This book brings together a series of interviews conducted by noted Iranian social scientist Ramin Jahanbagloo. These interviews cover the ideas of Indian-ness, Indian thought, religion, politics, secularism, and pluralism, as well as Gandhi, India and Pakistan, democracy, globalization and culture.

These six essays present an outsider's view of Western norms of progress, rationality, and maturity, and offer an alternate perspective on oppression in modern times. Well-known psychologist and social theorist Ashis Nandy stresses the importance of considering world views held by the "non-modern" cultures of the Third World in formulating a more humane and less technologically preoccupied vision of progress. Institutionalized oppression is seen as a process which co-opts the physical and psychological worlds of its victims and destroys the basis (...) of all dissenting visions of a just world. Concluding with an essay on Gandhi and his critical reaction to Western civilization, this book is an important contribution to political science, sociology, psychology, and South Asian studies. (shrink)

This volume presents six essays by leading sociologists, philosophers, physicists, and environmental activists that examine the links between science and violence from the Baconian era to the present day. It looks at two basic issues: science as it provides a new justification for state violence; and science as violent technological intervention, invading and disrupting stable patterns of private life in the name of progress and development.

This important and comprehensive work of 18th-century Islamic religious thought written in Arabic by a pre-eminent South Asian scholar provides an extensive and detailed picture of Muslim theology and interpretive strategies on the eve of the modern period.

Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...) a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. (shrink)

The historical mode may be the dominant mode of constructing the past in most parts of the globe but it is certainly not the most popular mode of doing so. The dominance is derived from the links the idea of history has established with the modern nation-state, the secular worldview, the Baconian concept of scientific rationality, nineteenth-century theories of progress and, in recent decades, development. This dominance has also been strengthened by the absence of any radical critique of the idea (...) of history within the modern world and for that matter, within the discipline of history itself. As a result, once exported to the nonmodern world, the historical consciousness has not only tended to absolutize the past in cultures that have lived with open-ended concepts of the past or depended on myths, legends, and epics to define their cultural selves, it has also made the historical worldview complicit with many new forms of violence, exploitation and satanism in our times and helped rigidify civilizational, cultural, and national boundaries. (shrink)

Critical analyses of literatures of the Indian diaspora discuss the “home” of origin as a subtext and a site to which diasporas aspire to return even though it remains an unachievable ideal that is refracted through nostalgic retellings of a space that remains at best “imaginary” (Mishra 2007). Alternatively, some critics, as Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald point out, view diasporas’ relationship with the homeland in terms of “loyalty,” obscuring in the process the antagonisms that may arise depending upon one’s (...) circumstances, antagonisms that produce “interactions” between homes of residence and those of origin (2012). In South Asian drama in Canada, many of the concerns regarding race, multiculturalism, job discrimination and violence against women and other marginalized groups are propelled by their links to the playwrights’ “home” of origin. With attention to selected plays, this paper will analyze how the networks between home and spaces of residence in multicultural Canada come alive on theatre stages through visual motifs, actors, props, and photographic collages, which confront the different trajectories of “home” that resurface in these plays. Through live scenes of imagination that speak to spectators, several plays under discussion in this essay expose how, while providing emotional sustenance for some, the baggage of “home” may also pose challenges in the home of residence. So the questions I raise are: How does home appear? To what end? And what does returning “home” teach us about the inequalities and injustices underlying the current global order? (shrink)

Commentary on Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of Umāsvāti, ca. 135-ca. 219, on Jaina philosophy.

It is common for philosophers to claim that doxastic voluntarism, the view that an agent can form beliefs voluntarily, is false, and therefore that agents do not have the kind of control over their beliefs required for a straightforward application of deontological concepts such as obligation or duty in the domain of epistemology. The role that the denial of doxastic voluntarism plays in an argument to the effect that agents do not have obligations with respect to belief is simply this.

_That is full. This is full. From the full comes the full. Remove the full from the full and what remains? The full._ This first line of the Isha Upanishad, one of the most powerful ancient books of faith, is so profound that Mahatma Gandhi famously said, “If all the Upanishads and all the other scriptures happened all of a sudden to be reduced to ashes, and if only the first verse in the Isha Upanishad were left in the memory (...) of the Hindus, Hinduism would live forever.” One of the shortest collections of texts, consisting of seventeen or eighteen verses, the Isha Upanishad is significant because of its explanation of man’s relationship with nature and God. However, it also goes beyond all faiths and religions to help people look within and without themselves to answer questions that have existed and persisted from the dawn of civilization. This beautifully crafted edition of the Isha Upanishad has been translated in clear and vivid language by Pritish Nandy, renowned poet, painter and filmmaker. And for the first time the powerful scripture is accompanied by brilliant illustrations by accomplished artist and designer, Sunandini Banerjee. Together the crisp passages and glowing illustrations manifest the thread that connects all that exists and chronicle mankind’s search for the true meaning of life. (shrink)

Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.

Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

Conventional forensic DNA analysis involves a matching principle, which compares DNA profiles from evidential samples to those from reference samples of known origin. In casework, however, the accessibility to a reference sample is not guaranteed which limits the use of DNA as an investigative tool. This has led to the development of phenotype prediction, which uses SNP analysis to estimate the physical appearance of the sample donor. Physical traits, such as eye, hair and skin colour, have been associated with certain (...) alleles within specific genes involved in the melanogenesis pathways. These genetic markers are also associated with ancestry and their trait prediction ability has mainly been assessed in European and North American populations. This has prompted research investigating the discriminatory power of these markers in other populations, especially those exhibiting admixture. South Africa is well known for its diversity, and the viability of these particular SNPs still needs to be assessed within this population. South African law currently restricts the use of DNA for molecular phenotyping, and there are also numerous ethical and social considerations, all of which are discussed. (shrink)

There is an argument according to which there must be something nonrelationally valuable for anything to be of value. The chains of dependence between values must come to an end, and humanity meets the specifications. I explore alternatives to terminating a regress in nonrelational value and give reason to reject the “borrowing” conception of relational value that drives the argument. I doubt that the nonrelational value of humanity can be secured by an argument from the structure of value, but I (...) am optimistic about the prospects for explaining our value relationally and give reason to favor a reflexive relational model. (shrink)

The authors argue that the chain of events which they describe is the end-product of a century's effort to convert Hindus into a 'proper' modern nation and a conventional ethnic majority. Simultaneously, the effort is equally to turn the followers of other Indian faiths into well-behaved ethnic minorities and nationalities. The American model of a 'melting pot' is being imposed with the expectation that it will dissolve India's primordial identities. A society which has for centuries been a salad bowl of (...) diverse communities, each identifiably different but constituting parts of a whole, is being forced to conform to the pattern of a 'proper' nation-state. (shrink)

Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...) that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument. (shrink)

Structural change in the cellular prion protein, PrPC to a ProteinaseK‐resistant β‐sheet‐rich insoluble form PrPSC and its accumulation have been considered to be central to the pathogenesis of the prion diseases (TSE). In a recent paper, Deleault et al have shown that specific endogenous RNA molecules can induce in vitro structural conversion of endogenous PrPC to PrPSC.1 Small highly structured synthetic RNAs can also induce this conversion process.2 However, recent in vivo results show that PrPSC is not directly involved in (...) the prion pathogenesis.3 It is possible, however, that nucleic‐acid‐induced PrPSC associated with the inducer nucleic acid could be the components of the infectious agent. BioEssays 26:469–473, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

The “dead-donor rule” states that, in any case of vital organ donation, the potential donor should be determined to be dead before transplantation occurs. In many countries around the world, neurological criteria can be used to legally determine death (also referred to as brain death). Nevertheless, there is considerable controversy in the bioethics literature over whether brain death is the equivalent of biological death. This international legal review demonstrates that there is considerable variability in how different jurisdictions have evolved to (...) justify the legal status of brain death and its relationship to the dead-donor rule.In this article, we chose to review approaches that are representative of many different jurisdictions—the United States takes an approach similar to that of many European countries; the United Kingdom’s approach is followed by Canada, India, and influences many other Commonwealth countries; Islamic jurisprudence is applicable to several different national laws; the Israeli approach is similar to many Western countries, but incorporates noteworthy modifications; and Japan’s relatively idiosyncratic approach has received some attention in the literature. Illuminating these different justifications may help develop respectful policies regarding organ donation within countries with diverse populations and allow for more informed debate about brain death and the deaddonor rule. (shrink)

L. Nandi Theunissen offers an original and provocative account of the value of humanity. Human beings have value just as anything of value has value: because we are capable of being of value to someone--in the first place, to ourselves. And this explains the key forms of ethical responsiveness that we owe to one another.

The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa began in the spring of 2014 and has since caused the deaths of over 6,000 people. Since there are no approved treatments or prevention modalities specifically targeted at Ebola Virus Disease , debate has focused on whether unproven interventions should be offered to Ebola patients outside of clinical trials. Those engaged in the debate have responded rapidly to a complex and evolving crisis, however, and this debate has not provided much opportunity for in-depth (...) analysis. Additionally, the existing literature on access to unproven therapies has focused on contexts like HIV/AIDS and oncology, which are very different than the Ebola epidemic. In this paper, we examine the ethical issues surrounding access to unproven therapies in the context of the recent Ebola outbreak to yield new insights about this controversial and unsettled issue. We argue first that, in this context, the interests of patients in obtaining access to unproven therapies are not fully aligned.. (shrink)

This experiment investigated the effect of format (line vs. bar), viewers’ familiarity with variables, and viewers’ graphicacy (graphical literacy) skills on the comprehension of multivariate (three variable) data presented in graphs. Fifty-five undergraduates provided written descriptions of data for a set of 14 line or bar graphs, half of which depicted variables familiar to the population and half of which depicted variables unfamiliar to the population. Participants then took a test of graphicacy skills. As predicted, the format influenced viewers’ interpretations (...) of data. Specifically, viewers were more likely to describe x–y interactions when viewing line graphs than when viewing bar graphs, and they were more likely to describe main effects and “z–y” (the variable in the legend) interactions when viewing bar graphs than when viewing line graphs. Familiarity of data presented and individuals’ graphicacy skills interacted with the influence of graph format. Specifically, viewers were most likely to generate inferences only when they had high graphicacy skills, the data were familiar and thus the information inferred was expected, and the format supported those inferences. Implications for multivariate data display are discussed. (shrink)

Indian thoughts on philosophy, education, life, aesthetics, etc.

My commentary focusses on the anecdote described by Elise v. Bernstorff in her research on transcultural education in rural Germany. I am interested in the potential intersections between v. Bernstorff’s findings and my own work on postcolonial literary theory and translation studies. On a methodological level, I am taking my cue from the ethical theory of the Caribbean philosopher Édouard Glissant on the one hand and postcolonial translation studies (Spivak, Tymoczko, Venuti) on the other.

Ethical consumerism has been dramatically increasing in recent decades, but in service sector, fewer research has been conducted especially in the fast-food industry. In this paper, we determined empirically the consumer perceived ethicality effects on repurchase intentions as well as on word of mouth through brand image partial mediation and customer expertise moderation in fast-food sector. The data were collected from 307 consumers of the fast-food restaurants through self-administered questionnaires. Common method variance and social desirability bias were measured before testing (...) hypotheses, and the data were investigated by SPSS and AMOS 21st version. The empirical results demonstrated that consumer perceived ethicality effects on repurchase intentions directly and through brand image partial mediation indirectly. Moreover, the direct and positive effects of repurchase intentions on word of mouth were experienced. This study generalized the results of previous studies of consumer perceived ethicality conducted in western culture in Pakistani fast-food sector. This study also proposed that firms should tackle ethical concerns at corporate and operational strategy levels to improve consumers’ behavioral intentions. (shrink)

Current formal dialectical models postulate normative rules that enable discussants to conduct dialogical interactions without committing fallacies. Though the rules for conducting a dialogue are supposed to apply to interactions between actual arguers, they are without exception theoretically motivated. This creates a gap between model and reality, because dialogue participants typically leave important content-related elements implicit. Therefore, analysts cannot readily relate normative rules to actual debates in ways that will be empirically confirmable. This paper details a new, data-driven method for (...) describing discussants’ actual reply structures, wherein corpus studies serve to acknowledge the complexity of natural argumentation. Rather than refer exclusively to propositional content as an indicator of arguing pro/contra a given claim, the proposed approach to dialogue structure tracks the sequence of dialogical moves itself. This arguably improves the applicability of theoretical dialectical models to empirical data, and thus advances the study of dialogue systems. (shrink)