The concept of human dignity plays an important role in the public discussion about ethical questions concerning modern medicine and biology. At the same time, there is a widespread skepticism about the possibility to determine the content and the claims of human dignity. The article goes back to Kantian Moral Philosophy, in order to show that human dignity has in fact a determinable content not as a norm in itself, but as the principle and ground of human rights and any (...) deontological norms in biomedical ethics. When it comes to defining the scope of human dignity, i.e., the question which entities are protected by human dignity, Kant clearly can be found on the “pro life”-side of the controversy. This, however, is the result of some specific implications of Kant’s transcendental approach that may be put into question. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Kommentar zum Text von Tatiana Tarkian werden zwei Argumente der Verfasserin einer kritischen Prüfung unterzogen: Zum einen das Argument, dass parentale Tugenden einer Auswahl künftiger Kinder nicht entgegenstehen würde; zum anderen das Argument, dass eine negative Selektion aufgrund von Behinderung keinen diskriminierenden Charakter gegenüber Behinderten habe, wenn die negative Selektion ledgilich aufgrund verbreiteter diskriminierender Urteile in der Gesellschaft erfolge.

A new controversy has arisen in practical philosophy concerning the principles of normativity. Conceptual approaches in the Kantian tradition, which derive the fundamental norms for human coexistence from formal determinants of reason are countered by models that have revived the notion of an authentic normativity of nature or of life, following Aristotle and Thomas of Aquinas. The volume brings together advocates of both positions.

New developments in modern medicine and biotechnology put long time certitudes about the meaning of ähealth and äillness more and more into question. Also, these concepts increasingly assume the role of normative concepts, which separate legitimate from illegitimate actions in many contexts of medical ethics, as in the case of äenhancement. This volume brings together the theoretical controversy on the concepts of ähealth and äillness and ethical reflections on the normative consequences of our understandig of these crucial concepts.

In the current theoretical discourse, human dignity as it is enshrined in the German Basic Law, is often interpreted as a special „right to non-instrumentalization“ which overturns any other human right. This interpretation usually refers to Kant’s concept of human dignity, according to which any person is an “end-in-itself”. By discussing the different possibilities on how to understand this idea, I want to point out that none of possible interpretations of Kant’s concept can give good reasons for an understanding of (...) human dignity as a special “right to non-instrumentalization”. Instead I propose to understand human dignity as the principle of and the reason for the absolute inviolability of basic human rights. (shrink)

In the current theoretical discourse, human dignity as it is enshrined in the German Basic Law, is often interpreted as a special „right to non-instrumentalization“ which overturns any other human right. This interpretation usually refers to Kant’s concept of human dignity, according to which any person is an “end-in-itself”. By discussing the different possibilities on how to understand this idea, I want to point out that none of possible interpretations of Kant’s concept can give good reasons for an understanding of (...) human dignity as a special “right to non-instrumentalization”. Instead I propose to understand human dignity as the principle of and the reason for the absolute inviolability of basic human rights. (shrink)

Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen ist und bleibt umstritten. Zugleich gibt es immer neue und tiefergehende biotechnologische Möglichkeiten, Embryonen zu manipulieren. Das betrifft insbesondere ihr Entwicklungspotential und die klare Zuordnung zur menschlichen Spezies. Dieses Buch untersucht, welche Auswirkungen diese neuen Manipulationsmöglichkeiten auf die Tragfähigkeit der Argumente haben, mit denen ein herausgehobener moralischer Status des Embryos begründet werden soll: die Potentialitäts- und Speziesargumente. In den Beiträgen werden aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Forschung mit Embryonen zusammengetragen und insbesondere folgende Fragen diskutiert: Was bedeuten (...) diese Entwicklungen für die Potentialitäts- und Speziesargumente – und damit letztendlich auch für den moralischen Status der so manipulierten Embryonen? Können die zentralen embryoethischen Argumente angesichts der neuen biotechnologischen Eingriffsmöglichkeiten überhaupt aufrechterhalten werden? Sind alle Varianten der Argumente betroffen oder nur einige? Können und müssen sie möglicherweise reformuliert oder neu gedacht werden? (shrink)

One of the main fields of research in genome editing is the manufacture of transgenic organisms. If this includes genetically human components, then we must not only ask whether such techniques should be allowed, but also what the moral status of “cross species beings” with a genetically “human” component would be and whether the possibility to manufacture them affects the validity of bioethical arguments from species affiliation. In my chapter I want to show that the two latter questions are less (...) dramatic than it might seem, because most, if not all transgenic organisms are not real “interspecies beings”, but rather belong to one of the original species, or constitute a new species. As for the first question, possible epistemic uncertainties about the status of transgenic organisms call for a precautionary approach. (shrink)

Deontologischen Ethiken zufolge hängt die moralische Bewertung einer Handlung von intrinsischen Charakteristika dieser Handlung ab. Wenn das der Fall ist, stellt sich aber die Frage, wie Handlungen eigentlich gegenüber ihren Folgen abgrenzbar sind, wenn Handlungen immer auch so beschrieben werden können, dass einige ihrer Folgen Teil der Handlungsbeschreibung sind. Um dieses Problem zu lösen, wird ein normativer Handlungsbegriff skizziert, bei dem aus einer Sequenz möglicher Handlungsbeschreibungen die erste normativ relevante Beschreibung als handlungsdefinierend herausgearbeitet wird.

In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in the broadest sense of the word) Aristotelian or neo‐Aristotelian argument; the second is an argument from the intrinsic logic of human rights, which Robert Spaemann refers toas a ‘transcendental‐pragmatic’ argument. On these (...) grounds, the article proposes a philosophical justification for an at least moderate speciesism. (shrink)

DieStammzellenmoderneEmbryo (s. a. Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Ethik, feministische)Status desReproduktionsmedizinReproduktionsmedizin hat die menschliche FortpflanzungFortpflanzung technisch manipulierbar gemacht und dabei neue Handlungsspielräume eröffnet. Damit tauchen auch neue ethische Fragen auf, die zum einen eine sozialethische Dimension aufweisen und zum anderen den ontologischen und normativen Status menschlicher EmbryonenEmbryo (s. a. Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Ethik, feministische)Status des betreffen. Sozialethische Fragestellungen ergeben sich insbesondere daraus, dass durch die neuen technischen Handlungsoptionen eine, wie Kuhlmann formuliert, „Aufspaltung der Elternrolle je nach genetischer, Schwangerschafts- und sozialer Funktion“ (Kuhlmann 2011, 85) möglich wird.

In the German legislation on embryo protection, the scope of protection is defined by its membership to the human species and by the embryo’s inherent potential to develop into a born human being. Both criteria refer to well-known bioethical arguments: the argument from species membership and the potentiality argument. With recent progresses in biotechnology it has, however, become possible manipulate the development potential of human embryos and to blur the boundaries between species. Hence, we must ask, whether both criteria (and (...) with them the arguments) can still hold their ground in bioethics and biomedical law. In my article, I argue, that the aforementioned biotechnological techniques do not require to abandon the arguments from species membership and potentiality. There is, however, a need to clarify what the criteria of species membership and inherent potentiality actually refer to in the relevant laws, i. e. the embryo protection law and the stem cell law. (shrink)