Although in the last decades increasingly more philosophers have paid attention to the life sciences, traditionally physics has dominated general philosophy of science. Does a focus on the life sciences and medicine produce a different philosophy of science and indeed a different conception of knowledge? Here Cristina Chimisso does not attempt to give a comprehensive answer to this question; rather, she presents a case study focussed on Georges Canguilhem. Canguilhem continued the philosophical tradition that we now call (...) historical epistemology, and always referred very closely to the philosophy of Gaston Bachelard. However, whereas Bachelard primarily studied the history of chemistry and physics, Canguilhem turned to the life sciences, medicine and psychiatry. Chimisso investigates their respective conceptions and uses of norms. Chimisso argues that some crucial differences in how they regarded norms, seldom emphasised by Canguilhem himself and indeed by critics, stem from the sciences on which they concentrated. (shrink)

Due to the variation, contingency and complexity of living systems, biology is often taken to be a science without fundamental theories, laws or general principles. I revisit this question in light of the quest for design principles in systems biology and show that different views can be reconciled if we distinguish between different types of generality. The philosophical literature has primarily focused on generality of specific models or explanations, or on the heuristic role of abstraction. This paper takes a (...) different approach in emphasizing a theory-constituting role of general principles. Design principles signify general dependencyrelations between structures and functions, given a set of formally defined constraints. I contend that design principles increase our understanding of living systems by relating specific models to general types. The categorization of types is based on a delineation of the scope of biological possibilities, which serves to identify and define the generic features of classes of systems. To characterize the basis for general principles through generic abstraction and reasoning about possibility spaces, I coin the term constraint-based generality. I show that constraintbased generality is distinct from other types of generality in biology, and argue that general principles play a unifying role that does not entail theory reduction. (shrink)

Bringing together scholars from philosophy, bioethics, law, sociology, and anthropology, this topical collection explores how innovations in the field of biomedicine and the life sciences are challenging and transforming traditional understandings of human temporality and of the temporal duration, extension and structure of human life. The contributions aim to expand the theoretical debate by highlighting the significance of time and human temporality in different discourses and practical contexts, and developing concrete, empirically informed, and culturally sensitive perspectives. The collection (...) is structured around three main foci: the beginning of life, the middle of life, and later life. This structure facilitates an in-depth examination of specific technological and biographical contexts and at the same time allows an overarching comparison of relevant similarities and differences between life phases and fields of application. (shrink)

This article presents an artistic and political experiment as an effort to advance democratic transactions in the life sciences. Artists built a ‘gender democratic labyrinth’ in Maastricht, in which scientists, women’s groups, people in general, artists, philosophers, politicians, journalists, clinical geneticists and many others interacted and negotiated on the creation of human embryos for medical-scientific research. By taking a gender perspective on the process of democratizing science, we aimed to create a space in which alterity and difference are (...) constitutive elements in the public exchanges on science and technology. The idea to build a labyrinth was theoretically based on the notion of agonistic democracy - in which pluralism is the result of contestations and divisions - and on a notion of science and technology as being contextualized and socialized. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the role of intuition-based ascriptions of cognition that are closely related to the ascription of mind. This practice hinders the explication of a clear and stable target domain for the cognitive sciences. To move forward, the proposal is to cut the notion of cognition free from such ascriptions and the intuition-based judgments that drive them. Instead, cognition is reinterpreted and developed as a scientific concept that is tied to a material domain of research. In this reading, cognition (...) becomes a changeable theoretical concept that can and must be adapted to the findings within this target domain. Taking humans as the best-established existing example of the relevant material target domain, this central case is extended to include all living systems. To clarify what it is about living systems that warrants their role as cognitive target domain, the new concept of cobolism is introduced as a complement to metabolism. Cobolism refers to the systematic ways in which each living system encompasses structures, processes and external events that maintain the fundamental metabolic processes that constitute the core of each living system. Cobolism is perfectly general, applies to bacterial and human cases alike, and provides a general format to describe wildly different cognitive organizations. It provides a clear target for the cognitive sciences to work on, turning them into what we can call the cognitive life sciences. (shrink)

Building on group discussions and interviews with life science researchers in Austria, this paper analyses the narratives that researchers use in describing what they feel responsible for, with a particular focus on how they perceive the societal responsibilities of their research. Our analysis shows that the core narratives used by the life scientists participating in this study continue to be informed by the linear model of innovation. This makes it challenging for more complex innovation models [such as responsible (...) research and innovation ] to gain ground in how researchers make sense of and conduct their research. Furthermore, the paper shows that the life scientists were not easily able to imagine specific practices that would address broader societal concerns and thus found it hard to integrate the latter into their core responsibilities. Linked to this, researchers saw institutional reward structures as strongly focused on scientific excellence. Thus, they saw reward structures as competing with—rather than incentivising—broader notions of societal responsibility. This narrative framing of societal responsibilities is indicative of a structural marginalisation of responsibility practices and explains the claim, made by many researchers in our sample, that they cannot afford to spend time on such practices. The paper thus concludes that the core ideas of RRI stand in tension with predominant narrative and institutional infrastructures that researchers draw on to attribute meaning to their research practices. This suggests that scientific institutions still have a core role to play in providing new and context-specific narratives as well as new forms of valuing responsibility practices. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine how trends in the use of images in modern life science journals have changed since the spread of computer-based visual and imaging technology. To this end, a new classification system was constructed to analyze how the graphics of a scientific journal have changed over the years. The focus was on one international peer-reviewed journal in life sciences, Cell, which was founded in 1974, whereby 1725 figures and 160 tables from the (...) research articles in Cell were sampled. The unit of classification was defined as a graphic and the figures and tables were divided into 5952 graphics. These graphics were further classified into hierarchical categories, and the data in each category were aggregated every five years. The following categories were observed: data graphics, explanation graphics, and hybrid graphics. Data graphics increased by more than sixfold between 1974 and 2014, and some types of data graphics including mechanical reproduction images and bar charts displayed notable changes. The representation of explanatory graphics changed from hand-painted illustrations to diagrams of Bezier-curves. It is suggested that in addition to the development of experimental technologies such as fluorescent microscopy and big data analysis, continuously evolving application software for image creation and researchers’ motivation to convince reviewers and editors have influenced these changes. (shrink)

The starting point of this PhD project is a constructivist interpretation of scientific practices: science does not study independent and pre-given phenomena, but constructs them in an active way. Although this topic has already been argued for in general, this project wants to focus on recent emerging life sciences, such as systems biology, Artificial Life and synthetic biology. These disciplines bring forth an extreme form of this constructivist aspect: they actively and explicitly produce biological phenomena, such as (...) synthetic cells that do not exist outside of the laboratories. It is, however, unclear what this ‘construction’ of nature entails. There are multiple interpretations of how to understand these technical mediations and how this constructive element either shows the uniqueness of scientific practices or precisely shows how there is nothing special about scientific practices in relation to other practices. On the one hand this project wants to identify the different interpretations of constructivism in science: what does it in fact mean to claim that science constructs its object? Secondly, it wants to differentiate the notion of constructivism itself, by abandoning it as a general claim to more local, historical claims. This allows us to differentiate how a discipline, such as synthetic biology, is constructive in a unique sense, rather than being classified merely as one illustration of constructivism. This allows us to make room for the singularity of synthetic biology: in what specific way is synthetic biology a constructive practice? (shrink)

Over the course of the last three decades, computer simulations have become a major tool of doing science and engaging with the world, not least in an effort to predict and intervene in a future to come. Born in the context of the Second World War and the discipline of physics, simulations have long spread into most diverse fields of enquiry and technological application. This paper introduces a topical collection focussing on simulations in the life sciences. Echoing the current (...) state of tinkering, fast developments, segmentation of knowledge and interdisciplinary collaboration, and in an effort to bridge the science-humanities divide, the contributors to this collection come from multiple disciplinary backgrounds, including information studies, cognitive sciences, philosophy and biology. The ambiguous character of simulations, their cutting across scientific disciplines, analysis and prediction, understanding and doing, gave rise to their success in contemporary life sciences and has been the object of much scientific debate. One of the main aims of this topical collection, by contrast, is to call into question the assumption of an obvious use and easy transfer of methods between fields of knowledge as diverse as, e.g. physics and biology. The collection presents historical case studies from various biological sub-fields. The articles study how simulations are used and the ways they contribute specifically to our understanding of life. Taking up Sergio Sismondo’s description of simulations as “compromises” and “glue”, they also critically engage with the question of what exactly the life sciences have been gluing together over the last two decades. (shrink)

The history of twentieth-century life sciences is not exactly a new topic. However, in view of the increasingly rapid development of the life sciences themselves over the past decades, some of the well-established narratives are worth revisiting. Taking stock of where we stand on these issues was the aim of a conference in 2015, entitled “Perspectives for the History of Life Sciences”. The papers in this topical collection are based on work presented and discussed at and around (...) this meeting. Just as the conference, the collection aims at exploring fields in the history of life sciences that appear understudied, sources that have been overlooked, and novel ways of engaging with this material. The papers convened in this collection may not be representative of the field as a whole; but we feel that they do indicate some elements that have received emphasis in recent years, and may become more central in the years to come, such as the history of previously neglected contexts and domains of the life sciences, the question of continuity and change on the level of practices, the history of complexity and diversity in twentieth-century life sciences and the reconsideration of the relationship between history and philosophy of life sciences. (shrink)

This paper challenges the common assumption that some phenotypic traits are quantitative while others are qualitative. The distinction between these two kinds of traits is widely influential in biological and biomedical research as well as in scientific education and communication. This is probably due to both historical and epistemological reasons. However, the quantitative/qualitative distinction involves a variety of simplifications on the genetic causes of phenotypic variability and on the development of complex traits. Here, I examine three cases from the (...) class='Hi'>life sciences that show inconsistencies in the distinction: Mendelian traits, Mendelian diseases, and polygenic mental disorders. I show that these traits can be framed both quantitatively and qualitatively depending, for instance, on the methods through which they are investigated and on specific epistemic purposes. This suggests that the received view of quantitative and qualitative traits has a limited heuristic power—limited to some local contexts or to the specific methodologies adopted. Throughout the paper, I provide directions for framing phenotypes beyond the quantitative/qualitative distinction. I conclude by pointing at the necessity of developing a principled characterisation of what phenotypic traits, in general, are. (shrink)

Definition of the problem “Dual use” refers to the applicability of a research result or methods for purposes that concern the internal or external security of a society. This includes research that can be used for military, intelligence, terrorist, or criminal purposes. Dual use has been an increasingly aggravating problem for many areas of the life sciences and medicine for over a decade. The main cause for this is that many of their results are capable of demonstrating how humans, (...) but also (domestic) animals and plants, can be manipulated and attacked, and which tools are particularly suitable for this purpose. Arguments The digitalization in the life sciences has two distinguishable impacts on the dual-use problem: an intensifying and an expanding one. By enabling faster and more comprehensive research and development processes, digitalization exacerbates the existing dual-use problem because it increases the pace at which the results of this research can be utilized for security-related purposes. Moreover, the digitalization of the life sciences expands the dual-use problem, as some of the digital tools developed and used in the life sciences can themselves have military or security-relevant applications. Conclusion Therefore, a broad-based governance including wide participation of stakeholders in the research process and broader information on dual use in good scientific practice education across institutions, career stages, and disciplines is necessary. (shrink)

This volume reviews examples and notions of robustness at several levels of biological organization. It tackles many philosophical and conceptual issues and casts an outlook on the future challenges of robustness studies in the context of a practice-oriented philosophy of science. The focus of discussion is on concrete case studies. These highlight the necessity of a level-dependent description of robust biological behaviors.Experts from the neurosciences, biochemistry, ecology, biology, and the history and the philosophy of life sciences provide a multiplex (...) perspective on the topic. Contributions span from protein folding, to cell-level robustness, to organismal and developmental robustness, to sensorimotor systems, up to the robustness of ecological systems.Several chapters detail neurobiological case-studies. The brain, the poster child of plasticity in biology, offers multiple examples of robustness. Neurobiology explores the importance of temporal organization and multiscalarity in making this robustness-with-plasticity possible. The discussion also includes structures well beyond the brain, such as muscles and the complex feedback loops involved in the peculiar robustness of music perception. Overall, the volume grounds general reflections upon concrete case studies, opening to all the life sciences but also to non-biological and bio-inspired fields such as post-modern engineering. It will appeal to researchers, students, as well as non-expert readers. (shrink)

Where humans can manipulate and integrate the information they receive in subtle and ever-changing ways from context to context, computers need structured and context-free background information of a sort which ontologies can help to provide. A domain ontology captures the stable, highly general and commonly accepted core knowledge for an application domain. The domain at issue here is that of the life sciences, in particular molecular biology and bioinformatics. Contemporary life science research includes components drawn from physics, (...) chemistry, mathematics, medicine and many other areas, and all of these dimensions, as well as fundamental philosophical issues, must be taken into account in the construction of a domain ontology. Here we describe the basic features of domain ontologies in the life sciences and show how they can be used. (shrink)

In what follows, I suggest that it makes good sense to think of the truth of the probabilistic generalizations made in the life sciences as metaphysically grounded in stochastic mechanisms in the world. To further understand these stochastic mechanisms, I take the general characterization of mechanism offered by MDC :1–25, 2000) and explore how it fits with several of the going philosophical accounts of chance: subjectivism, frequentism, Lewisian best-systems, and propensity. I argue that neither subjectivism, frequentism, nor a (...) best-system-style interpretation of chance will give us what we need from an account of stochastic mechanism, but some version of propensity theory can. I then draw a few important lessons from recent propensity interpretations of fitness in order to present a novel propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism according to which stochastic mechanisms are thought to have probabilistic propensities to produce certain outcomes over others. This understanding of stochastic mechanism, once fully fleshed-out, provides the benefits of allowing the stochasticity of a particular mechanism to be an objective property in the world, a property investigable by science, a way of quantifying the stochasticity of a particular mechanism, and a way to avoid a problematic commitment to the causal efficacy of propensities. (shrink)

This essay surveys the situation of Italian women life scientists from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. It follows the path that took women from being an exceptional presence to becoming a common, yet not equal, presence in the Italian science departments. Very different proportions of women occupied the three ranks in the academic hierarchy—students, research staff and professors. From the late nineteenth century onwards, women started to enrol in Italian universities. Initially, the second most popular department among (...) female students—outdone only by the humanities—was that of mathematics, physics and natural sciences. Concerning women among research staff, a brief statistical analysis reveals the growing proportion of the female workforce in academic institutions and brings into view poorly known female assistants and technicians. The most difficult career step for women was to gain a tenured university position. A comparison between bacteriologist Giuseppina Cattani’s ‘failure’ to gain such a position and the ultimately successful strategy of zoologist and limnologist Rina Monti, who became one of the very first female university professors in Europe, illustrates the opportunities as well as the obstacles women naturalists encountered on the way into the academia. These experiences and those of others show that well into the twentieth century the support of powerful male mentors continued to be indispensable for women scientists. Positions in peripheral institutes or specializations in emerging research fields, in particular hydrobiology, entomology and cytogenetics, provided opportunities for Italian women to work their way up to professorships. (shrink)

In the chapter on Observing Reason in the Phenomenology, as well as in §368 of the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel deals with the life sciences of his time. There, he labels the methodology of its representatives, namely zoology and comparative anatomy, as external teleology. In this paper I want to show that by doing so he is actually discussing a general kind of functionalism. Thereby, I want to highlight a line of thought in Hegel's texts which represents a (...) productive reading of external teleology contrary to a destructive reading on which scholars have mainly focussed. (shrink)

BackgroundInformed consent forms for clinical research are several and variable at international, national and local levels. According to the literature, they are often unclear and poorly understood by participants. Within the H2020 project CORBEL—Coordinated Research Infrastructures Building Enduring Life-science Services—clinical researchers, researchers in ethical, social, and legal issues, experts in planning and management of clinical studies, clinicians, researchers in citizen involvement and public engagement worked together to provide a minimum set of requirements for informed consent in clinical studies.MethodsThe template (...) was based on a literature review including systematic reviews and guidelines searched on PubMed, Embase, Cochrane Library, NICE, SIGN, GIN, and Clearinghouse databases, and on comparison of templates gathered through an extensive search on the websites of research institutes, national and international agencies, and international initiatives. We discussed the draft versions step-by-step and then we referred to it as the “matrix” to underline its modular character and indicate that it allows adaptation to the context in which it will be used. The matrix was revised by representatives of two international patient groups.ResultsThe matrix covers the process of ensuring that the appropriate information, context and setting are provided so that the participant can give truly informed consent. It addresses the key topics and proposes wording on how to clarify the meaning of placebo and of non-inferiority studies, the importance of individual participants’ data sharing, and the impossibility of knowing in advance how the data might be used in future studies. Finally, it presents general suggestions on wording, format, and length of the information sheet.ConclusionsThe matrix underlines the importance of improving the process of communication, its proper conditions (space, time, setting), and addresses the participants’ lack of knowledge on how clinical research is conducted. It can be easily applied to a specific setting and could be a useful tool to identify the appropriate informed consent format for any study. The matrix is mainly intended to support multicentre interventional randomized clinical studies, but several suggestions also apply to non-interventional research. (shrink)

This Open Access book combines philosophical and historical analysis of various forms of alternatives to mechanism and mechanistic explanation, focusing on the 19th century to the present. It addresses vitalism, organicism and responses to materialism and its relevance to current biological science. In doing so, it promotes dialogue and discussion about the historical and philosophical importance of vitalism and other non-mechanistic conceptions of life. It points towards the integration of genomic science into the broader history of biology. It details (...) a broad engagement with a variety of nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century vitalisms and conceptions of life. In addition, it discusses important threads in the history of concepts in the United States and Europe, including charting new reception histories in eastern and south-eastern Europe. While vitalism, organicism and similar epistemologies are often the concern of specialists in the history and philosophy of biology and of historians of ideas, the range of the contributions as well as the geographical and temporal scope of the volume allows for it to appeal to the historian of science and the historian of biology generally. (shrink)

In Science and Religious Anthropology: A Spiritually Evocative Naturalist Interpretation of Human Life, Wesley J. Wildman has awakened work in religious anthropology to a new day and a new kind of light. No one who works in religious anthropology, or in religion and science studies more generally, should be taken seriously who has not read, digested, and contended with Wildman’s work. Indeed, if one is looking for an education in genuine interdisciplinarity, in rigorous scholarly analysis and argumentation, and in (...) the ways in which academic theology, religious studies, and the scientific study of religion can mutually inform one another, Wildman’s book is the ideal school. Wildman carefully analyzes, creatively .. (shrink)

This article, which is intended both as a position paper in the philosophical debate on natural kinds and as the guest editorial to this thematic issue, takes up the challenge posed by Ian Hacking in his paper, “Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight.” Whereas a straightforward interpretation of that paper suggests that according to Hacking the concept of natural kinds should be abandoned, both in the philosophy of science and in philosophy more generally, we suggest that an alternative and less (...) fatalistic reading is also possible. We argue that abandoning the concept of natural kinds would be premature, as it still can do important work. Our concern is with the situation in the (philosophy of the) life sciences. Against the background of this concern we attempt to set something of an agenda for future research on the topic of natural kinds in the (philosophy of the) life sciences. (shrink)

Hans Jonas’ “philosophical biology,” although developed several decades ago, is still fundamental to the contemporary reflection upon the meaning of life in a systems thinking perspective. Jonas, in fact, closely examines the reasons of modern science, and especially of Wiener’s Cybernetics and Bertalanffy’s General System Theory, and at the same time points out their basic limits, such as their having a reductionistic attitude to knowledge and ontology. In particular, the philosopher highlights the problematic consequences of scientific reductionism for (...) human nature. As the final result of an overall process of naturalization, the essence of the human being is reduced to its quantitative features only, while the “meaning” of life as such becomes no different from the “fact” of its material consistency. However, the problem is that by such a process, the human being is deprived of his specificity. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to detail some reservations against the beliefs, claims, or presuppositions that current essentialist natural kind concepts (including homeostatic property cluster kinds) model grouping practices in the life sciences accurately and generally. Such concepts fit reasoning into particular preconceived epistemic and semantic patterns. The ability of these patterns to fit scientific practice is often argued in support of homeostatic property cluster accounts, yet there are reasons to think that in the life sciences kind (...) concepts exhibit a diversity of grouping practices that are flattened out by conceptualizing them as natural kinds. Instead this article argues that the process of understanding grouping practices needs to start from a more neutral position independent of any ontological account. Following Love (Acta Biotheor 57:51–75, 2009) this paper suggests that typical natural kind concepts should be broached in the first place as grouping strategies that use a variety of semantic and epistemic tactics to apply group-bound information to tasks of explanation and understanding. (shrink)

What, precisely, are the ‘changing perspectives on reality’ in contemporary scientific thought? The topics of the lecture are the scope and the limits of science with emphasis on the physical foundations of biology. The laws of physics in general and the physics of molecules in particular form the basis for explaining the mechanism of reproduction, the generation of structure and form in the course of the development of the individual organism, the evolution of the diversity and complexity of organisms (...) by mutation and selection, and the control of behaviour by information processing in the nervous system. However, the application of scientific thought to its own foundations reveals some basic limitations in science: indeterminacy in quantum physics, the limits of decidability in mathematics, and, most likely, the limitations of an algorithmic theory of the brain-mind relationship. In all these cases, the application of scientific methods to their own presuppositions leads us to recognize their intrinsic limitations. These limits, in turn, are closely related to fundamental philosophical questions on the relationship between human knowledge and reality. Modern science is consistent with different, though of course not all, interpretations of man and the universe, including the religious interpretations of the universe as God’s creation and man as God’s (mentally creative) image. (shrink)

Universal laws which are shown not only in a material world, but also in spiritual, represent a crystal lattice of knowledge. This base lattice is a basis for more specific and various phenomena of our life. Various sciences study the different sides of our life. However, there are common laws for all sciences, shown both in physics, and in biology; both in chemistry, and in economy; both in psychology, and in genetics.

This biography is a short yet comprehensive overview of the life of Meghnad Saha, the mastermind behind the frequently used Saha equations and a strong contributor to the foundation of science in India. The author explores the lesser known details behind the man who played a major role in building scientific institutions in India, developed the breakthrough theory of thermal ionization, and whose fervor about India's rapid progress in science and technology, along with concern for uplifting his countrymen and (...) optimizing resources, led him to eventually enter politics and identify the mismanagement of many programs of national importance to Parliament. This book is free of most academic technicalities, so that the reader with general scientific knowledge can read and understand it easily. One interested only in Saha's contribution to physics can pick up just that part and read it. Conversely, the average reader may skip the technical chapters, and read the book without loss of continuity or generality to still get a coherent picture. This work touches on all aspects of Saha's multidimensional personality, which overflows in the pages of his periodical, Science and Culture,as well as his many speeches, debates and discussions in Parliament, all of which is appropriately conveyed in this book. (shrink)

Life is a compelling addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, in which eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'life'. The book forges connections between art, science and the humanities in a vibrant and thought-provoking collection that exposes both conventional and unconventional views on the meaning of life, the enigmatic boundaries between the living and the dead, and what may or may not follow afterwards. This collection (...) arises from the Darwin College Lecture Series of 2012 and includes contributions from eight distinguished scholars, all of whom are held in esteem not only for their research, but also for their ability to communicate their subject to popular audiences. (shrink)

Dominant forms of contemporary big-data based digital citizen science do not question the institutional divide between qualified experts and lay-persons. In our paper, we turn to the historical case of a large-scale amateur project on biogeographical birdwatching in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to show that networked amateur research can operate in a more autonomous mode. This mode depends on certain cultural values, the constitution of specific knowledge objects, and the design of self-governed infrastructures. We conclude by arguing (...) that the contemporary quest for autonomous citizen science is part of a broader discourse on the autonomy of scientific research in general. Just as the actors in our historical case positioned themselves against the elitism of gentlemen scientists, avant-garde groups of the twenty first century like biohackers and civic tech enthusiasts position themselves against the system of professional science—while “digital citizen science” remains to oscillate between claims for autonomy and realities of heteronomy, constantly reaffirming the classic lay-expert divide. (shrink)

Animal protectionists condemn speciesism for motivating the practices protectionists condemn. This misconceives both speciesism and the morality condoning those practices. Actually, animal protectionists can be and generally are speciesists. The specifically speciesist aspects of people’s beliefs are in principle compatible with all but the most radical protectionist proposals. Humanity’s speciesism is an inclusivist ideal encompassing all human beings, not an exclusionary ethos opposing moral concern for nonhumans. Anti-speciesist rhetoric is akin to anti-racist rhetoric that condemned racists for regarding people as (...) moral inferiors because of their skincolor. Actually, racists never thought that skin color is itself a reason for discounting someone’s interests, just as humans have never thought that only a human can be a proper object of moral concern. Some speciesists have great concern for animal suffering; some don’t. Animal protectionists have yet to show that a lack of concern is due to some false assumptions. (shrink)

The twelve exploratory essays collected in this volume examine forms and limits of human inquiry. Where does scientific inquiry significantly apply? Can it cover the vast canvas of human experience? Where do other forms of inquiry, such as philosophy and the arts, attain their salience? With the emergence of the cognitive sciences, these questions have become more intriguing. Can human inquiry investigate its own nature? They are examined by a philosopher whose academic work concerns the study of language and mind; (...) as such, the sceptical inquiry turns on itself. [The] essays are reflections of a fine scholar... Their range is wide, and they are at once rigorous and accessible. They... are wise in their understanding of the limits of science's reach into the domain of what he calls 'common life'. They will be a source of much pleasure and instruction and insight to the serious reader. Akeel Bilgrami, Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University With remarkable range and depth, these tantalizing essays explore scientific and cultural forms of inquiry,... and other topics that have inspired reflection on the world and ourselves for ages. At each point, there are instructive and challenging new perspectives and insights... a welcome gift to the inquiring mind. Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Mukherji's interests go well beyond narrow academic concerns. His writings reflect the breadth of his aspirations and should appeal to the general public as well as to the experts. Francois Recanati, Senior Fellow, CNRS, Paris. (shrink)

Aristotelian naturalism (AN) holds that the norms governing the human will are special instances of a broader type of normativity that is also found in other living things: natural goodness and natural defect. Both critics and defenders of AN have tended to focus on the thorny issues that are specific to human beings. But some philosophers claim that AN faces other difficulties, arguing that its broader conception of natural normativity is incompatible with current biological science. This paper has three aims. (...) First, we consider a distinctive and nuanced critique of AN’s general understanding of natural normativity put forward by Tim Lewens. Second, after giving a defense of AN, we explore and evaluate Lewens’ proposed alternative view—Kantian projectivism about life forms. We present a problem for Kantian projectivism and suggest reasons for thinking that AN is, after all, the superior position. Finally, we clarify and explain how AN’s claims about life forms and our knowledge of them, relate to empirical observation and to contemporary biological science. (shrink)

This book explores the concept of Life from a range of perspectives. Divided into three parts, it first examines the concept of Life from physics to biology. It then presents insights on the concept from the perspectives of philosophy, theology, and ethics. The book concludes with chapters on the hermeneutics of Life, and pays special attention to the Biosemiotics approach to the concept. The question 'What is Life?' has been deliberated by the greatest minds throughout human (...) history. Life as we know it is not a substance or fundamental property, but a complex process. It is not an easy task to develop an unequivocal approach towards Life combining scientific, semiotic, philosophical, theological, and ethical perspectives. In its combination of these perspectives, and its wide-ranging scope, this book opens up levels and identifies issues which can serve as intersections for meaningful interdisciplinary discussions of Life in its different aspects. The book includes the four plenary lectures and selected, revised and extended papers from workshops of the 14th European Conference on Science and Theology (ECST XIV) held in Tartu, Estonia, April 2012. (shrink)

L’impact social de la science et de la technologie se manifeste par une série de relations que le présent modèle va découper sur des boucles de rétroaction. L’activité techno-scientifique des humains crée des perturbations dans le réseau des relations interindividuelles et sociales ainsi que dans l’environnement physique ; en retour, les environnements sociaux et physiques ainsi modifiés exercent des déterminations qui conditionnent et affectent la poursuite des activités initiales. De plus, à toutes les étapes de ces boucles de rétroaction jouent (...) des relations, en boucles également, par lesquelles certaines actions individuelles produisent un effet social et des états de choses collectifs produisent des effets sur les comportements individuels.Science and technology affect social life through numerous relations and the present model undertakes to picture the main ones as specific portions of feedback cycles. By its very creativity in science and technology man induces changes in the network of interindividual and social relations, and drastically modifies the physical environment ; those social and physical changes, in turn, serve as conditions and causes for retroactive changes in the human scientific and technological behavior. Furthermore, the model introduces the concept of " amplification socioficatrice " in order to highlight those additional relations through which certain individual actions or reactions come to have a social effect and existence in the midst of the generalized loop relations obtaining between individual and society. (shrink)

Is one of the roles of theory in biology answering the question “What is life?” This is true of theory in many other fields of science. So why should not it be the case for biology? Yet efforts to identify unifying concepts and principles of life have been disappointing, leading some (pluralists) to conclude that life is not a natural kind. In this essay I argue that such judgments are premature. Life as we know it on (...) Earth today represents a single example and moreover there is positive evidence that it may be unrepresentative of life considered generally. Furthermore, as I discuss, the prototype for theorizing about life has traditionally been based on multicellular plants and animals. Yet biologists have discovered that the latter represent a rare, exotic, and fairly recent form of Earth life. By far the oldest, toughest, most extensive, and diverse form of life on our planet is unicellular, prokaryotic microbes, and there are reasons to suppose that this is almost certainly true elsewhere in the universe as well. If there are explanatorily and predictively powerful, biologically distinctive principles for life that can be gleaned from our insular example of life it is more likely that they will be found among the microbes. I discuss some provocative ways in which unicellular microbes differ from multicellular eukaryotes and argue that some of them just might provide us with key insights into the nature of life. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the vital meaning and strategic role that nutrition holds in Claude Bernard’s “biological philosophy”, in the sense Auguste Comte gave to this expression, _i.e._ the theoretical part of biology. I propose that Bernard’s nutritive perspective on life should be thought of as an “interfield” object, following Holmes’ category. Not only does nutrition bridge disciplines like physiology and organic chemistry, as well as levels of inquiry ranging from special physiology to the organism’s (...) total level, including the cell and protoplasm, but it also forms the genetic and structural foundation for Bernard’s two fundamental axioms in general physiology: the necessary complementarity of destruction and creation (1) and the uniformity of this physiological law across all life forms, be it plants or animals (2). Because Bernard’s nutritive theory is a major pivot for the re-ordering of life and its characterization, I argue that it must be located and understood in the scientific and metaphysical context of his time, of which he claims to be the heir and challenger—what I propose to characterize as the “epistemic space” of nutrition, on the background of which Bernard builds his own “logic”. I then set out this _logic of nutrition_, focusing on three interrelated bernardian theses: the establishment of the theory of indirect nutrition as the basis for the notion of “milieu intérieur”; the enduring conception of nutrition as a continuous generation; the emphasis on nutrition as a way of reshaping the form/matter relationship. (shrink)

An astonishing debut from the beloved NPR science correspondent: intimate essays about the intersection of science and everyday life. In her career as a science reporter, Nell Greenfieldboyce has reported from inside a space shuttle, the bottom of a coal mine, and the control room of a particle collider; she's presented news on the color of dinosaur eggs, ice worms that live on mountaintop glaciers, and signs of life on Venus. In this, her debut book, she delivers a (...) wholly original collection of powerful, emotionally raw, and unforgettable personal essays that probe the places where science touches our lives most intimately. Expertly weaving her own experiences of motherhood and marriage with an almost devotional attention to the natural world, Greenfieldboyce grapples with the weighty dualities of life: birth and death, constancy and impermanence, memory and doubt, love and aging. She looks for a connection to the universe by embarking on a search for the otherworldly glint of a micrometeorite in the dust, consults meteorologists and storm chasers on the eerie power of tornadoes to soothe her children's anxieties, and processes her adolescent oblivion through the startling discovery of black holes. Inspired throughout by Walt Whitman's invocation to the "transient and strange," she remains attuned to the wildest workings of our world, reflecting on the incredible leap of the humble flea or the echoing truth of a fetal heartbeat. A beautiful blend of explanatory science, original reporting, and personal experience, Transient and Strange captures the ache of ordinary life, offering resonant insights into both the world around us and the worlds within us. (shrink)

What, precisely, are the ‘changing perspectives on reality’ in contemporary scientific thought? The topics of the lecture are the scope and the limits of science with emphasis on the physical foundations of biology. The laws of physics in general and the physics of molecules in particular form the basis for explaining the mechanism of reproduction, the generation of structure and form in the course of the development of the individual organism, the evolution of the diversity and complexity of organisms (...) by mutation and selection, and the control of behaviour by information processing in the nervous system. However, the application of scientific thought to its own foundations reveals some basic limitations in science: indeterminacy in quantum physics, the limits of decidability in mathematics, and, most likely, the limitations of an algorithmic theory of the brain-mind relationship. In all these cases, the application of scientific methods to their own presuppositions leads us to recognize their intrinsic limitations. These limits, in turn, are closely related to fundamental philosophical questions on the relationship between human knowledge and reality. Modern science is consistent with different, though of course not all, interpretations of man and the universe, including the religious interpretations of the universe as God’s creation and man as God’s (mentally creative) image. (shrink)

ArgumentHere I analyze the anatomical thought of the French physician and naturalist Félix Vicq d'Azyr (1748–1794) in order to bring to light its importance in the development of comparative anatomy at the end of the eighteenth century. I argue that his work and career can be understood as an ambitious program for a radical reform of all biomedical sciences and a reorganization of this whole field around comparative anatomy, on the conceptual as well as the institutional level. In particular, he (...) recommended a close connection between anatomical and physiological studies, and a generalization of the comparative approach towards organs and functions in man and animals. This conception led him not only to reform the scope, the methods, the style of description, and the vocabulary in anatomy, but also to construct a new classification of living beings and to pursue a quest for laws of organization. This strategy was successful, since Vicq d'Azyr was able to promote his thought as well as his institutional position efficiently. The Revolution and his untimely death prevented him from achieving his program, but his attempt would serve as an example for younger scientists like Cuvier. (shrink)

This essay considers how scholarly approaches to the development of molecular biology have too often narrowed the historical aperture to genes, overlooking the ways in which other objects and processes contributed to the molecularization of life. From structural and dynamic studies of biomolecules to cellular membranes and organelles to metabolism and nutrition, new work by historians, philosophers, and STS scholars of the life sciences has revitalized older issues, such as the relationship of life to matter, or of (...) physicochemical inquiries to biology. This scholarship points to a novel molecular vista that opens up a pluralist view of molecularizations in the twentieth century and considers their relevance to current science. (shrink)

This article aimed to show the analytical potential of the life-world concept in the field of public health, which has not received much attention in the phenomenological literature. Specifically, based on phenomenologically grounded qualitative research, we aimed to show how the life-world concept, as worked out in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, can offer new insights on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Although there are many ways in which the life-world can motivate vaccine hesitancy, we have narrowed our focus to one (...) of them. Our aim is to argue that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is motivated by discrepancies and conflicts between the perceptual life-world and the scientific knowledge. If the scientific knowledge about the pandemic and the vaccine is not integrated in the life-world—which in its core is an embodied, perceptual world—and instead conflicts with it, people are more likely to become disinclined to get vaccinated rather than motivated to pursue vaccination. We conclude the discussion by outlining ideas on how the insights offered by our analysis could be potentially used in devising management and communication strategies in public health crises, such as a pandemic outbreak. (shrink)

Among the more important contributions to late twentieth-century Aristotle studies was Pierre Pellegrin’s La Classification des animaux chez Aristote: Statut de la biologie et unité de l’aristotélisme, which appeared in 1982. This revisionist reading of the Historia animalium not only directed scholarly attention to Aristotle’s hitherto little-studied biological works, but it also discouraged the attempt to understand these works solely in terms of developments in modern biology. The result was a flurry of activity on the part of scholars who attempted (...) to reread the corpus in light of the biology and the biology in light of the corpus. Thus was born a new development in Aristotle studies that redirected attention toward finding unity within the corpus through the integrating value of key concepts, descriptions, and methods of the biological works. One of the best examples of this development can be found in the work of James Lennox who, over the past twenty years, has written extensively on Aristotle’s philosophy of biology. (shrink)

ONE OBSERVATION FORCES ITSELF UPON US AT THE OUTSET. It is just as hard to think about the problem of life today as it was a hundred or a thousand years ago. If we observe the state of the sciences, we are led to the conviction that an important issue still remains open: to develop a philosophy of life and the organism that is adequate to the level of biological discoveries. Our most urgent need in the dialogue among (...) science, philosophy, and theology does not arise, as it has happened for centuries, from physics and cosmology but from the life sciences, notably biology and genetics. This is a necessity on which thinkers of different schools, such as Hans Jonas and John Polkinghorne, are agreed. Physics is no longer the guiding science, or the sole guiding science: its place has been taken by biology, and it is high time that philosophy and theology turned to address the issues it raises, without entrusting the realm of nature and life solely to the sciences. While there is still a rich crop of studies about the Big Bang theory and scientific cosmology in general, little has been written on philosophical biology, where the presence of the theologians has been exiguous. One may wonder why this should be so: perhaps because the Big Bang theory seems allusively to evoke the truth of the creation, though a more careful consideration of this scientific theory, rather controversial and highly speculative, shows that it has nothing to do with the theme of creation, as it deals only with the cosmic becoming: as such it is unable to formulate statements on what transcends becoming and on creation understood as the total position in being of all things. But one may also conjecture that this insufficient interest in biology stems from the difficult problem of teleology and, more generally, from the reductionist attitude frequently displayed by scientists when they pass beyond their own field of research and formulate hypotheses and theories with universal implications, as they are prompted by an unbridled enthusiasm which has proved ill-advised on other occasions in the past. (shrink)

The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) spent most of his life as a private scholar in Naples. His Estetica, which first appeared in 1902, has remained a seminal work not only for aesthetics but also for general linguistics. As the full title indicates, this is not a narrow work dealing with the theory of art and criticism. For Croce intended this to be the first part of his 'philosophy of the spirit' and he thus presents a systematic (...) class='Hi'>general theory intended to solve all philosophical problems. The work presents an account of the structure of the human mind and shows how art arises naturally from that structure, as well as introducing the influential notion of the organic unity of a work of art. As a result, art is shown to be integral to any life and an essential aspect of what it is to be human. (shrink)

In France, the newly designed life and earth sciences programs for the Première Générale (second year of lycée) now include a segment dedicated to ecosystem services. The primary objective is to transition from an anthropocentric approach to an ecocentric approach, integrating the notion of ecosystem services (ES). Our article conducts an epistemological examination of the ES concept, scrutinizing its definition, the array of examples and services, the human role in the environment, monetization, and connections to environmental ethics. The analysis (...) was conducted using a corpus comprising life and earth sciences curricula, textbooks, and online resources, which unveiled diverse examples and materials pertaining to ES. The ensuing discussion emphasizes the need to embrace uncertainty and complexity in order to transcend a positivist rationalization of the human-nature relationship. (shrink)

The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce spent most of his life as a private scholar in Naples. His Estetica, which first appeared in 1902, has remained a seminal work not only for aesthetics but also for general linguistics. As the full title indicates, this is not a narrow work dealing with the theory of art and criticism. For Croce intended this to be the first part of his 'philosophy of the spirit' and he thus presents a systematic general (...) theory intended to solve all philosophical problems. The work presents an account of the structure of the human mind and shows how art arises naturally from that structure, as well as introducing the influential notion of the organic unity of a work of art. As a result, art is shown to be integral to any life and an essential aspect of what it is to be human. (shrink)

This rare publication continues an exploratory journey in relational biology, a study of biology in terms of the organization of networked connections in living systems. It builds on the author's two earlier monographs which looked at the epistemology of life and the ontogeny of life. Here the emphasis is on the intangibility of life, that the real nature of living systems is conveyed not by their tangible material basis but by their intangible inherent processes. Relational biology is (...) the approach that hails 'function dictates structure'; it is mathematics decoded into biological realizations. Therefore, the work begins with a concise introduction to category theory, equiping the reader with the mathematical metalanguage of relation biology. The book is organized around three parts: Part I is a comprehensive study of the most important functor in relational biology, the power set functor. The author lays the set-theoretic foundations of the functorial connections in relational biology, exploring relations, mappings, and set-valued mappings. In Part II, Natural Law receives a new mathematical formulation founded on two axioms: 'Everything is a set.' and 'Every process is a set-valued mapping.' The reader sees how Metabolism-Repair networks, equipped with set-valued processors, expand their role from models of biological entities to generic models of all natural systems. Part III expounds the various shades of invertibility in general, and the inversion of encoding to decoding in particular. A plethora of mathematical and biological examples illustrate the category-theoretic concepts of equivalence and adjunction. This book's algebraic approach to biological models will appeal to researchers and graduate students in mathematics, biology, and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, seeks to explain mental activities such as reasoning, remembering, language use, and problem solving, and the explanations it advances commonly involve descriptions of the mechanisms responsible for these activities. Cognitive mechanisms are distinguished from the mechanisms invoked in other domains of biology by involving the processing of information. Many of the philosophical issues discussed in the context of cognitive science involve the nature of information processing. For philosophy of science, a central question is (...) what counts as a scientific explanation. But what is a mechanistic explanation and how does it work, how can philosophy of science use it as a solution for the problem of integration in cognitive science? By answering these questions and merging my answers with discussion of concepts of philosophy, normativity and generality, I will investigate the following claim. -/- I claim that philosophy by using strength concepts such as normativity, generality, and a mechanistic philosophy of explanations, can be a most important contributor to cognitive science. I also investigate how philosophy of science could be (can be) a bridge between psychology and neuroscience. We need a distinction between philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy in cognitive science; I am talking about the latter. -/- This claim is very important for the integration and the future of the interdisciplinary field known as cognitive science. -/- Philosophy as a true cognitive science -/- When the Cognitive Science Society was founded, in the late 1970s, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology were playing smaller roles. The three disciplines that formed the core group were artificial intelligence, psychology, and linguistics. The curious thing is that George Miller, a psychologist and an important founder of cognitive sciences in a hexagon diagram that he presented, put philosophy at the top of the diagram and neuroscience at the very bottom. There is enough agreement now that neuroscience is the most important contributor to cognitive science and there are fair connections between philosophy and neuroscience. In that diagram there was almost no connection between philosophy and neuroscience. -/- The developments and rise of cognitive science in the last half-century has been accompanied by considerable amount of philosophical activity. Perhaps no other area within analytic philosophy in the second half of that period has attracted more attention or produced more publications. (Bechtel and Graham, 1998. Rumelhart and Bly 1999. Bechtel, Mandik, Mundale 2001. Thagard, 2007. Bennett and Dennett et al, 2007. Bennett and Hacker, 2008. Andler, 2009. Frankish and Ramsey, 2012.) -/- Many philosophers of science offer conclusions that have a direct bearing on cognitive science and its practitioners can profit from closer engagement with the rest of cognitive science. For example, William Bechtel has discussed three projects, two in naturalistic philosophy of mind and one in naturalistic philosophy of science that have been pursued during the past 30 years, that he contends, can make theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science (Bechtel, 2009). Paul Thagard is another example of the mentioned emerging school of philosophers of science that define cognitive science as the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence (Thagard, 2006). Thagard by presenting some general but important philosophical questions such as, “What is the nature of the explanations and theories developed in cognitive science?”, and by providing answers to these central questions has showed how philosophy of science can help cognitive science by the advantage of its generality. Andrew Brook, however, believes that philosophical approaches have never had a settled place in cognitive science but he is listed in a group of the philosophers of science that they are contributing very closely the cognitive science (Brook, 2009). Daniel Dennett , as well as being a member the mentioned naturalistic philosophers of science, believes that there is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science. -/- What are mechanisms? Let us begin abstractly before considering an example. Mechanisms are collections of entities and activities organized together to do something (cf. Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Craver & Darden, 2001; Bechtel &Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996). These explanations are known as ‘mechanistic explanations’. By using and developing these mechanistic explanations of philosophy of science one can draw normative consequences for cognitive science. Paul Thagard (Thagard, 2006 and 2009), William Bechtel (Bechtel, 2008 and 2009), Andrew Brook (Brook, 2008) investigated and promoted using the ‘normativity’ in philosophy to show a better and crucial role for philosophy of science in an interdisciplinary known as cognitive science. Some philosophers have thought that, in order to pursue this normative function, philosophy must distance itself from empirical matters, but there are examples where the investigations of descriptive and normative issues go hand in hand. ( Thagard, 2009). -/- I will investigate how we can reduce a higher-level science such as psychology to neuroscience without the problems of reductionism but via mechanistic explanations. By problem I mean psychology does not lose its autonomy. -/- Conclusion -/- If cognitive science is all about understanding the human mind, or if cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence, since the whole life of philosophy was involving with the ways of knowing (epistemology) and conceptions of reality (metaphysics), also philosophy has considered the so-called mind-body problem ( identity theory, functionalism, and heuristic identity theory) , then philosophy could be the most deserved discipline to be a most contributor in cognitive science. I tried to discuss this by using the three advantages in philosophy, normativity, and generality and by introducing an emerging school of mechanistic (not mechanical) philosophers. One thing left, as cognitive science is a two-way street, philosophers need also to stop in a station of cognitive science and learn from the most important advances in brain and neuroscience. -/- . (shrink)