Considerable attention in bioethics has been devoted to moral expertise and its implications for handling applied moral problems. The existence and nature of moral expertise has been a contested topic, and particularly, whether philosophers are moral experts. In this study, we put the question of philosophers’ moral expertise in a wider context, utilizing a novel and global study among 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries. We find that despite the skepticism in recent literature, the vast majority of philosophers do believe in (...) moral expertise and in the contribution of philosophical training and experience to its acquisition. Yet, they still differ on what philosophers’ moral expertise consists of. While they widely accept that philosophers possess superior analytic abilities regarding moral matters, they diverge on whether they also possess improved ability to judge moral problems. Nonetheless, most philosophers in our sample believe that philosophers possess an improved ability to both analyze and judge moral problems and that they commonly see these two capacities as going hand in hand. We also point at significant associations between personal and professional attributes and philosophers’ beliefs, such as age, working in the field of moral philosophy, public involvement, and association with the analytic tradition. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about moral expertise. -/- . (shrink)

This article discusses the composition and transmission of early Buddhist texts with specific reference to sutras. After briefly summarizing the main reasons why it is likely that these oral compositions were designed to be memorized and transmitted verbatim, I will discuss the main types of changes that these texts underwent in the course of their transmission and the reasons such changes occurred, then attempt to give an account of the challenge that change, particularly intentional change, posed to the oral transmission (...) of fixed, memorized texts. (shrink)

The new G?ndh?r? manuscript finds from Afghanistan and Pakistan, which date from approximately the first century BCE to the third or fourth century CE, are the earliest manuscript witnesses to the literature of the Indian Buddhist nik?yas or schools. They preserve texts whose parallels are found in the various Tripi?akas, or what remains of them, preserved in other languages and belonging to various nik?yas, including sections of?gamas such as the Ekottarik?gama and Vana-sa?yutta of the Sa?yutta-nik?ya/Sa?yukt?gama and anthologies of such s?tras, (...) besides many texts that are not generally classed as "canonical", such as commentaries. These very early collections of texts raise questions concerning canon-formation, such as whether the Gandh?ran communities that produced these manuscripts had fixed?gama collections and closed canons or whether this material witnesses a stage in which collections and canons were still relatively fluid and open, and whether these manuscripts, which span several centuries, witness a shift towards fixity. This paper addresses these issues and re-examines our understanding of the formation of the canons of the early Indian nik?yas in light of the new G?ndh?r? manuscript finds. (shrink)

Are philosophers moral experts, and if so, what does this imply for their proper role in moral decision-making? The dominant view on this subject argues that philosophers have superior moral understanding, but they are not better judges of what is morally right. Consequently, philosophers cannot and should not have an authoritative role in moral decision-making. In this article, I challenge this view and argue that an examination of the intimate connection between two capacities – to understand and to judge – (...) reveals that it is both inconsistent and simplistic. It is inconsistent because, all things being equal, if philosophers better understand moral problems, they are also better judges of them. It is simplistic because it adopts an all-or-nothing approach to moral expertise, while expertise is in fact conditional. Inspired by the psychological literature on expertise, I claim that we should not ask whether philosophers are moral experts but rather under which conditions they successfully execute their expertise. The conclusion of the dominant view needs to be reconsidered to reflect the conditional nature of philosophers' expertise. Although more empirical research is required, I offer several hypotheses for future endeavours that demonstrate what a conditional view of philosophers' moral expertise could look like. -/- . (shrink)

Novelty is a pivotal player in cognition, and its contribution to superior memory performance is a widely accepted convention. On the other hand, mnemonic advantages for familiar information are also well documented. Here, we examine the role of experimental distinctiveness as a potential explanation for these apparently conflicting findings. Across two experiments, we demonstrate that conceptual novelty, an unfamiliar combination of familiar constituents, is sensitive to its experimental proportions: Improved memory for novelty was observed when novel stimuli were relatively rare. (...) Memory levels for familiar items, in contrast, were completely unaffected by experimental proportions, highlighting their insensitivity to list-based distinctiveness. Finally, no mnemonic advantage for conceptual novelty over familiarity was observed even when novel stimuli were extremely rare at study. Together, these results imply that novel and familiar items are processed via partially distinct mechanisms, with novelty not providing a mnemonic advantage over familiarity. (shrink)

In recent decades, the discipline of bioethics has grown rapidly, as has the practice of ethical consultation. Interestingly, this new recognition of the relevance of moral philosophy to our daily life has been accompanied by skepticism among philosophers regarding the existence of moral expertise or the benefits of philosophical training. In his recent article in Bioethics, William R. Smith suggested that this skepticism is rooted in philosophers' belief that moral expertise is inconsistent with liberal–democratic values, when in fact they are (...) compatible. In this paper, we provide a unique opportunity to empirically examine Smith's observation by utilizing and extending global data on philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise, involving 4087 philosophers from 96 countries. Our findings support Smith's theoretical observation and show that societal levels of support for liberal–democratic values are associated with greater skepticism about moral expertise. We suggest that these findings might be explained by the cognitive process of motivated reasoning and an invalid inference of “is” from “ought.” Consequently, the potential tension between moral expertise and liberal–democratic values is invalidly used for rejecting the existence of moral expertise, while its main and valid implication is for how moral expertise should be applied in liberal–democratic settings. (shrink)

Nanomedicine offers remarkable options for new therapeutic avenues. As methods in nanomedicine advance, ethical questions conjunctly arise. Nanomedicine is an exceptional niche in several aspects as it reflects risks and uncertainties not encountered in other areas of medical research or practice. Nanomedicine partially overlaps, partially interlocks and partially exceeds other medical disciplines. Some interpreters agree that advances in nanotechnology may pose varied ethical challenges, whilst others argue that these challenges are not new and that nanotechnology basically echoes recurrent bioethical dilemmas. (...) The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the ethical issues related to nanomedicine and to reflect on the question whether nanomedicine generates ethical challenges of new and unique nature. Such a determination should have implications on regulatory processes and professional conducts and protocols in the future. (shrink)

Since the onset of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, an array of off-label interventions has been used to treat patients, either provided as compassionate care or tested in clinical trials. There is a challenge in determining the justification for conducting randomised controlled trials over providing compassionate use in an emergency setting. A rapid and more accurate evaluation tool is needed to assess the effect of these treatments. Given the similarity to the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) pandemic in Africa in 2014, we suggest (...) using a tool designed by the WHO committee in the aftermath of the EVD pandemic: Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Investigational Interventions (MEURI). Considering the uncertainty around SARS-CoV-2, we propose using an improved MEURI including the Plan–Do–Study–Act tool. This combined tool may facilitate dynamic monitoring, analysing, re-evaluating and re-authorising emergency use of unproven treatments and repeat it in cycles. It will enable adjustment and application of outcomes to clinical practice according to changing circumstances and increase the production of valuable data to promote the best standard of care and high-quality research—even during a pandemic. (shrink)

The predictive processing framework posits that people continuously use predictive principles when interacting with, learning from, and interpreting their surroundings. Here, we suggest that the same framework may help explain how people process self-relevant knowledge and maintain a stable and positive self-concept. Specifically, we recast two prominent self-relevant motivations, self-verification and self-enhancement, in predictive processing (PP) terms. We suggest that these self-relevant motivations interact with the self-concept (i.e., priors) to create strong predictions. These predictions, in turn, influence how people interpret (...) information about themselves. In particular, we argue that these strong self-relevant predictions dictate how prediction error, the deviation from the original prediction, is processed. In contrast to many implementations of the PP framework, we suggest that predictions and priors emanating from stable constructs (such as the self-concept) cultivate belief-maintaining, rather than belief-updating, dynamics. Based on recent findings, we also postulate that evidence supporting a predicted model of the self (or interpreted as such) triggers subjective reward responses, potentially reinforcing existing beliefs. Characterizing the role of rewards in self-belief maintenance and reframing self-relevant motivations and rewards in predictive processing terms offers novel insights into how the self is maintained in neurotypical adults, as well as in pathological populations, potentially pointing to therapeutic implications. (shrink)

Across species, animals have an intrinsic drive to approach appetitive stimuli and to withdraw from aversive stimuli. In affective science, influential theories of emotion link positive affect with strengthened behavioural approach and negative affect with avoidance. Based on these theories, we predicted that individuals’ positive and negative affect levels should particularly influence their behaviour when innate Pavlovian approach/avoidance tendencies conflict with learned instrumental behaviours. Here, across two experiments – exploratory Experiment 1 (N = 91) and a preregistered confirmatory Experiment 2 (...) (N = 335) – we assessed how induced positive and negative affect influenced Pavlovian-instrumental interactions in a reward/punishment Go/No-Go task. Contrary to our hypotheses, we found no evidence for a main effect of positive/negative affect on either approach/avoidance behaviour or Pavlovian-instrumental interactions. However, we did find evidence that the effects of induced affect on behaviour were moderated by individual differences in self-reported behavioural inhibition and gender. Exploratory computational modelling analyses explained these demographic moderating effects as arising from positive correlations between demographic factors and individual differences in the strength of Pavlovian-instrumental interactions. These findings serve to sharpen our understanding of the effects of positive and negative affect on instrumental behaviour. (shrink)

In reinforcement learning, a decision maker searching for the most rewarding option is often faced with the question: What is the value of an option that has never been tried before? One way to frame this question is as an inductive problem: How can I generalize my previous experience with one set of options to a novel option? We show how hierarchical Bayesian inference can be used to solve this problem, and we describe an equivalence between the Bayesian model and (...) temporal difference learning algorithms that have been proposed as models of RL in humans and animals. According to our view, the search for the best option is guided by abstract knowledge about the relationships between different options in an environment, resulting in greater search efficiency compared to traditional RL algorithms previously applied to human cognition. In two behavioral experiments, we test several predictions of our model, providing evidence that humans learn and exploit structured inductive knowledge to make predictions about novel options. In light of this model, we suggest a new interpretation of dopaminergic responses to novelty. (shrink)

In two studies we investigated the association between physical cleansing and moral and immoral behavior in real-life situations. In Study 1, after a workout at the gym, participants cheated more after taking a shower than before taking one. In the second study, participants donated more money to charity before rather than after they bathed for religious purification. The results extend previous findings about moral cleansing and moral licensing and are discussed within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory.

À la figure moderne du mal politique – et plus particulièrement à la pathologie des systèmes totalitaires qui engendrent la « superfluité » des individus – Arendt avait associé, au moment du procès Eichmann, l’idée de la « banalité du mal ». C’est par cette formule – la « terrible », l’ « indicible », l’ « impensable » banalité..

Le débat entre Carl Schmitt et Hans Blumenberg a des implications considérables. Il porte en dernière analyse sur le statut et la valeur assignés à la modernité, sur l’intelligibilité de l’histoire , sur la nature de la « légitimité » et donc in fine sur la confrontation entre « théologie politique » et « philosophie politique ». Ce dernier aspect pourrait également nous éclairer sur la fascination exercée par la pensée de Schmitt sur la « radicalité » politique actuelle. En (...) définitive, le débat porte sur le sens et la validité de la « sécularisation » et de la « sécularité » entendues comme catégories interprétatives de la modernité.The issue between Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg has significant involvements. It turns ultimately on the statute and the value of modernity, on the intelligibility of history , on the nature of legitimity and at last on the collation between « political theology » and « political philosophy ». Seen from that side, it might to throw some light on the fascination exerted by Schmitt’s thought on political « radicality » today. That issue finally turns on meaning and validity of « secularisation » and « secularity » as interpretative categories for modernity. (shrink)

"En me donnant un micro pour deux séries d'interventions, l'une sur l'histoire, l'autre sur la religion, France Culture m'a permis de résumer et clarifier les travaux que je mène depuis maintes années sur diverses affaires temporelles et spirituelles. Je ne saurais assez remercier sa directrice Sandrine Treiner de m'avoir ainsi donné l'occasion d'apporter ma petite pierre à l'édifice des Lumières, sous l'égide de la devise : Rendre la Raison populaire. Vaste programme, qui exige d'inquiéter nombre de lieux communs, ce qui (...) n'est jamais plaisant. Pourquoi? Parce que nous nous berçons de mots, toujours les mêmes, et que ces mots nous trompent. L'histoire? Elle est censée nous découvrir la réalité des choses : elle nous dorlote avec de fausses croyances. Les religions? Elles sont censées nous raconter des blagues : bombes et couteaux nous découvrent de rudes vérités. Et si l'opium du peuple n'était pas là où l'on pensait? C'est à renverser de vétustes perspectives qu'invite ce récapitulatif, dérangeant comme un réveille-matin". Régis Debray. (shrink)

Style and Function: A Study of the dominant stylistic features of the prose portions of Pali canonical sutta texts and their mnemonic function. Mark Allon. The Internatioal Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1997. xiv, 394 pp. ISBN 4-906267-40-8.

Allons sans détour au cœur du problème par deux thèses : 1 / il existe une idéologie de l’évaluation ; 2 / cette idéologie est une des grandes impostures de la dernière décennie.Commençons par la première thèse. Le terme « idéologie » est à prendre au sens qu’il a acquis depuis Marx : une vision du monde ou, plus modestement, une représentation illusoire qui..

Nous allons revenir en détail sur certaines des « mesures de sauvetage » déjà mises en œuvre et faire un tour d’horizon des déboires de ce monde de crise 2.0, dans lequel gouvernements, ménages et acteurs de la finance s’efforcent tous de réduire leur niveau d’endettement. Les résultats de cette situation sont sans appel : stagnation, chômage, démantèlement de l’État-providence et arrivée de coalitions de technocrates sans mandat électoral. Des stratégies de résistance doivent être mises en œuvre pour traiter efficacement (...) les causes sous-jacentes de la crise. Nous appelons de nos vœux une expansion de la demande globale rendue possible par la hausse des rémunérations dans les pays à bas salaires, des annulations de dettes dans les pays pauvres comme dans les plus riches, de nouveaux mécanismes de protection sociale et des structures financières mises au service de l’intérêt public. (shrink)

Nous allons analyser le passage de la conception freudienne de l'inconscient à celle de Lacan, mise en place à partir de son dernier enseignement. Dans celle-ci, l'interprétation n'est plus la seule clé de lecture de l'inconscient. Nous allons montrer l'articulation des deux inconscients avec la notion de «temps», et en quoi, ces deux différentes conceptions déterminent la direction de la cure. Dans la première, l'inconscient est plutôt envisagé à partir du temps passé, alors que dans la deuxième à partir du (...) futur: la contingence devient ainsi l'élément fondamental pour penser l'inconscient. La psychanalyse se montre alors comme une discipline qui ne vise pas seulement à déceler les mécanismes déterminés de l'inconscient, mais aussi comme pratique capable d'accueillir l'inattendu et de l'exploiter dans la cure. Vamos a analizar el pasaje de la concepción freudiana del inconsciente a la de Lacan, concebida a partir de su última enseñanza. En esta, la interpretación no es más la sola clave de lectura del inconsciente. Mostraremos la articulación de ambos inconscientes con la noción de "tiempo", y cómo estas dos diferentes concepciones determinan la dirección de la cura. En la primera, el inconsciente es sobre todo contemplado a partir del tiempo pasado, mientras que en la segunda a partir del futuro: la contingencia se hace así el elemento fundamental para pensar en el inconsciente. El psicoanálisis se muestra entonces como una disciplina que no pretende solamente descubrir los mecanismos determinados del inconsciente, sino también como práctica capaz de acoger lo inesperado y explotarlo en la cura. (shrink)

Fiona Allon writes that “ home, now more than ever, is seen as firmly connected to the world of politics and economics, as actively shaped and defined by the public sphere rather than existing simply as a refuge from it.” 1 From this perspective, claims to home as they are located in a relationship to claims of both national and local belonging are often a contested site within Australia, where notions of who is seen to be at home in (...) Australia are constantly being challenged and reworked. Structured around the desire amongst white people to retain Australia as a “white nation,” claims to home may be seen as operating in complex ways in regards to the rights that arise from the ongoing existence of Indigenous sovereignties, and the politics surrounding levels of immigration from groups of people perceived as belonging to minority racial groups. In this context, the notion of home is frequently drawn upon in relation to both how people perceive the way in which they, and others, belong in a country, and this raises questions surrounding who is legitimately able to call Australia home. Such discourses of home evoke feelings of ownership in people who feel that they have a legitimate claim to a country for reasons primarily of race or location of birth. In Australia, despite the powerful presence and voice of Indigenous peoples, popular perceptions of the country tend to place such homely rights firmly in the laps of white people, who, through images of white nuclear families in front of white picket fences, perceive themselves as already and rightfully at home in Australia. Yet such conceptions of Australia are not accepted without struggle. Notions of home are very much contested, especially in terms of Indigenous sovereignty and non-white immigration, both of which question the legitimacy of a normatively white Australia. Such ideas of home as being a contested space in which issues of national belonging are played out in Australia were seen quite clearly in relation to the 2005 Cronulla riots, in which thousands of white Australians gathered around Cronulla beach, shouting at and threatening those located as “Lebanese Muslim” people. The people involved in the riots made it quite clear that whilst Australia was a home for them, it ought not to be home to people who were identified as Lebanese Muslims. Such racist opinions exemplified the fact that Australia is seen to be a white country, and therefore as a legitimate home to white people rather than to non-white minority groups or even to Indigenous Australians. This is discussed in more detail later in this paper. (shrink)

Heidegger — Nous allons tenter, en partant du point de vue européen qui est le nôtre, de saisir quelques traits essentiels de l’art. La question de savoir si l’art a encore une place quelconque à notre époque est à nos yeux une question d’une extrême urgence. Nous allons commencer le colloque en nous demandant comment ce que nous nommons l’art extrême-oriental se comprend lui-même. De manière tout à fait concrète, nous voulons demander –...

Allons directement au cœur des analyses que propose G. Sibertin-Blanc des démarches effectuées par Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari dans les deux volumes de Capitalisme et schizophrénie, L’Anti-Œdipe (1972) et Mille Plateaux (1980). En marge du « Traité de nomadologie » qui, dans ce dernier ouvrage, donne son thème au douzième plateau, il écrit : « Un phénomène se définit comme nomade dès qu’il produit, « occupe et tient un espace lisse », espace « ouvert ou illimité dans toutes les (...) direction... (shrink)

La question que nous allons aborder dans ce cours est la suivante : peut-on réduire une société une simple agrégation d’individus, ou est-elle plus que cela ? Cette question introduit le débat qui oppose, en sciences sociales, les tenants de l’individualisme à ceux du holisme. En première approximation, les individualistes sociaux pensent qu’une société n’est rien de plus qu’une somme ou une agrégation d’individus. Les holistes sociaux pensent au contraire qu’une société n’est pas réductible à une simple agrégation d’individus. C’est (...) là une question fondamentale aussi bien pour les sociologues que pour les philosophes. Mais en tant que futurs ingénieurs, vous vous dites peut-être que cela ne va pas vous empêcher de dormir. Pour vous convaincre qu’il y a là certaines raisons sinon de faire des nuits blanches, du moins d’avoir quelques discussions animées, nous allons rapprocher cette question, que l’on traitera dans la première partie du cours, de deux autres dont l’enjeu vous semblera certainement plus immédiat. Nous les traiterons respectivement dans les deuxième et troisième parties du cours. (shrink)