Inequality, as well as the scope of the duty of justice to reduce it, has always been a central concern of political justice. Income taxation has been seen as a key tool for redistribution and the state was the arena for discussions of justice. Globalization and the tax competition it fosters among states change the context for the discussion of distributive justice. Given the state’s fading coercive power in taxation and the decreasing power of its citizenry to co-author its collective (...) will due to global competition, we can no longer assume that justice can be realized within the parameters of the state. International tax policy in an effort to retain justice often opts for cooperation as a vehicle to support distributive justice. But cooperation among states is more than a way for them to promote their aims through bargaining. Rather, it is a way for states to regain legitimacy by sustaining their very ability to ensure the collective action of their citizens and to treat them with equal respect and concern. The traditional discussion in international taxation seems to endorse a statist position — implicitly assuming that when states bargain for a multilateral deal, justice is completely mediated by the agreement of the states. In contrast, this Article argues that such a multilateral regime intended to provide the state with fundamental legitimacy requires independent justification. Contrary to the conventional statist position, I maintain that cooperating states have a duty to ensure that the constituents of all cooperating states are not treated unjustly because of the agreement. I argue that not only cosmopolitanism but political justice too requires that a justifiable cooperative regime must improve the welfare of the least well-off citizens in all cooperating states. I explain that cooperation alone is no guarantee of improved welfare and that certain transfer payments between rich and poor countries might be required to ensure this. (shrink)

This Article uses comparative analysis of childcare deductions in the U.S., Canada and Israel in order to expose the non-technical nature of the distinction between business and personal deductions. The comparative analysis reveals significant differences in the ways courts in the three jurisdictions have interpreted the distinction in the context of childcare expenses. Courts in these countries have dealt with the question in different eras and faced different legislative environments. The differences in time and legislative background not only help explain (...) some of the differences among the courts’ decisions in the three jurisdictions, but also expose the normative foundations of the seemingly technical distinction, demonstrating that the issue of childcare deductions in fact raises a question of baseline-setting. In allowing or disallowing the deduction of childcare, courts actually determine what counts — and more importantly what should count — for income tax purposes in general and deductions in particular. By exposing the baseline issues underlying questions of deduction, the Article demonstrates why it is preferable to explicitly use normative considerations in lieu of the so-called technical distinction between business and personal deductions. The comparative analysis further raises an institutional consideration; as shown, precisely because this is a baseline issue, legislatures, who enjoy a larger doctrinal tool box than courts, can offer greater flexibility as required when a variety of normative considerations should be taken into account. (shrink)