We propose a new game to strategically justify the constrained equal awards rule in claims problems. Our game is “procedurally fair” and “multilateral”. In addition, even if claimants cannot reach an agreement in any period, they can renegotiate in the next period. We show that, for each claims problem, the awards vector chosen by the constrained equal awards rule achieved at period 1 is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game.

In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPE.

On occasion, in multilateral negotiations, interested parties make unilateral demands. Certain agreements need unanimity. However, a lesser degree of consensus may be feasible. In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process.

We study a multilateral bargaining problem, where the buyer intends to purchase a subset of available items, each owned by a seller. The subset purchased must satisfy a notion of contiguity, which is modeled using graphs. The graph theoretic approach allows us to study different degrees of complementarity and substitutability between items. It also allows us to examine how degrees of complementarity and substitutability affect the share of surplus obtained by the buyer in the equilibrium of the (...) class='Hi'>bargaining game. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on the graphs for the buyer to extract full surplus in subgame perfect equilibrium. When the conditions are not met, we provide upper bounds on the equilibrium surplus share of the buyer. (shrink)

We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, (...) we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization. (shrink)

Inequality, as well as the scope of the duty of justice to reduce it, has always been a central concern of political justice. Income taxation has been seen as a key tool for redistribution and the state was the arena for discussions of justice. Globalization and the tax competition it fosters among states change the context for the discussion of distributive justice. Given the state’s fading coercive power in taxation and the decreasing power of its citizenry to co-author its collective (...) will due to global competition, we can no longer assume that justice can be realized within the parameters of the state. International tax policy in an effort to retain justice often opts for cooperation as a vehicle to support distributive justice. But cooperation among states is more than a way for them to promote their aims through bargaining. Rather, it is a way for states to regain legitimacy by sustaining their very ability to ensure the collective action of their citizens and to treat them with equal respect and concern. The traditional discussion in international taxation seems to endorse a statist position — implicitly assuming that when states bargain for a multilateral deal, justice is completely mediated by the agreement of the states. In contrast, this Article argues that such a multilateral regime intended to provide the state with fundamental legitimacy requires independent justification. Contrary to the conventional statist position, I maintain that cooperating states have a duty to ensure that the constituents of all cooperating states are not treated unjustly because of the agreement. I argue that not only cosmopolitanism but political justice too requires that a justifiable cooperative regime must improve the welfare of the least well-off citizens in all cooperating states. I explain that cooperation alone is no guarantee of improved welfare and that certain transfer payments between rich and poor countries might be required to ensure this. (shrink)

The urgent need to address climate change poses a range of complex moral and practical concerns, not least because rising to the challenge will require cooperation among countries that differ greatly in their wealth, the extent of their contributions to the problem, and their vulnerability to environmental and economic shocks. This thesis by publication in the field of climate ethics aims to characterise a range of national responsibilities associated with acting on climate change (Part I), and to identify proposals for (...) fulfilling those responsibilities through fair and feasible institutional arrangements (Part II). I aim not only to address substantive gaps in scholarly understanding of those responsibilities, but also to strengthen the ability of climate ethics to engage meaningfully with climate policy. Chapter 2 addresses the question of whether wealthy countries owe a “climate debt” to poor countries. It finds that even if climate debt (suitably interpreted) may provide a coherent and morally plausible concept, its political value as a discursive frame that can provide a basis for cooperation is limited. Chapter 3 investigates the role that equity may play in negotiations on a long-term climate change agreement. It argues that developed and developing countries may reach a “principled bargain” if both converge on a way of differentiating their responsibilities that places less emphasis on a rigid dichotomy between the two groups and more emphasis on objective criteria relating to their contribution to the problem and capacity to address it. Chapter 4 explores a question largely overlooked in climate ethics, namely whether wealthy countries owe compensation to those who are adversely affected by the climate policies which they enact. I find that enacting countries have responsibilities to compensate both domestic and foreign citizens who would suffer disproportionate losses from the effects of policies. Chapter 5 assesses whether wealthy countries may legitimately adopt unilateral (or “fragmented”) rather than multilaterally coordinated approaches to raising climate finance for developing countries. It finds that coordinated target-setting, effort sharing and oversight arrangements are essential, but that a mix of unilateral and coordinated approaches to raising funds will be necessary for securing legitimacy. In Chapter 6, through addressing the broader question of what should count as official aid, I consider whether wealthy countries may draw on aid budgets to support developing countries’ efforts to address climate change. I find that the current definition of official aid should be retained but supplemented by specified exclusions from eligibility in order to preserve the aid regime’s integrity. Nevertheless, some climate finance may justifiably be counted as aid provided that concerns relating to the diversion of aid funding are addressed. In addressing these research questions, the thesis seeks not only to make original theoretical contributions to climate ethics but also to strengthen broader scholarly understanding of the ways in which ethics and international public policy may inform one another, particularly by highlighting the role of framing considerations (Chapter 2), feasibility considerations (Chapter 3), and the ways in which principles of fairness and legitimacy map onto institutional functions (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). (shrink)

Regional integration over the past decade has facilitated a huge flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Latin America. Less is known, however, about why these newforeign enterprises decided to enter specific markets. This study investigates three recent investments in Costa Rica: two by U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) and another by an MNC based in Spain. The behavior of these MNCs is examined in their initial bargaining and subsequent operations. Through the lens of political economy, this study concludes that (...) Costa Rica’s stable democratic institutions and formalized economic links through multilateral and regional trade and investment accords constitute an advanced factor of comparative advantage that attracted foreign investment to Costa Rica and induced the MNCs to become responsive to host country interests. (shrink)

This article reviews the practices and differing sets of attitudes North Americans have taken with respect to fairness in international trade and proposes a set of common considerations for ongoing debates about these matters. After reviewing the asymmetrical relations between Canada, the United States, and Mexico and the impact of multilateral trade agreements on bilateral trade between these countries, the article looks at four typical normative views with respect to trade held by North Americans. These views variously emphasize concerns (...) for protectionism, liberal fair play, distributive justice, and dissent in the name of the environment or the working classes. Acknowledging that the debates over what is fair are not likely to be easily resolved, we call for open political processes that allow these debates to proceed, and we identify five common points of reference that might usefully inform these debates. These comprise (1) respect for flexibility, (2) the importance of institutions, (3) greater attention to the commutative justice principles for fair exchanges and corresponding guarantees so that all countries possess basic power to bargain on their own behalf, (4) the need to find fitting balance between local, national, regional, and international trade, and (5) more concern for the ways false pricing and abusive transfer pricing distort international trading relations. (shrink)

We present epistemic multilateral logic, a general logical framework for reasoning involving epistemic modality. Standard bilateral systems use propositional formulae marked with signs for assertion and rejection. Epistemic multilateral logic extends standard bilateral systems with a sign for the speech act of weak assertion (Incurvati and Schlöder 2019) and an operator for epistemic modality. We prove that epistemic multilateral logic is sound and complete with respect to the modal logic S5 modulo an appropriate translation. The logical framework (...) developed provides the basis for a novel, proof-theoretic approach to the study of epistemic modality. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the approach, we show how the framework allows us to reconcile classical logic with the contradictoriness of so-called Yalcin sentences and to distinguish between various inference patterns on the basis of the epistemic properties they preserve. (shrink)

Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? -/- We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in (...) academia can be disadvantaged in such situations by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner is disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration. (shrink)

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. when grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about (...) one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers. (shrink)

Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner showing that underrepresented groups in academia can be disadvantaged in collaboration (...) and bargaining by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner can be disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration. (shrink)

Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible (...) positive outcomes—that is, agreements with the requisite emissions reduction commitments. Other work on large-scale social dilemmas suggests that it should be possible to resolve the climate problem. It therefore seems that equilibrium selection may be a barrier to successful negotiations. Here we use an N-player bargaining game in an agent-based model with learning dynamics to examine the past failures of and future prospects for a robust international climate agreement. The model suggests reasons why the desirable solutions identified in previous game-theoretic models have not yet been accomplished in practice and what mechanisms might be used to achieve these solutions. (shrink)

Prevailing literature argues that arguing is the only appropriate mode of deliberation. The literature acknowledges bargaining, story telling, and other forms of communication, but is unwilling to describe these as deliberation, properly speaking. The claim is that describing them as such would amount to concept stretching. In this article I argue that arguing exhausts neither the legitimate modes of deliberation nor the modes for effective deliberation. To do this I delineate two basic categories of issues we normally deliberate upon, (...) and demonstrate that arguing is more appropriate for one category, not so appropriate for the other. (shrink)

A theory of implementation for multilateral regulation of business is introduced. Four types of implementation actors (international organizations, states, nongovernmental organizations, and business associations) and three implementation tasks (communicate, monitor, and sanction) are identified. The ease of implementation is affected by issues and events that occur early in the life cycle of a policy. Ten propositions are put forward regarding the effects of problem definition and policy formulation on implementation. The theory is illustrated with the Montreal Protocol on Substances (...) that Deplete the Ozone Layer. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.

This article argues that systematic comparative analyses of women's strategies and coping mechanisms lead to a more culturally and temporally grounded understanding of patriarchal systems than the unqualified, abstract notion of patriarchy encountered in contemporary feminist theory. Women strategize within a set of concrete constraints, which I identify as patriarchal bargains. Different forms of patriarchy present women with distinct “rules of the game” and call for different strategies to maximize security and optimize life options with varying potential for active or (...) passive resistance in the face of oppression. Two systems of male dominance are contrasted: the sub-Saharan African pattern, in which the insecurities of polygyny are matched with areas of relative autonomy for women, and classic patriarchy, which is characteristic of South and East Asia as well as the Muslim Middle East. The article ends with an analysis of the conditions leading to the breakdown and transformation of patriarchal bargains and their implications for women's consciousness and struggles. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom and others have suggested treating decision-making under moral uncertainty as analogous to parliamentary decision-making. The core suggestion of this “parliamentary approach” is that the competing moral theories function like delegates to the parliament, and that these delegates then make decisions by some combination of bargaining and voting. There seems some reason to hope that such an approach might avoid standard objections to existing approaches (for example, the “maximise expected choiceworthiness” (MEC) and “my favourite theory” approaches). However, the (...) parliamentary approach is so far extremely underspecified, making it largely indeterminate how such a model will in fact behave in the respects that those concerned with moral uncertainty care about. This paper explores one way of making it precise. We treat predicaments of moral uncertainty as analogous to bargaining situations alone (setting aside voting), and apply a version of the Nash solution that is standard in bargaining theory. The resulting model does indeed perform in many of the hoped-for ways. However, so also does a version of MEC that employs a structural approach to intertheoretic comparisons. It seems to us an open question which, regarding this version of MEC and the bargaining-theoretic approach, is superior to the other. We identify the key points on which the two differ. (shrink)

The question of what a group of rational agents would agree on were they to deliberate on how to organise society is central to all hypothetical social contract theories. If morality is to be based on a social contract, we need to know the terms of this contract. One type of social contract theory, contractarianism, aims to derive morality from rationality alone. Contractarians need to show, amongst other things, that rational and self-interested individuals would agree on an impartial division of (...) a cooperative surplus. But it is often claimed that contractarians cannot show this without introducing moral assumptions. This paper argues that on the right understanding of the question contractarians are asking, these worries can be answered. Without relying on moral assumptions, the paper offers a novel derivation of symmetry, which is the axiom responsible for the impartiality of the most famous economic bargaining solutions appealed to by contractarians. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.

We show how to embed a framework for multilateral negotiation, in which a group of agents implement a sequence of deals concerning the exchange of a number of resources, into linear logic. In this model, multisets of goods, allocations of resources, preferences of agents, and deals are all modelled as formulas of linear logic. Whether or not a proposed deal is rational, given the preferences of the agents concerned, reduces to a question of provability, as does the question of (...) whether there exists a sequence of deals leading to an allocation with certain desirable properties, such as maximising social welfare. Thus, linear logic provides a formal basis for modelling convergence properties in distributed resource allocation. (shrink)

Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.

This article describes and interprets the impact, particularly on women and children, of pressure by multilateral organizations on contemporary Brazilian early child care and education policies. Based on an analysis of macro data and documents, the author argues that this pressure is old, existing prior to the introduction of the concept of globalization into the vocabulary of the media and the social sciences. A first wave of pressure dates from the 1970s, during the cold war, and the second, beginning (...) in the 1990s, resulted from the Washington Consensus. The central argument and supporting data presented in this article show that the early child care and education models put forward by multilateral organizations both perpetuate and are sustained by gender inequality and intersecting relations of class, race, and age domination. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a theory of punishment I call Multilateral Retributivism. Typically retributive notions of justice are unilateral: focused on one person’s desert. I argue that our notions of desert are multilateral: multiple people are owed when a moral crime is committed. I argue that the purpose of punishment is communication with the end-goal of reconciling the offender to society. This leads me to conclude that the death penalty and life without parole are unjustified because (...) they necessarily cut communication short. (shrink)

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. when grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about (...) one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers. (shrink)

Does the “free market” foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to (...) which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the market because they have failed to take into account certain nontrivial facts about the market which are essential to the analysis of coercive market relations. (shrink)

Men and women have always bargained for sex. In Hard Bargains, philosopher-lawyer Linda Hirshman and legal historian Jane Larson provide the first complete analysis of power in heterosexual relationships, combining an eye-opening legal history of sexual regualtion with thought-provoking predictions of what the future might bring.

Does the “free market” foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to (...) which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the market because they have failed to take into account certain nontrivial facts about the market which are essential to the analysis of coercive market relations. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the merit of bargaining theory, in its economic and ecological forms, as a model for understanding variation in the frequency of participation in cooperative fishing among men of Ifaluk atoll in Micronesia. Two determinants of bargaining power are considered: resource control and a bargainer’s utility gain for his expected share of the negotiated resource. Several hypotheses which relte cultural and life-course parameters to bargaining power are tested against data on the frequency of (...) cooperative sail-fishing participation. Consistent with predictions generated from bargaining theory, we show that (1) age is negatively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, (2) men of highranking clans and men with high levels of education fish less than men of low-ranking clans and less-educated men, (3) men with high expected utility gains from fishing returns fish more than men with low expected utility gains, (4) number of dependents is positively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, and (5) the number of young genetic offspring residing with a man is positively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, whereas the number of genetic offspring more than 13 years old who are residing with a man is negatively correlated with cooperative fishing participation. (shrink)

Teleosemantics is the view that mental content depends on etiological function. Moral adaptationism is the view that human morality is an evolved adaptation. Jointly, these two views offer new venues for naturalist metaethics. Several authors have seen, in the conjunction of these views, the promise of assigning naturalistically respectable descriptive content to moral judgments. One such author is Neil Sinclair, who has offered a blueprint for how to conduct teleosemantic metaethics with the help of moral adaptationism. In this paper, I (...) argue that the prospects for assigning descriptive content to moral judgments on the basis of teleosemantics are bad. I develop my argument in dialogue with Sinclair’s paper and argue that, although Sinclair’s account of the evolution of morality is plausible, the teleosemantic account of the descriptive content of moral judgments which he bases thereon suffers from crucial shortcomings. I argue further that, given some minimal plausible assumptions about the evolution of morality made by Sinclair, no assignment of descriptive content is possible. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the combination of moral adaptationism and teleosemantics suggests that moral judgments lack descriptive content. (shrink)

As well as disagreeing about how much one should donate to charity, moral theories also disagree about where one should donate. In light of this disagreement, how should the morally uncertain philanthropist allocate her donations? In many cases, one intuitively attractive option is for the philanthropist to split her donations across all of the charities that are recommended by moral views in which she has positive credence, with each charity’s share being proportional to her credence in the moral theories that (...) recommend that particular charity. Despite the fact that something like this approach is already being used by real-world philanthropists to distribute billions of dollars of donations, it is not supported by any of the approaches to moral uncertainty that have been proposed thus-far in the philosophical literature. In this paper, we will develop a bargaining-based approach to moral uncertainty that honors the proportionality intuition in favor of splitting one’s donations. We also show how this bargaining-based approach has several further advantages over the best alternative proposals. (shrink)

Two agents endowed with different categorisations engage in bargaining to reach an understanding and agree on a common categorisation. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually associate a region with the same category end up rebranding it under (...) a different category. Finally, we show that this last equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction; that is, the unique equilibrium agreement may be inefficient. (shrink)

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement presents a partial theory of distributive justice. It is partial because it applies only to the distribution of gains from joint endeavors, or what we may call the ‘social surplus’ from cooperation. This surplus is the benefit we receive from cooperation insofar as this is greater than what we might have produced through individual efforts without interaction with others. The central core of Gauthier's theory of distributive justice is his bargaining theory of ‘minimax relative (...) concession’ or MRC. Whether his theory is compelling turns essentially on whether MRC is workable and compelling. It is this issue that I wish to address. (shrink)

A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, smallest or largest) distance from some reference point. We explore the workability and the limits of metric rationalization in bargaining theory where compromising is a core issue. We demonstrate that many well-known bargaining solutions are social compromises with respect to reasonable metrics. In the metric approach, bargaining solutions can be grounded in axioms on how (...) society measures differences between utility allocations. Using this approach, we provide an axiomatic characterization for the class of social compromises that are based on p-norms and for the attending bargaining solutions. We further show that bargaining solutions which satisfy Pareto Optimality and Individual Rationality can always be metrically rationalized. (shrink)

The first unified and systematic treatment of the modern theory of bargaining, presented together with many examples of how that theory is applied in a variety of bargaining situations. Abhinay Muthoo provides a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results and insights obtained from the wide-ranging and diverse bargaining theory literature. Furthermore, he develops new analyses and results, especially on the relative impacts of two or more forces on the bargaining outcome. Many topics - such as inside (...) options, commitment tactics and repeated bargaining situations - receive their most extensive treatment to date. In the concluding chapter, he offers pointers towards future research. Bargaining Theory with Applications is a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a research resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations. (shrink)

Virtual bargaining theory suggests that social agents aim to resolve non-cooperative games by identifying the strategy profile which they would agree to play if they could openly bargain. The theory thus offers an explanation of how social agents resolve games with multiple Nash equilibria. One of the main questions pertaining to this theory is how the principles of the bargaining theory could be applied in the analysis of hypothetical bargaining in non-cooperative games. I propose a bargaining (...) model based on the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution concept for non-cooperative games, broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie's ordinal egalitarian solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I provide formal characterizations of the ordinal and the cardinal versions of BES, discuss their application to n-player games, and compare model's theoretical predictions with the data available from several experiments involving `pie games'. (shrink)

Men and women have always bargained for sex. In Hard Bargains, philosopher-lawyer Linda Hirshman and legal historian Jane Larson provide the first complete analysis of power in heterosexual relationships, combining an eye-opening legal history of sexual regulation with thought-provoking predictions of what the future might bring. Hirshman and Larson tell a riveting tale that spans the centuries--from early accounts of adulterers hanging from the gibbet, to the impact of the Kinsey Reports and Hugh Hefner's playboy philosophy, to the 1960s judge (...) who argued in favor of sex with eleven-year-olds. The book examines the factors that have shaped our notions of sex, from Catholic teaching to the theories of Sigmund Freud, and it explores the Supreme Court decisions of the last few decades that revolutionized the politics of sex. And Hard Bargains not only provides a deep understanding of historical and current disputes, it also offers striking predictions of what sexual bargaining will look like in the future--rape laws replaced by laws of sexual autonomy, adultery subjected to breach of contract action, fornicators responsible for each other's rent, prostitution considered an unfair labor practice. These are a few of the surprising--and surprisingly workable--solutions the authors foresee in the 21st century. Hard Bargains takes a forthright and level-headed look at all aspects of one of the biggest controversies in contemporary American society--heterosexual sex--and delivers a radically new perspective on the sexual lives of women and men. (shrink)

My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.