58 found
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  1.  90
    Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2016 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    In Norms in the Wild, distinguished philosopher Cristina Bicchieri argues that when it comes to human behavior, social scientists place too much stress on rational deliberation. In fact, she says, many choices occur without much deliberation at all. Two people passing in a corridor automatically negotiate their shared space; cars at an intersection obey traffic signals; we choose clothing based on our instincts for what is considered appropriate. Bicchieri's theory of social norms accounts for these automatic components of coordination, where (...)
  2.  70
    The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most (...)
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  3. On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):3-22.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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  4.  93
    Shrieking sirens: Schemata, scripts, and social norms. How change occurs.Cristina Bicchieri & Peter McNally - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):23-53.
    :This essay investigates the relationships among scripts, schemata, and social norms. The authors examine how social norms are triggered by particular schemata and are grounded in scripts. Just as schemata are embedded in a network, so too are social norms, and they can be primed through spreading activation. Moreover, the expectations that allow a social norm’s existence are inherently grounded in particular scripts and schemata. Using interventions that have targeted gender norms, open defecation, female genital cutting, and other collective issues (...)
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  5. (1 other version)Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon - 2011
  6.  22
    Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
  7. (1 other version)Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
     
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  8.  62
    Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms.Cristina Bicchieri & Alex Chavez - unknown
    What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation—that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices (...)
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  9. Self-serving biases and public justifications in trust games.Cristina Bicchieri & Hugo Mercier - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):909-922.
    Often, when several norms are present and may be in conflict, individuals will display a self-serving bias, privileging the norm that best serves their interests. Xiao and Bicchieri (J Econ Psychol 31(3):456–470, 2010) tested the effects of inequality on reciprocating behavior in trust games and showed that—when inequality increases—reciprocity loses its appeal. They hypothesized that self-serving biases in choosing to privilege a particular social norm occur when the choice of that norm is publicly justifiable as reasonable, even if not optimal (...)
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  10. Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not.Cristina Bicchieri, Erte Xiao & Ryan Muldoon - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  11. Strategic behavior and counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  12.  81
    Norm manipulation, Norm evasion: Experimental evidence.Cristina Bicchieri & Alex K. Chavez - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):175-198.
    Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer (...)
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  13. Norms of cooperation.Cristina Bicchieri - 1990 - Ethics 100 (4):838-861.
  14.  23
    The Dynamics of Norms.Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, (...)
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  15.  78
    Computer-mediated communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: An experimental analysis.Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  16.  86
    Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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  17.  27
    Trust among Strangers.Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy & Gil Tolle† - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319.
    The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a “trust and reciprocate” norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.
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  18.  75
    The fragility of fairness: An experimental investigation on the conditional status of pro-social norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):229-248.
  19. Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior.Cristina Bicchieri - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  20.  52
    Backward Induction without Common Knowledge.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
    A large class of games is that of non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information. When the length of these games is finite, the method used to reach a solution is that of a backward induction. Working from the terminal nodes, dominated strategies are successively deleted and what remains is a unique equilibrium. Game theorists have generally assumed that the informational requirement needed to solve these games is that the players have common knowledge of rationality. This assumption, however, has given (...)
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  21.  48
    A structured approach to a diagnostic of collective practices.Cristina Bicchieri, Jan W. Lindemans & Ting Jiang - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:121138.
    “How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question but also an empirical one. Many organizations have implemented programs to abandon harmful social norms. These programs are standardly monitored and evaluated with a set of empirical tools. While monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of changes in objective outcomes and behaviors is well developed, we will argue that M&E of changes in the wide range of beliefs and preferences important to social norms is still problematic. In this paper, we first present (...)
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  22.  44
    Methodological rules as conventions.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (4):477-495.
  23.  72
    Norms, conventions, and the power of expectations.Cristina Bicchieri - 2014 - In Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi (eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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  24.  82
    Trust among strangers.Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy & and Gil Tolle - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):286-319.
    The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a "trust and reciprocate" norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.
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  25.  68
    The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games.Cristina Bicchieri, Azi Lev-on & Alex Chavez - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):125-147.
    Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that first-movers' expectations of second-movers' reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.
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  26.  55
    Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction.Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.) - 1992 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of (...)
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  27.  52
    An embarrassment of riches : modeling social preferences in ultimatum games.Cristina Bicchieri & Jiji Zhang - unknown
    Experimental results in Ultimatum, Trust and Social Dilemma games have been interpreted as showing that individuals are, by and large, not driven by selfish motives. But we do not need experiments to know that. In our view, what the experiments show is that the typical economic auxiliary hypothesis of non-tuism should not be generalized to other contexts. Indeed, we know that when the experimental situation is framed as a market interaction, participants will be more inclined to keep more money, share (...)
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  28.  78
    Symmetry arguments for cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma.Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The logic of strategy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 175.
  29.  74
    Rationality and game theory.Cristina Bicchieri - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 182--205.
    Bicchieri's topic is the modeling of interaction between decision makers in situations in which the outcome of the interaction depends on what the parties jointly do. Examples include chess, firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, jury members deciding on a verdict, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships. Rationality assumptions are a basic ingredient of game theory, but though rational choice might be unproblematic in normative decision theory, it becomes problematic in (...)
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  30. Counterfactuals, Belief Changes, and Equilibrium Refinements.Cristina Bicchieri - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):21-52.
    It is usually assumed in game theory that agents who interact strategically with each other are rational, know the strategies open to other agents as well as their payoffs and, moreover, have common knowledge of all the above. In some games, that much information is sufficient for the players to identify a "solution" and play it. The most commonly adopted solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is defined a combination of strategies, one for each player, such (...)
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  31.  70
    Common reasoning about admissibility.Cristina Bicchieri & Oliver Schulte - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):299 - 325.
    We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common (...)
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  32.  18
    Knowledge-dependent games: backward induction.Cristina Bicchieri - 1992 - In Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 327--343.
  33. Rationality and predictability in economics.Cristina Bicchieri - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):501-513.
  34.  48
    I’m so angry I could help you: Moral outrage as a driver of victim compensation.Erik W. Thulin & Cristina Bicchieri - 2016 - Social Philosophy and Policy 32 (2):146-160.
    :Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger is (...)
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  35.  50
    Backwards Forwards Induction.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - unknown
    Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Backwards Forwards Induction.
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  36.  66
    Forward Induction.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - unknown
    Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Forward Induction.
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  37. Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others.Erte Xiao & Cristina Bicchieri - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):49-63.
    Social cooperation often relies on individuals’ spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested that an individual’s tendency toward norm conformity is affected by empirical information (i.e., what others did or would do in a similar situation) as well as by normative information (i.e., what others think one ought to do). Yet little is known about whether people have an intrinsic desire to (...)
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  38. Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information.Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
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  39. Corruption, shared expectations, and social dilemmas.Cristina Bicchieri, Raj Patel & Leena Koni Hoffmann - 2023 - In Matthew Lindauer, James R. Beebe & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Advances in Experimental Political Philosophy. New York: Bloomsbury.
     
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  40.  10
    Game Theory: Nash Equilibrium.Cristina Bicchieri - 2003 - In Luciano Floridi (ed.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of computing and information. Blackwell. pp. 289–304.
    The prelims comprise: Strategic Interaction Nash Equilibrium Normal‐form Refinements Games in Extensive Form Extensive‐form Refinements Selection by Evolution Notes.
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  41. Knowing and supposing in.Cristina Bicchieri - unknown
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a su cient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, (...)
     
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  42. Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The logic of strategy. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  43.  27
    Book Review:Le Liberalisme Moderne: Analyse d'une Raison Economique. Serge-Christophe Kolm; Le Contrat Social Liberal: Philosophie et Pratique du Liberalisme. Serge-Christophe Kolm.Cristina Bicchieri - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):185-190.
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  44. Le regole metodologiche come convenzioni.Cristina Bicchieri - 1986 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 4 (3/4):89-100.
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  45.  18
    Norm-Supporting Emotions: From Villages to Complex Societies.Cristina Bicchieri & Erik Thulin - 2017 - In Thomas Christiano, Ingrid Creppell & Jack Knight (eds.), Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions: Reflections on Russell Hardin. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 327-349.
    How do socially imposed rules develop into internalized pro-social codes? In the article “From Bodo Ethics to Distributive Justice”, Russell Hardin discusses one of the central themes of his work: How we “export” social order from a small, insular community to a large, anonymous society. In Bodo’s small village, everyone knows everyone else, interactions are face-to-face, and people live relatively isolated from other communities. In this context, the social norms developed by the community are easily enforceable. But what about large, (...)
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  46.  67
    Preface.Cristina Bicchieri & Jason McKenzie Alexander - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):559-560.
  47.  42
    Preface.Cristina Bicchieri & Jason McKenzie Alexander - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):487-488.
  48.  41
    Rationality and indeterminacy.Cristina Bicchieri - 2009 - In Don Ross & Harold Kincaid (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 159.
    Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very search for better versions of rationality, as well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can be seen as answers to the indeterminacy that has accompanied game theory through its history. More recently, the experimental approach to game theory has attempted a more radical solution: by directly generating a stream of behavioral observations, one hopes that behavioral hypotheses will be sharper, (...)
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  49.  6
    Ragioni per credere, ragioni per fare: convenzioni e vincoli nel metodo scientifico.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Milano: Feltrinelli Editore.
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  50. Social Preferences: Norms, Beliefs and Rationality.Cristina Bicchieri - 2008 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 26 (3).
     
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