly practices, outputs, and outcomes. Few studies have concentrated on the other possible effects of academic inbreeding. This paper draws on a large number of studies on academic inbreeding to explore how the practice has been conceptualized, how it has emerged, and how it has been rationalized in the creation and development of higher education systems. Within this framework, the paper also explores how academic inbreeding shapes and maintains (...) a powerful academic oligarchy, leading to the stonewalling of both knowledge and institutional change to maintain social and political structures somewhat akin to those of medieval societies. The paper shows that the key to mitigating academic inbreeding practices lies in ensuring that academic recruitment processes are open, meritocratic, and transparent. However, a more difficult task is to change longstanding mentalities and disrupt a system that serves the interests of certain groups but not the advancement of knowledge or the fulfillment of universities’ social mandates. (shrink)

The article aims to determine socio-economic causes of the emergence of an oligarchy and its functions in the Ukrainian economy in the context of postmodernism. The essence of postmodernism is worldview-philosophical, economic and political systems collapse. This is a kind of opposition to modernism. As for the economy during postmodernism, namely its formation, the changes relate to the view of social relations and human activity. So, oligarchic Ukraine is trying to solve its problems personally. However, a holistic view on (...) the concept of oligarchy is falling apart, since the dominance of financial and industrial groups in the economy of Ukraine monopolizes entire economic sectors, and authorities of different levels in different ways protect not so much the interest of the Ukrainian people, but the interest of its richest layer. Most Ukrainian oligarchs were able to earn their capital in the 1990s, using any opportunity. It was quite cheap redistribution of state property, friendship with the authorities, seizure of someone else’s property. At the same time, oligarchs successfully used imperfect legislation. They simply rewritten it “for themselves”, repeatedly using “substitute” politicians. It is concluded that at the present stage of Ukraine’s development, the oligarchy has not only ceased to fulfill its stabilizing function, but also turned into the main obstacle to modernization processes. Therefore, the current civilization choice of Ukraine, in particular, is important paradigm of comprehension and strategy of action. (shrink)

In democracies around the world, the rich exercise a disproportionate share of political power. Democratic theorists universally condemn this. The current paper brings balance to this conversation by mustering a defense of limited oligarchy. I have two goals. First, I shall argue that we need not be overly despondent about the wealthy's outsized influence, for overrepresentation of the wealthy performs some good for us—good which might not be entirely obvious at first glance. Second, I hope to temper reform efforts (...) that seek to limit the wealthy's influence. While the people should have a greater say than they currently do, the wealthy's influence should still be greater than what their numbers suggest. I ultimately embrace oligarchic bicameralism, an old idea that proposes ordinary persons be represented in the lower chamber of the legislature, and property be represented in the upper. This is accomplished through a combination of sortition and elections. (shrink)

Nystrom and Puckett's pamphlet gives us the most comprehensive picture available of Richard Rorty's political views. This is Rorty being avuncular, cranky, and straightforward: his arguments on patriotism, the political left, and philosophy—as usual, unusual—are worth pondering. This pamphlet will appeal to all those interested in Rorty's distinct brand of pragmatism and leftist politics in the United States.

As the differently ordered title indicates, and through a careful examination of Books IV and VIII of Plato’s Republic, I seek to destabilize the common view that there is a specific number of regimes and a necessary order of decline in the Book VIII account of the decline of regimes, one consequence of which would be that Plato is a straightforwardly harsh critic of democracy. The upshot of my study is to argue that in fact, the account offers a qualified (...) defense, a proto-Kantian “critique” of democracy. I attempt to sustain this argument with references to several of the Letters of Plato. (shrink)

As the differently ordered title indicates, and through a careful examination of Books IV and VIII of Plato’s Republic, I seek to destabilize the common view that there is a specific number of regimes and a necessary order of decline in the Book VIII account of the decline of regimes, one consequence of which would be that Plato is a straightforwardly harsh critic of democracy. The upshot of my study is to argue that in fact, the account offers a qualified (...) defense, a proto-Kantian “critique” of democracy. I attempt to sustain this argument with references to several of the Letters of Plato. (shrink)

. The author has compared the world-view attitudes of oligarchy and capitalism on the basis of analysis of Ludwig von Mises’ writings. The results of such comparison allow us to maintain that there is neither market economy nor competition, and so nor capitalism in Ukraine. The world-view basis of capitalism is the philosophy of liberalism, which has such principles as equality, freedom, inviolability of private property, cooperation in favor of profits of the whole society. On the contrary, oligarchy (...) based on the strong desire of infinitive enrichment and exploitation hasn’t any philosophical basis. (shrink)

Michels started from the radical wing of the German Marxist party, the SPD, and ended in Italy as one of Mussolini's professors of Fascist political science. What unifies his intellectual biography is a Weberian concern with bureaucracy.

There are many studies and theories in the literature on the source of power in the formative years of the Mamlūk state. In these studies, the importance of power and influence as a form of becoming a sultan in the Mamlūks has been emphasized, although the oligarchic power of the umara has been indirectly mentioned in terms of the source of power by discussing the distinction between a puppet sultan and an authoritarian sultan. However, this axiom causes a number of (...) problems and ambiguities within itself and leads to the supersession of the determinism of the elite amirs. This work will try to overcome this problem by focusing on the political developments during the foundation years of the state and discussing how powerful and influential amirs were restricted by the umara on their way to becoming sultans. At the same time, by focusing on the chronicles of the period in question, the administrative determinism of the Mamlūk factions as a decision-making mechanism in the Mamlūk state will be pointed out. On the other hand, the statement that power emanated from both the sultan’s household faction and the military support of the elite amirs or khushdāshs who held the Mamlūk oligarchy in their hands leads to overlooking the tension or conflict between the two throughout Mamlūk political history. Considering the state of conflict between the two sides, it is a logical contradiction for the two opposing poles to agree on the same candidate. For instance, considering Muʿizz Aybak’s accession to power, the Sālihiyya-Bahriyya amirs unanimously endorsed his sultanate, but in the process, Muʿizz Aybak prevailed over the tensions he experienced with the elite that brought him to power and managed to become the absolute sultan, albeit for a short time. Therefore, it is essential to keep in mind that there was no uniform relationship between the sultan and the elite amirs, but rather a dynamic functioning. In other words, the future sultan, who had to establish good relations with the amirs until he became sultan, had to go against the amirs who brought him to power if he wanted to become an absolute ruler after he became sultan. In this study, the source of Mamlūk power is traced to the collective interests of the Mamlūk factions. It is emphasized that these interests were usually centered on candidates who were seen as more moderate among the factions. At the same time, by revealing the shortcomings of the understandings presented as a rule such as “the one who kills the sultan becomes the sultan” and “the powerful and influential become the sultan”, the analysis of the period from the founding years of the Mamlūks to Baybars’ sultanate mostly emphasizes the continuity of the status quo of the elite amirs by highlighting the “sultanate of weak and middle-ranking amirs”. The analysis has pointed out that those who killed sultans or usurped the throne were punished rather than usurping the throne as a legitimate right. Similarly, the consensus of the umara on the candidate for sultanate was pointed out by mentioning that those who were powerful and influential were being challenged rather than made sultan. (shrink)

This article examines the link between oligarchy and the notion of representative democracy, which for Castoriadis also implies the bureaucratisation of society. However, in an argument with and against Castoriadis, one has to decipher modern oligarchies before launching into a radical critique of the principle of representation. There is a diversity of representative democracies, and the complexity of modernity comes from a mixture of oligarchy, representation and democracy. Even though the idea of democracy has evolved, we do not (...) live under representative democracies but under liberal oligarchies. Direct democratic procedures and representative elements can sometimes be gathered in order to create new forms of political commitment. The main problem is avoiding a concentration of powers, which cannot create the conditions for the emergence of democratic institutions. (shrink)

Throughout his life, Cornelius Castoriadis displayed an unwavering commitment to democracy. He militated for it and developed concepts to elucidate its significance for human freedom. Yet are the concepts Castoriadis developed enough to explain the depth of his aforementioned commitment? In this essay, I try to imagine how Castoriadis would have addressed Roberto Michels’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ thesis. I find that Castoriadis’s concepts can help us question the normative value Michels assigned to oligarchy, but they fail to (...) explain how he could have remained so committed to democracy when oligarchy seems ineluctable. Such a commitment, I argue, ultimately rests on an existential decision, the roots of which cannot be rationally explained. (shrink)

The Constitution of the Athenians ascribed to Xenophon the orator.--The Politeia of the Spartans by Xenophon.--The Boeotian Constitution from the Oxyrhynchus historian.--The Constitution of Athens by Aristotle.

Long before the "one percent" became a protest slogan, American founding father John Adams feared the power of a class he called simply "the few"—the wellborn, the beautiful, and especially the rich. In John Adams and the Fear of American Oligarchy, Luke Mayville explores Adams’s deep concern with the way in which inequality threatens to corrode democracy and empower a small elite. Adams believed that wealth is politically powerful not merely because money buys influence, but also because citizens admire (...) and even identify with the rich. Mayville explores Adams’s theory of wealth and power in the context of his broader concern about social and economic disparities—reflections that promise to illuminate contemporary debates about inequality and its political consequences. He also examines Adams’s ideas about how oligarchy might be countered. A compelling work of intellectual history, John Adams and the Fear of American Oligarchy has important lessons for today’s world. (shrink)

The second part of this publication deals with 1. 17-36 in the unpublished fragment (B), which without doubt form the most original part of the law. For it was not only a question of creating an obstacle to a coup d'État that that would overturn a genuine democracy (represented by a boule and prytaneia of Athenian type, whose members were chosen by lot among the Eretrians), but also of henceforth reestablishing this constitution if a tyranny or oligarchy — interesting (...) association — was imposed by violence. Each citizen was invited to take up arms spontaneously (this clause offered a remarkable dialectical form, a semi-passive participation of Northwestern origin). An eventuality is envisaged of the People being no longer in control of the civic centre, in particular the zone of the boukuterion designated there probably by the term Agoraion (= Metroon at Athens?), or even of them being kept outside the town : in this case the democratie elements should regroup in some part of the territory, a tactic well attested in Greece and even Eretria (the role of the maritime fortress of Porthmos) in order to retake the power. Lastly, sanctions are envisaged against citizens who had not served the cause of the People, while its defenders would be rewarded by the grant of lands and goods belonging to those who had been guilty. A considerable conduding section reviews the principal problems posed by this document : the date, circumstances of its promulgation, place(s) it was exhibited, identity of the legislator, and possible juridical and/or philosophical models. Today it seems certain that the law (necessarily before 336) has to be related to the liberation of Eretria in the autumn of 341, a relatively well documented event. As is a priore probable, an influence by Athenian legislation can be detected in the first part of the text. But a comparison with the celebrated law proposed by Eucrates of Piraeus in 337/6 shows that the Attic model would not account for ail its particularities. The Eretrian law — which is, moreover, the oldest of its kind to have survived on stone — appears radier to be the fruit of an unhappy political experience undergone in the recent past. (shrink)

During the turbulent last years of the fifth century BC, Athens twice suffered the overthrow of democracy and the subsequent establishment of oligarchic regimes. In an in-depth treatment of both political revolutions, Julia Shear examines how the Athenians responded to these events, at the level both of the individual and of the corporate group. Interdisciplinary in approach, this account brings epigraphical and archaeological evidence to bear on a discussion which until now has largely been based on texts. Dr Shear particularly (...) focuses on the recreation of democracy and the city, both ritually and physically, in the aftermath of the coups and demonstrates that, whilst reconciliation after civil strife is difficult and contentious, it is also crucial for rebuilding a united society. Theories of remembering and forgetting are applied and offer a new way of understanding the dynamics in Athens at this time. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analizan ciertos aspectos de la sociedad nazarí de finales del siglo XV. Para hacerlo, se emplean las informaciones contenidas en un pleito de hidalguía de principios del siglo XVI. Este pleito afectó a los descendientes de un converso granadino hijo de un alcaide de Iznalloz. La particular perspectiva que proporcionan estos testimonios, que realizan una equiparación entre hidalguía castellana y parte de la oligarquía granadina, plantean numerosas preguntas sobre la sociedad del Reino de Granada a finales (...) de la Edad Media. (shrink)

This paper aims to show how elite theories do not offer a better alternative to democracy and to present the idea of a hegemonic majority that, by accounting for greater both individual and collective engagement and responsibility, breaks the exclusivity of elitism. Inspired by Gramsci’s theory, this idea reinforces the construction of the political decision-making process without developing a concept of authority based on an exclusive elite. It focuses on a specific interpretation of the role of the intellectuals as the (...) connection between the civil society and the government, fortifying or even restoring the trust between the individuals and their representatives and thereby strengthening the legitimacy of our democratic systems. (shrink)

Découverte près d'Alivéri en Eubée, cette importante inscription du milieu du IVe siècle av. J.-C. est demeurée longtemps inédite. Il s'agit d'une grande stèle amputée en haut et à gauche, où se lisent encore 35 lignes gravées stoichédon (à raison de 51 lettres par ligne après restitution). Sur la base du lieu de trouvaille, de la langue et du contenu, on peut rapporter à la même stèle le fragment IG XII 9, 190, en dépit du fait que ce petit morceau (...) — perdu depuis longtemps — n'a pas été présenté comme un texte stoichédon par son unique copiste. Ce rapprochement permet de restituer le frag ment en question (A) plus sûrement qu'on n'avait pu le faire jusqu'ici : c'est le début de la loi, avec l'énoncé des récompenses prévues pour le tyrannoctone, modulées en fonction de son statut politique et social. Le texte du nouveau morceau (B) se compose lui-même de deux sections distinguées par une asyndète significative. La première section (1. 1-17) comporte une série de clauses ayant pour objet la protection de la constitution démocratique contre toute tentative de mise en place d'un régime tyrannique, notamment par le biais d'une motion subversive : le contrevenant se verra non seulement privé de ses droits civiques (discussion sur la notion d'atimia à cette date) et de ses biens (confiscation par l'État — avec une dîme pour Artémis Amarysia, dont la prééminence dans le panthéon érétrien est ainsi confirmée), mais proscrit à perpétuité (interdiction d'inhumer ses restes dans l'Érétriade ou Érétrias gê; impunité et même récompense accordées à son meurtrier). Cette première section s'achève par une imprécation solennelle visant à décourager toute atteinte contre les dispositions de la loi elle-même (rôle intéressant des prêtres et des prêtresses — avec le mot rare, sinon même nouveau, hiéris pour hiéreia — lors des Dionysia et des Artémisia) ; entre les termes de cette imprécation et le libellé des grands serments « internationaux » (attestés à partir du IVe siècle précisément) il y a plus d'un point commun à relever. (shrink)