Nash, Bargaining and Evolution

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):1185-1198 (2021)
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Abstract

Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.

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Reply to critics.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1741-1756.

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