Starting from a historical-juridical study of A. M. de Aldama on the origin and evolution of the reference to the teaching of Christian doctrine to pueri contained in the formula of final vows of all priests in the Society of Jesus, the author investigates the meaning of this ministry and its importance today. In an analytic section, the article traces the historical development of the ministry of education in Christian doctrine to pueri and rudes in the experience of Ignatius and (...) his first companions and in the foundational texts. The theme is treated above all in the light of some questions brought up by the historical data of the past and present. In conclusion the author seeks to reply synthetically to the questions, by showing some essential elements in the significance of the ministry of teaching Christian doctrine to children for an apostle in today's world. (shrink)

The recent global outspread of the COVID-19 pandemic has influenced the lives of people across multiple countries including athletes, coaches, and supporting staff. Along with everybody else, coaches found themselves constrained to an at-home self-isolation, which limited their ability to normally engage with their profession and to interact with their athletes. This situation may also have impacted their own psychological well-being. With this study, we explored coaches’ perceptions of stress in relation to their emotion regulation strategies depending upon their gender (...) and competitive level. A sample of 2272 Italian coaches were surveyed during the period of lockdown. Mean values for perceived stress and emotion regulation strategies were compared to normative data of the two instruments as reported in the original studies. Furthermore, two Multivariate analyses of variance were completed to observe the potential differences in the coaches’ emotion regulation strategies and perception of stress. Finally, a blockwise regression analysis was run to assess how coaches’ emotion regulation strategies impacted upon their perception of stress. Both women and men reported higher levels of perceived stress than those reported in the normative data. Similarly, average scores for emotion regulation strategies were significantly different from those reported for normative data, in particular, coaches reported slightly higher use of emotion regulation strategies than participants in the original study. Significant gender-based differences emerged in terms of emotional regulations, with men adopting more suppression than women. No differences by competitive level were found. In terms of perceived stress, male coaches and elite coaches showed to be more in control of the situation than female coaches and non-elite coaches, respectively, while women experienced more negative stress than men. The blockwise regression evidenced how reappraisal resulted to be predictive in helping coaches to reduce their perception of stress, while suppression predicted higher stress perceptions. (shrink)

Children and adolescents are not indifferent to the dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the need to be forced to live in confinement. The change in life to which they have been abruptly subjected forces us to understand the state of their mental health in order to adequately address both their present and future needs. The present study was carried out with the intention of studying the consequences of confinement on anxiety, sleep routines and executive functioning of 1,028 children (...) and adolescents, aged from 6 to 18 years, residing in Spain to; assess if there are differences regarding these consequences in terms of sex and age; how anxiety affects executive functioning in males and females; and to examine the possible correlations between the measured variables. For this purpose, an online questionnaire containing five sections was designed: the first section gathers information on sociodemographic and health data, while the following sections gather information from different standardized scales which measure anxiety, sleep and executive functions, whose items were adapted in order to be completed by parents, and/or legal guardians. The statistical analyzes carried out highlights significant differences in executive functioning between males and females. In turn, in regards to age, greater difficulties were detected in anxiety in the 9 to 12 age group and greater sleep disturbances between 13 and 18 year olds. On the other hand, significant differences were found in intra-sexual executive functioning depending on whether they presented greater or lesser anxiety, with executive functioning being more tendentiously maladjusted in males than in females, revealing a significantly relevant effect size. Positive correlations are obtained between state anxiety and sleep and executive functioning alterations. Finally, through Path Analysis, it is verified that state anxiety is the variable with the greatest weight within the model that would explain the alteration in the executive functioning of the present sample. (shrink)

entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 97-119, 2005.

It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...) ‘how to accept a conditional?’ has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration. First we propose an account of the basic idea of epistemic conditionality, by studying the conditionals validated by epistemic models where iteration is permitted but not constrained by special axioms. Our modeling does not presuppose that epistemic states should be represented by belief sets (we only assume that to each epistemic state corresponds an associated belief state). A full encoding of the basic epistemic conditionals (encompassing all forms of iteration) is presented and a representation result is proved. In the second part of the essay we argue that the notion of change involved in the evaluation of conditionals is suppositional, and that such notion should be distinguished from the notion of updating (modelled by AGM and other methods). We conclude by considering how some of the recent modellings of iterated change fare as methods for iterated supposing. (shrink)

Cet article compare deux livres majeurs : La Symbolique du mal, de Paul Ricœur et La Littérature et le mal, de Georges Bataille. L’articulation de ces deux penseurs que tout semble opposer répond à l’espoir de dégager une forme de compatibilité productive entre eux à travers leur intérêt commun pour le langage du mal. On insistera tout d’abord sur Ricœur : c’est en reconnaissant que le dire de l’expérience du mal passe d’abord nécessairement par un langage symbolique qu’il nous permet (...) de penser l’insistance de Bataille sur la place de la littérature quant au mal. On montrera ensuite que l’affirmation par Bataille d’une lucidité littéraire moderne du mal, tout en permettant de confirmer les thèses de Ricœur au sujet du caractère à la fois historique et langagier de l’expérience du mal, nous conduit aussi à en formuler la principale conséquence : que le langage du mal, marqué du sceau de la créativité poétique, ne peut sans doute pas être tenu pour achevé. On soulignera enfin l’intérêt de cette approche pour interpréter, avec la littérature, les nouvelles expériences du mal aujourd’hui. (shrink)

Gerd Gigerenzer and Thomas Sturm have recently proposed a modest form of what they describe as a normative, ecological and limited naturalism. The basic move in their argument is to infer that certain heuristics we tend to use should be used in the right ecological setting. To address this argument, we first consider the case of a concrete heuristic called Take the Best (TTB). There are at least two variants of the heuristic which we study by making explicit the choice (...) functions they induce, extending these variants of TTB beyond binary choice. We argue that the naturalistic argument can be applied to only one of the two variants of the heuristic; we also argue that the argument for the extension requires paying attention to other “rational” virtues of heuristics aside from efficacy, speed, and frugality. This notwithstanding, we show that there is a way of extending the right variant of TTB to obtain a very well behaved heuristic that could be used to offer a stronger case for the naturalistic argument (in the sense that if this heuristic is used, it is also a heuristic that we should use). The second part of the article considers attempts to extending the naturalistic argument from algorithms dealing with inference to heuristics dealing with choice. Our focus is the so-called Priority Heuristic, which we extend from risk to uncertainty. In this setting, the naturalist argument seems more difficult to formulate, if it remains feasible at all. Normativity seems in this case extrinsic to the heuristic, whose main virtue seems to be its ability to describe actual patterns of choice. But it seems that a new version of the naturalistic argument used with partial success in the case of inference is unavailable to solve the normative problem of whether we should exhibit the patterns of choice that we actually display. (shrink)

The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like (...) FOL + K)in terms of neighborhood frames with constant domains. The first order models we present permit the study of many epistemic modalities recently proposed in computer science as well as the development of adequate models for monadic operators of high probability. Models of this type are either difficult of impossible to build in terms of relational Kripkean semantics [40].We conclude by introducing general first order neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer a general completeness result for the entire family of classical first order modal systems in terms of them, circumventing some well-known problems of propositional and first order neighborhood semantics (mainly the fact that many classical modal logics are incomplete with respect to an unmodified version of either neighborhood or relational frames). We argue that the semantical program that thus arises offers the first complete semantic unification of the family of classical first order modal logics. (shrink)

It is becoming clear that many of today’s management theories are inadequate theoretically and practically to move understanding, scholarship, and practice to where it needs to be for scholars, business leaders, and policy makers to cope with an increasing fraught world. This Special Issue’s focus is on sustainability. Sustainability challenges need to incorporate multidisciplinary interventions and the trans- and interdisciplinary nature of solutions. To actively seek transformation toward sustainability, fundamental and innovative short-term as well as long-term efforts are required in (...) society, economy, technology, and education, including our understanding of human behavior and attitudes toward the management of the environment. This introductory piece presents natural science theories as a promising approach for achieving progress toward transformation for sustainability. (shrink)

Axel Honneth is internationally renowned for being one of the leading political and social philosophers of our time, and is highly regarded for his work on recognition and the struggles for recognition. In this interview, he discusses his work over the past four decades, starting from the rise of his intellectual vocation to his most recent book on the sovereignty of work. The text is a transcript, revised by the author, of the dialogue Honneth had with his interviewers and the (...) audience at the masterclass held on 24 May 2023 at the University of Trento, as part of the first series of lectures “Voices from Contemporary Philosophy”. (shrink)

: In today’s political philosophy framework, it is commonplace to associate Adam Smith with akind of theory that ignores human dispositions and considers only the self-interested perspective ofindividuals. Although this view has been widely supported in different fields – viz Philosophy andEconomy, we consider this a biased interpretation. Using the Cambridge School orientation, we explainthe importance of historical background in reading Smith’s work to argue that Smith’s writings should beinterpreted within the Scottish Enlightenment context. From this contextual approach, it is (...) possible tosustain an integrated reading of Smith’s books The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and An Inquiryinto the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations (WN). This reading leads to a more faithfulinterpretation of Smith’s idea that the agent in society is morally engaged in socio-economic relations.Once this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend a systematic analysis of Smith’s philosophy arguingthat Smith’s philosophy is a holistic system, in what we call a tripartite theory. (shrink)

Consider a rational agent X at certain point of time t. X's epistemic state can be represented in different ways.

Esta tese, de caráter epistemológico, tem como objetivo demonstrar como a relação entre filosofia e psicoterapia contribui com o empreendimento da Análise Existencial frankliana, permitindo vislumbrar uma concepção de ser humano desde uma dimensão existencial. A relação com a filosofia se deu principalmente a partir das obras de Martin Heidegger, em especial Os fundamentos metafísicos da lógica e Seminários de Zollikon. No tocante à bibliografia de Frankl, destaca-se Logoterapia e Análise Existencial. Esta pesquisa teórico-bibliográfica está dividida em três momentos. No (...) primeiro, buscou-se tematizar a relação entre filosofia e psicoterapia, a fim de compreender a Análise Existencial. O segundo capítulo, partindo de uma crítica à epistemologia psiquiátrica moderna, buscou perscrutar a antropologia filosófica proposta por Frankl com vistas ao itinerário de reabilitação da dimensão espiritual. Por fim, buscou-se explicitar o fenômeno da transcendência como constituição essencial do ser humano. (shrink)

Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model.

Team reasoning is the idea that we can think as a ‘we’ and this can solve some coordination dilemmas, such as Hi-Lo. However, team reasoning can only solve the dilemmas it is intended to solve if the conditions for team reasoning warrant the belief that others will also perform team reasoning and these conditions cannot render team reasoning otiose. In this paper, I will supplement the theory of team reasoning by explaining how agency transformation also involves a change in the (...) normative attitude. To do this, I will use the theory of affordances, which is the idea that the environment provides ways to interact with it. I will argue that when a person perceives as a group member, she associates herself and the other members with the group’s mosaic of affordances. This triggers a feeling of joint ownership of the agency. It is the feeling that it is up to us to deal with the situation, so we feel entitled to demand each other to cooperate. It warrants the belief that others are team-reasoners without rendering team reasoning otiose. This means that the agency transformation (from I to we) involves a change in the normative attitude. (shrink)

This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...) of choice, and in a very recent article [BS07] Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura develop Sen's proposal, offering an extension of the classical theory of choice that is capable of dealing with social norms. The first part of this article offers an alternative functional characterization of the extended notion of rationality employed by Bossert and Suzumura in [BS07]. This characterization, unlike the one offered in [BS07], represents a norm-sensitive notion of rationality in terms of a pure functional constraint unmediated by a notion of revealed preference (something that is crucial for the application developed in the second part of this article). This functional characterization is formulated for general domains (as is Bossert and Suzumura's characterization) and is therefore empirically more applicable than usual characterizations of rationality. Interestingly, the functional constraint we propose is a variant of a condition first entertained in [AGM85] by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson in the area of belief change. The second part of this article applies the theory developed in the first part to the realm of belief change. We first point out that social norms can be invoked to concoct counterexamples against some postulates of belief change (like postulate (*7)) that are necessary for belief change to be relational. These examples constitute the epistemological counterpart of Sen's counterexamples against condition α in rational choice (as a matter of fact, Rott has showed in [Rot01] that condition and postulate (*7) are mutually mappable). These examples are variants of examples Rott has recently presented in [Rot04]. One of our main goals in this article consists in applying the theory developed in the first part to develop a theory of norm-inclusive belief change that circumvents the counterexamples. We offer a new axiomatization for belief change and we furnish correspondence results relating constraints of rational choice to postulates of belief change. (shrink)

Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...) that every Popper function is representable in terms of the standard real values of some infinitesimal measure. Our main goal in this article is to study the constraints on (qualitative and probabilistic) change imposed by an extended version of McGee's result. We focus on an extension capable of allowing for iterated changes of view. Such extension, we argue, seems to be needed in almost all considered applications. Since most of the available axiomatizations stipulate (definitionally) important constraints on iterated change, we propose a non-questionbegging framework, Iterative Probability Systems (IPS) and we show that every Popper function can be regarded as a Bayesian IPS. A generalized version of McGee's result is then proved and several of its consequences considered. In particular we note that our proof requires the imposition of Cumulativity, i.e. the principle that a proposition that is accepted at any stage of an iterative process of acceptance will continue to be accepted at any later stage. The plausibility and range of applicability of Cumulativity is then studied. In particular we appeal to a method for defining belief from conditional probability (first proposed in [42] and then slightly modified in [6] and [3]) in order to characterize the notion of qualitative change induced by Cumulative models of probability kinematics. The resulting cumulative notion is then compared with existing axiomatizations of belief change and probabilistic supposition. We also consider applications in the probabilistic accounts of conditionals [1] and [30]. (shrink)

One of the main applications of the logic of theory change is to the epistemic analysis of conditionals via the so-called Ramsey test. In the first part of the present note this test is studied in the “limiting case” where the theory being revised is inconsistent, and it is shown that this case manifests an intrinsic incompatibility between the Ramsey test and the AGM postulate of “success”. The paper then analyses the use of the postulate of success, and a weakening (...) of it, generating axioms of conditional logic via the test, and it is shown that for certain purposes both success and weak success are quite superfluous. This suggests the proposal of abandoning both success and weak success entirely, thus permitting retention of the postulate of “preservation” discarded by Gärdenfors. (shrink)

We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure prominently among the basic intuitions in (...) the works of, among others, Quine and Ullian (1978), Levi (1980, 1991), Harman (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), formal accounts of belief change (AGM, KM – see Gärdenfors (1988); Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991)) have abandoned both principles (see Rott (2000)). We argue for the principles and we show how to construct a contraction operation, which obeys both. An axiom system is proposed. We also prove that the decision-theoretic notion of contraction can be completely characterized in terms of the given axioms. Proving this type of completeness result is a well-known open problem in the field, whose solution requires employing both decision-theoretical techniques and logical methods recently used in belief change. (shrink)

Ouvrages Cathiard Marie-Agnès & Rebière Catherine, Lecture labiale pour l’adulte devenu sourd, 1re éd., Paris, De Boeck Supérieur, 2020, 192 p. Cathiard Marie-Agnès, Vivre avec des prothèses auditives ou des implants cochléaires, éditeur Books On Demand, 2022, 192 p. Directions d’ouvrages collectifs – Ouvrages en collaboration Cathiard Marie-Agnès & Pajon Patrick, Les imaginaires du cerveau, Fernelmont, Intercommunications & Éditions Modulaires Européennes, coll. « Transversales philosophique...

How does Creating Shared Value (CSV) differ from Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? How can universities teach CSV to students? The aim of this study is to present the case of the Shared Value Living Lab (SVLL) recently carried out at the University of Torino (UniTo), a large Italian public university. Specifically, the paper analyzes CSV related arguments such as building ecosystems and collective impact, and by questioning the role of experiential learning in adult education. The transformative learning theory of Mezirow (...) (2000) assists the discussion and interpretation of the results derived from this research from an intrinsic perspective, as the researchers “interacted” with the participants. The risks and opportunities of teaching CSV concepts are presented side by side with the strengths and weaknesses of innovative learning tools that have already been adopted by universities and business schools. The study contributes to the current literature by showing how students can reframe the problem of CSV, escaping from ordinary meaning schemes. The interaction between the researchers, the students, and the local actors is atypical of a generalist public university. It is also a good example of a triple helix collaboration that can be implemented in other areas of education research. (shrink)

S. Jakowski introduced the discussive prepositional calculus D 2as a basis for a logic which could be used as underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories (see, for example, N. C. A. da Costa and L. Dubikajtis, On Jakowski's discussive logic, in Non-Classical Logic, Model Theory and Computability, A. I. Arruda, N. C. A da Costa and R. Chuaqui edts., North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977, 37–56). D 2has afterwards been extended to a first-order predicate calculus and to a higher-order logic (...) (cf. the quoted paper). In this paper we present a natural version of D 2, in the sense of Jakowski and Gentzen; as a consequence, we suggest a new formulation of the discussive predicate calculus (with equality). A semantics for the new calculus is also presented. (shrink)

The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like (...) FOL + K)in terms of neighborhood frames with constant domains. The first order models we present permit the study of many epistemic modalities recently proposed in computer science as well as the development of adequate models for monadic operators of high probability. Models of this type are either difficult of impossible to build in terms of relational Kripkean semantics [40].We conclude by introducing general first order neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer a general completeness result for the entire family of classical first order modal systems in terms of them, circumventing some well-known problems of propositional and first order neighborhood semantics (mainly the fact that many classical modal logics are incomplete with respect to an unmodified version of either neighborhood or relational frames). We argue that the semantical program that thus arises offers the first complete semantic unification of the family of classical first order modal logics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Belief Revision in Latin America: The Legacy of Carlos Alchourrón The AGM Approach The Logic of Theory Change and Epistemology What Is an Epistemic State? Departures from AGM References.

Este trabalho constitui um recorte de um projeto de Iniciação Científica do Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Sudeste de Minas Gerais, Campus Santos Dumont (IF Sudeste MG-Santos Dumont), realizado por alunos do curso de graduação em Licenciatura em Matemática. Por meio do levantamento bibliográfico, buscou-se responder à pergunta: quais os caminhos percorridos pelas pesquisas em educação matemática crítica no Brasil nos últimos 22 anos? Para tal, consideramos exclusivamente artigos, publicados em periódicos da área de Educação Matemática de (...) circulação nacional e internacional, complementando a busca com o acesso ao Portal de Periódicos CAPES. Com isso, realizamos a revisão sistemática da literatura, classificando os trabalhos em categorias temáticas que, além de organizá-los, serve de base para a síntese crítica dos trabalhos. Além disso, apontam como resultados não só as tendências em certos temas de pesquisa, mas também lacunas. (shrink)

O maniqueísmo fundamenta-se na afirma9áo de dois principios ontológicos oríginantes do mundo: o Bem ou a Luz, representado no sol, e o Mal ou as Trevas, personificado na matéria. Desse dualismo ontológico, deriva a idéia de que o homem náo é responsável pelo mal que pratica, mas esse é culpa de sua natureza má ou o mal está inerente á sua natureza corpórea. Daí que, a rigor, náo existe mal moral no maniqueísmo, mas apenas mal natural. Entretanto, paradoxalmente, esse fala (...) de uma Moral do dever, através da qual a parte boa do homem (a alma) deve lutar para libertar-se das amarras da matéría (o corpo), mediante uma rigorosa vida ascética, concretizada na observáncia dos trés mandamentos chamados de trés selos: o selo da boca, das máos e dos seios. (shrink)

It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [27]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gardenfors showed in [13] that believing 'If A then B' cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A.

Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question 'how to accept a conditional?' has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration.

The "Ellsberg phenomenon" has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [5] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and present empirical work suggesting an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg's own diagnosis.

In a series of recent articles Angelika Kratzer has argued that the standard account of modality along Kripkean lines is inadequate in order to represent context-dependent modals. In particular she argues that the standard account is unable to deliver a non-trivial account of modality capable of overcoming inconsistencies of the underlying conversational background.

forthcoming in Studies on Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford.

Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage. Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion. The (...) ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky. We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a experiment that confirms our hypothesis. (shrink)

In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) Hertwig et al. draw a distinction between decisions from experience and decisions from description. In a decision from experience an agent does not have a summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. A career choice, deciding whether to back up a computer hard drive, cross a busy street, etc., are typical examples of decisions from experience. In such decisions agents can rely only of their encounters with the corresponding prospects. By contrast, an (...) agent furnished with information sources such as drug-package inserts or mutual-fund brochures—all of which describe risky prospects—will often make decisions from description. In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) it is shown (empirically) that decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. Most of these results (summarized and analyzed in (Hertwig, 2009)) are concerned with the role of risk in decision making. This article presents some preliminary results concerning the role of uncertainty in decision-making. We focus on Ellsberg’s two-color problem and consider a chance setup based on double sampling. We report empirical results which indicate that decisions from description where subjects select between a clear urn, the chance setup based on double sampling and Ellsberg’s vague urn, are such that subjects perceive the chance setup at least as an intermediate option between clear and vague choices (and there is evidence indicating that the double sampling chance setup is seen as operationally indistinguishable from the vague urn). We then suggest how the iterated chance setup can be used in order to study decisions from experience in the case of uncertainty. (shrink)

The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...) do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions. (shrink)

One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.

Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson published in 1985 a seminal article on belief change in the Journal of Symbolic Logic. Researchers from various disciplines, from computer science to mathematical economics to philosophical logic, have continued the work first presented in this seminal paper during the last two decades. This paper explores some salient foundational trends that interpret the act of changing view as a decision. We will argue that some of these foundational trends are already present, although only (...) tacitly, in the original article by the AGM trio. Other accounts decidedly depart from the view of contraction and revision presented in this seminal paper. I shall survey various types of theories that progressively depart form the axiomatic treatment defended by AGM. First, I consider theories where rational agents are considered as maximizers as opposed to optimizers ). Second, I consider which feasible set to use in contraction understood as a cognitive decision. This leads to rethink the very notion of what minimal change in contraction is. I shall conclude with some philosophical reflections concerning the sort of epistemological voluntarism that is tacit in seeing change in view as a rational choice. Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors y David Makinson publicaron en 1985 un artículo seminal sobre cambio de creencias en Journal of Symbolic Logic. Investigadores de varias disciplinas, desde la ciencia de la computación hasta la economía matemática y la lógica filosófica, han continuado en las dos últimas décadas esta línea de investigación. Este trabajo explora algunos aspectos fundacionalmente salientes que interpretan el acto de cambio de vista como una decisión. Argumentaremos que algunos de esos aspectos fundacionales ya estaban presentes, aunque solo tácitamente, en el artículo original del trío AGM. Otros abordajes parten decididamente de la contracción y revisión tal como fueran presentadas en el trabajo seminal. Inspeccionaré varios tipos de teorías que progresivamente parten del tratamiento axiomático defendido por AGM. Primero, considero teorías donde los agentes racionales aparecen como maximizadres opuestos a los optimiadores ). Segundo, me pregunto cuál conjunto derrotable debe usarse en una contracción entendida como una decisión cognitiva, lo cual lleva a repensar la importante cuestión de en qué consiste la noción de cambio mínimo en la contracción. Concluiré con algunas reflexiones filosóficas acerca de la suerte de voluntarismo epistemológico que está tácito en la concepción del cambio como una opción racional. (shrink)

Normative accounts in terms of similarity can be deployed in order to provide semantics for systems of context-free default rules and other sophisticated conditionals. In contrast, procedural accounts of decision in terms of similarity (Rubinstein 1997) are hard to reconcile with the normative rules of rationality used in decision-making, even when suitably weakened.

L'articolo propone un'analisi del termine moralismo. Tralasciandone l'accezione comune e quella storiografica, la riflessione qui sviluppata si rivolge a una concezione politica del moralismo, perlomeno nella misura in cui la politica si accompagna a una normativa morale. Ma non si tratta di discorso meramente normativo, poiché l'etica e l'etica della politica devono essere in realtÀ applicate a un sistema non teorico, bensě empirico, alla «realtÀ sociale strutturata». La situazione politica italiana attuale č appunto il terreno sul quale si esercita la (...) critica proposta nel contributo. (shrink)