Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

According to a widely shared notion, music is not only something that we can understand, but moreover something that gives us access to a specific form of cognitive reflection. This paper suggests that the first part of this notion is only plausible if musical understanding is not explained in terms of grasping the meaning of music, but in terms of experiencing its sense. Music has neither a classifiable meaning full content nor a predicative structure, both of which are necessary in (...) order for a medium of reflection. Therefore, the second part of this notion can only be defended in a rather modest way, insofar as the cognitive function of music is limited to its role merely as a means that serves our otherwise language-based reflexive competence. (shrink)

Matthias Vogel challenges the belief, dominant in contemporary philosophy, that reason is determined solely by our discursive, linguistic abilities as communicative beings. In his view, the medium of language is not the only force of reason. Music, art, and other nonlinguistic forms of communication and understanding are also significant. Introducing an expansive theory of mind that accounts for highly sophisticated, penetrative media, Vogel advances a novel conception of rationality while freeing philosophy from its exclusive attachment to linguistics. Vogel's media of (...) reason treats all kinds of understanding and thought, propositional and nonpropositional, as important to the processes and production of knowledge and thinking. By developing an account of rationality grounded in a new conception of media, he raises the profile of the prelinguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of rationality and advances the Enlightenment project, buffering it against the postmodern critique that the movement fails to appreciate aesthetic experience. Guided by the work of Jürgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and a range of media theorists, including Marshall McLuhan, Vogel rebuilds, if he does not remake, the relationship among various forms of media -- books, movies, newspapers, the Internet, and television -- while offering an original and exciting contribution to media theory. (shrink)

Looking back onto 50 years of teaching and research, Herbert Schnädelbach describes factors that shaped the development of philosophy during these years, leading foremost to a scientification of philosophy and to a specialization of philosophers. Simultaneously, he makes the diagnosis of a transformation from a personalized interpretation and explanation discipline to a cooperative effort, distinguished more by an increased interest in systemic questions and cooperation than by irreconcilable frontline positioning. The influence of the university reforms of the 1960s and of (...) the years from 2000 onwards, how he relates to Kant, Hegel, and Adorno and to the role of the Critical Theory are also subject matters of the interview, as are questions regarding the tasks of philosophy in modern society. (shrink)

The essay presents the outlines of the conceptual framework which Ruth G. Millikan has developed in order to establish a comprehensive theory of functions. Although it is widely acknowledged that this theory is full of insights, criticism has been raised in recent times. Her theory of proper functions is especially under fire since it is said not to be able to account for those functional ascriptions that are in use in biology, and to suffer from a conceptual congenital defect which (...) prevents us from ascribing to a wide range of biological phenomena those functions that we intuitively ascribe to them. In discussing these reproaches it is shown that none of them is justified. (shrink)

The first part of the essay tries to show that Davidson's explanation of irrationality in terms of a fragmentation of the mind is not compatible with interpretationist premises of his own theory. Instead of adopting the conception of two semi-autonomous departments of the mind, I argue for an explanation of strong forms of irrationality based on two kinds of contentful mental states: functionally individuated representational states and states whose content depends on a rationalizing interpretation. Akrasia – as a form of (...) irrationality caused by mental states that are not propositionally transparent – seems to fit neatly into that picture. (shrink)

Guided by the work of Jürgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and a range of media theorists, including Marshall McLuhan, Vogel rebuilds, if he does not remake, the relationship among various forms of media -- books, movies, newspapers, the ...

Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass sich der Prozess des ästhetischen Erfahrens als einer des verstehenden Nachvollzugs begreifen lässt, in dem wir die mit Erlebnisqualitäten verbundenen Wahrnehmungen (beispielsweise einer Melodie) auf einer grundlegenden Ebene mittels der Erlebnisqualitäten anderer Wahrnehmungen (beispielsweise einer Geste) strukturieren; und zwar so, dass wir den Gegenstand dieses Verstehens als eine Einheit erfassen. Es zeigt sich dabei zum einen, dass sich Verstehen nicht im begrifflichen Erfassen von Bedeutungen, Handlungen oder Ursache- Wirkungs-Relationen erschöpft; und zum anderen, dass uns in (...) Gestalt des Nachvollziehens eine Form des Verstehens offensteht, der die Möglichkeit innewohnt, uns selbst und anderen Aspekte unseres subjektiven Erlebens (des Gegenstands) bewusst zu machen und begrifflich zu artikulieren. Die Philosophie des Geistes muss sich daher der Aufgabe stellen, das Verhältnis zwischen phänomenalen und intentionalen Aspekten unseres Geistes produktiver zu erläutern als bloß in Formeiner Disjunktion. I will try to show that the process of making an aesthetic experience can be conceived as a process of understanding via re-enactment in which we structure the phenomenal qualities of perceptions (e.g. of a melody) at a fundamental level by means of the phenomenal qualities of other perceptions (e.g. of a gesture); and this in such a way that we grasp the object of this understanding as a unity. Thereby, it turns out that understanding is not restricted to conceptually grasping meanings, actions, or relations of cause and effect. Moreover, re-enactment shows itself as a form of understanding, which enables us to become aware of aspects of our subjective experience, to make others understand these aspects, and to articulate them conceptually. hilosophy of mind must therefore face the task of elucidating the relationship between phenomenal and intentional aspects of our mind in a more productive way than in the form of a mere disjunction. (shrink)