Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

People often struggle with Bayesian reasoning. However, research showed that people’s performance (and rationality) can be supported by the way of representing the statistical information. First, research showed that using natural frequencies instead of probabilities as format of statistical information increases people’s performance in Bayesian situations thoroughly. Second, research also yielded that people’s performance increases through using visualization. We build our paper on existing research in this field. The main aim is to analyse people’s strategies in Bayesian situations that are (...) still erroneous although statistical information is represented by natural frequencies and visualizations. In particular, we compare two pairs of visualization with similar numerical information (tree diagram vs. unit square and double-tree diagram vs. 2x2-table) concerning their impact on people’s erroneous strategies in Bayesian situations. For this aim, we conducted an experiment with 540 university students. The students were randomly assigned to four conditions that are defined by the four different visualizations of statistical information. The students were asked to indicate a fraction as response in four Bayesian situations. We documented the numerator and the denominator of the students’ responses representing a basic set and a subset in a Bayesian situation. Our results show that people’s erroneous strategies are highly dependent on the visualization. A central finding is that the visualization’s characteristic of making the nested-sets structure of a Bayesian situation transparent has a facilitating effect on people’s Bayesian reasoning. For example, compared to the unit square, a tree diagram does not explicitly visualize the set-subset relations that are relevant in a Bayesian situation. Accordingly, compared to a unit square, a tree diagram partly hinders people to find the correct denominator in a Bayesian situation, and, in particular, triggers to select a wrong numerator. By analyzing people’s erroneous strategies in Bayesian situations, we contribute to investigating approaches to facilitate Bayesian reasoning and to further develop the teaching of Bayesian reasoning. (shrink)

Der Ausdruck ›Bewusstsein‹ hat viele Bedeutungen. Zu den wichtigen Bedeutungsfacetten gehören: wach sein, auf etwas aufmerksam sein, etwas mit Absicht tun, sich seiner selbst bewusst sein, eine Empfindung verspüren. Daraus ergibt sich folgende Unterteilung :Vigilanzbewusstsein Kognitives Bewusstsein Handlungsbewusstsein Selbstbewusstsein Phänomenales Bewusstsein Menschen verfügen über alle sechs Arten Bewusstsein. Es ist eine offene Frage, ob dies auch auf Tiere zutrifft. Bei Säugern und Vögeln scheint es nahe zu liegen, dass sie über Bewusstsein im Sinne von, und verfügen. Offen bleibt, ob bestimmte (...) Vögel oder Säugetiere etwas mit Absicht tun können und ob sie über Selbstbewusstsein im Sinne eines Zugangs zu den eignen psychischen Zuständen verfügen. Es gibt bei Menschenaffen, Walen oder Rabenvögeln deutliche Hinweise darauf, dass sie in der Kommunikation bestimmte Absichten mitteilen wollen und möchten, dass die Rezipienten diese Absichten richtig verstehen. Bei Delfinen finden sich Hinweise aus dem Bereich der Forschung zur ›Metakognition‹, die besagen, dass bestimmte Tiere Zugang zu ihren psychi­schen Zuständen haben und dies in der Entscheidungsfindung miteinbeziehen. Verlässt man diese beiden Tierklassen wird einiges unklar. Bei Fischen oder Insekten etwa stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern sie überhaupt über einen Schlaf-Wach-Zyklus verfügen. Man kann durchaus die Auffassung vertreten, dass die Unterscheidung von Schlaf- und Wachphasen eine Voraussetzung dafür ist, bei einem Tier überhaupt von Bewusstsein zu sprechen, denn die Fähigkeit aufzuwachen scheint die basalste Form von Bewusstsein zu sein. (shrink)

It is still a widespread assumption that metaphysics and ontology deal with roughly the same questions. They are supposed to be concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and to give an account of the meaning of 'existence' or 'being' in line with the broadest possible metaphysical assumptions. Against this, Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything. He argues that the concept of existence (...) is incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view. In the context of recent debates surrounding new realism and speculative realism, Gabriel also develops the outlines of a realist epistemological pluralism. His idea here is that there are different forms of knowledge that correspond to the plurality of fields of sense that must be acknowledged in order to avoid the trap of metaphysics. (shrink)

A provocative argument that environmental thinking would be better off if it dropped the concept of “nature” altogether and spoke instead of the built environment. -/- Environmentalism, in theory and practice, is concerned with protecting nature. But if we have now reached “the end of nature,” as Bill McKibben and other environmental thinkers have declared, what is there left to protect? In Thinking like a Mall, Steven Vogel argues that environmental thinking would be better off if it dropped the (...) concept of “nature” altogether and spoke instead of the “environment”—that is, the world that actually surrounds us, which is always a built world, the only one that we inhabit. We need to think not so much like a mountain (as Aldo Leopold urged) as like a mall. Shopping malls, too, are part of the environment and deserve as much serious consideration from environmental thinkers as do mountains. -/- Vogel argues provocatively that environmental philosophy, in its ethics, should no longer draw a distinction between the natural and the artificial and, in its politics, should abandon the idea that something beyond human practices (such as “nature”) can serve as a standard determining what those practices ought to be. The appeal to nature distinct from the built environment, he contends, may be not merely unhelpful to environmental thinking but in itself harmful to that thinking. The question for environmental philosophy is not “how can we save nature?” but rather “what environment should we inhabit, and what practices should we engage in to help build it?”. (shrink)

Where do we come from? Are we merely a cluster of elementary particles in a gigantic world receptacle? And what does it all mean? In this highly original new book, the philosopher Markus Gabriel challenges our notion of what exists and what it means to exist. He questions the idea that there is a world that encompasses everything like a container life, the universe, and everything else. This all-inclusive being does not exist and cannot exist. For the world itself (...) is not found in the world. And even when we think about the world, the world about which we think is obviously not identical with the world in which we think. For, as we are thinking about the world, this is only a very small event in the world. Besides this, there are still innumerable other objects and events: rain showers, toothaches and the World Cup. Drawing on the recent history of philosophy, Gabriel asserts that the world cannot exist at all, because it is not found in the world. Yet with the exception of the world, everything else exists; even unicorns on the far side of the moon wearing police uniforms. Revelling in witty thought experiments, word play, and the courage of provocation, Markus Gabriel demonstrates the necessity of a questioning mind and the role that humour can play in coming to terms with the abyss of human existence. (shrink)

This paper combines two ideas: (1) That the Lewisian best system analysis of lawhood (BSA) can cope with laws that have exceptions (cf. Braddon-Mitchell in Noûs 35(2):260–277, 2001; Schrenk in The metaphysics of ceteris paribus laws. Ontos, Frankfurt, 2007). (2) That a BSA can be executed not only on the mosaic of perfectly natural properties but also on any set of special science properties (cf., inter alia, Schrenk 2007, Selected papers contributed to the sections of GAP.6, 6th international congress of (...) the society for analytical philosophy. Mentis, Paderborn/Münster, 2008; Cohen and Callender in Philos Stud 145:1–34, 2009, Erkenntnis 73:427–447, 2010). Bringing together (1) and (2) results in an analysis of special science ceteris paribus laws. (shrink)

English summary: The focus of the contributions in this volume is on the relationships of the young Kierkegaard with the philosophy in Berlin and also with Pietism whose influence expresses itself mainly in his later edifying writings. Berlin and Halle are important reference points for Kierkegaard's roots of thinking which can be characterized as passion and inwardness. Texts about love from all periods of his work together with musical and visual reflections on Kierkegaard combine both aspects and provide an aesthetic (...) comment to the scholarly contributions in this volume. These contributions are the results of two German-Danish conferences in the Kierkegaard Year 2013 in Berlin and Halle, which were funded by the Danish Carlsberg Fond and the Centre for Theology and Theological Education of the Church of Denmark and were organized by the theological faculties in Berlin and Halle. German description: Zentral fur diesen spannenden Aufsatzband sind Beziehungen des jungen Kierkegaard zur Berliner Philosophie sowie sein Verhaltnis zum Pietismus in den erbaulichen Schriften vor allem des spaten Kierkegaard. Berlin und Halle sind wichtige Bezugspunkte fur die Wurzeln des Kierkegaardschen Denkens, die man gut mit den begriffen 'Leidenschaft' und 'Innerlichkeit' charakterisieren kann. Texte uber die Liebe aus allen Phasen des Kierkegaardschen Werkes mit musikalischen und visuellen Reflexionen zu Kierkegaard verbinden die beiden Aspekte miteinander und fungieren als ein asthetischer Kommentar zu den wissenschaftlichen Beitragen. Die Beitrage des Bandes gehen auf zwei deutsch-danische Tagungen im Kierkegaardjahr 2013 in Berlin und Halle zuruck, die vom danischen Carlsbergfond und dem Theologisch-Padagogischen Zentrum der danischen Volkskirche finanziert wurden und in Zusammenarbeit mit den theologischen Fakultaten in Berlin und Halle stattfanden. Mit Beitrager von Svend Andersen, Philipp David, Tim Hagemann, Albrecht Haizmann, Eberhard Harbsmeier, Anders Kingo, Per Ohrgaard, Markus Pohlmeyer, Joachim Ringleben, Christian Senkel und Traugott Vogel. (shrink)

The political scientist and former Bavarian Minister of Culture Hans Maier has created a historically profound, theologically educated, literarily and musically highly sensitive, politically mature body of work, with which he has inscribed himself in the (intellectual) history of the Federal Republic. This book is the first to contain contributions by renowned scholars and politicians on the rich work and impact of the Catholic scholar and politician Hans Maier. It thematises and appreciates in detail his view of German history and (...) the traditions of political thought, his critique of political language, political theology, totalitarianism and political religions, but also his contributions on Catholicism and modernity, his writings on literature and music, and finally his influence as an academic teacher, public intellectual and politician. With contributions by Udo Bermbach, Thomas Brose, Ahmet Cavuldak, Horst Dreier, Hermann-Josef Große Kracht, Jens Hacke, Oliver Hidalgo, Hans Günter Hockerts, Patrick Horst, Horst Möller, Heinrich Oberreuter, Henning Ottmann, Mark Edward Ruff, Hans Otto Seitschek, Michael Stolleis, Bernhard Vogel, Peter Graf von Kielmansegg, Theo Waigel and Markus Zimmermann. (shrink)

Contextualism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims (involving e.g. predicates of personal taste or epistemic modals) depends on the context of utterance. Relativism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of assessment. Both views make concrete, empirically testable predictions about how such claims are used by ordinary English language speakers. This chapter surveys some of the recent empirical literature on the topic and presents four new experiments (total N=724). Consistent with contextualism (...) and inconsistent with relativism, the results suggest that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of utterance, not the context of assessment. (shrink)

Since causal processes can be prevented and interfered with, law-governed causation is a challenge for necessitarian theories of laws of nature. To show that there is a problematic friction between necessity and interference, I focus on David Armstrong's theory; with one proviso, his lawmaker, nomological necessity, is supposed to be instantiated as the causation of the law's second relatum whenever its first relatum is instantiated. His proviso is supposed to handle interference cases, but fails to do so. In order to (...) be able to handle interferences, any theory which utilizes a kind of necessitation as lawmaker has to downgrade what it treats as necessity to something more akin to (Newtonian) forces. (shrink)

Hume glaubte, die Kausalverknüpfung sei eine „secret connection“, also eine Verknüpfung, die mindestens unerkennbar, wenn nicht sogar inexis- tent ist. Einige moderne Gegner Humes halten dem entgegen, dass apos- teriorisch entdeckte, metaphysische Notwendigkeit, wie wir sie bei- spielsweise von Kripke und Putnam kennen, diejenige objektiv-reale Verknüpfung in der Welt ist, die auch die Rolle einer kausalen Verknüp- fung in der Welt spielen kann. Ich hinterfrage diese anti-Hume’sche Identifizierung kausaler mit me- taphysischer Notwendigkeit, zeige aber auch einen anderen Weg auf, kausale (...) Kräfte zu postulieren: Wenn unsere willentlichen Handlungen auf Widerstände in der Welt stoßen, haben wir (direkten) Beobachtungszu- gang zu einer Verknüpfung in der Welt, die mindestens einen essentiellen Teil kausaler Kraft ausmacht. (shrink)

In the paper the fragment transmitted by Ausonius and ascribed to Quintus Cicero on the signs of the zodiac is analysed in terms of language, transmission history and intertextuality. As a result, authorship by Q. Cicero must be regarded with great scepticism.

Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But actions (...) are neither mental nor physical events. They are realized by physical events, but they are not type-identical with them. This gives us non-reductive physicalism without downward causation. The tenability of this view has been questioned. Jaegwon Kim, in particular, has argued that non-reductive physicalism is committed to downward causation. Appealing to the nature of actions, I will argue that this commitment can be avoided. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are so called ceteris paribus laws, i.e., roughly speaking, laws with exceptions. Yet, the ceteris paribus clause of these laws is problematic. Amongst the more infamous difficulties is the danger that 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, ceteris paribus' may state no more than a tautology: 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, unless not'. One of the major attempts to avoid this problem (and others concerning (...) ceteris paribus laws) is to claim that the subject matter of laws are ascriptions of dispositions, powers, capacities etc., and not the regular behaviour we find in nature. That we do not know whether the cetera are paria in a specific situation does not matter to the dispositionalist because the objects have the disposition regardless of the circumstances. The defence of the latter claim is that dispositions can be instantiated without being manifested. Hence, the laws that ascribe dispositions are strict and it looks as if they do not face the above mentioned problems of ceteris paribus laws. In this essay I attempt to show that these assumptions are wrong. I hope to illustrate that not only does the ceteris paribus clause reoccur inside the dispositions, moreover, there are laws—laws about non-fundamental entities with instable dispositions—which bear a ceteris paribus clause that cannot be hidden in a disposition. (shrink)

Though ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism is apparently based on disagreement, this aspect of skepticism has been widely neglected in contemporary discussion on skepticism. The paper provides a rational reconstruction of the skeptical argument from disagreement that can be found in the books of Sextus Empiricus. It is argued that this argument forms a genuine skeptical paradox that has no fully satisfactory resolution. All attempts to resolve it make knowledge or justified belief either intuitively too easy or impossible.

In this highly original book, Markus Gabriel presents 'Neo-Existentialism', an anti-naturalist view that holds that human mindedness consists in an open-ended proliferation of mentalistic vocabularies. Challenged by Charles Taylor, Andrea Kern and Jocelyn Benoist, Gabriel deftly refutes naturalism's metaphysical claim to epistemic exclusiveness.

According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How (...) much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

Frames, i.e., recursive attribute-value structures, are a general format for the decomposition of lexical concepts. Attributes assign unique values to objects and thus describe functional relations. Concepts can be classified into four groups: sortal, individual, relational and functional concepts. The classification is reflected by different grammatical roles of the corresponding nouns. The paper aims at a cognitively adequate decomposition, particularly, of sortal concepts by means of frames. Using typed feature structures, an explicit formalism for the characterization of cognitive frames is (...) developed. The frame model can be extended to account for typicality effects. Applying the paradigm of object-related neural synchronization, furthermore, a biologically motivated model for the cortical implementation of frames is developed. Cortically distributed synchronization patterns may be regarded as the fingerprints of concepts. (shrink)

Behind the images, the actual logical work iscarried out by reasoning-specific operations on these spatial layout models.

Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively analyse dispositional predicates. -/- In the light of these anti-Humean successes, and in combination with ideas surrounding metaphysical necessity put forward by Kripke and Putnam, some dispositionalists felt encouraged to propose a strong anti-Humean view under the name of “Dispositional Essentialism”. -/- In this paper, I show that, ironically, the (...) counterexamples dispositionalists have used against the Humean reductive analysis of dispositional predicates also prove to be problems for a strong form of dispositional essentialism that assimilates dispositionality and metaphysical necessity. -/- Help comes from an unlike ally—Carnapian reductions sentences—but the alliance is not unproblematic. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of a proprioceptive art in addition to, for example, visual or auditory arts, where aspects of some martial arts will serve as examples of that art form. My argument is inspired by a thought of Ted Shawn’s, one of the pioneers of American modern dance: "Dance is the only art wherein we ourselves are the stuff in which it is made.” In a first step, I point out that in some practices of martial arts (in (...) the paper I will introduce “hyongs” & “katas”), we are, too, the stuff these performances are made of. Second, I show that we, as martial arts practitioners, are not in the first place visual or auditorial observers (as common in painting or music or ballet) but introspective, proprioceptive perceivers of our bodies and their movements. (As a corollary we get that we are, in such a case, necessarily our exclusive audience.) In an third crucial step, I show that the martial arts practices referred to, hyongs & katas, and especially the proprioceptive aspects thereof, can indeed count as art. Thus, proprioceptive art is possible because some practices of some martial arts are actual existing examples of that art form. (shrink)

In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore this concept through the lens of judgment and decision making in sports (JDMS). Embodied cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts “embodiment” and “cognition” lack consensus, and consequently the degree of “radicalism” is not universally defined, either. In this paper (...) we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective, but from two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up a competition between approaches, but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. (2012) and (2) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS. (shrink)

Eating disorders are evolutionarily novel conditions that lead to some of the highest mortality rates of all psychiatric disorders. Several evolutionary hypotheses have been proposed for eating disorders, but only the intrasexual competition hypothesis is extensively supported by evidence. We present the mismatch hypothesis as a necessary extension to the current theoretical framework of eating disorders. This hypothesis explains the evolutionarily novel adaptive metaproblem that has arisen when mating motives and readily available food rewards conflict with one another. This situation (...) is exacerbated in contemporary environments characterized by sedentary lifestyles, caloric surplus and the ubiquity of social comparisons that take place via social media. Our psychoneuroimmunological model connects ultimate-level causation with proximate mechanisms by showing how the adaptive metaproblem between mating motives and food rewards leads to chronic stress and, further, to disordered eating. Chronic stress causes neuroinflammation, which increases susceptibility to OCD-like behaviors that typically co-occur with eating disorders. Chronic stress upregulates the serotonergic system and causes dysphoric mood in patients with restricting-type anorexia nervosa. Dieting, however, reduces serotonin levels and dysphoric mood, leading to a vicious serotonergic-homeostatic stress/starvation cycle whereby cortisol and neuroinflammation increase through stringent dieting. Between-individual and within-individual variation in eating disorders partially arises from (co)variation in gut microbiota and stress responsivity, which influence neuroinflammation and the serotonergic system. In binge-related eating disorders, even a short period of fasting drops serotonin levels, a state alleviated by binge eating. Eating disorder treatments should aim to reduce the chronic stress, neuroinflammation, stress responsivity and gut dysbiosis that fuel the disorders. We review the advances that have been made in recent years in understanding how to best treat eating disorders, outlining directions for future clinical research. Connecting ultimate causes with proximate mechanisms and treating biopsychosocial causes rather than manifest symptoms will enable more effective and sophisticated long-term interventions for the millions of people who suffer from eating disorders. (shrink)

Angesichts des vielfach diagnostizierten Ausmaßes der Zerstörung des Planeten Erde wird aktuell viel über die Notwendigkeit der Neuzusammensetzung des lebendigen Sozialen nachgedacht. Als Alternative zur klassischen Anrufung der Gesellschaft und den von ihr einzuleitenden Maßnahmen gegen den drohenden Untergang wird auf neu zu erschaffende Kollektive gesetzt, die sowohl menschliche als auch nichtmenschliche Akteure umfassen. Diese neuen Kollektive sollen sich durch Bündnisse, Symbiosen, Kooperationen, Assoziationen und Verträge konstituieren. Vergleichbar werden die im Detail verschiedenen, insgesamt aber posthumanistisch ausgerichteten Vorschläge, durch ihren gemeinsamen (...) Ausgangspunkt der verletzten Erde, für die Rettungsmaßnahmen in Gang gesetzt werden sollen: Bündnisse, die Gaia stiftet - im Angesicht der drohenden Gefahr! Im Mittelpunkt der Überlegungen von Lynn Margulis, Michel Serres, Bruno Latour und Donna Haraway, die im Folgenden diskutiert werden sollen, steht die Suche nach der Verbindung und Kooperation mit anderen als nur menschlichen Lebewesen. Die gesuchten Verbindungen, Verflechtungen und Versammlungen von menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Akteuren werden jedoch, so meine These, überwiegend im Sinne eines friedlichen Miteinanders ausbuchstabiert, während andere Formen der Verbindung dagegen, etwa durch stabile Gegnerschaft, andauernden Streit, stetige Auseinandersetzungen, vernachlässigt werden. Die während der Zusammensetzung der Kollektive notwendig werdenden Grenzziehungen und mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit auftretenden Konflikte um die Frage der Zugehörigkeiten werden weitgehend ausgeblendet zugunsten eines immensen Vertrauens in die Bereitschaft zur Versammlung und die Friedfertigkeit der Kollektivbildung. Mit anderen Worten: Während Kooperation, Verschmelzungen und Vermischungen überbetont werden, geraten Grenzziehungen, Konflikte und Kämpfe ins Hintertreffen. (shrink)

It is a common intuition that at least in some cases disagreement has skeptical consequences: the participants are not justified in persisting in their beliefs. I will argue that the currently popular non-dialectical and individualistic accounts of justification, such as evidentialism and reliabilism, cannot explain this intuition and defend the dialectical conception of justification that can explain it. I will also argue that this sort of justification is a necessary condition of knowledge by relying on Craig's genealogy of the concept (...) of knowledge. I will then respond to the accusation that the dialectical conception leads to radical skepticism. My response is partly concessive. It does lead to skepticism in areas where controversy prevails, such as philosophy, politics and religion, but this sort of skepticism is quite intuitive. Finally, I deal with the objection that my defense of skepticism about philosophy is self-refuting. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to strengthen links between cognitive brain research and formal logic. The work covers three fundamental sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if...then”, reasoning in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the (...) fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving logical reasoning problems. This account resolves many disputes about how humans reason logically and why we sometimes deviate from the norms of formal logic. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Kommentar zum Text von Tatiana Tarkian werden zwei Argumente der Verfasserin einer kritischen Prüfung unterzogen: Zum einen das Argument, dass parentale Tugenden einer Auswahl künftiger Kinder nicht entgegenstehen würde; zum anderen das Argument, dass eine negative Selektion aufgrund von Behinderung keinen diskriminierenden Charakter gegenüber Behinderten habe, wenn die negative Selektion ledgilich aufgrund verbreiteter diskriminierender Urteile in der Gesellschaft erfolge.

In their recent book Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman and Ross claim: (i) Physics is analytically complete since it is the only science that cannot be left incomplete. (ii) There might not be an ontologically fundamental level. (iii) We should not admit anything into our ontology unless it has explanatory and predictive utility. In this discussion note I aim to show that the ontological commitment in implies that the completeness of no science can be achieved where no fundamental level exists. (...) Therefore, if claim requires a science to actually be complete in order to be considered as physics,, and if Ladyman and Ross's “tentative metaphysical hypothesis ... that there is no fundamental level” is true,, then there simply is no physics. Ladyman and Ross can, however, avoid this unwanted result if they merely require physics to ever strive for completeness rather than to already be complete. (shrink)

Many consider the nature of human consciousness to be one of the last great unsolved mysteries. Why should the light turn on, so to speak, in human beings at all? And how is the electrical storm of neurons under our skull connected with our consciousness? Is the self only our brain's user interface, a kind of stage on which a show is performed that we cannot freely direct? In this book, philosopher Markus Gabriel challenges an increasing trend in the (...) sciences towards neurocentrism, a notion which rests on the assumption that the self is identical to the brain. Gabriel raises serious doubts as to whether we can know ourselves in this way. In a sharp critique of this approach, he presents a new defense of the free will and provides a timely introduction to philosophical thought about the self – all with verve, humor, and surprising insights. Gabriel criticizes the scientific image of the world and takes us on an eclectic journey of self-reflection by way of such concepts as self, consciousness, and freedom, with the aid of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nagel but also Dr. Who, The Walking Dead, and Fargo. (shrink)

The notion of a “third food regime” implies simultaneous processes of further global concentration and integration and at the same time resistance through new emerging producer–consumer relations. This paper examines these processes by looking at Austria over the last 30 years. While direct producer–consumer cooperatives established at an early point, today forms of community supported agriculture are rare. This paper explains this by identifying a shift of the entire food system from “food from nowhere” to “food from here.” The account (...) follows the early emergence of alternative food networks through the political appeal to consumer patriotism in connection with Austria joining the EU, to a sustained positioning of retail chains with regional and national food products. The paper argues that this satisfies the needs of a large proportion of consumers and discourages the emergence of new food initiatives. The paper follows the development of different approaches and their transformations until today. Thus a picture evolves of changing, and partly progressing consumer–producer relations in response to wider societal and political transformation processes. The results explain why the movement towards CSA is currently weak in Austria, but demonstrate at the same time how alternative food networks may contribute to a transformation of the food system. (shrink)

I attempt to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the Categories. On the basis of close textual analysis, I argue that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance (...) universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, I argue that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the Categories. (shrink)