In T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge (2016)
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Abstract |
Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups?
We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in academia can be disadvantaged in such situations by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner is disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration.
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Keywords | power bargaining collaboration nash demand game evolutionary game theory academia social epistemology |
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References found in this work BETA
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
Ethics in Psychology: Professional Standards and Cases.Gerald P. Koocher - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
What is the State of Blacks in Philosophy?Tina F. Botts, Liam K. Bright, Guntur Mallarangeng, Quayshawn Spencer & Myisha Cherry - 2014 - Critical Philosophy of Race 2 (2):224-242.
View all 14 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Divergence of Values and Goals in Participatory Research.Lucas Dunlap, Amanda B. Corris, Melissa Jacquart, Zvi Biener & Angela Potochnik - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88:284-291.
The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science.Carole J. Lee - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (5):1026-1036.
The Computational Philosophy: Simulation as a Core Philosophical Method.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3647-3673.
Collective Responsibility and Fraud in Scientific Communities.Bryce Huebner & Liam Kofi Bright - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Perron Tollefsen (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge.
View all 9 citations / Add more citations
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